Rise to senior command Wilton was still only a substantive captain at the end of hostilities, but was considered by the Military Board to be among those "promising officers who have forced their way to the top during the war" and hence to deserve retention of their wartime rank. He became Deputy Director of Military Operations and Plans at Army Headquarters (AHQ), Melbourne, in March 1946 and was promoted to substantive lieutenant-colonel on 30 September. Wilton took charge of Military Operations and Plans the following year. and appointed a member of the
Bridgeford Mission, which advised the Australian government on the state of the
Malayan Emergency. On a visit to Singapore in February–March 1951 as part of a joint planning team, he urged his British counterparts to maintain their presence in
Malaya as the basis of a combined force, without which Australia would be reluctant to commit any troops for the region's security. Wilton relinquished his post at AHQ in November 1951, and attended the
Imperial Defence College in London during 1952. (second left) and
Henry Wells (second right), in 1953|alt=Full-length portrait of five men in military uniforms The 28th was described in the
official history of Australia's involvement in the Korean War as "the most nationally diverse"
brigade in the
1st Commonwealth Division, consisting of Australian, British, Indian and New Zealand units, yet also "an outstandingly well-knit formation". After operating on the eastern side of the
Jamestown Line from April, the 28th was transferred westward to relieve the
29th Brigade at the Hook, the Commonwealth Division's most vulnerable position, on 9–10 July. At 6:15pm on 23 July, Wilton informed his
battalion chiefs that an
armistice was ready to be signed, and to keep patrols to the minimum level necessary for the line's security. The brigade's
last action took place over the next three days, when it used artillery, mortar, machine-gun and rifle fire to repulse a heavy assault by Chinese troops, inflicting as many as 3,000 casualties. Wilton later recalled the "terrible and gruesome sight" of no-man's land "literally carpeted with dead bodies". Having succeeded in maintaining his command's discipline and morale during a potentially problematic time at the end of the conflict and the beginning of peace, he handed over the 28th to Brigadier
Ian Murdoch on 19 February 1954. For his service in Korea, Wilton was raised to
Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) in the
Queen's Birthday Honours on 10 June 1954. He was also awarded the US
Legion of Merit for his "outstanding leadership and initiative"; the decoration was
gazetted on 1 May 1956. After returning to Australia, Wilton was appointed Brigadier in Charge of Administration at
Headquarters Eastern Command, his first administrative post. In November 1955 he was assigned to the General Staff at AHQ, where he was responsible for intelligence, operations and plans, and took part in Australian preparations for
SEATO exercises. He was promoted to
major general on 24 March 1957, and became Commandant of the Royal Military College, Duntroon. Although not strongly religious, Wilton considered himself responsible for the spiritual and moral development of younger cadets; he made a point of attending church parade regularly, and in 1959 personally launched an appeal for public funds to build the college's Anzac Memorial Chapel, which would open in 1966. His chief goal, though, was academic: concerned that graduates were at risk of falling behind their increasingly tertiary-qualified peers in industry and public service, he worked assiduously to make the college a degree-granting institution; this was realised in 1967. From June 1960 through 1962, Wilton was Chief of the Military Planning Office at SEATO Headquarters,
Bangkok. He believed Thailand to be strategically vital, declaring "if you want to hold Southeast Asia, you need to hold Thailand". His position allowed him to closely observe the
deteriorating situation in Laos, which threatened to spill over into Thailand, and the Western Powers' growing focus on
South Vietnam. He was appointed a
Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB) in the 1962 Queen's Birthday Honours, in particular for his "conspicuous devotion to duty and his singleness of purpose" as Commandant of Duntroon. On 21 January 1963, Wilton was promoted
