Arab–Khazar wars

The Caucasus as a frontier of civilizations 's 1887 map of the Sasanian Persian fortifications of the Caspian Gates at Derbent The Arab–Khazar wars were part of a long series of military conflicts between the nomadic peoples of the Pontic–Caspian steppe and the more settled regions south of the Caucasus. The two primary routes over the mountains, the Darial Pass (Alan Gates) in the centre and the Pass of Derbent (Caspian Gates) in the east along the Caspian Sea, have been used as invasion routes since classical antiquity. Consequently, defence of the Caucasus frontier against destructive raids by steppe peoples such as the Scythians and Huns came to be regarded as one of the chief duties of imperial regimes of the Near East. This is reflected in the popular belief in ancient and medieval Middle Eastern cultures that Alexander the Great had barred the Caucasus with divine assistance against the mythical hordes of Gog and Magog. According to historian Gerald Mako, the latter were stereotypical "northern barbarians" as conceived by the settled civilizations of Eurasia: "uncivilized savages who drank blood, who ate children, and whose greed and bestiality knew no limits". If Alexander's barrier failed and Gog and Magog broke through, the Apocalypse would follow. Starting with Peroz I (), the shahs of the Sasanian Empire built a line of stone fortifications to protect the vulnerable frontier on the Caspian shore. When completed under Khosrow I (), these stretched over from the eastern foothills of the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea. The fortress of Derbent was the strategically crucial centre point of this fortification complex, as seen in its Persian name (). The Turkic Khazars appeared in the area of present-day Dagestan in the second half of the sixth century, initially as subjects of the First Turkic Khaganate. After the latter's collapse, they emerged as an independent, dominant power in the northern Caucasus by the seventh century. As the most recent steppe power in the region, early medieval writers came to identify the Khazars with Gog and Magog and the Sasanian fortifications at Derbent as Alexander's wall. The Khazars are mentioned in medieval histories as being present in the Caucasus since the first centuries CE, but these are rejected as anachronistic by modern scholars. Some scholars have argued the Khazars must be identified with Turks who raided Sasanian Persia in the late 6th century, but again the evidence is unreliable, being derived from much later Arabic sources. Modern scholarship generally holds that the Khazars first campaigned in the South Caucasus during the Byzantine–Sasanian War of 602–628, as subjects of the Western Turkic Khaganate, who allied with the Byzantine Empire in the Third Perso-Turkic War. The Turks sacked Derbent in 627, broke through the local Sasanian defences, and joined the Byzantines in their siege of Tiflis. When Byzantine emperor Heraclius () invaded Persia proper the next year, 40,000 Turks joined him. Their contribution was decisive for ending the war in a Byzantine victory. For a short while afterwards, as Sasanian power collapsed, the Turks exercised some control over Caucasian Iberia (approximately present-day Georgia), Caucasian Albania (the modern Republic of Azerbaijan) and Adharbayjan (modern Iranian Azerbaijan), while Armenia, the southwestern half of the South Caucasus, was in Byzantine hands. However, after the assassination of Tong Yabghu, the Western Turkic , around 630, the extension of Turkic control into the South Caucasus was abandoned, and the region returned to Sasanian influence by 632. The collapse of the West Turkic Khaganate led to the independence of the Khazars, then living in the Middle Volga region, and their emergence as an imperial power in their own right between the 660s and 680s, when they defeated Old Great Bulgaria and expanded into the North Caucasus. Opposing armies In the Caucasus, the Khazars came into contact with the nascent Arab caliphate, which had extended its power over the South Caucasus in the 640s, after the first wave of the early Muslim conquests. The eastern Caucasus became the main theatre of the Arab–Khazar conflict, with the Arab armies aiming to gain control of Derbent (Arabic , 'Gate of Gates') and the Khazar cities of Balanjar and Samandar. Their locations have yet to be established with certainty by modern researchers, but both cities are referred to as Khazar capitals by Arab writers and may have been winter and summer capitals, respectively. Due to Arab attacks, the Khazars later moved their capital further north to Atil (Arabic ) in the Volga Delta. Arabs Like other Near Eastern peoples, the Arabs were familiar with the legend of Gog and Magog, who appear in the Quran in the Arabicized form . After the Muslim conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries, their perceptions incorporated many of the cultural concepts of their new subjects. This was reflected in early Muslim geographic works, where the Caucasus was seen as part of a great continuous mountain chain that spanned the earth and divided the civilized lands of the south from the 'Land of Darkness' beyond, an idea deriving from