Task Force Kean Lieutenant General Walton Walker and the Eighth Army began preparing a
counteroffensive, the first conducted by the UN in the war, for August. It would kick off with an attack by the US reserve units in the Masan area to secure Chinju from the KPA 6th Division, followed by a larger general push to the
Kum River in the middle of the month. One of his goals was to break up a suspected massing of KPA troops near the Taegu area by forcing the diversion of some KPA units southward. On August 6, the Eighth Army issued the operational directive for the attack by
Task Force Kean, named for the US 25th Infantry Division commander,
Major General William B. Kean.
Task Force Kean consisted of the 25th Division, less the
27th Infantry Regiment and a field artillery battalion, with the
5th Regimental Combat Team (5th RCT) and the
1st Provisional Marine Brigade attached. Together this represented a force of about 20,000 men. The plan of attack required the force to move west from positions held near Masan, seize the Chinju Pass, and secure the line as far as the Nam River. However, the offensive relied on the arrival of the entire 2nd Infantry Division, as well as three more battalions of American tanks.
Task Force Kean kicked off its attack on August 7, moving out from Masan. At the Notch, a northern pass into the city and site of a previous battle, the
35th Infantry Regiment encountered 500 KPA infantry, defeating them. The force surged forward to Pansong, inflicting another 350 casualties on the KPA. There, they overran the KPA 6th Division's headquarters. However the rest of the task force was slowed by KPA resistance.
Task Force Kean pressed on the Chindong-ni area, resulting in a confused battle where the fragmented force had to rely on
air strikes and airdrops to keep it effective.
Task Force Kean's offensive had collided with one being delivered simultaneously by the KPA 6th Division. Heavy fighting continued in the area for three days. By August 9,
Task Force Kean was poised to retake Chinju. The task force, aided by air power, initially advanced quickly though KPA resistance was heavy. On August 10 the Marines picked up the advance, However the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade elements were withdrawn from the force on August 12 to be redeployed elsewhere on the perimeter.
Task Force Kean continued forward supported by naval However, Eighth Army requested several of its units to redeploy to Taegu to be used elsewhere on the front, particularly at the
Naktong Bulge In the confusion, KPA armor was able to penetrate roadblocks and assault the supporting artillery positions. The surprise attack was successful in
wiping out most of the 555th and 90th Field Artillery Battalions, with much of their equipment. Both KPA and US armor swarmed to the scene and US Marine aviation continued to provide air cover, but neither side was able to make appreciable gains despite inflicting heavy casualties on one another. US forces were unsuccessful in retaking the positions where the artillery was overrun, suffering numerous casualties in several failed attempts to do so. Upon later inspection, the bodies of 75 men, 55 from the 555th Field Artillery and 20 from the 90th Field Artillery, were found executed when the area again came under American control, in what was later known as the Bloody Gulch massacre.
Task Force Kean was forced to withdraw back to Masan, unable to hold its gains, and by August 14 it was approximately in the same positions it had been in when it started the offensive.