lieutenant general and became
Chief of the General Staff (CGS), succeeding Lieutenant General
Sir Reginald Pollard. He was appointed a
Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (KBE) in the
1964 New Year Honours.
Chief of the General Staff Following the lead of the US Army, in 1960 the Australian Army had replaced its former "triangular" divisional structure of three infantry battalions under a brigade headquarters, with a "
pentropic" organisation consisting of five larger battalions without a brigade layer between division and battalion headquarters. This had the effect of reducing the total number of Australian battalions, while increasing their individual strength. Wilton was unhappy with the pentropic structure, reasoning that the number of battalions, rather than their relative strength, was the overriding factor when considering potential overseas deployments. The US had in any event abandoned the system in June 1961. In October 1964, Wilton commissioned a review that ultimately recommended a return to the triangular formation. In the meantime, as a response to the
Indonesia–Malaysia Konfrontasi, the Australian government reintroduced conscription, which Wilton fought until convinced that the government was not going to improve pay and conditions sufficiently to attract by any other means the recruits needed to meet overseas commitments. Wilton was keen to mitigate any prejudices the national servicemen might have against the regular soldiery, and vice versa; when he found a memo from an Army committee asserting that "it must be recognised that the NS man was likely to be a reluctant soldier", he wrote on it "This assumption not justified". In February–March 1965, following a request from the Malaysian government, Australia despatched 1 Squadron,
Special Air Service Regiment, and
3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, to
Borneo—a commitment Wilton felt able to recommend as a result of the recent decisions to increase the Army's personnel and battalion numbers. By mid-1964, Australia had already sent a
small team of military advisors, as well as a
flight of newly acquired
DHC-4 Caribou transports, to aid the South Vietnamese government in its fight against the
Viet Cong. The
1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, was deployed in May 1965. It was attached to a
US Army brigade, and Wilton was responsible for setting its operational parameters. In August, he recommended to his opposite number in the RAAF, Air Marshal
Alister Murdoch, the despatch of two
UH-1 Iroquois helicopters to Vietnam. Wilton believed that both services would benefit from gaining familiarisation with air/ground operations in the region before any large-scale commitment of Australian forces. He was exasperated when Murdoch rejected the idea on resourcing grounds, despite the fact that two-thirds of the RAAF's UH-1 complement had been purchased for the express purpose of army cooperation. According to the official history of the post-war Air Force, when the Federal government deployed
No. 9 Squadron and its UH-1s to Vietnam less than a year later, the unit was under-prepared for combat operations. Wilton supported the RAAF's request that the deputy commander of Australian Forces Vietnam be an
air officer, despite the misgivings of some senior Army personnel and the fact that an appointment of this level was not commensurate with the services' relative commitments to the conflict. In what the
official history of Australia in the Vietnam War described as a "pragmatic and far-sighted approach", Wilton expressed his hope that such an arrangement would give the Air Force a closer understanding of land/air cooperation, and avoid "increasing differences of views about strategic and tactical concepts with the Australian Armed Forces". Following the Federal government's decision in March 1966 to despatch a
task force of two battalions to Vietnam, Wilton negotiated with US and South Vietnamese commanders a self-contained area of operations for the Australians, in
Phuoc Tuy Province, where they could function with a reasonable degree of independence. He also approved
Nui Dat, in the centre of the province forward of the major population areas, as the task force's main base, despite its distance from support units in
Vung Tau and the extra effort required to defend it. Wilton rejected a mobile role for the Australians that would have placed them under the control of a US division because, he believed, "their operations became a bit of a meat grinder" with "tremendous casualties". On 19 May 1966, he took over from Air Chief Marshal
Sir Frederick Scherger as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC), a position foreshadowing that of the modern
Chief of the Defence Force. He was succeeded as CGS by Lieutenant General Daly.
