Iran–Iraq War and Iraqi debt to Kuwait When the
Iran–Iraq War broke out,
Kuwait initially stayed neutral and also tried mediating between Iran and Iraq. In 1982, Kuwait along with other
Arab states of the Persian Gulf supported Iraq to curb the Iranian Revolutionary government. In 1982–1983, Kuwait began extending significant financial loans to Iraq. Kuwait's large-scale economic assistance to Iraq often triggered hostile Iranian actions against Kuwait. Iran repeatedly targeted Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1984 and fired weapons at Kuwaiti security personnel stationed on
Bubiyan island in 1988. During the Iran–Iraq War, Kuwait functioned as Iraq's major port once
Basra was shut down by the fighting. However, after the war ended, the friendly relations between the two neighbouring
Arab countries turned sour for several economic and diplomatic reasons that culminated in an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. By the time the Iran–Iraq War ended, Iraq was not in a financial position to repay the
US$14 billion it had borrowed from Kuwait to finance its war and requested that Kuwait forgive the debt. Iraq argued that the war had prevented a possible rise of Iranian hegemony over Kuwait. Kuwait's unwillingness to write off the debt strained the relationship between the two countries. In late 1989, several official meetings were held between Kuwaiti and Iraqi leaders, but did not result in an agreement.
Kuwaiti economic warfare and slant drilling In 1988, Iraq's Oil Minister,
Issam Al-Chalabi, strove for a reduction in the crude oil production quota of
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members to end the
1980s oil glut. Chalabi argued that higher oil prices would help Iraq to pay back its US$60 billion debt by increasing its revenues. Throughout much of the 1980s, Kuwait's oil production had already been considerably above its mandatory OPEC quota and this had prevented a rise of crude oil prices. According to former Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz, "every US$1 drop in the price of a barrel of oil caused a US$1 billion drop in Iraq's annual revenues, triggering an acute financial crisis in Baghdad". During the Iran–Iraq War, Iraqi oil drilling operations in Rumaila declined while Kuwait's operations increased. In 1989, Iraq accused Kuwait of using "advanced drilling techniques" to exploit oil from its share of the Rumaila field. Iraq estimated that US$2.4 billion worth of Iraqi oil was "stolen" by Kuwait and demanded compensation. According to oil workers in the area, Iraq's slant drilling claim was fabricated, as "oil flows easily from the Rumaila field without any need for these techniques."
Iraqi irredentism of the
Ottoman Empire in 1897. After the
Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, Kuwait was established as an autonomous
kaza, or district, of the Ottoman Empire and a
de facto protectorate of
Great Britain. Iraq had a history of
irredentist claims to
Kuwait. After gaining independence in 1932, the
Kingdom of Iraq immediately declared that the
Sheikhdom of Kuwait was rightfully a territory of Iraq, claiming it had been part of an Iraqi territory until being created by the British. The
Iraqi Republic under
Abd al-Karim Qasim also held irredentist claims to Kuwait. The
Saddam government also believed this and justified the invasion by claiming that Kuwait had always been an integral part of Iraq and only became an independent state due to the interference of the
British government. After signing the
Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, the British government planned to split Kuwait from the Ottoman territories into a separate
sheikhdom, but this agreement was never ratified. The Iraqi government also argued that the Kuwaiti Emir was a highly unpopular figure among the Kuwaiti populace. By overthrowing the Emir, Iraq claimed that it granted Kuwaitis greater economic and political freedom. Kuwait had been loosely under the authority of the Ottoman vilâyet of
Basra, and although its ruling dynasty, the
Al Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to Britain, it did not make any attempt to secede from the
Ottoman Empire. For this reason, its borders with the rest of Basra province were never clearly defined or mutually agreed upon.
Iraq–United States correspondence On 25 July 1990,
April Glaspie, the
U.S. ambassador to Iraq, asked the Iraqi high command to explain the military preparations in progress, including the massing of Iraqi troops near the border. In turn, Saddam attacked American policy with regard to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE): : Glaspie replied: Saddam and Glaspie later disputed what was said in this meeting. Saddam published a transcript but Glaspie disputed its accuracy before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1991. According to
Richard E. Rubenstein, when Glaspie was later asked by British journalists why she had said that, her response was "we didn't think he would go that far" meaning invade and annex the whole country. Although no follow-up question was asked, it can be inferred that what the U.S. government thought in July 1990 was that Saddam Hussein was only interested in pressuring Kuwait into
debt forgiveness and to lower oil production. In addition, only a few days before the invasion, the
Assistant Secretary of State,
John Hubert Kelly, told the U.S.
House of Representatives in a public hearing that the United States had no treaty obligations to defend Kuwait. When asked how the U.S. would react if Iraq crossed the border into Kuwait, Kelly answered that it "is a hypothetical or a contingency, the kind of which I can't get into. Suffice it to say we would be concerned, but I cannot get into the realm of 'what if' answers." However, Saddam's foreign minister
Tariq Aziz later told
PBS Frontline in 1996 that the Iraqi leadership was under "no illusion" about America's likely response to the Iraqi invasion: "She [Glaspie] didn't tell us anything strange. She didn't tell us in the sense that we concluded that the Americans will not retaliate. That was nonsense you see. It was nonsense to think that the Americans would not attack us." And in a second 2000 interview with the same television program, Aziz said:There were no mixed signals. We should not forget that the whole period before August 2 witnessed a negative American policy towards Iraq. So it would be quite foolish to think that, if we go to Kuwait, then America would like that. Because the American tendency ... was to untie Iraq. So how could we imagine that such a step was going to be appreciated by the Americans? It looks foolish, you see, this is fiction. About the meeting with April Glaspie—it was a routine meeting...She didn't say anything extraordinary beyond what any professional diplomat would say without previous instructions from his government...what she said were routine, classical comments on what the president was asking her to convey to President Bush. He wanted her to carry a message to George Bush—not to receive a message through her from Washington. ==Invasion==