Persian and possibly ancient Babylonian traditions. Consequently, according to Mako, the caliphs soon adopted the notion that it was their duty "to protect the settled, i.e. the civilized world from the northern barbarian". This imperative was reinforced by the Muslim division of the world into the House of Islam () and the House of War (), to which the Tengric pagan Turkic steppe peoples such as the Khazars were consigned. While their Byzantine and Sasanian predecessors simply sought to contain the steppe peoples through fortifications and political alliances, historian David Wasserstein notes the leaders of the Arab caliphate were "expansionists interested in conquest"; their northward thrust threatened the survival of the Khazars as an independent polity. Historian Khalid Yahya Blankinship agrees, emphasizing the highly ideological nature of the Muslim caliphate and its dedication to the doctrine of , which in political terms entailed "the struggle to establish God's rule in the earth through a continuous military effort against the non-Muslims". The early Muslim state was geared toward expansion, with all able-bodied adult male Muslims subject to conscription. Its manpower pool was accordingly enormous and historian Hugh N. Kennedy estimates 250,000 to 300,000 men were inscribed as potential soldiers () in the provincial army registers . Kennedy stresses that this force was spread throughout the empire and many of the proved loath to answer summons if the prospects for an easy victory and plunder were low, but on the other hand, these numbers could be supplemented by unregistered Arab volunteers. This put the Arabs at a distinct advantage over their enemies: the entire nominal strength of the contemporary Byzantine army is estimated at 120,000 men, though revisionist historians put it at as low as 30,000. Arab armies of the early Muslim conquests contained sizeable contingents of light and heavy cavalry, but relied primarily on their infantry. Arab cavalry was often limited to skirmishing early in a battle before dismounting and fighting on foot. Arab armies resisted cavalry charges by digging trenches and forming a spear wall behind them. This tactic indicates the discipline of Arab armies, particularly the elite Syrian troops, which in the Umayyad period served continuously rather than being called up for specific campaigns, and were a de facto professional, standing army. According to Kennedy, the Arabs' higher degree of training and discipline gave them an advantage against nomadic peoples like the Khazars. In the 8th century, Arab armies were often accompanied by local forces provided by the various local potentates, who not only were under Arab suzerainty, but often enough had suffered themselves due to Khazar raids. Thus in 732 the presiding prince of Armenia, Ashot III Bagratuni, is known to have renewed an agreement for the employment of Armenian cavalry with the Arab army for three years, in exchange for 100,000 silver dirhams per year. Khazars , showing an early medieval armoured steppe warrior with a captive The Khazars followed a strategy common to their nomadic predecessors; their raids might reach deep into the South Caucasus, Mesopotamia and Anatolia, but they were, according to historian Peter B. Golden, not aimed at conquest. Instead, Golden notes they were "typical of nomads testing the defenses of their sedentary neighbors" and a means of gathering booty, the acquisition and distribution of which was fundamental to tribal coalitions. According to Golden, the strategic stake of the conflict for the Khazars was control of the Caucasus passes. According to historian Boris Zhivkov, on the other hand, the Khazars contested the extension of Arab rule over Albania. Zhivkov considers that the Khazars laid special claim to the province, based on the ephemeral control exercised there by the Western Turks after the last Byzantine–Sasanian war. The sources do not provide details of the composition or tactics of Khazar armies, and the names of Khazar commanders are rarely recorded. Although the Khazars adopted elements of the civilizations to their south and possessed towns, they remained a tribal, semi-nomadic power. Like other steppe societies originating in Central Asia, they practised a mobile form of warfare and relied on skilled, hardy cavalry. The rapid movements and sudden attacks and counterattacks of the Khazar cavalry are emphasized in medieval sources. In the few detailed descriptions of pitched battles, the Khazar cavalry launch the opening attacks. Heavy (cataphract) cavalry is not recorded in the sources, but archaeological evidence attests to the use of heavy armour for riders and (possibly) horses. The presence of Khazar infantry must be assumed (especially during siege operations), although it is also not explicitly mentioned. Modern historians point to the use of advanced siege machines as evidence that Khazar military sophistication was equal to that of other contemporary armies. The less-rigidly organized, semi-nomadic nature of the Khazar state also worked to their advantage against the Arabs, as they lacked a permanent administrative centre, whose loss would paralyze the government and force them to surrender. The