First phase: under the NNC The Naga Army was founded by
Reivilie Angami in 1952. In its first phase it was part of the
Naga National Council political party. also known by other names, such as Naga Home Guard (preceded by the Safe Guard), Naga Federal Army, The Naga National Council leadership fled to
East Pakistan and Phizo went from there into exile. The insurgents meanwhile dispersed among the civilian population and engaged in small, sporadic, guerrilla attacks. Some of the most severe confrontations of this period took place in
Jotsoma village. Later, on 26 August 1960, a
Douglas C-47 plane of the
Indian Air Force was shot down during an attempt to drop relief materials and ammunitions to a military outpost. Eventually, on 6 September 1964 the Indian Armed Forces declared a ceasefire. In 1966 the insurgents sought help from China. The first expedition being led by NNC General Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah in October. It trekked across the mountainous
Sagaing Division, reaching the Chinese border three months later in January 1967. Over 130 military personnel were trained and indoctrinated in
Tengchong,
Yunnan, and returned to Nagaland with brand-new Chinese equipment, including rifles and rocket launchers. A second expedition was led by NNC leader
Isak Chishi Swu and Naga Army General Mowu Gwizan. The 330 men left in December 1967 and reached China by March 1968, being similarly trained and supplied weapons at Tengchong. A third expedition with one hundred men, led by Ngasating Shimray and Lt. Colonel Taka left Nagaland in January 1968, but they were blocked by
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) members, and turned back after having their weapons confiscated. General
Kaitho Sukhai, who had been in the Naga Army since the beginning, firmly opposed it and left the organization in July 1967. The following year in August he would be assassinated. Shortly thereafter Kaito Sukhai's supporters, who were mostly
Sümi Naga, defected from the Naga Army and formed their own organization, the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN). In the end the cadres of this group gave up the armed struggle and went back to civilian life. Some of them joined the
Border Security Force (BSF). Following the signing of the 1975
Shillong Accord, a key group of the illegal Naga political organisation accepted military defeat and the surrender of arms. The accord —between the
Government of India and "Underground Representatives" whose rank or status in the Naga army or the
Federal Government of Nagaland were not even mentioned— stipulated that the armament of the Naga guerrillas should be deposited in agreed spots. However, those inspecting the implementation of the accord observed that weapons that had been surrendered were old and outdated and inferred that the best weaponry of the underground forces had been sent across the border to units entrenched in Burma's frontier region.
Rano M. Shaiza, Phizo's niece, saw the accord as a favorable opportunity towards a solution of the intractable Naga problem, but she warned too that 'a sizeable underground hardcore led by well-trained, experienced and dedicated leaders has established its headquarters in the Naga territory of northern Burma'. The Shillong Accord brought relief both to the battle-weary insurgent military personnel, as well as to the civilians living in areas where Indian authorities had put counter-insurgency measures in place. After the surrender of weapons by the Naga guerrillas, over six hundred prisoners of war were released from Indian jails and all cases against them were withdrawn. Numerous Naga military units had been decimated by the Indian forces as a result of the intensive military operations of the previous years. The curfew that had been imposed in many rural sectors, and which prevented harvesting —thus threatening villagers with famine, was finally lifted. Moreover, villagers who had been fined up to 118,062.50
Indian rupees as punishment for assisting the Naga army were reimbursed. The cessation of hostilities in 1975, meant that the Naga Army personnel fighting inside Nagaland had accepted defeat, conceding the operational victory to the Indian military. According to governor L.P. Singh, at a certain point around 1,400 Naga soldiers had surrendered. Meanwhile, the NNC, the political wing, had made fundamental concessions in order to survive. However, the group led by
Thuingaleng Muivah quartered beyond the Burmese border had remained relatively intact. Muivah, along with
Isak Chishi Swu, wanted to keep the armed struggle going against India and denounced the signatories of the accord in the most severe terms: "In spite of 'the bitterest pressure they have been subjected to, the Nagas will forever hold their own ... any talks, any negotiations tending to [include Nagaland] within the Indian Union are unequivocally the works of hidden traitors who in no way represent the people'. This intransigence created a wide rift in Naga society. After the years of confrontation there was a general desire for peace in Nagaland and the Shillong Accord was seen as a positive step by large sections of the public. Nevertheless, there was a wide gap between those supporting the accord and those opposing it. In 1978 members of the Nagaland Peace Council (NPC) —the organization which had arranged the meeting at Shillong— organized an expedition to the Naga area of northern Burma in order to persuade the last remnants of the NNC, FGN and the Naga Army to accept the accord. Even though the Indian authorities had been duly informed by the Naga Peace Council of their mission, the group was waylaid and arrested by Indian security units before they reached the Burmese border. From there the arms consignments would eventually reach Kaphlang's Taga camp, located south of
