In his book
The Selfish Gene (1976), the evolutionary biologist
Richard Dawkins used the term
meme to describe a unit of human
cultural transmission analogous to the
gene, arguing that replication also happens in
culture, albeit in a different sense. While
cultural evolution itself is a much older topic, with a history that dates back at least as far as
Darwin's era, Dawkins (1976) proposed that the meme is a unit of culture residing in the brain and is the mutating
replicator in human cultural evolution. After Dawkins, many discussed this unit of culture as evolutionary "information" which replicates with rules analogous to
Darwinian selection. A
replicator is a pattern that can influence its surroundings – that is, it has
causal agency – and can propagate. This proposal resulted in debate among anthropologists, sociologists, biologists, and scientists of other disciplines. Dawkins did not provide a comprehensive explanation of how replication of units of information in the brain controls human behaviour and culture, as the main focus of the book was on gene expression. Dawkins apparently did not intend to present a comprehensive theory of
memetics in
The Selfish Gene, but rather coined the term
meme in a speculative spirit. Accordingly, different researchers came to define the term "unit of information" in different ways. The evolutionary model of cultural information transfer is based on the concept that memes—units of information—have an independent existence, are self-replicating, and are subject to selective evolution through environmental forces. Starting from a proposition put forward in the writings of Dawkins, this model has formed the basis of a new area of study, one that looks at the self-replicating units of culture. It has been proposed that just as memes are analogous to genes, memetics is analogous to genetics. The modern memetics movement dates from the mid-1980s. A January 1983 "
Metamagical Themas" column by
Douglas Hofstadter, in
Scientific American, was influential – as was his 1985 book of the same name. "Memeticist" was coined as analogous to "geneticist" – originally in
The Selfish Gene. Later Arel Lucas suggested that the discipline that studies memes and their connections to human and other carriers of them be known as "memetics" by analogy with "genetics". and was accelerated with the publication in 1996 of two more books by authors outside the academic mainstream:
Virus of the Mind: The New Science of the Meme by former
Microsoft executive turned motivational speaker and professional poker-player
Richard Brodie, and
Thought Contagion: How Belief Spreads Through Society by
Aaron Lynch, a mathematician and philosopher who worked for many years as an engineer at
Fermilab. Lynch claimed to have conceived his theory totally independently of any contact with academics in the cultural evolutionary sphere, and apparently was not aware of
The Selfish Gene until his book was very close to publication. Around the same time as the publication of the books by Lynch and Brodie the e-journal
Journal of Memetics – Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission (published electronically from 1997 to 2005) first appeared. It was first hosted by the Centre for Policy Modelling at
Manchester Metropolitan University. The e-journal soon became the central point for publication and debate within the nascent memeticist community. (There had been a short-lived paper-based memetics publication starting in 1990, the
Journal of Ideas edited by Elan Moritz.) In 1999,
Susan Blackmore, a psychologist at the
University of the West of England, published
The Meme Machine, which more fully worked out the ideas of Dennett, Lynch, and Brodie and attempted to compare and contrast them with various approaches from the cultural evolutionary mainstream, as well as providing novel (and controversial) memetics-based theories for the evolution of language and the human sense of individual selfhood.
Etymology The term
meme derives from the
Ancient Greek μιμητής (
mimētḗs), meaning "imitator, pretender". The similar term
mneme was used in 1904, by the German evolutionary biologist
Richard Semon, best known for his development of the
engram theory of
memory, in his work
Die mnemischen Empfindungen in ihren Beziehungen zu den Originalempfindungen, translated into English in 1921 as
The Mneme. Until
Daniel Schacter published
Forgotten Ideas, Neglected Pioneers: Richard Semon and the Story of Memory in 2000, Semon's work had little influence, though it was quoted extensively in
Erwin Schrödinger’s 1956
Tarner Lecture “
Mind and Matter”. Richard Dawkins (1976) apparently coined the word
meme independently of Semon, writing this: Mimeme' comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like 'gene'. I hope my classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme. If it is any consolation, it could alternatively be thought of as being related to 'memory', or to the French word même."
David Hull (2001) pointed out Dawkins's oversight of Semon's work. Hull suggests this early work as an alternative origin to memetics by which Dawkins's memetic theory and classicist connection to the concept can be negotiated."Why not date the beginnings of memetics (or mnemetics) as 1904 or at the very least 1914? If [Semon's] two publications are taken as the beginnings of memetics, then the development of memetics [...] has been around for almost a hundred years without much in the way of conceptual or empirical advance!"Despite this, Semon's work remains mostly understood as distinct to memetic origins even with the overt similarities accounted for by Hull.
