Housing bubble In the wake of the
subprime mortgage and credit crisis in 2007, Greenspan stated that there was a
bubble in the U.S. housing market, warning in 2007 of "large double digit declines" in home values "larger than most people expect". Greenspan also noted, however, "I really didn't get it until very late in 2005 and 2006." Greenspan stated that the housing bubble was "fundamentally engendered by the decline in real long-term interest rates", though he also claims that long-term interest rates are beyond the control of central banks because "the market value of global long-term securities is approaching $100 trillion" and thus these and other asset markets are large enough that they "now swamp the resources of central banks". After the
September 11, 2001 attacks, the
Federal Open Market Committee voted to reduce the
federal funds rate from 3.5% to 3.0%. Then, after the
accounting scandals of 2002, the Fed dropped the federal funds rate from then current 1.25% to 1.00%. Greenspan stated that this drop in rates would have the effect of leading to a surge in home sales and refinancing, adding that "Besides sustaining the demand for new construction, mortgage markets have also been a powerful stabilizing force over the past two years of economic distress by facilitating the extraction of some of the equity that homeowners have built up over the years". The
Federal Reserve acknowledged the connection between lower interest rates, higher home values, and the increased liquidity the higher home values bring to the overall economy: "Like other asset prices, house prices are influenced by interest rates, and in some countries, the housing market is a key channel of monetary policy transmission." In a February 23, 2004, speech, Greenspan suggested that more homeowners should consider taking out
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) where the interest rate adjusts itself to the current interest in the market. The Fed's own funds rate was at a then all-time-low of 1%. A few months after his recommendation, Greenspan began raising interest rates, in a series of rate hikes that would bring the funds rate to 5.25% about two years later. A triggering factor in the
subprime mortgage crisis is believed to be the many subprime ARMs that reset at much higher interest rates than what the borrower paid during the first few years of the mortgage. In 2008, Greenspan expressed great frustration that the February 23 speech was used to criticize him on ARMs and the
subprime mortgage crisis, and stated that he had made countervailing comments eight days after it that praised traditional fixed-rate mortgages. In that speech, Greenspan had suggested that lenders should offer to home purchasers a greater variety of "mortgage product alternatives" other than traditional fixed-rate mortgages. as well as "engineering" the housing bubble itself. In 2004,
Businessweek magazine analysts argued: "It was the Federal Reserve-engineered decline in rates that inflated the housing bubble ... the most troublesome aspect of the price runup is that many recent buyers are squeezing into houses that they can barely afford by taking advantage of the lower rates available from adjustable-rate mortgages. That leaves them fully exposed to rising rates." In September 2008,
Joseph Stiglitz stated that Greenspan "didn't really believe in regulation; when the excesses of the financial system were noted, (he and others) called for self-regulation—an
oxymoron". Greenspan, according to
The New York Times, says he himself is blameless. On April 6, 2005, Greenspan called for a substantial increase in the regulation of
Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac: "Appearing before the
Senate Banking Committee, the Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan, said the enormous portfolios of the companies—nearly a quarter of the home-mortgage market—posed significant risks to the nation's financial system should either company face significant problems." Despite this, Greenspan still claims to be a firm believer in free markets, although in his 2007 biography he wrote, "History has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low
risk premiums" as seen before the credit crisis of 2008. In 2009,
Robert Reich wrote that "Greenspan's worst move was to contribute to the giant housing bubble and the worst worldwide crash since the
Great Depression. In 2004 he lowered interest rates to 1%, enabling banks to borrow money for free, adjusted for inflation. Naturally, the banks wanted to borrow as much as they possibly could, then lend it out, earning nice profits. The situation screamed for government oversight of lending institutions, lest the banks lend to unfit borrowers. He refused, trusting the market to weed out bad credit risks. It did not." In congressional testimony on October 23, 2008, Greenspan finally conceded error on regulation.
The New York Times wrote, "a humbled Mr. Greenspan admitted that he had put too much faith in the self-correcting power of free markets and had failed to anticipate the self-destructive power of wanton mortgage lending ... Mr. Greenspan refused to accept blame for the crisis but acknowledged that his belief in deregulation had been shaken". Although many
Republican lawmakers tried to blame the housing bubble on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Greenspan placed far more blame on Wall Street for bundling subprime mortgages into securities.
