At the time of the breakout and after it, the 1st Panzer Army emerged from the encirclement with greatly reduced combat power, in terms of both personnel and materiel, with all of its divisions afterwards being considered fit for limited defensive operations only or were no longer operational, as reported by army’s management department (
Führungsabteilung), as well as subordinated corps’ and divisions. At 14:50 on 5 April, one day before establishing first tenuous contact with the forward elements of Hausser’s II SS Panzer Corps that arrived from France, the 1st Panzer Army High Command reported the following condition of its divisions: The breakdown of the material and personnel condition of the 1st Panzer Army after the breakout is given below.
Material condition The material losses were extremely high, with most of the armoured vehicles, motor vehicles, artillery and anti-tank guns, as well as various equipment of the rear services, being lost, mainly through abandonment in the spring mud. After the breakout, the formations of the army retained only a small number of their vehicles, weaponry and equipment. This meant that the 1st Panzer Army would continue to be hamstrung by major material deficiencies, especially in motor vehicles, all the way to early June 1944. There were numerous reasons for such losses. As the Red Army penetrated deep into the rear areas of the 1st Panzer Army, the threat of complete encirclement loomed for the German forces. For this reason, the Germans were forced to conduct hurried retreats, which often turned into chaotic flight, in order to prevent the consolidation of the Soviet encirclement ring. However, the combination of the deep spring mud, which slowed the movements to a crawl, chronic shortages of prime movers, lack of spare parts, fuel shortages, as well as limited rail net, had made it impossible to evacuate large number of heavy weaponry, vehicles and non-operational equipment in a timely manner. Furthermore, cannibalizing the damaged tanks to repair others was frequent, while draining of fuel the vehicles that did not have all-wheel drive, necessary to overcome the mud, was typical. In addition to the aerial re-supply, this became one of the means of saving fuel during the breakthrough. The vehicles deemed non-essential were then usually forced off the road and set ablaze, typified by the case of the 1st Panzer Division at the
Zbruch river. Regarding the destruction of vehicles deemed not essential, the commander of the 1st Panzer Army General Hube gave the following order on 24 March 1944, when the army was cut off: The selection of the vehicles to be destroyed was controlled strictly from above, which tried not to allow this process to be given a free hand. The procedure to destroy selective vehicles was typified by the case of the 16th Panzer Division, which reported the following course of action: In addition, the deep thrust of the Red Army had also cut off the 1st Panzer Army in a large operational area, in which there were numerous rear-service workshops, where hundreds of non-operational German armoured vehicles were in various stages of repair, especially after the attempt to relieve the
Korsun Pocket the previous month. is in the foreground,
StuG III in the background.The result of all this was that enormous number of vehicles, weaponry and equipment of all sorts was lost, mainly through abandonment in the mud. Between 12–19 April 1944, an investigation was made by a group of motor vehicle officers of the
Generalquartiermeister branch, subordinated to the German Army General Staff (
Generalstab des Heeres), about the total irrecoverable material losses of the 1st Panzer Army units in the Kamenets-Podolsky ‘cauldron’ (
Kessel), in cooperation with the
Oberquartiermeister department of the 1st Panzer Army. This included the total irrecoverable losses (called
Totalausfälle) of motor vehicles, armoured vehicles, as well as various specialized repair vehicles. This investigation would not be complete until 25 April 1944. The units of the 1st Panzer Army under investigation included the
1st,
6th,
7th,
16th,
17th and
19th Panzer Divisions,
20th Panzergrenadier Division,
1st,
75th,
82nd,
96th,
168th,
208th,
291st and
371st Infantry Divisions,
101st Jäger Division, 300th and 301st StuG Brigades, 88th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion, as well as various small General Headquarters (GHQ) combat units of the III, XXIV, XXXXVI Panzer Corps’ and LIX Army Corps. The list is largely complete, but there are several units that are missing from it. Most notably, the
1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH is not included in this list. It was encircled as part of the 1st Panzer Army. On 27 March 1944, the worn-out LSSAH received orders to move to the
