Maimonides refers repeatedly to the
Mutakallimūn (Kalam philosophers) in
The Guide for the Perplexed. Some examples of his characterization of Kalamic thought can be found at the end of Book I (Chapters 73–76). Maimonides continues in that section to provide a history of Kalamic thought, its sources and subsequent development, and then proceeds to condemn a certain laxity of thought to be found in this philosophical school. In particular, Maimonides takes strong issue with the Kalamic proof of God's existence and unity from the Creation of the World in time. While Maimonides himself
does regard the world as having been created
ex nihilo (rather than being eternally existing, as
Aristotle would have it), Maimonides also considers this proposition as being far from obvious, and in all likelihood not susceptible to proof. He thus regards the Kalamic approach as starting from a position of
convenience rather than from an irrefutable premise, and their methodology as being entirely tainted by their eagerness to produce certain results which support their prior beliefs. Additionally he considers their premises to "run counter to the nature of existence that is perceived." He writes that "every one of their premises, with few exceptions, is contradicted by what is perceived of the nature of that which exists, so that doubts come up with regard to them." However, in many cases the Kalamists were indeed more prescient than Maimonides himself in their beliefs regarding the discrete nature of matter, existence of vacuum, and other physical characteristics of the natural world.
Principles of Kalam according to Maimonides In Book I Chapter 73, Maimonides presents the 12 premises of the Mutakallimūn, and disputes most of them. The premises are, in brief, as follows: • Existence of atoms: The world is composed of small particles which are not divisible, and which have no identifying essential properties (only accidents). • Existence of vacuum: There exist certain spaces which are devoid of all substance and material. • Time is discrete: Time is made up of fundamental
instants which are not themselves subject to further division. • Every body is subject to accidents: Any body must have either an accident (non-essential feature) or its opposite. A body cannot be without accidents. • These accidents exist in the atom. • An atom has one-instant duration: An atom does not persist (its accidents do not persist) more than one moment of time. God must repeatedly create these accidents at each time instant, or they permanently go out of existence. • Accidents in bodies also do not persist and must be recreated. This and the previous principle constitute a denial of
causality. • Only substance and accident exist: Bodies differ only in regard to their accidents. • Accidents subsist in a common substratum: An accident cannot subsist in another accident. • Any state of affairs which can be imagined is admissible in intellectual argument. • All kinds of infinity are impossible. • The senses may be in error: The senses should not be trusted in matters of demonstration. Not all of these principles were elements of the Jewish Kalam as practiced by particular thinkers. For example,
atomism was a principle embraced by earlier Karaite Jews but not by the Geonim or later Karaites.
Harry Austryn Wolfson, in his study on the Jewish Kalam, considers it doubtful whether any Jewish thinkers ever embraced the denial of causality.
Arguments of Kalam according to Maimonides In Book I Chapter 74, Maimonides reproduces the seven methods by which the Mutakallimūn demonstrate that the world is created in time. In Chapter 75, Maimonides reproduces the five methods by which the Mutakallimūn demonstrate the unity of God. In Chapter 76, Maimonides reproduces the three methods by which the Mutakallimūn demonstrate the incorporeality of God. Needless to say, Maimonides finds most of these methods to be philosophically inadequate and naïve. ==Jewish Kalam personalities==