Ahmad al-Qushashī After the opponents of the wahdat al-wujūd doctrine had dominated the intellectual climate in the Hijaz in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, this doctrine celebrated a comeback with the Medinan scholar Ahmad al-Qushashī (d. 1661). Al-Muhibbī, in his biographical lexicon of personalities of the 11th Islamic century, referred to him as the
Imam of those who teach the unity of existence (
imām al-qāʾilīn bi-waḥdat al-wujūd). ِAl-Qushashī wrote a treatise entitled
Kalimat al-jūd bi-l-baiyina wa-l-shuhūd ʿalā l-qawl bi-waḥdat al-wujūd ("The Treatise on the Doctrine of the Unity of Existence Generously Equipped with Evidence"), which is currently only available in manuscript form. In it, he explained that
wahdat al-wujūd meant that there was no partner for God in His existence; the contingent things consisted exclusively of His objects of knowledge, His actions and His creatures. In addition, in the treatise he quoted the Ottoman
Sheikh Islam Kemal-Paşa-zâde (d. 1534) as saying that it is the ruler's responsibility to convert people to the doctrine of the unity of existence (
yajib ʿalā walī al-amr an yaḥmil an-nās ʿalā l-qawl bi-waḥdat al-wujūd). Al-Qushashī claims to have seen this in an
autograph by Kemal-Paşa-zâde. Although there is a fatwa by Kemal-Pasha-zade to protect the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī, wahdat al-wujūd is not mentioned in it. Ahmad al-Qushashī also formulated his own theological doctrine with the doctrine of the "unity of attributes" (
waḥdat al-ṣifāt). His student Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī (see below) referred to this doctrine as "the sister" of the doctrine of wahdat al-wujūd and was of the opinion that al-Qushashī's efforts in laying the foundations of it were similar to those of Ibn ʿArabī regarding wahdat al-wujūd.
Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī Another important proponent of the doctrine of wahdat al-wujūd in the Hijaz was al-Qushashī's student Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī (d. 1690), who dedicated several works to it. The most important of these was his commentary
Itḥāf al-dhakī on the work
al-Tuḥfa al-mursala ilā l-Nabī by Fadlallāh al-Burhānpūrī (see above). Al-Kūrānī wrote this commentary at the request of students from Southeast Asia (
Bilād Ǧāwā) who were staying in Medina. Al-Burhānpūrī had begun his work with the statement that God is existence. Al-Kūrānī took this statement as the starting point for admonitions, which he divided into seven sections. In the fifth section he admonishes the reader: "The first duty that befalls the one who strives after this noble science (sc.
ʿilm al-ḥaqāʾiq =
metaphysics) is that he should be fully aware that there is no contradiction between the belief in the unity of existence (
tawḥīd al-wujūd) on the one hand and the
Sharia and the imposition of command and prohibition on the other." The unity of existence, which entails that those addressed when duties are imposed are individuations (
taʿayyunāt) of the absolute existence and manifestations of the names of the true God, does not mean that they are no longer burdened with duties because it is God who has created them and they are like prisoners in his hand. According to al-Kūrānī, the assumption that unity and existence and the divine imposition of duties contradict each other stems from the fact that the people concerned did not correctly understand the concept of acquisition (
kasb), which is based on the unity of existence. In the seventh section, al-Kūrānī admonishes the reader to be aware that the profession of the unity of existence does not contradict the statement of the master of the Sufis
al-Junayd: "
Tawhid is the separation of the pre-existent from the produced" (
al-tawḥīd ifrād al-qadīm min al-muḥdath), nor the teaching of the
Sunnis that tawhīd is the rejection of the likening (
tashbīh) of God with creation on the one hand and the complete emptying (
taʿṭīl) of God on the other. Regarding the statement of al-Junayd, al-Kūrānī considers that the doctrine of the unity of existence does not contradict it because its proponents have clearly stated that the universal truths (
al-ḥaqāʾiq al-kullīya) are limited to three types: • a part of them is related to the True One (
al-Ḥaqq) and belongs to Him. These include divinity (
ulūhīya), the all-encompassing essential mercy (
al-raḥma al-dhātīya), which in terms of abundance (
al-fayyāḍīya) is existence, necessity (