Khazar army was composed of Khazar troops and those of vassal princes and allies. Its overall size is unclear, and references to 300,000 men in the invasion of 730 are clearly exaggerated. Historian Igor Semyonov observes the Khazars "never entered into battle without having a numerical advantage" over their Arab opponents, which often forced the latter to withdraw. According to Semyonov, this attests to the Khazars' skill in logistics and their ability to gather accurate information about their opponents' movements, the layout of the country, and the condition of roads. Connection with the Arab–Byzantine conflict To an extent, the Arab–Khazar wars were also linked to the long-lasting struggle of the Caliphate against the Byzantine Empire along the eastern fringes of Anatolia (a theatre of war which adjoined the Caucasus). The Byzantine emperors pursued close relations with the Khazars which amounted to an alliance for most of the period in question, including the marriage of emperor Justinian II () to Khazar princess Theodora in 705. The possibility of the Khazars linking with the Byzantines through Armenia was a grave threat to the Caliphate, especially given Armenia's proximity to the Umayyad Caliphate's metropolitan province of Syria. This did not materialize; Armenia was left largely quiet, with the Umayyads granting it wide-ranging autonomy and the Byzantines refraining from actively campaigning there. Given the common threat of Khazar raids, the Umayyads found the Armenians (and the neighbouring Georgians) willing allies against the Khazars. The 20th-century Byzantinist Dimitri Obolensky suggested the Arab expansion in the Caucasus was motivated by a desire to outflank Byzantine defences from the north and envelop the Byzantine Empire in a pincer movement, but this idea is rejected as far-fetched by more recent scholars. Wasserstein objects to Obolensky's proposition as a scheme of extraordinary ambition which hinges on two untenable assumptions: that the Muslims had concluded a direct assault against Byzantium was without prospects of success, and that they had more detailed geographical knowledge than can be demonstrated for the time in question. Mako agrees that such a grand strategic plan is not borne out by the rather limited nature of the Arab–Khazar conflict until the 720s. It is more likely that the northward expansion of the Arabs beyond the Caucasus was, at least initially, the result of the onward momentum of the early Muslim conquests. Local Arab commanders of the period often exploited opportunities haphazardly and without an overall plan, sometimes pursuing expansion even against direct caliphal orders. From a strategic perspective, it is more probable that the Byzantines encouraged the Khazars to attack the Caliphate to relieve mounting pressure on their eastern frontier in the early eighth century. Byzantium profited from the diversion of Muslim armies northwards during the 720s and 730s, and the Byzantine–Khazar entente resulted in another marriage alliance between future emperor Constantine V () and Khazar princess Tzitzak in 733. Gaining control of the northern branch of the trade networks linking Europe with East Asia (the so-called "Silk Road") by the Caliphate has been suggested as a further motive for the conflict. Mako disputes this claim, pointing out that warfare declined precisely at the time of greatest expansion of these networks, after the mid-eighth century. ==First war and aftermath==

First Arab invasions and its provinces (in green) at its greatest extent, The Khazars and Arabs came into conflict as a result of the first phase of Muslim expansion; by 640, following their conquest of Byzantine Syria and Upper Mesopotamia, the Arabs had reached Armenia. Arabic and Armenian sources differ considerably on the details and chronology of the Arab conquest of Armenia, but by 655 the Armenian princes had capitulated, and both the Byzantine and Persian halves of Armenia were subjugated. Arab rule was overthrown during the First Muslim Civil War (656–661), but after its end the Armenian princes returned to their tributary status in the newly established Umayyad Caliphate. The Principality of Iberia concluded a similar treaty with the Arabs, and only Lazica (on the Black Sea coast) remained under Byzantine influence. Neighbouring Adharbayjan was conquered in 639–643; raids were launched into Arran (Caucasian Albania) under Salman ibn Rabi'a and Habib ibn Maslama during the early 640s, leading to the submission of its cities. As in Armenia, Arab rule was not securely established there until after the First Muslim Civil War. According to Arab chroniclers, the first attack on Derbent was launched in 642 under Suraqa ibn Amr; Abd al-Rahman ibn Rabi'a commanded his vanguard. Al-Tabari's History of the Prophets and Kings, written in the early 10th century, reports that Shahrbaraz, the Persian governor of Derbent, offered to surrender the fortress to the Arabs and aid them against the Caucasian peoples if he and his followers were relieved of the , a poll tax imposed on non-Muslims. Shahrbaraz's proposal was accepted and ratified by Caliph Umar (). Al-Tabari reports the first Arab advance into Khazar lands occurred after the