Task Force Kean had failed in its objective of diverting North Korean troops from the north, and also failed in its objective of reaching the Chinju Pass. However, the offensive is noted to have significantly increased morale among the troops of the 25th Infantry Division, which performed extremely well in subsequent engagements. The KPA 6th Division had been reduced to 3,000–4,000 and had to replenish its ranks with South Korean conscripts from Andong. Fighting in the region continued for the rest of the month. Rough terrain west of Masan limited the choice of the positions. The mountain group west of Masan was the first readily defensible ground east of the Chinju Pass. The mountain ridges of
Sobuk-san dominated the area and protected the Komam-ni-
Haman-Chindong-ni road, the only means of north-south communication west of Masan. Northwest of Komam-ni was the broken spur of P'il-bong, dominated by Sibidang-san, along the
Nam River. Sibidang was an excellent observation point for the surrounding area, and US artillery emplaced in the Komam-ni area could interdict the road junction at Chungam-ni. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry held the regiment's left flank west of Komam-ni, while the 2nd Battalion held the right along the Nam River. 3rd Battalion, redesignated from the 1st Battalion,
29th Infantry Regiment, was in reserve on the road south of
Chirwon from where it could move quickly to any part of the line. From north to south, the division had its 13th, 15th, and 14th Regiments. The first replacements arrived at Chinju on about August 12. Approximately 2,000 unarmed South Koreans conscripted in the
Seoul area joined the division by August 15. At Chinju, the 6th Division issued them grenades and told the recruits they would have to pick up weapons from killed and wounded on the battlefield. Another group of 2,500 replacements conscripted in the Seoul area joined the 6th Division on August 21, bringing the division strength to approximately 8,500 men. In the last week of August and the first week of September, 3,000 more recruits conscripted in southwest Korea joined the division. The 6th Division used this last body of recruits in labor details at first and only later employed them as combat troops. The 35th Infantry set to work to cover its front with
trip flares, but they were in short supply and gradually it became impossible to replace them. Illuminating flares were also in short supply, and the reserve stocks had deteriorated to such a degree that only about 20 percent of the supply issued to the regiment was effective. Even when employed, the time lapse between a request for them and delivery by the big howitzers allowed some KPA infiltration before the threatened area was illuminated. The 64th Field Artillery Battalion, with C Battery, 90th Field Artillery Battalion, attached, and A Company, 88th Medium Tank Battalion, supported the regiment. Three
M4A3 Sherman tanks, from positions at Komam-ni, acted as artillery and placed interdiction fire on Chungam-ni. Six other
M26 Pershing tanks in a similar manner placed interdiction fire on Uiryong across the Nam River. At the western, KPA-held base of Battle Mountain and P'il-bong were the villages of Ogok and Tundok, from the crest. A north-south mountain trail crossed a high
saddle just north of these villages and up the west slope about halfway to the top of Battle Mountain. This road gave the KPA an advantage in mounting and supplying their attacks in the area. A trail system ran from Ogok and Tundok to the crests of Battle Mountain and P'il-bong. On August 20, the KPA 6th Division intensified its efforts to attack Battle Mountain, and began sending stronger attacks to capture the two peaks. In the face of these, all of C Company except the company commander and about 25 men abandoned their position on Battle Mountain. Upon reaching the bottom of the mountain those who had fled reported erroneously that the company commander had been killed and their position surrounded, then overrun by the KPA. On the basis of this misinformation, American artillery and mortars fired concentrations on C Company's former position, and fighter-bombers, in 38 sorties, attacked the crest of Battle Mountain, using
napalm, fragmentation bombs, rockets and machine guns. This action forced the company commander and his remaining 25 men off Battle Mountain after they had held it for 20 hours, 24th Infantry troops continued to straggle from their positions, ignoring commands from officers to stay in place. Both African-American and white officers, infuriated by the disobedience, wrote sworn statements implicating the deserters. The situation was so severe that those who stayed in their positions were often given
Bronze Star Medals with
Valor Devices because they were so far outnumbered in the fighting. Battle Mountain changed hands so often during August that there is no agreement on the exact number of times. The intelligence sergeant of the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry estimated the peak changed hands 19 times. The 24th Infantry consistently captured Battle Mountain in the same way. Artillery, mortar, and tank fire raked the crest and air strikes employing napalm blanketed the top of the peak. Then, the infantry attacked from the hill beneath the east slope of the summit. Supporting mortars would set up a base of fire and kept the heights under barrage until the infantry had arrived at a point just short of the crest. The mortar fire then lifted and the infantry moved rapidly up the last stretch to the top, usually to find it abandoned by the KPA.