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee Vietnam Wilton accepted the
domino theory and never wavered in his commitment to Vietnam, but as early as mid-1967 he doubted that the war could be won unless the US was prepared to go all out and invade the
North. Cautious about expanding Australia's involvement, he advocated deploying a
Centurion tank squadron rather than a third infantry battalion when calls came to increase the strength of the task force in Vietnam, but in the end the Federal government announced both commitments in October 1967. Wilton also advised the government to reject any requests from the US command in Vietnam to rotate the Australian task force out of Phuoc Tuy and display its capabilities in a wider operational arena, reasoning that it was more important for the troops to remain in the countryside they knew and continue to build relations with the local people. Conflict continued to simmer between the Army and the RAAF regarding air support, and Wilton oversaw discussions between Daly and Murdoch that secured a separate Army air organisation, leading to the formation of the
Australian Army Aviation Corps in July 1968. On 22 August, the Federal government announced that Wilton would be promoted to
general, effective 1 September, in recognition of his "outstanding contribution to the Commonwealth in his present appointment". He was the first Australian officer to attain the rank since Blamey, twenty-seven years before. at Vung Tau, South Vietnam, in 1968|alt=Tanks and military personnel US troop reductions in 1969 under President
Richard Nixon's
Vietnamization policy led to increasing demands for similar withdrawals of Australian troops. Wilton, Daly and other senior officers argued that the "balanced" nature of the Australian task force would be damaged by a piecemeal withdrawal and that the only valid form of reduction would be "one out, all out"; the government chose a phased withdrawal, pulling out one battalion in October 1970 and the other two in October and December 1971. The divisive nature of the war caused conflict within Wilton's own family; all his children actively opposed it, and in September 1969 his son Robert publicly burnt his draft deferment notice outside
Parliament House, Canberra, having earlier called upon students at the
Australian National University not to register for national service.
The Canberra Times ran an article on the Parliament House incident, complete with a photograph of Robert burning his notice. As Australia's senior soldier, Wilton refused to comment on the situation; Robert reported that he and his father respected one another's viewpoints, and relations within the family remained amicable. One of the most controversial aspects of Australia's conduct of the Vietnam War had been the employment of a barrier minefield around Phuoc Tuy from 1967 to 1969. Wilton maintained that the minefield was already under construction when he first learned of it, and that he considered the decision within the purview of the commander on the ground, Brigadier
Stuart Graham. When confronted with the increasing casualties among Australian troops from mines evidently lifted from the area by the Viet Cong, he pointed out that the South Vietnamese, who had been expected to patrol the minefield, were not playing their part. Wilton further believed that the barrier minefield was an innovative solution to the problems facing the task force and that the commander's decision to implement it was "better than sitting on his backside and not trying anything". He rejected suggestions by critics that the minefield was "the biggest blunder" Australia made in Vietnam, declaring that this was "like being wise after the event".
Joint defence aspirations (left) and Major General
Kenneth MacKay (centre) at Vung Tau Airfield, South Vietnam, in 1966|alt=Informal portrait of three men in military uniforms Wilton's position as CCOSC had no statutory authority over the heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force, nor a direct line of command to Australian Forces Vietnam. David Horner noted that in an emergency, Wilton "had to issue directives and then seek retrospective endorsement of them by either the minister or the Chiefs of Staff Committee." According to historian
Eric Andrews, Wilton "chaffed over his lack of command over the services and the need for organisational reform". While CGS, he had joined Scherger in calling for a single
Australian Defence Force organisation with one
Minister of Defence, in contrast to the existing arrangement where each service operated with virtual autonomy, supported by its own minister and department. In July 1967, he became a member of the Tertiary Education (Services' Cadet Colleges) Committee to plan a tri-service military academy, which was eventually opened as the
Australian Defence Force Academy in 1986. He was also able to push through a plan to establish, in 1970, the
Joint Intelligence Organisation to replace the former Joint Intelligence Bureau and three single-service intelligence groups. In 1967, and again in 1970, Wilton recommended the creation of a single Defence Board of Administration, consisting of the Defence Minister, the Defence Secretary, CCOSC, and the three service chiefs, to take over the functions of the Air, Military, and Naval Boards, along with those of their separate ministers. Though nothing came of this at the time, The following year, the single-service ministries were abolished in favour of an all-encompassing
Department of Defence; by 1984, the CCOSC position had evolved to become the Chief of the Defence Force, directly commanding all three armed services through their respective chiefs. ==Later life==