South Korea South Korea's
Ministry of Unification is a government organization that is in charge of preparing for a
future reunification between North and South Korea. It is responsible for north–south relations including economic trade, diplomacy, and communication, and education of reunification, which involves spreading awareness in schools and among the public sphere. The Ministry of Unification is thus the main organization that manages North Korean defectors in South Korean territory by establishing admission processes and resettlement policies. It also has regional sub-organs called Hana Centers that help defectors in their day-to-day life for a more smooth transition into South Korean society. According to the Ministry of Unification, the cumulative number of North Korean defectors who have resettled in South Korea reached 34,538 as of the end of 2025. Military defections across the heavily fortified
demilitarized zone (DMZ) are few in number, with only 20 defectors since 1996. Under the
South Korean Constitution, North Korea is viewed as an illegal occupier of the Korean peninsula. As such, under South Korean law, all North Koreans are citizens of the Republic of Korea, so they are granted citizenship status almost immediately upon entering the country. This causes issues for North Korean refugees hoping to gain refugee or asylum status in the United States. Their citizenship status in South Korea blocked them from receiving immigration status, until 2004 in the United States, because they were considered to be resettled and no longer qualified for refugee status. In 2004, South Korea passed controversial new measures intended to slow the flow of
asylum seekers because of concern that a growing number of North Koreans crossing the
Amnok and
Duman rivers into China would soon seek refuge in the South. The regulations tighten defector screening processes and slash the amount of money given to each refugee from ₩28,000,000 ($24,180) to ₩10,000,000 ($8,636). South Korean officials say the new rules are intended to prevent ethnic Koreans living in China from entering the South, as well as to stop North Koreans with criminal records from gaining entry. As of 2006, the state provided some defectors with apartments, and all those who wished to study were granted the right to enter a university of their choice. For a period of time after their arrival, defectors were also provided with personal bodyguards. In 2016, defectors past retirement age received Basic Livelihood Benefits of about ₩450,000 ($390) per month, which covered basic necessities, but left them amongst the poorest of retirees. In 2017, the South Korean government increased to $860,000 the reward it pays to defectors who provide information that helps South Korean security interests. Those who defect with weapons are entitled to other amounts. North Korean refugees arriving in the South first face joint interrogation by authorities having jurisdiction including the National Intelligence Service and the National Police Agency to ensure that they are not spies. They are then sent to
Hanawon, a government resettlement center where they are provided a 12-week social adaptation mandatory course, mainly focused on economic and political education, as well as job training. After three months of resettlement training, the government provides assistance in residence, employment, and health insurance. However, apart from these essential trainings for social adaptation, psychological needs such as mitigating traumatic experiences and vulnerable mental health statuses are not significantly addressed. Another organization,
PSCORE, runs education programs for refugees, providing weekly English classes and one-on-one tutoring. Children can attend
local South Korean schools or specific schools for North Korean refugee children. At local South Korean schools, they may suffer discrimination and cruelty from other children. The refugee schools do not prepare them well for South Korean society. North Korean students generally fall behind South Korean peers academically. Until up to age 35, they can go to college without paying any fees. The percentage of female defectors has risen from 56% in 2002 to a high of 85% in 2018. The employment status of defectors before leaving North Korea was 2% held administrative jobs, 3% were soldiers (all able-bodied persons are required to serve 7–10 years in the
military), 38% were "workers", 48% were unemployed or being supported by someone else, 4% were "service", 1% worked in arts or sports, and 2% worked as "professionals". According to the World Institute for North Korea Studies, a young female defector who does not attend a university has little chance of making a living in the South. These events include witnessing public executions, starvation, torture, and being sent to a correctional facility. Moreover, during migration, they are subjected to additional trauma through multiple relocations before arriving in South Korea. Once resettled, many experience acculturation stress that includes homesickness, cultural shock, alienation, perceived discrimination, and feelings of marginalization. As a consequence, in a survey of over 24,000 of North Koreans who migrated to South Korea between August and December 2012, 607 identified as suffering from depression, anxiety, or
suicidal ideation. Moreover, North Korean refugees exhibit post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms which are not significantly addressed through governmental agencies. A study of 182 defectors has shown that, due to mutual mistrust between North and South Koreans, defectors are often unable to receive medical help. With limited government-sponsored programs for migrants, North Koreans face vocational, medical, and educational difficulties assimilating in South Korea and rely on
nongovernmental organizations. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations have repeatedly urged recipient nations of North Korean defectors to better identify defectors who are at high risk for poor
mental health and to provide them with appropriate medical and social support. About 15% of North Korean refugees say they have suicidal thoughts, compared to 5% for South Koreans overall.