September push On August 31, 1950, the 25th Division held a front of almost , beginning in the north at the
Namji-ri bridge over the Naktong River and extending west on the hills south of the river to the Nam's confluence with it. It then bent southwest up the south side of the Nam to where the Sobuk-san mountain mass tapered down in its northern extremity to the river. There the line turned south along rising ground to Sibidang-san, crossed the saddle on its south face through which passed the Chinju-Masan railroad and highway, and continued southward up to Battle Mountain and on to P'il-bong. From P'il-bong the line dropped down spur ridge lines to the southern coastal road near Chindong-ni. The US 35th Infantry Regiment held the northern of the division line, from the Namji-ri bridge to the Chinju-Masan highway. The regiment was responsible for the highway. The regiment's weakest and most vulnerable point was a gap along the Naktong River between most of F Company on the west and its 1st Platoon to the east. This platoon guarded the Namji-ri
cantilever steel bridge on the division extreme right at the boundary with the US 2nd Infantry Division across the Naktong River. Aerial reconnaissance in the last week of August had disclosed to Eighth Army a large amount of KPA activity behind the lines opposite the US 2nd and 25th Divisions in the southern part of the Pusan Perimeter. The KPA had built three new
underwater bridges across the Nam River in front of the 35th Infantry in the 25th Division sector. Aerial bombing only temporarily and partially destroyed these bridges, and they were repaired overnight. Just before midnight August 31, KPA
I Corps started its portion of
The Great Naktong Offensive, a coordinated attack all along the Pusan Perimeter with a goal of breaking the UN defensive lines and capturing Pusan. Late in the afternoon of August 31, observers with G Company, 24th Infantry, noticed activity in front of their positions. They called in two air strikes that hit this area at dusk. US artillery sent a large concentration of fire into the area, but the effect of this fire was not known. All US units on the line were alerted for a possible KPA attack. That night the KPA launched The Great Naktong Offensive against the entire UN force. The KPA 6th Division advanced first, hitting F Company on the north side of the pass on the Chungam-ni-Haman road. The ROK troops in the pass left their positions and fell back on G Company to the south. South of the pass, at dawn,
First Lieutenant Houston M. McMurray found that only 15 out of 69 men assigned to his platoon remained with him, a mix of US and ROK troops. The KPA attacked this position at dawn. They came through an opening in the barbed wire perimeter which was supposed to be covered by a man with a
M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, but he had fled. Throwing grenades and spraying the area with
PPSh-41 "burp gun" fire, the KPA quickly overran the position. The KPA passed through the crumbling US lines quickly and overran the 2nd Battalion command post, killing several men there and destroying much of the battalion's equipment. With the 2nd Battalion broken, Haman was open to direct attack. As the KPA encircled Haman, Roberts, the 2nd Battalion commander, ordered an officer to take remnants of the battalion and establish a roadblock at the south edge of the town. Although the officer directed a large group of men to accompany him, only eight did so. The 2nd Battalion was no longer an effective fighting force. Pockets of its soldiers remained in place and fought fiercely, but the majority fled upon attack, and the KPA were able to move around the uneven resistance. They surrounded Haman as the 2nd Battalion crumbled in disarray. When the KPA attack broke through the 2nd Battalion, the 1st Battalion commander ordered his unit, which was about south of Haman on the Chindong-ni road, to counterattack and restore the line. Roberts assembled all the 40 men of the disorganized 2nd Battalion he could find to join in this counterattack, which got under way at 07:30. Upon contact with the KPA, the 1st Battalion broke and fled to the rear. The better part of two regiments of the KPA 6th Division poured into and through the Haman gap, now that they had captured the town and held it. For 30 minutes
US Air Force aircraft struck KPA positions around Haman with bombs, napalm, rockets, and machine gun fire. They also attacked the KPA-held ridges around the town. Fifteen minutes of concentrated artillery fire followed. Fires spread in Haman. Infantry from 3rd Battalion moved out in attack west at 16:30, reinforced by a platoon of tanks from A Company, 79th Tank Battalion. Eight tanks, mounting infantry, spearheaded the attack into Haman, capturing the city easily, as most of the KPA troops had abandoned it. KPA in force held the ridge on the west side of the town, and their machine gun fire swept every approach, destroying one tank and the attacking infantry suffered heavy casualties. But the battalion pressed the attack and by 18:25 had seized the first long ridge west of Haman. By 20:00 it had secured half of the old battle position on the higher ridge beyond, west of Haman. Just short of the crest on the remainder of the ridge, the infantry dug in for the night. It had recaptured Haman and was pushing back to the 24th's old positions. The KPA attacked Haman daily for the next week. Following the repelling of KPA infiltration on September 7, the attack on Haman ground to a halt. The KPA, racked by logistical and manpower shortages, focused more heavily on their attacks against 24th Infantry positions on Battle Mountain, as well as 35th Infantry positions at the Nam River. 24th Infantry troops at Haman encountered only probing attacks until September 18.