Nanyun, near the
Chindwin river, at . Taga would become one of the main ULFA training camps, as well as of the
NDFB. Even so, with the passing of the years inter-tribal differences in the NSCN military camp became worse by the day. They were exacerbated by the overbearing behavior of the Western Naga personnel towards those belonging to the Eastern Naga groups,
The 1997 ceasefire In 1997, after a number of discussions, the Indian government was able to bring the NSCN (IM) leaders to sign a ceasefire agreement. Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu laid three preliminary conditions, of which the government of India accepted two. The negotiations began in the summer and a ceasefire agreement was signed, which included the suspension of hostilities for a period of three months with effect from the 1 August 1997 in order to engage in political level discussions. Meanwhile, the Naga soldiers came out of their jungle hideouts to accompany their political leaders signing the agreement. The latter were housed in old offices of the
Indian Forest Department. After a period of time the NSCN (IM) would add its own buildings to accommodate its military personnel, the place becoming what is now Camp Hebron. As part of the agreement, a ceasefire monitoring group was established and eleven ground rules were set. These included that on the NSCN (IM) side there was to be no killing, kidnapping or extortion, while there would be no active military operations by the Indian security forces. Naga military camps could be maintained in notified places, but militia members would not patrol with arms and would not forcefully recruit new cadres. However, they were allowed to move from camp to camp concealing their arms. Although the ceasefire was meant for Nagaland, unofficially it was allowed to be extended to the Naga districts of Manipur, a provision that would eventually prove to be a crucial mistake on the part of the Indian Government. and the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA). The latter was allegedly formed owing to the involvement of the NSCN (IM). In all these exactions Naga cadres operated along with the extortionists, but when the ceasefire monitoring group demanded explanations from the NSCN (IM) concerning extortion, the invariable reply was that it was an operation of the Manipuri outfits and that they were not to blame. On 4 August 1999 the ceasefire agreement between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM was extended for another year. Again, on 16 March 2002, a NSCN (IM) vehicle carrying Naga military personnel from
Chandel to
Ukhrul, was stopped at a
security checkpoint near
Pallel manned by the Manipur Rifles. The latter asked the uniformed cadres in the vehicle to lay down their weapons. When the Nagas opened fire, the Manipur Rifles guards immediately fired back. At the end of the shooting there were eleven dead among the Nagas and their weapons were seized. Later there was a strong protest from the NSCN (IM) party leadership, but the government reminded them that, as part of the ceasefire agreement, the Naga cadres should not have moved with their weapons showing, and at any rate they should have stopped when challenged by the guards manning the checkpoint. Thus the seized weapons were not returned. Later, on 25 March 2002 the Chandel District Commissioner was kidnapped and the NSCN (IM) claimed that it was in retaliation for the killing of the eleven Naga cadres nine days before. The NSCN (IM) demanded the weapons to be returned in exchange for the kidnapped official. This issue brought about an interruption of the talks with the Government of India, but the Government stood firm. It threatened that if the District Commissioner was not released, the whole peace process would immediately collapse. Subsequently, the DC was released and the ceasefire resumed. In a continuation of the initial NSCN policy, a number of other insurgent organizations, such as ULFA,
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF),
PLA,
United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and the
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), were provided military training and shelter by the NSCN (K). The Burmese military paid little attention to the Naga and its fellow insurgent groups who linked up with each other along the little-patrolled Burmese border with India because it was more concerned with ethnic insurgencies further to the east, especially in
Shan State. and