wujūb), permanence (
al-qaiyūmīya), which is subsistence in itself, the establishment of others, self-sufficiency (
al-ghinā al-dhātī), and the like. • the second part is related to the world (
kawn) and belongs to it. These include need (
al-faqr), essential nothingness (
al-ʿadmīya al-dhātīya), lowliness (
dhilla), contingency (
imkān) and multiplicity. • the third part is that which is directly related to the True One and indirectly related to the world through the addition of existence. This includes, for example, knowledge, will, power and the like, which can relate to God, in which case they are pre-existent (
qadīm), or to the world, in which case they are secondarily occurring (
ḥādith). As long as this is the case, the essentially eternal existence is separated from the things produced, as al-Junayd also taught, even though they clearly state that the things produced are individuations and relations of the absolute essentially eternal existence, as well as manifestations of the names and attributes. As for the second point, namely the compatibility of the confession of the unity of existence with the Sunni rejection of the likening and emptying of God, it is known that "the truth-finders from the people of clear revelation and right tasting" (
al-muḥaqqiqūn min ahl al-kashf al-ṣarīḥ wa-l-dhawq al-ṣaḥīḥ), who taught the unity of existence, adhered to the belief that appropriately combines the acquittal (
tanzīh) of God from all the properties of the created beings with the confirmation of the likening attributes, this on the basis of
kashf and experience, confirmed by the Qur'an and the Sunna. Because, as al-Kūrānī explains, they clearly state that God is not bound to any states of being (
akwān), even if He reveals Himself in the manifestations of the names. Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī speaks about Wahdat al-wujūd in another passage, namely when commenting on the explanation of the author that the existence identical with God is one, but the types of its clothing (
albās) are different and varied. Al-Kūrānī explains this diversity with the diversity of qualities (
shuʾūn), names, realities and fixed entities, while reiterating that this diversity and variety does not affect the unity of existence (
waḥdat al-wujūd) because it is one of the requirements of its essential absoluteness. In two other writings, al-Kūrānī responded to questions from Southeast Asian Muslims who apparently interpreted Wahdat al-wujūd in a pantheistic sense. These were: • the two-folio
Mirqāt al-ṣuʿūd ilā ṣiḥḥat al-qawl bi-waḥdat al-wujūd. In this treatise, al-Kūrānī rejected an extreme notion held by some Southeast Asian Sufis who claimed that Muhammad possessed divine aspects and that this was the true meaning of
wahdat al-wujūd. He contrasts this with what he believes to be the correct meaning of this doctrine. According to it, God is absolute existence in the true sense of absoluteness - that which is not limited by anything in the cosmos - and manifests itself in created forms without being limited by these forms. Al-Kūrānī responds to this idea that the doctrine of wahdat al-wujūd is correct from the point of view of religious law (
šarʿan) because it is consistent with the Qur'an and the Sunnah. • The second writing was al-Kūrānī's treatise
al-Maslak al-jalī fī ḥukm shaṭḥ al-walī. In this treatise, al-Kūrānī mentions that in the year 1084 of the
Hijra (= 1673/74 CE) he received a letter from Southeast Asia in which it was reported that some people there said: "God is ourselves and our existence, and we are He Himself and His existence" (
inna Llāha taʿālā nafsunā wa-wujūdunā, wa-naḥnu nafsuhū wa-wujūduhū). The letter asked whether this statement could be interpreted in a figurative sense or whether it represented open disbelief. In his reply, al-Kūrānī explains that God, the absolute existence, is different from human existence and from contingent existence in general.
ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī Although Ahmad Sirhindī had spoken out against Wahdat al-Wujūd at the beginning of the 17th century, some of the most prominent Naqshbandi Sufis in the
Ottoman Empire also returned to this teaching in the 18th century, for example
Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d. 1731) in Damascus. He wrote two treatises on this subject:
Īḍāḥ al-maqṣūd min waḥdat al-wujūd ("Explanation of what is meant by the Unity of Existence") and
al-Wujūd al-ḥaqq ("The Existence, the True One").
