High Court Sir Robert Megarry VC held that the
European Convention on Human Rights was not justiciable in England, and therefore Article 8 of the convention created no legal or
equitable right. When tapping was done for crime prevention by the
Post Office for police, there was no law against it. Tapping on the warrant of the Home Secretary was effective in law. Unlike searches and seizures involving trespass, there was no immunity based on a property right (except copyright) in telephone conversations, and no general right of privacy at
common law or under the
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 section 5, which related only to unauthorised interceptions. Nor did Malone have any contractual right of confidentiality from telephones, and breach of any confidentiality right was excused for detecting or preventing crime. In any case the Post Office intercepted the messages, so a claim against the Metropolitan Police would fail in its entirety. A matter so complex as phone tapping was for Parliament, not the Courts. Megarry VC remarked that the situation in English law compared very unfavourably to West Germany, exemplified by the
Klass case, and cried out for legislation, which would be compatible with the Convention. In the course of his judgment he said the following:
European Court of Human Rights The European Court of Human Rights held that the UK allowing the phone tapping was in breach of its obligations under
ECHR article 8, because there was no express law that indicated "with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities." There was an interference with article 8, which was not justified because phone tapping was not "in accordance with the law". This required adequate clarity about circumstances in which one's communications may be intercepted. ==Significance==