(CBI) regulates Section 110 SPVs. When Irish
public scandals concerning the Section 110 SPV emerged in 2016–2017, the CBI upgraded the little-used L–QIAIF, Per earlier (), while Irish banks used Section 110 SPVs to raise global capital for Irish loan books, they never used Section 110 SPVs to avoid Irish taxes on their Irish activities (the Irish borrower paid interest to the Irish bank, and not into a Section 110 SPV). The Irish financial media noted in 2016 that US
distressed debt funds (known by the pejorative term–
vulture funds) were filing Irish company
CRO accounts with large profits on their Irish investments (made from 2012 onwards), but no Irish tax payments. They could also see that the equity of these companies was "owned" by Irish-registered charities (children's charities in cases), some of which were operated by IFSC-based law firms. The
CRO filings showed these
vulture funds were using
orphaned Section 110 SPVs, structured by IFSC–based law firms (e.g.
Matheson, A&L Goodbody and Dillon Eustace and Mayson Hayes Curran), who use Section 110 SPVs in
securitisation work, to export untaxed income and capital gains earned on domestic Irish assets to offshore locations (via the PPN interest payments), such as the Cayman Islands. The Irish media uncovered that the
National Asset Management Agency, presented to
distressed debt funds in London on how to use Section 110 SPVs (and QIAIFs) to avoid Irish taxes on their Irish investments. Public statements, Guideline Bulletins, and
FOI Data, from the
Revenue Commissioners, implied that the Revenue Commissioners (a) knew these funds were using Section 110 SPVs and CG50 land certificates) to facilitate the tax avoidance.
Stephen Donnelly, TD, called for a Dáil investigation and produced calculations based on the €80 billion of published loan balances sold by the
National Asset Management Agency (or "NAMA") to the US funds for circa €40 billion. Donnelly estimated that the loss of Irish taxes over the next decade from these assets being taken out of the Irish tax system (i.e.
base erosion and profit shifting effects), could reach €20 billion (or €2 billion per annum). The
Irish Times calculated the total economic contribution of Section 110 SPVs since their creation, would be vastly exceeded by these tax losses. The affair escalated into a major public scandal during 2016, and was covered as such in the international media, and in several Irish
RTÉ Prime Time Investigates programs. The Irish Government claimed that the U.S. funds had discovered unknown but legitimate
loopholes, which they moved to close in the 2016 Finance Act. The Government budgeted €50 million in total additional taxes from the closure of these
loopholes, however
NAMA, a small investor in Section 110 SPVs, disclosed an immediate €158 million tax charge due to the Act. The slowness of the Government's response in closing these "perceived"
loopholes, and the extensive list of exemptions (including a 5-year CGT exemption), and excluded parties to the Act, remains a source of dispute.
Irish Revenue attempted no prosecution for the acknowledged tax-avoidance. Funds could leave Section 110 SPVs in place and continue to earn tax-free gains, as long as they did not foreclose. If they foreclosed, they had a period in which to sell the assets, and hence the 5–year CGT exemption. They could also transfer their Section 110 assets into a more confidential QIAIF (and later, an LQIAIF), also using the 5–year CGT exemption to avoid incurring taxes while restructuring. The limited response of the government led some Irish commentators to wonder if the
vulture funds had their support (i.e. there was no
loophole just a "blind eye"). In June 2018, the Central Bank of Ireland reported that €55 billion in Irish assets, owned by U.S. distressed debt funds, equivalent to 25% of Irish
GNI*, moved out of Section 110 SPVs. This figure exceeded
Stephen Donnelly's 2016 estimate of €40 billion in Irish distressed asset values hiding in Section 110 SPVs (representing €80 billion in loan balances). The
Central Bank of Ireland had begun a process to upgrade the tax-free
L–QIAIF regime in November 2016 (just after Minister Noonan closed the "perceived" Section 110 loopholes). In April 2019, Irish technology entrepreneur
Paddy Cosgrave launched a Facebook campaign to highlight abuses of Section 110 SPVs, as well as QIAIFs and L-QIAIFs, stating: "The L-QIAIF runs the risk of being a
weapon of mass destruction". Further research by Stewart and Doyle shows Russian firms funneled €100bn into Irish Section 110 SPVs since 2007. Some of these Russian firms appeared unsuitable from a number of perspectives (i.e. criminal or sanctioned activities). Many SPVs resembled a
brass plate type set up - a situation the Irish Government has stated that it is adverse to. Of particular note in this research was: Stewart and Doyle's academic papers on Irish Section 110 SPVs highlight the combination of an anonymous (via
orphaning), and tax-free (via the Profit Participation Notes), OECD–whitelisted wrapper, in an effectively unregulated environment, which has coincided with Ireland's position as the world's 4th largest
Shadow Banking OFC. The ex-Deputy Governor of the
Central Bank of Ireland said the risks of Section 110 SPV abuse are not appreciated by the Irish Government. The IMF noted the same
brass plate type regulation of Irish Section 110 SPVs. This was picked up by
Oxfam who has listed Ireland as a top
corporate tax haven. It has coincided with G20 economy, Brazil, blacklisting
Ireland as a tax haven. A 2017 seminal academic paper published in
Nature on global
offshore financial centres (OFCs) ("Uncovering Offshore Financial Centers: Conduits and Sinks in the Global Corporate Ownership Network") lists Ireland as one of five key global
Conduit OFCs (with the Netherlands, UK, Singapore and Switzerland). The five Conduit-OFCs are the links to 24
Sink OFCs, which comprise the key offshore centres (i.e. the Cayman Islands). The Conduit-OFCs are the hubs which provide the regulatory reputation and the legal and taxation wappers (i.e. Section 110 SPVs) for money to get into, and out of, the Sink OFCs. ==See also==