Social and ethnic tensions The politics of identity plays a considerable role in deepening the social and ethnic gulf that separates North and South. Most South Koreans, who unlike North Koreans can be readily interviewed and polled in large numbers, harbour at least somewhat negative attitudes towards their neighbors, which North Korean defectors have experienced up-close on arrival. In 2010, the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) conducted face-to-face research of over 1,000 South Koreans on their perspectives on the ethnic identity of North Korean defectors assimilating into South Korea. The results reveal that South Koreans generally do not support the reunification of the two countries. One reason for this opposition is that some South Koreans have grown suspicious of defectors and of their true intentions in migrating southwards. South Koreans' politically (rather than personally) relevant antagonism against North Korea as a whole, however, is mainly targeted at its communist regime and at what they perceive as its contribution to the division of the formerly coherent national identity. Some have interpreted the outcome of the KGSS survey as evidence that the idea of "one nation, two countries" does not exist in the minds of most South Koreans.
Canada North Korean asylum seekers and defectors have been rising in numbers in Canada since 2006.
Radio Free Asia reports that in 2007 alone, over 100 asylum applications were submitted, and that North Korean refugees have come from China or elsewhere with the help of Canadian missionaries and
NGOs. The rapid increase in asylum applications to Canada is due to the limited options, especially when receiving asylum is becoming more difficult. On 2 February 2011, then-Prime Minister
Stephen Harper met Hye Sook Kim, a North Korean defector and also received advice from Dr.
Norbert Vollertsen, "Canada can persuade China, among others, not to repatriate the North Korean refugees back to North Korea but, instead, let them go to South Korea and other countries, including Canada." 780 North Koreans lived in Canada in 2016.
China According to estimates by the
US State Department, 30,000 to 50,000 defectors have legal refugee status, out of a larger total of North Koreans hiding in the country. China does not grant asylum or refugee status to North Koreans and, with few exceptions, considers them illegal immigrants and deports them back to North Korea. According to an
ETH Zurich report, China does this to avoid jeopardising relations with Pyongyang. A 2009 world refugee study found that around 11,000 North Korean refugees remained in hiding in China close to the North Korean border. Some NGOs have been releasing inflated numbers on the amount of North Korean defectors in China, but many experts and official organizations such as the UNHCR have criticized their figures as unreliable. These refugees are not typically considered to be members of the
ethnic Korean community, and the Chinese census does not count them as such. Some North Korean refugees who are unable to obtain transport to South Korea marry ethnic Koreans in China and settle there; they blend into the community but are subject to deportation if discovered by the authorities. Those who have found brokers and traffickers try to enter the South Korean consulate in
Shenyang. The brokers are often Korean-Chinese or South Korean missionaries, or other North Korean defectors. As of 2002, the Chinese government has tightened the security and increased the number of police outside the consulate. According to documentarian Cho Cheon-hyeon in February 2021, most North Koreans in China preferred to stay there or return to the North rather than go to South Korea. During the mid-1990s, the percentages of male and female defectors were relatively balanced. In early to mid-1990s, male labour was valuable since North Korean defectors could work in Chinese countrysides and factories and secure hideout in return. Before 2009, over 70% of female North Korean defectors were victims of human trafficking. After 2009, the percentage of female North Korean defectors with experience of human trafficking decreased to 15% since large numbers of defectors began to enter South Korea through organized groups led by brokers. Lankov wrote in 2010 that many Chinese husbands attempt to improve their Korean wives' official standing and may try expensively bribing the officials to get them a Chinese Resident Identity Card where they are registered as China-born ethnic Koreans. In the early to mid-1990s, the Chinese government was relatively tolerant with the issue of North Korean defectors. Unless the North Korean government sent special requests, the Chinese government did not display serious control of the residence of North Koreans in Chinese territory. In June 2002, a diplomatic row broke out between China and South Korea after Chinese security