Internalists and externalists The memetics movement split almost immediately into two. The first group were those who wanted to stick to Dawkins' definition of a meme as "a unit of
cultural transmission". Gibron Burchett, a memeticist responsible for helping to research and co-coin the term
memetic engineering, along with Leveious Rolando and Larry Lottman, has stated that a meme can be defined, more precisely, as "a unit of
cultural information that can be copied, located in the brain". This thinking is more in line with Dawkins' second definition of the meme in his book
The Extended Phenotype. The second group wants to redefine memes as observable
cultural artifacts and behaviors. However, in contrast to those two positions, the article "Consciousness in meme machines" by Susan Blackmore rejects neither movement. Andrej Drapal tried to bridge the gap with his differentiation of memes as quantum entities existing per se in quantum superposition and collapsing when detected by brains from cultural artifacts. Memes are to artifacts as genotypes are to phenotypes. These two schools became known as the "internalists" and the "externalists." Prominent internalists included both Lynch and Brodie; the most vocal externalists included Derek Gatherer, a geneticist from
Liverpool John Moores University, and William Benzon, a writer on cultural evolution and music. The main rationale for externalism was that internal brain entities are not observable, and memetics cannot advance as a science, especially a
quantitative science, unless it moves its emphasis onto the directly quantifiable aspects of culture. Internalists countered with various arguments: that brain states will eventually be directly observable with advanced technology, that most cultural anthropologists agree that culture is about
beliefs and not artifacts, or that artifacts cannot be replicators in the same sense as mental entities (or DNA) are replicators. The debate became so heated that a 1998 Symposium on Memetics, organised as part of the 15th International Conference on
Cybernetics, passed a motion calling for an end to definitional debates. McNamara demonstrated in 2011 that functional connectivity profiling using neuroimaging tools enables the observation of the processing of internal memes, "i-memes", in response to external "e-memes". This was developed further in a paper "Memetics and Neural Models of Conspiracy Theories" by Duch, where a model of memes as a quasi-stable neural associative memory
attractor network is proposed, and a formation of
Memeplex leading to conspiracy theories illustrated with the simulation of a self-organizing network. An advanced statement of the internalist school came in 2002 with the publication of
The Electric Meme, by Robert Aunger, an anthropologist from the
University of Cambridge. Aunger also organised a conference in Cambridge in 1999, at which prominent sociologists and anthropologists were able to give their assessment of the progress made in memetics to that date. This resulted in the publication of
Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science, edited by Aunger and with a foreword by Dennett, in 2001.
Decline In 2005, the
Journal of Memetics ceased publication and published a set of articles on the future of memetics. The website states that although "there was to be a relaunch... after several years nothing has happened".
Susan Blackmore left the University of the West of England to become a freelance science-writer and now concentrates more on the field of consciousness and cognitive science. Derek Gatherer moved to work as a computer programmer in the pharmaceutical industry, although he still occasionally publishes on memetics-related matters.
Richard Brodie is now climbing the world professional poker rankings.
Aaron Lynch disowned the memetics community and the words "meme" and "memetics" (without disowning the ideas in his book), adopting the self-description "thought contagionist". He died in 2005.
Susan Blackmore (2002) re-stated the definition of meme as: whatever is copied from one person to another person, whether habits, skills, songs, stories, or any other kind of information. Further she said that memes, like genes, are replicators in the sense as defined by Dawkins. That is, they are information that is copied. Memes are copied by
imitation, teaching and other methods. The copies are not perfect: memes are copied with variation; moreover, they compete for space in our memories and for the chance to be copied again. Only some of the variants can survive. The combination of these three elements (copies; variation; competition for survival) forms precisely the condition for
Darwinian evolution, and so memes (and hence human cultures) evolve. Large groups of memes that are copied and passed on together are called
co-adapted meme complexes, or
memeplexes. In Blackmore's definition, the way that a meme replicates is through imitation. This requires
brain capacity to generally imitate a model or selectively imitate the model. Since the process of social learning varies from one person to another, the imitation process cannot be said to be completely imitated. The sameness of an idea may be expressed with different memes supporting it. This is to say that the
mutation rate in memetic evolution is extremely high, and mutations are even possible within each and every iteration of the imitation process. It becomes very interesting when we see that a social system composed of a complex network of microinteractions exists, but at the macro level an order emerges to create culture. Many researchers of cultural evolution regard memetic theory of this time a failed paradigm superseded by
dual inheritance theory. Others instead suggest it is not superseded but rather holds a small but distinct intellectual space in cultural evolutionary theory.
"Internet Memetics" A new framework of
Internet Memetics initially borrowed Blackmore's conceptual developments but is effectively a data-driven approach, focusing on digital artifacts. This was led primarily by conceptual developments Colin Lankshear and Michele Knobel (2006) and
Limor Shifman and Mike Thelwall (2009). Shifman, in particular, followed Susan Blackmore in rejecting the internalist and externalist debate, however did not offer a clear connection to prior evolutionary frameworks. Later in 2014, she rejected the historical relevance of "information" to memetics. Instead of memes being
units of cultural information, she argued information is exclusively delegated to be "the ways in which addressers position themselves in relation to [a meme instance's] text, its linguistic codes, the addressees, and other potential speakers." This is what she called
stance, which is analytically distinguished from the
content and
form of her meme. As such, Shifman's developments can be seen as critical to Dawkins's meme, but also as a somewhat distinct conceptualization of the meme as a communicative system dependent on the internet and social media platforms. By introducing memetics as an internet study there has been a rise in empirical research. That is, memetics in this conceptualization has been notably testable by the application of social science methodologies. It has been popular enough that following Lankshear and Knobel's (2019) review of empirical trends, they warn those interested in memetics that theoretical development should not be ignored, concluding that, "[R]ight now would be a good time for anyone seriously interested in memes to revisit Dawkins’ work in light of how internet memes have evolved over the past three decades and reflect on what most merits careful and conscientious research attention."As Lankshear and Knobel show, the Internet Memetic reconceptualization is limited in addressing long-standing memetic theory concerns. It is not clear that existing Internet Memetic theory's departure from conceptual dichotomies between internalist and externalist debate are compatible with most earlier concerns of memetics. Internet Memetics might be understood as a study without an agreed upon theory, as present research tends to focus on empirical developments answering theories of other areas of cultural research. It exists more as a set of distributed studies than a methodology, theory, field, or discipline, with a few exceptions such as Shifman and those closely following her motivating framework. ==Criticisms==