OB West area in Belgium for rebuilding, when the situation would allow it. However, since it was trapped with the 1st Panzer Army in the East at the time, the movement was delayed until mid-April 1944- the withdrawal of the remaining personnel and equipment of combat-ineffective LSSAH to the Beverloo training area in Belgium would not be complete until 19 April 1944. For this reason, as well as due to mixing of divisions (attaching parts of it to another), it was not possible to keep exact track of LSSAH’s numbers, even though its material losses were also very high, as it arrived to Belgium with just a fraction of the equipment that it was supposed to have. The data on LSSAH’s material situation is given separately. The table below gives the losses of motor vehicles of all types, based on classifications, sustained by all of the units listed above, except for the 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH, which is listed separately. As already mentioned, the losses of the 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH are not given. Nonetheless, a comparison of its motor vehicle situation on 1 March 1944 (before the start of the Soviet offensive) and on 1 May 1944, when the refitting in Belgium was underway, provides a good indication of the scale of losses sustained by LSSAH. On 1 May 1944, when LSSAH was already in Belgium and the refitting was underway, the number of motor vehicles was just a fraction of what it was supposed to have. The actual percentage of losses most likely was higher, since some workshops, where various motor vehicles of LSSAH were in repair, found themselves outside the pocket when the 1st Panzer Army was cut off. Already on 29 March 1944, it was ordered to transport those vehicles by rail to Belgium, hence some non-operational vehicles were evacuated. Whatever the precise number, it is clear that LSSAH sustained very heavy motor vehicle losses and by May 1944 it had just a fraction of vehicles that it was supposed to have, based on its 'authorized strength' (
Sollstärke). The destruction of a large number of vehicles, which ran out of fuel, had a depressing effect on the soldiers.
SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Weidinger, one of the commanders in the regimental-sized SS-Kampfgruppe Das Reich in the pocket, described how vehicles of the unit were blown up on the night of 31 March- 1 April 1944, before crossing the Smotrich river: The huge metal graveyards on both sides of the road created major difficulties in movement. The war diary (
Kriegstagebuch) of the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 1 of the 1st Panzer Division, entry for 30 March 1944 at 20.30, noted: On 2–3 April 1944, the
III Panzer Corps, with the
17th Panzer Division as a spearhead, encountered major logistical difficulties while crossing the bridge across the Zhvanets river, due to harsh weather, major traffic jams and preference of the 17th Panzer Division to preserve its own vehicles at the expense of other corps units. This led to another huge metal graveyard of motor vehicles before the bridge crossing. The war diary of the Quartermaster Department of the III Panzer Corps, entry for 3 April 1944 at 13.50, noted: The subsequent activity report (
Tätigkeitsbericht), prepared by the Quartermaster Department of the III Panzer Corps, added further details regarding the difficulties of crossing the bridge due to sharply deteriorating weather, which led to the loss of the greater part of the corps' motor vehicles before the bridge crossing: To see how the 24 March 1944 order, to blow up any vehicles deemed not vital in order to preserve fuel, was implemented, General Hube personally made several inspections of various units of the III Panzer Corps on 1 April 1944. He noted that the order was still not strictly implemented. At the start of 2 April 1944, the HQ of the III Panzer Corps received the following message from Hube: In addition to motor vehicle losses, the 1st Panzer Army lost a considerable number of various repair, recovery and other specialized vehicles of the maintenance services. This had a major detrimental effect on subsequent attempts to restore the combat effectiveness of army's mobile formations, the operational strength of their vehicles and weapons. With regards to this, already on 12 April 1944, two days after the breakout was fully complete but the overall scale of material losses was not yet clear, the command of the 1st Panzer Army came to general conclusions, as noted in its war diary: As a result of the 12–19 April 1944 investigation, the following number of specialized vehicles and various wheeled equipment of maintenance services was reported as permanently lost (