guards dragged a would-be asylum seeker from Seoul's embassy in Beijing. Before the incident, China had reportedly allowed North Koreans inside other foreign missions to go to South Korea by way of a third country, including a North Korean family who was detained in Shenyang on May. In 2012, Beijing allowed 5 defectors to leave for South Korea after they had spent three years in China. In February 2012, Chinese authorities repatriated 19 North Korean defectors being held in Shenyang and five defectors in Changchun from the same location. The case of the 24 detainees, who had been held since early February, garnered international attention due to the North's reported harsh punishment of those who attempted to defect. Human-rights activists say those repatriated face harsh punishment, including torture and imprisonment in labour camps. North Korean repatriation gained Chinese media coverage on 2012, and drew sympathy towards the refugees from Chinese netizens. In August 2014, 11 North Koreans detained by China on the Laos border was reported by
Sky News to have been released rather than repatriated after talks between Chinese and South Korean diplomats. In April 2016, China allowed 13 North Korean restaurant workers to defect to South Korea, with spokesman
Lu Kang saying they all had valid identity documents. The case became controversial 2 years later after 4 waitresses said they were brought to the South against their will, with the restaurant manager claiming he had been pressured by South Korea's intelligence agency. South Korean human-rights activists have held rallies at the Chinese embassy in Seoul and have appealed to the U.N. Human Rights Council to urge China to stop the deportation of the refugees. The
North Korea Freedom Coalition has created a list alleging that thousands of North Korean defectors have been repatriated by China. For some of them the fate after repatriation to North Korea ranges from torture, detention,
prison camp to
execution. The list includes humanitarian workers, who were assassinated or
abducted by North Korean agents for helping refugees. In 2021, one such North Korean defector
Zhu Xianjian escaped prison in China but was quickly recaptured by police. China's policy involves forcibly repatriating North Korean defectors, whom it calls illegal migrants rather than refugees. As such China can deal with such defectors as criminals within their own judicial and legal system.
Europe In 2014, research by the human rights organisation the
European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea claims that there are around 1,400 North Korean refugees in Europe. Citing
UNHRC statistics, the report identified North Korean communities in
Belgium,
Denmark,
Finland,
France,
Germany,
Luxembourg, the
Netherlands,
Norway,
Sweden and the
United Kingdom. As of 2015, the largest North Korean community in Europe resides in
New Malden, South West London. Approximately 600 North Koreans are believed to reside in the area, which is already notable for its
significant South Korean community. According to a
Eurostat report, a total of 820 North Koreans became citizens of European Union countries in the 2007–2016 period, with nearly 90 percent of them living in Germany and Britain.
Japan According to a 2020
Waseda University paper, Japanese diplomats and NGOs quietly collaborated with Chinese authorities to fly a number of defectors to Japan. China stopped collaborating with Japan on this issue in 2010 after relations deteriorated from the
Senkaku Islands dispute. There have been three cases of North Koreans defecting directly to Japan by boat. In January 1987, a stolen boat carrying 13 North Koreans washed ashore at Fukui Port in
Fukui Prefecture, and then continued to South Korea via
Taiwan. In June 2007, after a six-day boat ride a family of four North Koreans was found by the
Japan Coast Guard off the coast of
Aomori Prefecture. They later settled in South Korea. In September 2011, the Japan Coast Guard found a wooden boat containing nine people, three men, three women and three boys. The group had been sailing for five days towards South Korea but had drifted towards the
Noto Peninsula and thought they had arrived in South Korea. They were found in good health. Japan resettled about 140 ethnic Koreans who managed to return to Japan after initially immigrating to North Korea under the 1959–1984 mass "repatriation" project of ethnic Koreans from Japan. This supposed humanitarian project, supported by
Chongryon and conducted by the
Japanese and North Korean
Red Crosses, had involved the resettlement of around 90,000 volunteers (mostly from South Korea) in North Korea, which Chongryon hailed as a "paradise on earth". Some of the Koreans who were repatriated, including
Kim Hyon-hui, a student of
Yaeko Taguchi, revealed evidence about the whereabouts of Japanese citizens who had been kidnapped by North Korea.