Īḍāḥ al-maqṣūd min waḥdat al-wujūd Al-Nābulusī wrote the treatise
Īḍāḥ al-maqṣūd min waḥdat al-wujūd in 1680. As he later stated in
al-Wujūd al-ḥaqq, he drew for it on the knowledge of
Abū Bakr, whose knowledge, according to him, was based on “the secrets of Unity of Existence" (
asrār waḥdat al-wujūd). The actual intention of the treatise becomes clear right at the beginning, where the author, following the
Hamdala, describes God as the one who is characterized by the unity of existence, as it is known to the people of observation (
muʿāyana) and experience (
shuhūd), not according to the wrong meaning among the people of
Ilḥād and
Zandaqa. The treatise was directed against what it considered to be false interpretations of Wahdat al-Wujūd and aimed to determine the true meaning of this term. The wrong interpretations were, in his opinion, also the reason why this doctrine had been rejected by mentally limited and narrow-minded people. In reality, however, al-Nābulusī asserts, this teaching is in agreement with the teaching of the
Sunnis. According to al-Nābulusī, the controversy over the
wahdat al-wujūd doctrine is ultimately due to the different interpretations of the word "existence" (
wujūd). Whoever interprets this word precisely as the essence of existence (
ʿain ḏāt al-wujūd) rejects
wahdat al-wujūd because he claims a newly emerged existence (
wujūd ḥādith) that coincides with the essence of the existent. His rejection of the
wahdat al-wujūd doctrine is, however, a mistake, since this newly emerged existence, which he claims is a second existence alongside the existence of God, in his opinion nevertheless consists in the existence of God (
qāʾim bi-wujūd Allāh), so that for him too, ultimately all existence goes back to the existence of God. On the other hand, whoever interprets existence as that through which every created being exists, accepts the
wahdat al-wujūd doctrine and considers it to be true, which is the correct standpoint to which all doctrines ultimately lead. Al-Nābulusī explains the different understandings of existence with a comparison: If one dissolves
vitriol or
cinnabar in water so that it changes color, then the water has a real existence and the vitriol or cinnabar only an assumed
virtual existence (
wujūd mafrūḍ muqaddar). One can therefore assume that these are different existences. The proponents of
wahdat al-wujūd, however, meant by "existence" only that through which the existent becomes existent, not the assumed virtual existence. But ultimately even the scholars of externals (
rusūm) and Kalām, who consider the assumed virtual existence as an existence in its own right, would have to admit the truth of
wahdat al-wujūd, since the assumed virtual existence only exists through the existence of God. It requires a first existence. All of them thus voluntarily or inevitably taught the unity of existence. As for the ignorant proponents of
wahdat al-wujūd who claimed that their supposed virtual existence was the existence of God and also their attributes were the attributes of God in order to overthrow the Shari'ah rules, dissolve the Muhammadan community and get rid of the obligation (
taklīf), it is justified to denigrate them for their false teaching, and the scholars of the outside world (
ʿulamāʾ aẓ-ẓāhir) would also be rewarded by God for this denigration. However, when these scholars proceed from denigrating this vulgar mob, which deviates from religion like an arrow from its trajectory, to denigrating the ruling Imams of the Knowers of Truth, believing that the latter taught
wahdat al-wujūd in a similar sense, this was reprehensible in religion and unacceptable to those who believe in God and the Last Day.
al-Wujūd al-ḥaqq In
al-Wujūd al-ḥaqq, al-Nābulusī emphasized the difference between the unity of existence and the multiplicity of existents (
kathrat al-mawjūd). He wrote in it: {{Quote|Even if you hear us speaking of
wahdat al-wujūd, don't think that we are speaking about it according to the beliefs of the people of ignorance, stubbornness, error and ingratitude. Rather, we are making a distinction between the unity of existence and the multiplicity of existents. Regarding the difference between existence and existing things, al-Nābulusī explains that the former is the origin (
aṣl), while the latter follow it, emerge from it and exist in it. The meaning of "existing" (
mawjūd) is a thing that has existence, not existence itself. What is being talked about is the unity of existence, not the unity of the existent. The existing is not one, but there is multiplicity in it, as the Koran says in surah 7:86 : "And remember (the times) when you were few and He made you many!"