Totalausfälle). At the time of the breakout on 6 April 1944, the command of the 1st Panzer Division submitted a report to the LIX Army Corps about the condition of the division. The report noted that due to the heavy losses in motor vehicles, the loss of nearly all of the maintenance and repair facilities, their equipment, the divisional supply and support units became inoperable: Similarly, on 6 April 1944, the 7th Panzer Division submitted its condition report to the command of the LIX Army Corps, in which the crippling material losses and their impact are highlighted: The final category of losses is regarding the armoured vehicles of all classifications. Just like with motor vehicle losses, the list is mostly complete, but losses of the 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH are not included. Losses of the two Tiger tank battalions that were trapped in the pocket (503rd and 509th) are not listed either. All of this is described below, after the table. Precise losses of the 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH in armoured vehicles are unknown but most of them were certainly lost. Just like with motor vehicles, comparison of the armoured vehicle status for 1 March 1944 and 1 May 1944, provides a good indication. Two months later, when it was in Belgium, only a fraction of armoured vehicles was left. Similarly to motor vehicles, some of the non-operational tanks of LSSAH found themselves outside the pocket. According to Guderian report in early May 1944, these vehicles were evacuated by rail and sent back to Germany for further repairs. As a result, in the 1 May 1944 status report of LSSAH, when it was refitting at the Beverloo training area in Belgium, these tanks are not included, since they were in Germany. Nonetheless, its clear that most of LSSAH’s armoured vehicles and armoured personnel carriers were lost in the pocket.At the time of the breakout on 7 April 1944, LSSAH had a total operational strength of 2 Tigers and 9 Stug’s. In terms of Tiger tanks, the heavy tank company, attached to LSSAH, lost most of its tanks by the time the breakout was complete. According to the company report, 75% of Tigers were lost due to self-destruction (to prevent capture), 15% were lost in combat operations and 10% were lost due to other causes. Other units not included in this report are the
503rd and
509th Heavy Tiger Tank Battalions. According to the history of the 503rd Battalion, after the breakout in April 1944, the battalion was 'bled white' as far as tanks are concerned. On 1 March 1944, this battalion had a total of 24 operational Tigers and 10 in repair. In May 1944, the 503rd Battalion was withdrawn to Ohrdruf training area in Thuringia for complete refitting. Similarly, the 509th Tiger battalion lost most of its tanks as well. As of 1 March 1944, it had 28 operational Tigers. At the time of the breakout on 9 April 1944, only one operational Tiger was left. With the addition of the 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH, 503rd and 509th Tiger battalions, the overall number of panzers and StuG’s lost, including Tigers that are not included in the table above, was well over 400. In the same way, the number of other armoured vehicles lost (
Schützenpanzerwagen and
Panzerspähwagen) was higher. According to the data available for 7 April 1944, when the first contact with the German relief forces was established, the German units had the following number of operational armoured vehicles. In terms of the number of artillery pieces lost in the pocket, precise calculations were not done, however, as the army's war diary noted on 12 April 1944, most of it was lost in the pocket and only a small number was preserved. Although an investigation was not done about the exact losses of artillery pieces, the overall scale of their losses can be calculated with high level of accuracy, by comparing the artillery status of the 1st Panzer Army units in mid-March and mid-April 1944, for which the reports are available. Specifically, the status for 10–12 March 1944, prepared by the
General der Artillerie department of the
OKH (
General der Artillerie im Oberkommando des Heeres), as well as the status for 13 April 1944 (three days after the breakout was fully complete), prepared by High Command of Army Group North Ukraine for the aforementioned department. For the 10–12 March 1944 report, the artillery holdings of all divisions of the 1st Panzer Army and its GHQ artillery units, all of which soon will be encircled in the Kamenets–Podolsky pocket, are included. In addition, it includes three divisions of the neighboring 4th Panzer Army-
68th Infantry Division,
7th Panzer Division and the
1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH. On that date, these three divisions were subordinated to the
4th Panzer Army, however, once the Red Army will collapse the German front and the contact between the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies will be lost, these divisions will find themselves in the space of the
1st Panzer Army and will be re-subordinated to it. These three made up the 'Mauss Group' (
Gruppe Mauss) in the pocket, named after the commander of the 7th Panzer Division
Karl Mauss, which was part of the
