After nine years with the Court of Appeals, Reyes was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1954 by
President Ramon Magsaysay. At 52, he was among the youngest justices appointed to the Court. However, Reyes would never get to serve as Chief Justice. This was in part because his close friend
Roberto Concepcion, several months his junior, was appointed to the Court a few months before Reyes. Concepcion was named Chief Justice in 1966. During his tenure on the Court, Reyes and
Claro M. Recto were unsuccessfully nominated to the
International Court of Justice. In his 18 years on the Court, Reyes grew in prominence unlike few other Supreme Court magistrates before and since. Often, especially on matters relating to his specialty, civil law, his opinions proved to be the final word. In some quarters, he was called "the Court", in tribute to the considerable influence he wielded over his colleagues. Upon his retirement in 1972, one of his colleagues, the future Chief Justice
Felix Makasiar, said of Reyes that "
[n]o jurist within living memory has commanded during the last quarter of a century, the deep respect and admiration of the bench and bar, of dilettantes and scholars, of professors and students."
Jurisprudence As expected, Reyes penned many leading decisions in civil law that remain widely studied today, including
Tenchavez v. Escaño,
122 Phil. 765 (1966), on the recognition of foreign divorces in the Philippines;
Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring,
128 Phil. 313 (1967), which defined
force majeure; and
Medina v. Makabali,
137 Phil. 329 (1969), affirming the
best interest of the child as the paramount rule in custody cases. His dissenting opinion in
Exconde v. Capuno,
101 Phil. 843 (1957), on the
tort liability of schools for damages caused by their students, was eventually adopted by the Court in
Amadora v. Court of Appeals,
160 SCRA 315 (1988). Reyes weaved his strong nationalist views to an interpretation of the 1935
Constitution that emphasized its nationalistic thrust. He notably dissented in
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration,
41 SCRA 292 (1971), where the Court had relaxed the requisites for a foreigner to acquire Filipino citizenship through marriage. Reyes opined that unlike perhaps in the
United States, the Philippine constitution disfavored the absorption of immigrants and thus the citizenship laws should be interpreted with that view in mind. In similar fashion was Reyes's most famous opinion, among his last, in
Republic v. Quasha,
46 SCRA 160 (1972). The Court, through Reyes, insisted on a restrictive interpretation of the expiring Parity Amendments occasioned by the
Bell Trade Act, towards the end of prohibiting the ownership by foreigners of residential lands. At the end of his opinion, he criticized the earlier enactment of the Parity Amendments to the Constitution, saying:
That Filipinos should be placed under the so-called Parity in a more disadvantageous position than United States citizens in the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of the public lands, forests, mines, oils and other natural resources of their own country is certainly rank injustice and inequity that warrants a most strict interpretation of the "Parity Amendment", in order that the dishonorable inferiority in which Filipinos find themselves at present in the land of their ancestors should not be prolonged more than is absolutely necessary. ==IBP presidency and later activism==