capture of Derbent. Abd al-Rahman ibn Rabi'a reached Balanjar with no losses, and his cavalry advanced up to 200 parasangs—about —north, as far as al-Bayda on the Volga, the future Khazar capital. This dating, and the improbable claim that the Arabs suffered no casualties, have been disputed by modern scholars. Based at Derbent, Abd al-Rahman launched frequent raids against the Khazars and local tribes over the following years, but they were of small scale and no details about them are recorded in the sources. Disregarding the caliph's instructions for caution and restraint, Abd al-Rahman or (according to Baladhuri and Ya'qubi) his brother Salman led a large army north in 652, aiming to take Balanjar. The town was besieged for several days, with both sides using catapults, until the arrival of a Khazar relief force and a sortie by the besieged forces ended in a decisive defeat for the Arabs. Abd al-Rahman and 4,000 of his troops were killed, and the rest fled to Derbent or Gilan in present-day northern Iran. Khazar and Hunnic raids into the South Caucasus Due to the First Muslim Civil War and priorities on other fronts, the Arabs did not attack the Khazars again until the early eighth century. Despite the re-establishment of Arab suzerainty after the end of the civil war, the tributary South Caucasus principalities were not yet firmly under Arab rule and their resistance (encouraged by Byzantium) could not be overcome. For several decades after the initial Arab conquest, considerable autonomy was left to local rulers; Arab governors worked with them, and they had small forces of their own. The Khazars refrained from large-scale interventions in the south; pleas for assistance by Yazdegerd III (), the last Sasanian shah, were unanswered. After the Arab attacks, the Khazars abandoned Balanjar and moved their capital further north in an attempt to evade the Arab armies. However, Khazar auxiliaries and Abkhazian and Alan troops are recorded fighting alongside the Byzantines against the Arabs in 655. The only recorded hostilities in the second half of the 7th century were a few Khazar raids into the South Caucasus principalities that were loosely under Muslim dominion. These raids were primarily in search of plunder rather than attempts at conquest. In one such raid into Albania in 661–62, they were defeated by local prince Juansher (). A large-scale raid across the South Caucasus in 683 or 685 (also a time of civil war in the Muslim world) was more successful, capturing much booty and many prisoners and killing the presiding princes of Iberia (Adarnase II) and Armenia (Grigor I Mamikonian). At the same time, the North Caucasian Huns also launched attacks on Albania in 664 and 680. In the first incursion, Prince Juansher was obliged to marry the daughter of the Hunnic king. Modern scholars debate whether the Huns acted independently or as Khazar proxies, but several historians consider Hunnic ruler Alp Iluetuer a Khazar vassal; if so, Albania was under a form of indirect Khazar rule during the 680s. Umayyad caliph Mu'awiya I () tried to counter Khazar influence by inviting Juansher to Damascus twice, and the 683/685 Khazar raid may have been a reaction to those invitations. According to historian Thomas S. Noonan, on the other hand, the "cautious nature of Khazar policy in the Southern Caucasus" made them avoid direct confrontation with the Umayyads and intervene only during times of civil war. Noonan argues this caution came about because the Khazars were themselves preoccupied with consolidating their rule of the Pontic–Caspian steppe and were satisfied with the "limited goal of bringing Albania into the Khazar sphere of influence". == Second war ==

, the Sasanian-era citadel in Derbent Relations between the two powers remained relatively quiet until the early eighth century, when the stage for a new and more intense round of conflict was set. At the turn of the century, Byzantine political authority was marginalized in the Caucasus: the civil war in the Caliphate ended in 693, and the Umayyads were able to inflict significant defeats on the Byzantines, who descended into a long period of turmoil. The Arabs began a sustained offensive against Byzantium that would eventually culminate in the great assault on the Byzantine capital Constantinople in 717–718. In the same period, the Caliphate tightened its grip on the Christian principalities of Transacaucasia. After the suppression of a large-scale Armenian rebellion in 705, Armenia, Iberia and Albania finally came under direct Arab rule as the province of Arminiya. Only the western South Caucasus (present-day Georgia) remained free from direct control by either of the two rival powers, who now confronted each other for control of the Caucasus. The first Arab advance came as early as 692/93, with an expedition to secure the pass of Derbent; but Arab forces were soon forced to withdraw. The conflict resumed in 707 with a campaign by Umayyad general Maslama, son of Caliph Abd al-Malik (), in Adharbayjan and up to Derbent. Further attacks on Derbent are reported by different sources in 708 by Muhammad ibn Marwan, and the following year by Maslama, but the most likely date for Derbent's recovery by the