Shah Waliullah Dehlawi The Indian scholar
Shah Waliullah Dehlawi (d. 1762) studied the doctrine of wahdat al-wujūd intensively as well. He believed that wahdat al-wujūd "according to the taste of the philosopher" (
ʿalā ḏauq al-ḥakīm) differs from wahdat al-wujūd according to the
opinion of others. Sadr ad-Dīn al-Qūnawī's statement on this says, according to him, "that existence is comprehensive and common to all beings, is an
imagination (
tamaṯṯul) of the necessary
reality (
al-ḥaqīqa al-wuǧūbīya) and emanates from it". In his work
at-Tafhīmāt al-ilāhīya, Shah Waliullah Dehlawi explained that the realization of the belief in existential unity (
taḥqīq tauḥīd al-wujūdī) consists in "that in the external and in the
thing in itself there is only one reality, namely existence, and that in the sense of self-realization (
taḥaqquq) and confirmation (
taqarrur), not in the original sense (
lā bi-l-maʿnā al-maṣdarī)." The rest of existing things, explains Shāh Walīyallāh, rose and appeared in it, just as the forms of the waves rise in the sea or the accidents appear in their substrates. The core of their nature as existing things is that they have a connection to the reality of existence. For the Sufis who profess unity (
al-ṣūfīya al-muwaḥḥida), all realities are accidents of existence. However, these realities that appear in existence are not independent things, but rather qualities and aspects of reality (
shuʾūn al-wujūd wa-iʿtibārātuh) in the sense that existence, when it reveals itself, shows numerous receptivities, so that it embodies itself in one form and another in another, and is then called either human or horse. In a letter to the Medina-based Ottoman scholar Afandī Ismāʿīl ibn ʿAbdallāh, Shah Waliullah commented on the difference between wahdat al-wujūd and wahdat al-shuhūd. The Ottoman scholar had asked him to make a comparison (
taṭbīq) between the two concepts. Shah Waliullah explained in his reply that the two expressions were used in two different contexts: • Firstly, they were used in connection with the mystical journey to God (
al-sayr ilā Llāh). Thus, it is said that a certain
sālik, that is, a walker on the mystical path, is at the station (
maqām) of wahdat al-wujūd, while another has reached the station of wahdat al-shuhūd. Wahdat al-wujūd here means immersing oneself in the knowledge of the unifying truth (
maʿrifat al-ḥaqīqa al-jāmiʿa), in which the world becomes individualized, in such a way that all judgments of differentiation and separation (
aḥkām al-tafriqa wa-l-tamāyuz), on which the knowledge of good and evil is based and on which clear statements are made about the religious law (
sharʿ) and the intellect (
ʿaql), are lost. Some travellers remain at this station until God releases them from it. The meaning of wahdat al-shuhūd, on the other hand, is the connection of the judgments of connection and separation (
al-jamʿ wa-l-tafriqa). The walker of the mystical path then knows that things are one (
wāḥida) from one aspect and many (
kathīra) from another. This latter stage of the journey is more perfect and higher than the first. • On the other hand, the expressions are also used to describe different points of view in the knowledge of the realities of things (
maʿrifat ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ) and the nature of the connection between what has come into being in time (
al-ḥādith) and the pre-existent (
al-qadīm). According to one group, the world consists of
accidents that are combined in a single truth (
aʿrāḍ mujtamiʿa fī ḥaqīqa wāḥida), just as wax can take on the form of a human being, a horse and a donkey, while the nature of the wax remains the same in all of these. Although wax is named after the forms it has assumed, these forms are in reality still representations (
tamāṯīl) that only have existence through the wax. Another school, on the other hand, sees the world as reflections of the divine names and attributes (
ʿukūs al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt), which are reflected in the mirrors of the non-existences (
al-aʿdām al-mutaqābila) that face them. For example, when the light of divine power (
qudra) is reflected in the mirror of its non-existence, namely powerlessness (
ʿajz), it becomes contingent power (