DHD personnel. According to Anie Konyak, Undersecretary of the NSCN (K), two members of his group as well as five attackers were shot dead in the course of the encounter. In the same month the Indian security forces seized of
TNT from the Khaplang fraction during a raid in
Changlang district, Arunachal Pradesh. Meanwhile, on the Burmese side of the border the Tatmadaw carried out a vigorous counterinsurgency campaign between January and February that left at least 100 NSCN (K) and ULFA cadres dead. The ceasefire with the central government was extended in April, but security forces kept a watch and arrested cadres involved in extortion. In late November the Burmese military deployed again in an offensive seeking to dislodge Khaplang's Naga Army small groups and their ULFA allies from their bases in the Sagaing Region. will support the cause of the Eastern Nagas in Myanmar to help them get due political recognition and rights from the Government there. They have been neglected by Yangon. The Nagas in Nagaland should unanimously support them to facilitate their development along with other Naga communities." In April the ceasefire was extended for another year. Meanwhile, the months that followed saw a recrudescence of the fratricidal fighting between NSCN (K) cadres and those belonging to its rival NSCN (IM), as well as a series of defections between one group and the other. as well as members of the now largely marginal Naga National Council, were also present in the meeting. However, in the months that followed, the hostilities between the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) army members were relentlessly pursued by both sides, resulting in numerous deaths. In October large quantities of modern light weapons and ammunition were smuggled across the India-Myanmar border. Owing to extensive counterinsurgency operations by the
Assam Rifles in Assam and Nagaland, the NSCN (K) and ULFA moved their military training camps to Arunachal Pradesh in the area of
Changlang and the Myanmar border in November. Newly recruited cadres underwent advanced training in order to be sent later into Myanmar to join the other Naga Army and ULFA units. and
Black Widow, which were carrying out insurgency operations using those camps as bases. ULFA cadres were carrying out their activities from the safety provided by NSCN (K) camps and the other two outfits were being sheltered by the NSCN (IM). The source further quoted that "... given that the government is in a ceasefire with the two Naga outfits, it is Delhi's responsibility to ensure that their camps are not misused". A two-day long 'Naga Convention for Reconciliation and Peace' was held in
Kohima on 21 and 22 February 2009. A number of Naga community groups, including the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR), the
Naga Hoho and its constituent units, political outfits and church assemblies adopted a resolution urging all organisations to "genuinely and honestly" implement reconciliation. NSCN (K) chairman S.S. Khaplang applauded the Naga community groups for taking the initiative to hold the convention. Since its inception in March 2008, the FNR organised ten meetings of the warring groups operating on both sides of the border. On 7 June the NSCN (K) issued a set of conditions for the unification with the opposing NSCN (IM) fraction. Among these it emphasized that the merger would only be possible after both rival groups revoke the ongoing peace talks with the Indian Government. The Khaplang envoy also stated that any reconciliation meeting between the top leadership of the two main NSCN factions should be held in Nagaland and not on a foreign country. "Meeting for peace and reconciliation at junior level may take place anywhere but for the top level the IM gang must first break the ongoing talks with India and declare the outcome along with the reasons for withdrawal," the group’s spokesman said. Following the 5th Naga Reconciliation meeting which concluded at Chiang Mai in Thailand on 8 June, a joint declaration was signed by Naga the warring groups in order to resolve "all outstanding issues" among themselves in the "larger interest" of the Naga people. The "Covenant of Reconciliation" that allegedly sought an early solution to the Naga political problem was signed by the NSCN (IM) chairman Isak Chishi Swu, NSCN (K) chairman S.S. Khaplang and S. Singya, the president of Naga National Council. The gathering had been held at the behest of the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR). The FNR leader Rev. Wati Aier claimed that the declaration would give a "new direction" to the Nagas. The faction leaders jointly declared that in the future they would uphold Naga reconciliation and forgiveness based on the "historical and political rights of the Nagas". "We resolve to continue to work together in this spirit of love, non-violence, peace and respect to resolve outstanding issues amongst us," the three Naga leaders stated in the joint declaration. A follow-up meeting of the representatives of the Naga militant factions would be scheduled towards the middle of August 2009 in Dimapur. Still, an effective unification between the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) remained elusive despite the repeated efforts. == See also ==