British mining, 1917 The BEF miners eventually completed a line of deep mines under Messines Ridge that were charged with of
ammonal and
gun cotton. Two mines were laid at on the northern flank, one at
St Eloi, three at Hollandscheschur Farm, two at Petit Bois, single mines at Maedelstede Farm, Peckham House and
Spanbroekmolen, four at Kruisstraat, one at Ontario Farm and two each at Trenches on the southern flank. A group of four mines was placed under the German
strongpoint Birdcage at Le Pelerin, just outside
Ploegsteert Wood. The large mines were at St Eloi, charged with of ammonal, at Maedelstede Farm, which was charged with , and Spanbroekmolen on one of the highest points of the Messines Ridge, which was filled with of ammonal. The mine at Spanbroekmolen was set below ground, at the end of a gallery long. When detonated on 7 June 1917, the blast of the mine at Spanbroekmolen formed the "
Lone Tree Crater" with a diameter of and a depth of .) The mine at Ontario Farm did not produce a crater but left a shallow indentation in the soft clay, after wet sand flowed back into the crater.
Birdcage 1–4 on the extreme southern flank in the II Anzac Corps area, were not required because the Germans made a local retirement before 7 June.
Peckham 2 was abandoned due to a tunnel collapse and the mine at La Petite Douve Farm was abandoned after the German
camouflet blast of 27/28 August 1916. The evening before the attack, Harington, the Second Army Chief of Staff, remarked to the press, "Gentlemen, we may not make history tomorrow, but we shall certainly change the geography".
German mining, 1916–1917 In December 1916, Füßlein (also Füsslein), commander of German mining operations in the salient, had recorded that British deep mining was intended to support an offensive above ground and received three more mining companies, to fight in the British lower as well as the upper mine systems and had gained some success. In April 1917, the
4th Army (General
Friedrich Sixt von Armin) received information from air reconnaissance that a British offensive was being prepared in the Messines Ridge sector, and a spy reported to OHL that if the offensive at Arras was frustrated, the British would transfer their effort to Flanders.
Hermann von Kuhl, the Chief of Staff of (Army Group
Crown Prince Rupprecht), suggested that the salient around Messines Ridge be abandoned, since it could be attacked from three sides and most of the defences were on forward slopes, vulnerable to
concentric, observed artillery-fire. A voluntary retirement would avoid the calamity experienced by the defenders at the
Battle of Vimy Ridge on 9 April. Kuhl proposed a retirement to the Line (Oosttaverne Line to the British), halfway back from the Second Line along the ridge or all the way back to the Third Line (Warneton Line). At a conference with 4th Army commanders to discuss the defence of Messines Ridge on 30 April, most of them rejected the suggestion, because they considered that the defences had been modernised, were favourable for a mobile defence and convenient for counter-attacks. The artillery commander of said that the German guns were well-organised and could overcome British artillery. The divisional commanders were encouraged by a report by Füßlein on 28 April, that the counter-mining had been such a success, particularly recently that For this and other reasons the withdrawal proposal was dropped as impractical. Soon after the conference, Füßlein changed his mind and on 10 May, reported to the 4th Army his suspicions that the British had prepared several deep mines, including ones at Hill 60, Caterpillar, St Eloi, Spanbroekmolen and Kruisstraat and predicted that if an above-ground offensive began, there would be big mine explosions in the vicinity of the German front line. On 19 May, the 4th Army concluded that the greater volume of British artillery fire was retaliation for the increase in German bombardments and although defensive preparations were to continue, no attack was considered imminent. On 24 May, Füßlein was more optimistic about German defensive measures and Laffert wrote later, that the possibility of mine explosions was thought remote and if encountered they would have only local effect, as the front trench system was lightly held. From 12 May, weekly reports by the 4th Army made no mention of mining and Rupprecht made no reference to it after the end of the month. Other officers like (Lieutenant-Colonel) Wetzell and (Colonel) Fritz von Lossberg, wrote to OHL warning of the mine danger and the importance of forestalling it by a retirement; they were told that it was a matter for the commanders on the spot. ==Battle: 7 June 1917==