Laos Public Radio International reported in 2011 that Laos, along with Vietnam and Myanmar, were largely unsympathetic to North Korean refugees. In 2013, nine defectors were arrested and sent back to North Korea. This caused international outrage partially because one of the defectors is the son of a
Japanese abductee.
Mongolia A much shorter route than the standard China-Laos-Thailand route is straight to
Mongolia, whose government tries to maintain good relations with both
North and
South Korea, but is sympathetic to northern refugees. North Korean refugees who are caught in Mongolia are sent to South Korea, effectively granting them a free air ticket. However, using this route requires navigating the unforgiving terrain of the
Gobi Desert. Also, tighter border control with China has made this route less common.
Philippines The
Philippines has been used in the past as a transit point for North Korean refugees, often arriving from China and then being sent on to South Korea. A 2005
leaked US embassy cable suggested that for 2 years, the South Korean embassy in Beijing facilitated the transit of nearly 500 refugees annually to
Ninoy Aquino International Airport for transfer to South Korea. In its 2020 census, the
Philippine Statistics Authority reported that there are 406 North Koreans with
permanent resident status in the Philippines, with 159 living in
Metro Manila. The country has been hard to reach due to the fact refugees have to cross China and get on a boat to the archipelago. A notable incident of North Korean defection to the Philippines happened in 1997 when
Hwang Jang-yop, who served as the
Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly from 1972 to 1983, defected to South Korea. He initially walked into the South Korean embassy in
Beijing posing as one of their diplomats. The Chinese government cordoned off the embassy from leaving, but a few weeks later a deal was brokered, and Hwang and his companion Kim Duk-hong were permitted to leave Beijing for a 3rd country. The Philippines was selected as a transit point before they could fly to South Korea. President
Fidel V. Ramos tasked the National Security Advisor
Jose T. Almonte in ensuring the safety of the North Korean defectors. Hwang and Kim arrived in
Clark Air Base, and were taken custody by the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) and brought them to a
safe house in
Baguio City. The media soon found out, and Baguio City was the center of a media frenzy. This prompted the NICA to move Hwang and Kim to another safe house near
Manila. After two weeks, Hwang and Kim were turned over to the South Korean authorities, and were flown to Seoul.
Russia A study by
Kyung Hee University estimated that roughly 10,000 North Koreans live in the
Russian Far East; many are escapees from North Korean work camps there. This includes
a population in Kamchatka, which was around 1,800 by 2020. To cross the 17-kilometre border between Russia and North Korea, defectors must find a way across the
Tumen River. This is rarely done, because
Russia's short stretch of the river is far better patrolled than
China's stretch. Even when they succeed, the rewards for doing so are not as high since the
ethnic Korean community in Russia is far smaller to receive sufficient support from, as opposed to China, which has a
larger Korean population. Lastly, North Korea is believed to have infiltrated Russia in search of defectors and those who support them, as explained below. Both
South Korean diplomatic missions and local ethnic Koreans are reluctant to provide them with any assistance; it is believed that North Korea ordered the assassination of South Korean consul
Choi Duk-gun in 1996 as well as two private citizens in 1995, in response to their contact with the refugees. As of 1999, there were estimated to be only between 100 and 500 North Korean refugees in the area. In 2014, Russia and North Korea drafted an agreement to deport illegal immigrants found to be living in either country.
Thailand Thailand is generally the final destination of North Koreans escaping through China. While North Koreans are not given
refugee status and are officially classified as illegal immigrants, the Thai government will deport them to South Korea instead of back to North Korea. This is because South Korea recognizes native Koreans from the entire Korean Peninsula as
citizens. These North Korean escapees are subject to imprisonment for illegal entry; however, most of these sentences are suspended. Recognizing this, many North Koreans will in fact surrender themselves to the
Royal Thai Police as soon as they cross the border into Thailand.
