Preparations and prelude Crewmen aboard
Minas Geraes began planning for a revolt years before 1910, according to João Cândido, an experienced sailor who would later become the leader of the Revolt of the Lash. The conspirators were motivated by the treatment of enlisted men in the Brazilian Navy, extending beyond the lash to even their substandard food, which led to not-uncommon outbreaks of
beriberi. Some had formed a committee and had been meeting secretly for years in Rio de Janeiro. This semi-formal organization was only expanded when they were sent to
Newcastle in the United Kingdom for training—the operation of such large and complex warships required specific skills. When interviewed years after the mutiny, Cândido said that they "maintained the committees in the very hotels where we were residing, awaiting the construction of the ships. Almost two years paid by the Brazilian government, we sent messengers to sound out the situation here [in Brazil]. We did this so that when we arrive, we would be prepared to act"—they were just "waiting for a date and for power," referring to the brand-new warships. The experience of these crewmen in the United Kingdom was such that historian Zachary Morgan believes that it was a pivotal formative period in shaping the later mutiny. The sailors were paid on time, in cash, and received extra money because they had to buy their own meals; during their time there they faced little if any discrimination; and the
Armstrong shipyard workers
unionized and even successfully went on
strike in the meantime, delaying the completion of the new Brazilian warships. Moreover, they were able to observe their British
Royal Navy counterparts—an experience that Morgan says would have been "jarring" because these sailors "were no longer impressed, no longer lashed, [and] were accepted as citizens." The revolt started shortly after the brutal 250 lashes given to
Marcelino Rodrigues Menezes, a regular Afro-Brazilian enlisted sailor, for bringing two bottles of
cachaça on board the ship. There is some scholarly disagreement on if this number is correct and exactly when this sentence was carried out, but all agree that it was the immediate catalyst. A later Brazilian government observer, former navy captain
José Carlos de Carvalho, told the president of Brazil that Menezes' back looked like "a
mullet sliced open for salting."
Mutiny newspaper on 24 November 1910 A significant percentage of the naval crewmen stationed in Rio de Janeiro, perhaps 1,500 to 2,000 out of 4,000, revolted at around 10 pm on 22 November. They began on
Minas Geraes, where the ship's commander and several loyal crewmen were killed, and the gunfire on board the dreadnought alerted the other ships in the harbor that the revolt had begun. By midnight, the rebels had
São Paulo, the new cruiser
Bahia, and the coast-defense ship all under control, with the "Admiral" João Cândido in overall command. The crews of the smaller
minelayer , the
training ship , and the
torpedo boats and all revolted as well, but they made up only two percent of the overall mutineers. The majority of
Repúblicas crew left to bolster
São Paulo and
Deodoro; those aboard the other ships either joined with the rebels or fled ashore. While most officers were allowed to peacefully leave their ships after the uprisings began, there were notable exceptions: on
Minas Geraes, for instance, officers on board had time to draw their weapons and defend themselves. The ship's captain, , was killed in the fighting along with several loyal and rebel crewmen. Other bloodshed was much more limited: on the cruiser
Bahia, the only officer present was killed after he shot a rebel crewman, and one lieutenant on
São Paulo killed himself. Civilian technicians (some of them British), machinists, and other personnel integral to the warships were kept aboard without violence. By the end of the evening, key warships that remained in government hands included
Bahias sister , the aging cruiser , and the new destroyers of the
Pará class. Their potential power, however, was dwarfed by the dreadnoughtseach of which outgunned the combined firepower of all of the warships that remainedand was severely tempered by personnel issues. First, naval officers were suspicious of even those enlisted men who remained loyal to the government. Officers took over all of the positions that would be involved in direct combat, and the numbers of enlisted men were reduced wherever possible. Further complicating matters were missing weapon components, such as
firing caps for the destroyers'
torpedoes, without which they could not be fired. When caps were finally located and delivered, they did not fit the newer torpedoes carried by the destroyers. The correct caps were only fitted two days after the revolt began. Before midnight on 22 November, the rebels sent a telegraph to the president, reading "We do not want the return of the
chibata [lash]. This we ask the President of the republic and the Minister of the Navy. We want an immediate response. If we do not receive such a response, we will destroy the city and the ships that are not revolting." Fonseca, however, refused to allow any direct contact between himself and the mutineers. Instead, the rebel force moved to Ilha do Viana at 1 am on 23 November to coal and take on supplies to guard against the possibility of an extended siege. After the sun rose, the bodies of the dead sailors from
Minas Geraes were sent on a launch to
Ilha das Cobras, along with a letter from João Cândido—who was in command of the rebel armada—and his fellow sailors to the Brazilian president
Hermes da Fonseca, the nephew of the first president who had been in office for only one week. It included a demand for the end of the 'slavery' being practiced by the navy—most notably the continued use of the lash despite its ban in every other Western nation: During the same morning, the rebel ships fired on several army forts located around
Guanabara Bay, along with the naval arsenal and bases on Ilha das Cobras and
