Casualties U.S. estimates of Khmer Rouge casualties were 13–25 killed on Koh Tang with an unknown number killed on Swift Boats and on the Cambodian mainland. and an Air Force crewman killed in the crash of
Knife 31; an Air Force crewman killed in the crash of
Knife 21; one Marine killed in action on the West Beach; and three Marines missing in action and presumed dead. Fifty were wounded Between 1991 and 1999, U.S. and Cambodian investigators conducted seven joint investigations, led by the JTF-FA. On three occasions Cambodian authorities unilaterally turned over remains believed to be those of American servicemen. In October and November 1995, U.S. and Cambodian specialists conducted an underwater recovery of the
Knife 31 crash site where they located numerous remains, personal effects and aircraft debris associated with the loss. , a U.S. Navy salvage vessel, enabled the specialists to conduct their excavation offshore. In addition to the support provided by the Cambodian government, the Government of Vietnam also interviewed two Vietnamese informants in
Ho Chi Minh City who turned over remains that were later positively identified. As a result of these investigations the remains of
Second Lieutenant Richard Vandegeer, Lance Corporals Gregory S Copenhaver and Andres Garcia and Privates First Class Lynn Blessing, Walter Boyd, Antonio R Sandoval and Kelton R. Turner were identified.{{refn| • First Lieutenant Donald Backlund, pilot of
Jolly Green 11 • First Lieutenant Richard C. Brims, pilot of
Knife 51 •
Staff Sergeant Jon Harston, flight mechanic of
Knife 31 Second Lieutenant James V. McDaniel, platoon commander of Company G, 2/9 Marines was awarded the
Navy Cross. Two Airmen and four Marines were awarded the
Silver Star: • Technical Sergeant
Wayne Fisk, a pararescueman on
Knife 51. • First Lieutenant Bob Blough, pilot of
Jolly Green 44. • Lieutenant Colonel Randall W. Austin, the commanding officer of 2/9 Marines. • First Lieutenant Michael S. Eustis, USMC, the artillery liaison officer of 2/9 Marines. • First Lieutenant James D. Keith, USMC, the executive officer of Company G, 2/9 Marines. • First Lieutenant Terry L. Tonkin, USMC, the forward air controller of 2/9 Marines. Although the
Mayaguez incident did not occur in Vietnam, it is commonly referred to as the last battle of the Vietnam War. However, U.S. military personnel who participated in it are not eligible for the
Vietnam Service Medal by virtue of participating in that battle alone. The
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal is authorized instead for military members who participated in the battle. A congressional bill was introduced in 2016 to award veterans of the
Mayaguez battle the medal, but the bill was referred to committee, effectively ending it.
Impact on Kampuchea The U.S. air attacks destroyed a large part of the Khmer Navy and Air Force weakening them for the war with Vietnam over the disputed islands. In mid-June Vietnam attacked Poulo Wai and fought the Khmer Rouge before withdrawing in August and recognising it as Kampuchean territory. U-Tapao air base had been used by U.S. rescue forces despite an explicit refusal of permission by the relatively new civilian Thai government of
Kukrit Pramoj. However Ford's public approval ratings fell off quickly and precipitously as details of the incident and casualty figures became better known. On 23 June 1975, the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs asked the
General Accounting Office to review all aspects of the incident. On the War Powers Resolution, the General Accounting Office report's assessment was "The available evidence suggests less than full compliance with Section 3 [of the War Powers Resolution]." The paramount objective during the crisis, as Scowcroft later explained, "was to make it clear, to everyone, to our friends, to potential opponents, that notwithstanding the fact that we had just withdrawn from Southeast Asia under fairly ignominious circumstances, if you will, that the United States understood its interests and was prepared to protect them." Schlesinger later said the same thing, acknowledging the primary reason for the use of force was “to make quite clear to all parties that the United States was still an effective force." Although the general goal was to reinforce the US reputation for defending its interests, the main concern in that regard was the Korean Peninsula. As Scowcroft related in 1980, "To the extent that we were looking anywhere specifically, it was primarily probably not Southeast Asia at that time, but at Korea," where the renewal of the long-simmering conflict between the two Koreas was considered a real possibility. In addition to the failure of intelligence to determine the whereabouts of the crew of
Mayaguez and the presence of a sizable hostile force on Koh Tang, the timing of the operation was questioned until it became clear that combat had been underway four hours before the crew was released. Within the services, the Marines in particular were critical of the
ad hoc nature of the joint operation and the perceived pressure from the Administration for hasty action, although the success of Operation Frequent Wind had been the basis for many decisions made during the crisis.
Vice Admiral George P. Steele, the Seventh Fleet commander, later stated that: "The sad part of the
Mayaguez is that we had sufficient force coming up with the Seventh Fleet, after it had been turned around from the evacuation of Vietnam stand down, to seize Southern Cambodia. I begged for another day or two, rather than commit forces piecemeal as we did .... The idea that we could use U.S. Air Force air police and Air Force helicopters as an assault force appears to me as ridiculous today as it did then." The former
Knife 22, number 68-10928, upgraded to MH-53M Pave Low is on display at Memorial Air Park,
Hurlburt Field, Florida. ==See also==