Battle of Nam River Meanwhile, the KPA 7th Division troops committed all of their effort into attacking the US 35th Infantry line. Other KPA soldiers crossed the Nam on an underwater bridge in front of the paddy ground north of Komam-ni and near the boundary between the 2nd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Wilkins, Jr., holding the river front and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard G. Teeter's 1st Battalion holding the hill line that stretched from the Nam River to Sibidang-san and the Chinju-Masan highway. The 35th Infantry, facing shortages of equipment and reinforcements, was under-equipped but nonetheless prepared for an attack. In the low ground between these two battalions at the river ferry crossing site, the 35th Infantry commander had placed 300 ROK Police, expecting them to hold there long enough to serve as a warning for the rest of the forces. By midafternoon, Kean felt that the situation was so dangerous that he ordered the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, to attack behind the 35th Infantry. A large part of the division artillery was under direct KPA infantry attack. During the morning hours of September 1, when the KPA 7th Division troops had attacked, the first American unit they encountered was G Company, 35th Infantry, at the north shoulder of the gap. Battalions, companies, and platoons, cut off and isolated, fought independently of higher control and help except for airdrops which supplied many of them. Airdrops also supplied relief forces trying to reach the front-line units. Tanks and
armored cars drove to the isolated units with supplies of food and ammunition and carried back critically wounded on the return trips. In general, the 35th Infantry fought in its original battle line positions, while at first one battalion, and later two battalions, of the 27th Infantry fought toward it through the estimated 3,000 KPA operating in its rear areas. Although the 25th Division generally was under much less pressure after September 5, there were still severe local attacks. Heavy rains caused the Nam and Naktong Rivers to rise on September 8 and 9, reducing the danger of new crossings. However, KPA attacks against 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry occurred nightly. The approaches to the Namji-ri bridge, one of their key targets to protect, were mined. At one time there were about 100 KPA dead lying in that area. From September 9 to 16, there were limited attacks on the 35th Infantry's front, but most of the KPA momentum had been broken and they could not muster strong attacks against the regiment again.
Evacuation of Masan Civilians in Masan posed an unexpectedly dangerous problem for the UN forces. The town had a large community of Communist sympathizers and agents. At the peak of the KPA offensive, Han Gum Jo, manager of the Masan branch of the
Korean Press Association, confessed that he was chief of the
South Korean Labor Party in Masan and that he had been funneling information to the KPA through a Pusan headquarters. Additionally, the chief of the Masan prison guards was found to be the head of a Communist cell that included seven of his subordinates. This, and other counterintelligence information, came to light at a time when the most intense fighting was in progress only a few miles away. Kean considered the situation so dangerous that he ordered Masan evacuated of all people except police, public officials, railroad and utility workers, and necessary laborers and their families. Evacuation was to be completed in five days. On September 10 and 11 alone the 25th Division evacuated more than 12,000 people by
Landing Ship Tank (LST) from Masan.
North Korean withdrawal The UN
counterattack at Inchon collapsed the KPA line and forced them back on all fronts. On September 16 the Eighth Army began its
breakout from the Pusan Perimeter however, the 25th Infantry Division was still fighting KPA forces behind its lines, and KPA strongpoints existed on the heights of Battle Mountain, P'il-bong, and Sobuk-san. Kean felt that the division could advance along the roads toward Chinju only when the mountainous center of the division front was clear. He therefore believed that the key to the advance of the 25th Division lay in its center where the KPA held the heights and kept the 24th Infantry Regiment under daily attack. On September 19 the UN discovered the KPA had abandoned Battle Mountain during the night, and the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, moved up and occupied it. On the right, the 35th Infantry began moving forward. There was only light resistance until it reached the high ground in front of Chungam-ni where hidden KPA soldiers in
spider holes shot at 1st Battalion soldiers from the rear. The next day the 1st Battalion captured Chungam-ni, and the 2nd Battalion captured the long ridge line running northwest from it to the Nam River. Meanwhile, the KPA still held strongly against the division left where the 27th Infantry had heavy fighting in trying to move forward. The KPA withdrew from the Masan area the night of September 18–19. The KPA 7th Division withdrew from south of the Nam River while the 6th Division sideslipped elements to cover the entire front. Covered by the 6th Division, the 7th had crossed to the north side of the Nam River by the morning of September 19. Then the KPA 6th Division withdrew from its positions on Sobuk-san. == Aftermath ==