qudra mumkina). The same applies analogously to other attributes and also to existence itself. The school of thought of the first group is called wahdat al-wujūd and that of the second wahdat asch-shuhūd. In contrast to Ahmad al-Sirhindī, who had distinguished between wahdat al-wujūd as a metaphysical teaching and wahdat ash-shuhūd as a mystical experience, Shah Waliullah believed that both concepts have a mystical and a metaphysical quality. The starting point for Shah Waliullah's preoccupation with the topic was a dream he had in 1731 during his stay in the
Hijaz and describes in his work
Fuyūḍ al-Ḥaramayn. In it, he saw a crowd of people. Half of them were engaged in
Dhikr and Yād-Dāsht ("concentration on God"). Lights appeared on their hearts and freshness and beauty on their faces, and they did not believe in wahdat al-wujūd. The other half believed in wahdat al-wujūd and were busy contemplating the divine permeation of existence (
sarayān al-wujūd). Their hearts showed shame and despondency in the view of God, who is busy controlling the world in general and souls in particular. Their faces looked desiccated. The two groups argued, each claiming that their way (
ṭarīqa) was better than the other. When they could not resolve their dispute, they turned to Shah Waliullah to seek his judgment. In a long speech, he stated that wahdat al-wujūd was a true teaching, but those who believed in it were so absorbed in thinking about the immanence of God in the world that they lost the worship of God, the love of God and the transcendence of God.
Ismāʿīl al-Gelenbevī On the grounds that the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujūd had become known among prominent scholars and was one of the dangerous places where feet slipped (
mazāliq al-aqdām), the Ottoman theologian and mathematician Ismāʿīl ibn Mustafā al-Gelenbevī (d. 1791), who was active in
Istanbul, wrote a treatise on this topic too. In it he based his work on the distinction already made by Ibn Sabʿīn and al-Qāshānī between the necessarily existent, i.e. God, and the contingently existent, which means everything that is not divine. In his treatise, al-Gelenbevī first makes it clear that he considers the view of
wahdat al-wujūd popular among a group of Sufis, according to which the necessary is "the sum of the parts of the world" (
majmūʿ ajzāʾ al-ʿālam), to be blatant disbelief (
kufr ṣarīḥ). In order to explain what he considered to be the correct philosophical doctrine of wahdat al-wujūd, he draws the following analogy: With this simile, al-Gelenbevī wanted to make it clear that contingent things have no existence of their own apart from the necessary existence, but exist solely through the existence of the necessary, i.e. God. The obvious existence of every contingent existent is the existence of the necessary, not another independent existence. Rather, the other independent existence is as imaginary and a product of the imagination as the uprightness of the threads or as mirror images. According to al-Gelenbevī, the counterparts of those who teach the unity of existence are those who teach the multiplicity of existence (
kathrat al-wujūd). They attribute to each contingent existent an existence of its own, which is not connected to the existence of the necessarily existent. According to al-Gelenbewī, what the proponents of
wahdat al-wujūd teach inevitably means that all effects and actions that appear to emanate from the non-necessary actually emanate from God. What has confused the rational people, however, is the fact that the totality of these effects and actions also includes that which is disgraceful (
qabīḥ) according to the
Sharia and reason. Many scholars have therefore accused Muhyī l-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, Sadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī and other great "representatives of unity" (
ahl al-waḥda) of
unbelief. But there is no reason to declare them unbelievers because it is also Sunni teaching that there is compulsion in people's actions and what appears to be shameful does not come about through the voluntary choice (
ikhtiyār) of people, but is predetermined from all eternity (
azalī). == Wahdat al-wujūd as the true meaning of the formula Lā ilāh illā Llāh ==