Arabs is Maslama's 713/14 expedition. Marwan also brought a large number of Slav and Khazar captives south, whom he resettled in the eastern Caucasus; al-Baladhuri says about 20,000 Slavs were settled at Kakheti, and the Khazars were resettled at al-Lakz, where they embraced Islam. The Slavs soon killed their appointed governor and fled north, and Marwan pursued and killed them. Marwan's 737 expedition was the climax of the Arab–Khazar wars, but its results were meagre. Although the Arab campaigns after Ardabil may have discouraged the Khazars from further warfare, recognition of Islam or Arab supremacy by the was evidently based on the presence of Arab troops deep in Khazar territory, which was unsustainable. The withdrawal of the Arab armies, followed by the Muslim civil wars of the 740s and the subsequent collapse of the Umayyad regime in the Abbasid Revolution certainly "left little political pressure to remain Muslim", according to Golden. Even the credibility of the conversion to Islam is disputed by modern scholars; al-Baladhuri's account, which is probably closest to the original sources, suggests it was not the but a minor lord who converted to Islam and was placed in charge of the Khazars at al-Lakz. Blankinship cites this as indicating the implausibility of the conversion, since those Khazars who actually converted to Islam had to be moved to safety in Umayyad territory. The conversion is also contradicted by the fact that the Khazar court is known to have embraced Judaism as its faith. Dunlop placed this as early as , but the process is not well documented and was apparently gradual; it was certainly underway in the last decades of the eighth century, according to historical sources, and numismatic evidence indicates it was probably complete by the 830s. The conversion was primarily confined to the Khazar elites, and Christianity, Islam, and Tengrism and local pagan beliefs remained widespread among the Khazar subjects, and even members of the royal house are known to have professed Islam—and thus been barred from ascending the throne. Many modern scholars believe the Khazar elites' conversion to Judaism was a means of stressing their own identity as separate from (and avoiding assimilation by) the Christian Byzantine and Muslim Arab empires they were in contact with, and was a direct result of the 737 events. Aftermath and impact Whatever the real events of Marwan's campaigns, warfare between the Khazars and Arabs ceased for more than two decades after 737. Arab military activity in the Caucasus continued until 741, with Marwan launching repeated expeditions against minor principalities in present-day Dagestan. Blankinship says these campaigns more closely resembled raids, designed to seize plunder and extract tribute to ensure the upkeep of the Arab army, than attempts at permanent conquest. On the other hand, Dunlop argues Marwan came "within an ace of succeeding" in his conquest of Khazaria, and suggests the Arab commander "apparently intended to resume operations against the at a later date" which never materialized. Despite the Umayyad establishment of a more-or-less stable frontier anchored at Derbent, they could not advance any further (despite repeated efforts) in the face of Khazar resistance. Dunlop drew parallels between the Umayyad–Khazar confrontation in the Caucasus and that between the Umayyads and the Franks at roughly the same time across the Pyrenees, which ended with the Battle of Tours; according to Dunlop, like the Franks in the west, the Khazars played a crucial role in stemming the tide of early Muslim conquest. This view was also shared by Soviet historian and Khazar expert Mikhail Artamonov, as well as by Golden, and C. E. Bosworth. According to Golden, during the long conflict the Arabs were "able to maintain their hold over much of Transcaucasia"; despite occasional Khazar raids, this "had never really been seriously threatened". In their failure to push the border north of Derbent, however, the Arabs were clearly "reaching the outer limits of their imperial drive". Arab control in most of the territories under their nominal rule remained thin on the ground, being exercised mostly through local princes who had submitted to Muslim rule. This submission was often only nominal, unless it could be enforced by Arab governors by force. Likewise, Islamization proceeded slowly and was likely superficial at first. For a period of some four centuries, while their power lasted, the Khazars remained an obstacle to the further northward expansion of Islam. Blankinship considers the Caliphate's limited gains in the second war disproportionate to the resources expended; effective Arab control was limited to the lowlands and coast, and the land was too poor to replenish the Umayyad treasury. In addition, the large garrison at Derbent further depleted the already-overstretched Syro-Jaziran army, the main pillar of the Umayyad regime, whose dispersion across the Caliphate's far-flung fronts was eventually the major factor in the fall of the Umayyad dynasty during the civil wars of the 740s and the subsequent Abbasid Revolution. Balanjar was no longer mentioned after the Arab–Khazar wars, but a people known as "Baranjar" was later recorded as living in Volga Bulgaria—probably descendants of the original tribe which gave the town its name and resettled there as a result of the wars. Soviet and Russian archaeologists and historians such as and Svetlana Pletnyova consider the eighth-century emergence of the Saltovo-Mayaki culture in the steppe region between the Don and Dnieper Rivers as resulting from the Arab–Khazar conflict, since Alans from the North Caucasus were resettled there by the Khazars. ==Later conflicts==

