On November 29, 1963, one week after President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, President
Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a seven-member commission headed by Chief Justice
Earl Warren to conduct the federal government's investigation. Willens participated in early meetings inside the Justice Department concerning the law-enforcement response to the assassination. On December 5, he obtained one of the few copies of the FBI's preliminary report identifying
Lee Harvey Oswald as the likely assassin, and prepared a summary noting critical errors in the FBI's work. On December 17, Willens was assigned by
Nicholas Katzenbach to join the staff of the Warren Commission, reporting to the chief counsel,
Lee Rankin. Willens worked full-time on the commission's investigation until its report was issued on September 24, 1964. In the early days, his work focused on hiring lawyers and investigators; gathering and reviewing the records collected by the FBI and local police concerning the assassination; and preparing a rough outline of topics to be investigated and reported to the commission. Willens personally recruited several lawyers to join the staff, including
Arlen Specter. Rankin assigned a team of two lawyers to each of the major areas for investigation. Willens observed the first meeting of the newly hired staff January 13, 1964, and reported: "The lawyers were enthusiastic about their assignments, eager to get to work, and determined to ferret out whatever conspiracy might have led to the assassination and the murder of Oswald." Rankin assigned Willens to coordinate the work of the investigative teams and to assist their communication with other agencies. Willens worked closely with
Norman Redlich to monitor the progress of the teams and edit their interim reports. He also acted as a liaison between the Commission and the Justice Department, providing frequent informal updates to Miller and Katzenbach. Willens reports in his book that the commission's attorneys knew from the beginning of the investigation that the FBI had made serious errors in its initial report of the assassination. As the investigation continued, it became clear that the FBI was withholding important information about Oswald. Among other things, the FBI misled the Commission concerning its surveillance of Oswald in Dallas and New Orleans before the assassination, and failed to disclose Oswald's encounter with
FBI Agent James Hosty. Further, in an act of "inexcusable dishonesty," Hoover concealed from the commission his own decision to discipline Hosty and 16 other FBI agents for their failure to identify Oswald as a security risk and to inform the Secret Service before the president's arrival in Dallas. Willens notes that later investigations examined the hidden FBI evidence "and no facts have come to light that challenge our fundamental conclusions regarding the identity of the assassin and the absence of any conspiracy." From the outset of the investigation, the commission's lawyers believed that evidence of a conspiracy was most likely to be found in Mexico, where Oswald traveled in September 1963. In April 1964, Willens went to Mexico to meet with FBI and CIA agents and to speak to witnesses concerning Oswald's interactions with Soviet and Cuban personnel in
Mexico City. The agents indicated that Oswald's activities in Mexico were limited to efforts to obtain visas for travel through Cuba to the Soviet Union, and no evidence suggested that his visit was related to President Kennedy. In his book, Willens describes the genesis of the
single-bullet theory in informal meetings of the commission attorneys as they tried to determine the number of bullets fired at the presidential car and who was hit by each bullet. One attorney,
David Belin, focused his efforts on trying to prove that a second shooter had participated in the assassination, but detailed work by the FBI and analysis of the
Zapruder film suggested that all of the shots that hit President Kennedy and
Governor Connally originated from Oswald's position in the book depository. Based on that work, the staff lawyers decided to test the hypotheses that the first bullet to hit the president also caused Connally's wounds. Over the objection of the FBI and Secret Service, they organized a reenactment of the shooting in Dallas on May 24, 1964. The reenactment "produced convincing evidence" supporting the single-bullet theory, and that evidence was confirmed by expert review of the medical and ballistics evidence. However, because Gov. Connally testified that he was hit by the second bullet – not the first bullet that hit the president – the Commission decided not to take a position on the single-bullet theory. Instead, the Commission concluded that "there is no question" that all of the shots were fired from the sixth floor of the book depository. At Warren's request, Willens prepared a draft outline of the commission's report on March 31, 1964. Thereafter, Willens, Redlich and Rankin shared the work of reviewing and editing each section of the report. Willens writes that their goal was to present the facts "in a way that would persuade readers that our investigation was sufficiently thorough that the conclusion finding no credible evidence of a conspiracy was a fair and reasonable one." The Commission delivered the report to the president on September 24, 1964, and released it to the public on September 27. ==President Johnson’s Crime Commission==