United States On 5 May 2006, unnamed North Koreans were granted refugee status by the
United States, the first time the U.S. accepted refugees from there since President
George W. Bush signed the
North Korean Human Rights Act in October 2004. The group, which arrived from an unnamed Southeast Asian nation, included four women who said that they had been the victims of forced marriage. Since this first group of refugees, the U.S. has admitted approximately 170 North Korean refugees by 2014. Between 2004 and 2011, the U.S. has admitted only 122 North Korean refugees and only 25 have received political asylum. A number of North Koreans have entered illegally, estimated at 200, and generally settle in
Koreatown, Los Angeles. An aunt and uncle of
Kim Jong Un have lived in the United States since 1998. The first official North Korean refugees entered the United States on May 5, 2006. These six refugees were the first since the
North Korean Human Rights Act was signed in 2004. The number of North Koreans in the United States remains low due to the difficulty of escaping North Korea, South Korea's policy regarding the Northern refugees, and the United States' long-standing belief that North Koreans should be resettled in South Korea. Immigration to the United States for North Koreans remains difficult due to the many obstacles placed in front of them.
North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 On October 18, 2004, United States President
George W. Bush signed the
North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) into law. The main purpose of this law was to encourage North Korea to treat those within their borders well and to protect those who have escaped. One of the paths this law creates is the possibility for North Korean defectors to apply for United States immigration status. This law also appointed a special envoy for North Korean Human Rights issues, one of which was Robert R. King, who was appointed by Barack Obama in 2009 and served until 2017. King wrote extensively about this issue and North Korean immigration to the U.S. and how this law impacted North Koreans. This act "clarifies that North Koreans are eligible to apply for U.S. refugee and asylum consideration and are not preemptively disqualified by any prospective claim to citizenship they may have under the South Korean constitution." This law was valid through 2008 and has been reauthorized in 2008, 2012, and 2017, and is, as of November 28, 2024, working on re-authorization in 2024. Each re-authorization has lasted four years. Another major obstacle that North Koreans face when attempting to relocate to the United States is the amount of time required to wait for a decision from the government. While in South Korea, their paperwork could be processed generally within a 2-4 week window, the United States takes on average 18–24 months to go through the process. According to the
International Crisis Group in 2006, although Vietnam maintained
diplomatic relations with North Korea, growing
South Korean investment in Vietnam had prompted Hanoi to tolerate the transit of some North Korean refugees to Seoul. Four of the biggest defector safe-houses in Vietnam were run by South Korean expatriates. In July 2004, 468 North Korean refugees were airlifted to South Korea in the single largest mass defection; Vietnam initially tried to keep their role in the airlift secret, and in advance of the deal, even anonymous sources in the South Korean government would only tell reporters that the defectors came from "an unidentified Asian country". Following the airlift, Vietnam tightened border controls and deported several safehouse operators. Five North Korean defectors who surrendered to the Ho Chi Minh City police in May 2004 in an appeal to go to South Korea were reportedly deported to China by Vietnamese authorities on 16 June. On 25 June 2012, a South Korean activist surnamed Yoo was arrested in Vietnam for helping the North Korean defectors to escape. He was reportedly released after eight days and then deported to Seoul. Nine North Koreans were arrested on 22 October 2015 and then reportedly deported to the Chinese city of
Shenyang. In April 2019, six North Koreans were stopped by Vietnamese military authorities in the
Hà Tĩnh Province; three managed to escape while the other three were reportedly deported to China. On 23 November 2019, 14 defectors who had left China two days earlier were caught in Vietnam as they attempted to make their way to Laos. The Vietnamese authorities returned the group to China on 28 November. Ten of the original 14 were caught again in Vietnam the next day. According to a Seoul-based activist group in January 2020, 11 North Koreans detained in Vietnam while seeking to defect to South Korea were released with the help of European institutions. A
Wall Street Journal report said that US officials had intervened to secure the defectors' release; the report's accuracy was questioned by South Korea's
Foreign Ministry and the activist group's leader. == Psychological and cultural adjustment ==