The Khazars resumed their raids on Muslim territory after the Abbasid succession in 750, reaching deep into the South Caucasus. Although the Khazars had re-consolidated control of Dagestan almost to the gates of Derbent by the ninth century, they never seriously attempted to challenge Muslim control of the southern Caucasus. At the same time, the new Abbasid dynasty's hold on its empire was too tenuous for a resumption of the ambitious Umayyad offensives. In Noonan's judgment, "[T]he Khazar-Arab Wars ended in a stalemate", followed by a gradual rapprochement that encouraged the growth of trade between the two empires: large, stashed quantities of Arab coins in Eastern Europe suggest the second half of the 8th century marks the start of the trade routes linking the Baltic and Eastern Europe with the Caucasus and the Middle East. The first conflict between the Khazars and Abbasids resulted from a diplomatic manoeuvre by Caliph al-Mansur (). Attempting to strengthen the Caliphate's ties with the Khazars, he ordered the governor of Armenia, Yazid al-Sulami, to marry a daughter of the Baghatur . The marriage took place, but she and her child died in childbirth two years later. The , suspecting the Muslims of poisoning his daughter, raided south of the Caucasus from 762 to 764. Led by the Khwarezmian Ras, the Khazars devastated Albania, Armenia and Iberia, and captured Tiflis. Yazid evaded capture, but the Khazars returned north with thousands of captives and much booty. When the deposed Iberian ruler Nerse tried to induce the Khazars to campaign against the Abbasids and restore him to his throne in 780, the refused. This was probably the result of brief anti-Byzantine Khazar foreign policy resulting from disputes in the Crimea; at this time, the Khazars helped Leon II of Abkhazia throw off Byzantine rule. Peace reigned in the Caucasus between the Arabs and Khazars until 799, when the last major Khazar attack into the South Caucasus occurred. Chroniclers again attribute the attack to a failed marriage alliance. Georgian sources say the wanted to marry Shushan, the beautiful daughter of Prince Archil of Kakheti () and sent his general Bulchan to invade Iberia and capture her. Most of central K'art'li was occupied, and Prince Juansher () was taken captive for several years. Shushan committed suicide rather than be captured, and the furious had Bulchan executed. Arab chroniclers attribute the conflict to plans by the Abbasid governor, the Barmakid al-Fadl ibn Yahya, to marry one of the s daughters, who died on the journey south. A completely different story is reported by al-Tabari; the Khazars were invited to attack by a local Arab magnate in retaliation for the execution of his father, the governor of Derbent, by the general Sa'id ibn Salm. According to Arab sources, the Khazars raided as far as the Araxes against troops led by Yazid ibn Mazyad (the new governor of the South Caucasus) and reserve forces led by Khuzayma ibn Khazim. The Arabs and Khazars continued to clash sporadically in the North Caucasus during the ninth and tenth centuries, but the warfare was localized and far less intense than the eighth-century wars. The Ottoman historian Münejjim Bashi records a period of warfare from to 912, perhaps linked to the Caspian raids of the Rus' (whom the Khazars permitted to cross their lands unhindered) at about the same time. For the Khazars, peace on the southern border became more important as new threats to their hegemony emerged in the steppes. Caliphal authority also receded over the 9th and 10th centuries, allowing the re-emergence of native Christian states, initially as caliphal vassals, but de facto independent: Alania, Bagratuni Armenia, and Iberia. The final disintegration of the Abbasid empire during the early 10th century also led to the establishment of large Muslim principalities in the region, often ruled by non-native (Daylamite or Kurdish) dynasties, such as the Shirvanshahs, the Sallarids, and the Shaddadids, to name the most prominent. The Khazar presence also diminished with the progressive collapse of their authority in the 10th century and defeats by the Rus' and other Turkic nomads such as the Oghuz Turks. The Khazar realm contracted to its core around the lower Volga, removed from the reach of the Muslim principalities of the Caucasus; Ibn al-Athir's reports of a war between the Shaddadids with the "Khazars" in 1030 probably refers, instead, to the Georgians. The last Khazars found refuge among their former enemies; Münejjim Bashi records that in 1064, "the remnants of the Khazars, consisting of three thousand households, arrived in Qahtan [somewhere in Dagestan] from the Khazar territory. They rebuilt it and settled in it". ==Notes==