Korpsgruppe Chevallerie. The 13 April 1944 report once again includes all divisions and GHQ artillery units, whose artillery holdings were reported a month ago and which were then encircled in the pocket, including the Mauss Group (now part of the army). Note that the category of 'Available' in the table below includes artillery pieces that are both operational and in short-term repair. Thus, in terms of the
10.5 cm leFH 18, the number decreased by 250 (-55%) in one month, the
15 cm sFH 18 decreased by 131 (-70%), the
10 cm schwere Kanone 18 decreased by 28 (64%), while in terms of the
15 cm Kanone 18,
17 cm Kanone 18 and
21 cm Mörser 18 there were none left. The very poor shape of the 18th Artillery Division after the breakout, a powerful mobile artillery formation before the encirclement, is especially indicative of the scale of the artillery losses sustained by the 1st Panzer Army. Although these 1st Panzer Army artillery reports are complete in relation to the indicated weapons above, they do not include reports on other types of artillery, such as the heavy infantry guns (
15 cm sIG 33), their self-propelled variants (
Grille) and others. There is information available for the number of
Grille lost, based on the investigation of the 12–19 April 1944, whose results are seen above- a total of 17
Grille were lost in the pocket, from the 6th, 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions. The very poor overall material condition of the
19th Panzer Division after the conclusion of the heavy battles in April 1944 is one of numerous examples of the condition of the 1st Panzer Army divisions after the breakout and subsequent battles to stabilize the front. All the major material problems, which hamstrung the divisions after the breakout and the 1st Panzer Army as a whole, are highlighted in the divisional status report (
Zustandsbericht) of the
19th Panzer Division on 1 May 1944- the tremendous shortage of motor vehicles meant that divisional movement, supply and combat management faced huge difficulties, the loss of nearly all maintenance services meant that proper restoration of remaining vehicles and weapons back to full operational state was no longer feasible, while enormous losses in armoured vehicles, artillery, anti-tank guns and all kinds of supporting equipment meant that these weapons could be used to limited extent only. The acting commander of the
19th Panzer Division,
Oberst Walter Denkert, reported the following material condition of the division: The vehicle and weapon holdings of the division at the start of May were the following, as reported in the same status report.
Konstantin Simonov, a well-known Soviet writer and wartime correspondent, who was with the 1st Ukrainian Front at the time in April 1944, described the areas left by the retreating 1st Panzer Army, which were littered with abandoned vehicles and equipment:
Personnel condition The overall personnel losses of the 1st Panzer Army in the pocket were not excessive, but its divisional combat units sustained heavy losses, meaning that their combat strength (
Gefechtsstärke) at the time of the breakout was reduced to remnants or just a fraction of what they were supposed to have. The breakthrough battles had tremendously eroded the personnel strength of the 1st Panzer Army divisions, which had already been depleted before they were encircled, by nearly three weeks of heavy combat since the start of the Soviet Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation on 4 March 1944. To refit the decimated combat units, divisions resorted to putting various specialists and personnel from the supply services into the combat ranks, which meant that the troop training level, quality and internal cohesion level had significantly declined. In addition, the general physical and mental state of the troops had considerably deteriorated at the time of the breakout, as a result of continuous heavy combat and difficult retreats in spring mud and snowstorms. The incessant combat in these conditions meant that troops had no time to tend to their hygienic needs, clothing was badly worn (especially footwear), while hot meals were a rarity. A sizable number of soldiers were put out of action due to various type of sickness (severe lice infestation, various intestinal disorders, trench foot, frostbite etc.) resulting from these conditions. This combination of combat losses and sickness had depleted the actual combat strength of the 1st Panzer Army divisions to such an extent that only a fraction of it remained, based on their authorized strength (Sollstärke). In terms of authorized strength, at the end of 1943, as a result of heavy losses on the Eastern Front, the OKH ordered the existing infantry divisions to be converted into the infantry divisions of 'new type 44' (