Villegagnon Island,
Niterói, and the presidential palace. One shell hit a home on
Castello Hill, killing two children; while there may have been other casualties, the deaths of these children clearly weighed on the rebels' consciences. Cândido still remembered them decades later, where in an interview he stated that he and his crewmen collected money from their "miserable pay" to pay to bury the children. Broadly speaking, however, it appears that the ships were well-handled and commanded. Contemporary observers were surprised to note that the crewmen, despite lacking white officers, had complete control of their warships and were able to stay in good formation as they circled around the bay. The rebels favored firing over the city or around government-controlled military targets rather than outright destruction, something that Zachary Morgan believes was motivated by either humanitarian concerns or (at the very least) pragmatism—by limiting the actual damage, they could gain support among legislators, the press, and general population. This has, however, caused a historiographical argument among scholars that persists to this day. Onshore, civilians woke on the morning of 23 November to find that the most powerful ships in their navy, crewed by the lowest of the underclass, were firing on the city. Thousands quickly fled, although nearly all were unable to. The press initially stoked these peoples' fears, although they later flipped to lionizing the rebels, portraying them as heroes. Fonseca and the navy's high command were faced with two extremely unpalatable choices. They could use the government-controlled ships to attack and possibly destroy the rebel ships, but doing so would mean destroying three incredibly expensive ships that had received significant global attention and were—in their eyes—a
crucial part of refashioning Brazil as a serious international power. Worse, there was a significant chance that the remaining Brazilian ships, all of which were smaller and much older than the ships controlled by the mutineers, would lose if it came to open combat. But by folding and giving into the rebel's list of demands—that is, demands from the underclass and broadly black naval crews—the elites would suffer an incredible embarrassment. Fonseca chose both. First, the Brazilian Congress began negotiating with the mutineers, although this was not Fonseca's preferred solution—he and the Minister of the Navy Marques Leão began plotting a military solution. At the behest of Congress, José Carlos de Carvalho was appointed as a liaison to the rebels. Carvalho, a federal deputy and former naval captain, talked with the crew on all four ships and reported to Congress that the rebels were well led and organized—and their main armament was fully functional. His report showed that the sailor's complaints, especially about the lash, were well justified and that a military option would be unlikely to succeed. By the afternoon on 23 November, the Brazilian Congress had begun work on a bill that would grant amnesty to all involved and end the use of corporal punishment in the navy. Pressed by his navy minister, Forseca did not yet give up on the military option. On the same afternoon, the rebels received an illicit telegram warning from the government-held
destroyer that they were planning to attack. In response, the rebels moved outside of the bay for the evening in an attempt to make any torpedo-led assault more difficult. They returned on 24 November at 10 am, a day where
Correio da Manhã was the first press source to refer to Cândido as the "admiral" of the rebel fleet. They later noted: In Congress, the influential senator and losing presidential candidate
Rui Barbosa championed the rebels' cause. Barbosa used the navy officials' rhetoric against them in arguing for a diplomatic solution, noting that if the new dreadnoughts were as unsinkable as they claimed, the remaining warships in government hands would certainly not be able to force a military victory. Furthermore, he argued, if such an attack had the support of Congress and failed, any resulting destruction of Rio de Janeiro would be considered their fault. These arguments won Barbosa much support in the Senate, so much that the body began working on an amnesty that would absolve the mutineers of all criminal charges once the ships were turned back over to the government. After hours of debate, the bill was passed unanimously that day and sent to the lower Chamber of Deputies on 25 November. Naval leaders disagreed and continued planning for a military confrontation. Zachary Morgan writes that "naval leaders believed that only a military confrontation with the rebels would restore their lost honor," and that any such action would have to take place before an amnesty was approved. That left very little time. The aforementioned armament and personnel problems handicapped the government ships; an attempt to procure the necessary torpedoes was foiled by
Deodoros guns. When night fell on 23 November, radio messages about available torpedoes to the government destroyers, huddled for protection, did not reach the ships. They were only able to obtain these weapons on 24 November, and during that night, Fonseca ordered them to attack the rebel ships. However, they were not given the chance to attack, as the rebel armada did not return to Guanabara Bay until the amnesty was passed by Congress. It is not known if the rebels were warned or were simply taking defensive precautions. The amnesty was passed by the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of 125–23. Under the threat of having a veto overridden, Fonseca signed the amnesty. The rebels returned on 26 November after a short period of consternation—additional demands, such as an increase in salary, had yet to be proposed in Congress, much less passed—with their ships in formation,
Minas Geraes leading
São Paulo, with
Bahia and
Deodoro to each side. By 7 pm, the mutineers officially accepted the amnesty provisions. == Aftermath ==