2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession In March 2008, Greenspan wrote an article for the
Financial Times Economists' Forum in which he said that the
2008 financial crisis in the United States is likely to be judged as the most wrenching since the end of
World War II. In it he argued: "We will never be able to anticipate all discontinuities in financial markets." He concluded: "It is important, indeed crucial, that any reforms in, and adjustments to, the structure of markets and regulation not inhibit our most reliable and effective safeguards against cumulative economic failure: market flexibility and open competition." The article attracted a number of critical responses from forum contributors, who, finding causation between Greenspan's policies and the discontinuities in financial markets that followed, criticized Greenspan mainly for what many believed to be his unbalanced and immovable ideological suppositions about global capitalism and free competitive markets. Notable critics included
J. Bradford DeLong,
Paul Krugman,
Alice Rivlin,
Michael Hudson, and
Willem Buiter. Greenspan responded to his critics in a follow-up article in which he defended his ideology as applied to his conceptual and policy framework, which, among other things, prohibited him from exerting real pressure against the burgeoning housing bubble or, in his words, "leaning against the wind". Greenspan argued, "My view of the range of dispersion of outcomes has been shaken, but not my judgment that free competitive markets are by far the unrivaled way to organize economies". He concluded: "We have tried regulation ranging from heavy to central planning. None meaningfully worked. Do we wish to retest the evidence?"
Financial Times associate editor and chief economics commentator
Martin Wolf defended Greenspan primarily as a scapegoat for the market turmoil. However, an October 15, 2008, article in
The Washington Post analyzing the origins of the economic crisis claims that Greenspan vehemently opposed any regulation of
derivatives, and actively sought to undermine the office of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission when the commission sought to initiate regulation of derivatives. Meanwhile, Greenspan recommended improving mark-to-market regulations to avoid having derivatives or other complex assets marked to a distressed or illiquid market during times of material adverse conditions seen during the late 2000s credit crisis. Greenspan was not alone in his opposition to derivatives regulation. In a 1999 government report that was a key driver in the passage of the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000—legislation that clarified that most
over-the-counter derivatives were outside the regulatory authority of any government agency—Greenspan was joined by Treasury Secretary
Lawrence Summers,
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman
Arthur Levitt, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman William Ranier in concluding that "under many circumstances, the trading of financial derivatives by eligible swap participants should be excluded from the CEA" (
Commodity Exchange Act). Other government agencies also supported that view. In Congressional testimony on October 23, 2008, Greenspan acknowledged that he was "partially" wrong in opposing regulation and stated "Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder's equity—myself especially—are in a state of shocked disbelief." Referring to his free-market ideology, Greenspan said: "I have found a flaw. I don't know how significant or permanent it is. But I have been very distressed by that fact." When Representative
Henry Waxman (D-CA) pressed him to clarify his words. "In other words, you found that your view of the world, your ideology, was not right, it was not working," Waxman said. "Absolutely, precisely", Greenspan replied. "You know, that's precisely the reason I was shocked, because I have been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well." Greenspan admitted fault in opposing regulation of derivatives and acknowledged that financial institutions didn't protect shareholders and investments as well as he expected.
Matt Taibbi described the
Greenspan put and its bad consequences saying: "every time the banks blew up a speculative bubble, they could go back to the Fed and borrow money at zero or one or two percent, and then start the game all over", thereby making it "almost impossible" for the banks to lose money. He also called Greenspan a "classic
con man" who, through political savvy, "flattered and bullshitted his way up the
Matterhorn of American power and ... jacked himself off to the attention of Wall Street for 20 consecutive years". In the documentary film
Inside Job, Greenspan is cited as one of the persons responsible for the
2008 financial crisis. He is also named in
Time magazine as one of the "25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis".
Political views and alleged politicization of office Greenspan describes himself as a "lifelong
libertarian Republican". Critics argue that these policies contributed to
asset bubbles and
moral hazard. In March 2005, in reaction to Greenspan's support of President
George W. Bush's plan to
partially privatize Social Security, then-Democratic Senate Minority Leader
Harry Reid attacked Greenspan as "one of the biggest political hacks we have in Washington" Greenspan also received criticism from Democratic Congressman
Barney Frank and others for supporting Bush's Social Security plans favoring private accounts. Greenspan had said Bush's model has "the seeds of developing full funding by its very nature. As I've said before, I've always supported moves to full funding in the context of a private account". Others, like Republican Senator
Mitch McConnell, disagreed that Greenspan was too deferential to Bush, stating that Greenspan "has been an independent player at the Fed for a long time under both parties and made an enormous positive contribution". Economist Paul Krugman wrote that Greenspan was a "three-card maestro" with a "lack of sincerity" who, "by repeatedly shilling for whatever the Bush administration wants, has betrayed the trust placed in the Fed chairman". Republican Senator
Jim Bunning, who opposed Greenspan's fifth reconfirmation, charged that Greenspan should comment only on monetary policy, not fiscal policy. Greenspan had used his position as Fed chairman to comment upon fiscal policy as early as 1993, however, when he supported
President Clinton's deficit reduction plan, which included tax increases and budget cuts. In an October 2011 lecture addressing the
Occupy movement,
Noam Chomsky characterized portions of Greenspan's February 1997 testimony to the U.S. Senate as an example of the self-serving attitudes of the so-called 1%. In that testimony, Greenspan had stated that growing worker insecurity is a significant factor keeping inflation and inflation expectation low, thereby promoting long-term investment. ==Personal life==