Infanterie Division neuer Art 44). The main aim was, while preserving its essential component parts, to somewhat reduce the overall strength of the division, by removing surplus support services and staffs, as well as reducing the overall number of infantry battalions. The same principles were adopted in panzer divisions. The table below shows the authorized strength of infantry and panzer divisions at the start of 1944. Depending on the composition of the unit, its authorized strength may be slightly higher or lower, therefore, these numbers serve as a general guideline. Just how badly depleted the 1st Panzer Army formations were at the time of the breakout can be seen from numerous reports, prepared by the staffs of the encircled corps’, regarding the condition of their subordinated divisions. All of them share the same points- heavily understrength divisions, especially in terms of combat strength, tremendous physical exhaustion, only a fraction of authorized weapons, motor vehicles and armored vehicles available, low overall 'combat value' (
Kampfwert). The report prepared by the management department (Ia-
Führungsabteilung) of the
XXXXVI Panzer Corps of
Korpsgruppe Breith, about the condition of its divisions several days before the breakout, is one of many of this type. The
XXIV Panzer Corps, which was part of the
Korpsgruppe Chevallerie, was in a very poor shape as well, as seen from the 8 April 1944 report, when the breakout was largely complete. It consisted of the 96th (until 7 April), 208th, 291st Infantry Divisions, as well as the remnants of the 68th Infantry Division and the 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH. Note that the term 'ration strength' (
Verpflegungsstärke) in the table below refers to the overall unit strength, based on how many personnel in total, combat and non-combat (supply services, veterinarians, medics, staffs, repair personnel etc.) had to be provided with rations on the reporting day. On the same day, 8 April 1944, the command of the XXIV Panzer Corps wrote a detailed report about its condition and situation: The hardest hit division in the pocket was the
82nd Infantry Division. It operated as one of the rearguard infantry divisions of the XXXXVI Panzer Corps of
Korpsgruppe Breith, on the eastern side of the pocket. In a weekly report of the XXXXVI Panzer Corps on 2 April 1944, it was reported that 82nd Infantry Division sustained 'heavy personnel and material losses', as a result of which it had the lowest combat strength (809 men) of all divisions and no anti-tank guns. On 4 April 1944, due to situation, the division was sent to reinforce the neighboring III Panzer Corps, also part of
Korpsgruppe Breith. In the war diary (
Kriegstagebuch) of the
III Panzer Corps, entry for 4 April 1944, it is noted that 1st Panzer Army high command criticized the decision of the command of the XXXXVI Panzer Corps to send its weakest division (82nd) to reinforce the III Panzer Corps, ordering to replace it with another instead. But since the detachment of the 82nd Infantry Division was already in progress when the army order arrived, it was sent nonetheless. The breakout from the pocket and several weeks of hard fighting afterwards, in order to stabilize the front along the
Strypa river, meant that by the end of April 1944 the 82nd Infantry Division was in remnants. Its strength at the end of the month is shown in the table. The German term 'actual strength' (
Iststärke), seen in the table, refers to all personnel that are organic part of the unit's composition. Thus, it includes divisional personnel that might be on leave, temporarily attached to other units, absent for whatever other reason, as well as wounded and sick personnel that are recovering in unit's area of operations and are expected to return to service within the space of 8 weeks. Therefore,
Iststärke is not an indicator of the unit's actual combat capabilities or that this number were all combat troops. It is used for planning and organizational purposes, calculating the unit's overall strength based on how many personnel in total, combat and non-combat, were part of its establishment. On 10 May 1944, the worn-out
Kampfgruppe 82nd Infantry Division was ordered to be disbanded by Army Group North Ukraine high command, with its remaining combat-worthy elements to be incorporated into the neighboring
254th Infantry Division, itself in remnants. The strength of the 254th Infantry Division on 19 April 1944, a week and a half after the breakout was the following. The panzer divisions, operating as armoured spearheads and battering ram on the way to the west, were heavily understrength and exhausted by the time the contact was re-established with the relief forces of the II SS Panzer Corps. As one of the armoured spearheads of
Korpsgruppe Chevallerie on the way to the west, the
16th Panzer Division was engaged in continuous combat and movements for weeks in adverse weather conditions. Three days before the breakout was complete, the command of the 16th Panzer Division submitted a detailed combat strength report to the command of the XXIV Panzer Corps, showing how badly weakened its combat elements were. Similarly, the
19th Panzer Division saw heavy fighting in the first week of April, as well as encountering tremendous difficulties in movement and supply. In the 11 April 1944 after-action report, prepared by the management department of the 19th Panzer Division, the operations of the division for 2–5 April 1944 are described: Losses of the 19th Panzer Division for 2–5 April 1944 amounted to 172 killed, wounded and missing in total. As divisional command noted in this same report, by the end of 5 April, these losses amounted to a staggering 45% of the initial combat strength (
Gefechtsstärke) that division had at the start of 2 April. Due to decimated combat ranks, the division had to refit them with drivers from the supply services, but the strength did not improve- several days after the breakout, the division reported that its 'trench strength' (
Grabenstärke), that is, a number of infantry deployed at the front edge, was only 200 soldiers. On 11 April 1944, the total divisional infantry combat strength (
Gefechtsstärke), including headquarter staffs and troops on standby, was the following. Due to the severely depleted combat ranks, as well as the loss of most of the vehicles, weapons and equipment of the supply services, the command of the
1st Panzer Division was forced to use various types of rear area personnel for deployment at the front as infantry units. In a 6 April 1944 report, about the condition of the division, the command of the 1st Panzer Division wrote: The
6th Panzer Division had a distinction to be the first division from the encircled 1st Panzer Army to establish contact with the forward elements of the
II SS Panzer Corps. Specifically, the 114th Panzergrenadier Regiment of the 6th Panzer Division was the unit that established first contact with elements of the
10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg in the area of
Buchach at 17.05 on 6 April 1944. The decimated state of the regiment is seen from the report about its condition on that day, prepared by regimental staff. This report also noted that two-thirds of its panzergrenadiers had front-line experience of less than three months, while the majority of non-commissioned officers came from supply services. For these reasons, the report emphasized an urgent need of fully qualified NCO's and adequate training. The mobility of the regiment with motor vehicles was only at 30%. After the breakout and several more weeks of heavy combat to stabilize the front, the 6th Panzer Division was badly worn by the start of May 1944- its panzergrenadier battalions had on average just 45% of their authorized personnel, panzer regiment 41%, while anti-tank battalion just 31%. In the monthly status report (
Zustandsbericht) of the 6th Panzer Division for 1 May 1944, its divisional commander,
Generalmajor Rudolf Freiherr von Waldenfels, reported: The
7th Panzer Division operated to the north of the 6th Panzer Division and therefore was among the first divisions to establish contact with the relief forces. On 6 April 1944, the command of the 7th Panzer Division submitted its condition report to the command of the LIX Army Corps. In addition to the huge material losses of all sorts, pointed out in that report, the report noted the poor overall condition of the troops: As a result of continuous heavy combat since the start of March 1944, including the encirclement and breakout from the Kamenets–Podolsky pocket, the 7th Panzer Division was significantly understrength by mid-April 1944. By that point, its strength, aside from parts of the division that were not physically present with it or it attached to other divisions, was just a fraction of what it was supposed to have. It was subordinated to the LIX Army Corps. In the same 16 April 1944 report, the commander of the division,
Generalmajor Karl Mauss, gave the following judgement on the combat value of the division, which is similar to the report submitted 10 days ago: The
20th Panzergrenadier Division (LIX Army Corps), which operated as a rearguard formation on the eastern side of the pocket, was badly weakened by the time the encirclement ring was to open. In a 6 April 1944 condition report, the command of the division noted that division as a whole no longer resembled a cohesive and effective fighting unit, due its poor material and personnel condition: As for the strength of the divisions of the LIX Army Corps, one week after the breakout, it was the following. In terms of physical health, as can be seen already, the condition of the troops of the 1st Panzer Army had fallen sharply by the time the breakout was achieved, due to continuous movement in adverse weather conditions, without ability to have proper rest, meal and perform hygiene matters, with clothing, especially footwear, being torn. In turn, this frequently produced apathetic behavior, sense of depression, demoralization.
SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Weidinger described the condition and mood of the troops of the regimental-sized SS-Kampfgruppe Das Reich in the pocket: In the activity report for April 1944, the 1st Panzer Army doctor (
Armee-Arzt) described the condition of the troops at the time of the breakout: When the first contact of the 1st Panzer Army had been re-established with the German relief forces of the
II SS Panzer Corps at the end of 6 April 1944, the
10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg was the spearhead of the relief force.
SS-Untersturmführer Hans-Dietrich Sauter was among the soldiers of
Frundsberg who met the first German troops marching out of encirclement. In the history of the 10th SS Panzer Division, the following impressions are noted: Just how sick the troops were, with many types of illnesses, is illustrated by a detailed report about the health condition of the troops of the
16th Panzer Division (III Panzer Corps) right after the breakout. On 8, 9 and 10 April 1944, health inspections were conducted in several units of the 16th Panzer Division by the
III Panzer Corps doctor (
Korpsarzt). The following picture emerged, in a 10 April 1944 report submitted to the III Panzer Corps: By 1 May 1944, as a result of continuous heavy combat throughout March–April 1944, the personnel strength of the 1st Panzer Army corps' declined tremendously. The huge imbalance between the combat strength (
Gefechtsstärke) on one hand and the overall strength on the other, be it ration strength (
Verpflegungsstärke) or actual strength (
Iststärke), was particularly notable. In response to the request of the command of the 1st Panzer Army to provide information on its strength, the command of the LIX Army Corps submitted its report on 5 May 1944, about its strength at the start of the month. It consisted of the 82nd, 254th, 291st, 371st Infantry Divisions, 20th Panzergrenadier Division, 1st Panzer Division, remnants of the
25th Panzer Division (attached to the 20th Panzergrenadier Division), as well as numerous GHQ units. The two months of heavy combat and difficult withdrawals in March–April 1944, which included the encirclement and subsequent breakout from the Kamenets–Podolsky pocket, meant that the strength of the 1st Panzer Army had declined signifficantly, with regards to both overall and especially combat strength. The tremendous shortages of combat troops and equipment of all sorts, meant that refitting of the 1st Panzer Army would have to be carried out to the summer of 1944. Regarding the measures to increase the combat effectiveness of army divisions, on 6 May 1944 the 1st Panzer Army High Command prepared a total of 16 guidelines, which were to be followed: By the start of June 1944, the condition of the 1st Panzer Army had notably improved, as a result of the stabilization of the front, onset of warm weather and the fact that after 17 April 1944 the Soviet 1st Ukrainian Front went on the defensive. This meant that German forces had an entire month of May to rest and refit, which was urgently needed, given the physically, numerically and materially worn-out state of all divisions of the 1st Panzer Army. Overall, at the start of June 1944, its divisions and army as a whole were fit for defensive operations (
Kampfwert III), which was an improvement compared to its condition at the time of the breakout on 5 April 1944, when all of its divisions were fit for limited defensive operations only (
Kampfwert IV) or were no longer operational as a whole (
Kampfwert V). Nonetheless, going into June 1944, the 1st Panzer Army continued to be hamstrung by major material deficiences, especially in motor vehicles. Similarly, the personnel situation have improved, but its divisions still had on average 25-30% personnel shortages in relation to their authorized strength. The chronic issue remained- shortages of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers. The 1 June 1944 report said: == German personnel losses ==