Bradley's personal experiences in the war are documented in his award-winning book ''A Soldier's Story,'' published by Henry Holt & Co. in 1951. It was re-released by The Modern Library in 1999. The book is based on an extensive diary maintained by his aide-de-camp, Chester B. Hansen, who ghost-wrote the book using the diary; Hansen's original diary is maintained by the U. S. Army Heritage and Education Center, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. On 25 March 1942, Bradley, recently promoted to major general, assumed command of the newly activated 82nd Infantry Division. Bradley oversaw the division's transformation into the first American airborne division and took parachute training. In August the division was re-designated as the
82nd Airborne Division and Bradley relinquished command to Major General
Matthew Ridgway, who had been his assistant division commander (ADC). Bradley then took command of the
28th Infantry Division, which was a National Guard division with soldiers mostly from the state of Pennsylvania. observing General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill and Lieutenant General Omar Bradley fire
M1 carbines shortly before the
Normandy landings, 15 May 1944. Stood to the far left, wearing a
peaked cap, is Major General
Charles H. Corlett.
North Africa and Sicily Bradley did not receive a front-line command until early 1943, after
Operation Torch, the
Allied invasion of
French North Africa. He had been given
VIII Corps after being succeeded by
Lloyd D. Brown as commander of the 28th Division, but instead was sent to
North Africa to be Eisenhower's front-line troubleshooter. At Bradley's suggestion,
II Corps, which had just suffered a great defeat at the
Kasserine Pass, was overhauled from top to bottom, and Eisenhower, now the
Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied forces in North Africa, installed Major General
George S. Patton as corps commander in March 1943. Patton requested Bradley as his deputy, but Bradley retained the right to represent Eisenhower as well. Bradley succeeded Patton as commander of II Corps in April and directed it in the final Tunisian battles of April and May, with
Bizerte falling to elements of II Corps on 7 May 1943. The campaign as a whole ended six days later, and with it came the surrender of over 200,000
Axis Germans and Italians. As a result of his excellent performance in the campaign, Bradley was promoted to
Brevet lieutenant general on 2 June 1943 However, the bombing was successful in knocking out the enemy communication system, rendering German troops confused and ineffective, and opened the way for the ground offensive by attacking infantry. Bradley sent in three infantry divisions—the
9th,
4th and
30th—to move in close behind the bombing. The infantry succeeded in cracking the German defenses, opening the way for advances by armored forces commanded by Patton to sweep around the German lines. As the build-up continued in Normandy, the
Third Army was formed under Patton, Bradley's former commander, while Lieutenant General
Courtney Hodges, whom Bradley had succeeded as Commandant of the Infantry School, succeeded Bradley in command of the First Army; together, they made up Bradley's new command, the
12th Army Group. By August, the 12th Army Group had swollen to over 900,000 men and ultimately consisted of four field armies. It was the largest group of American soldiers to ever serve under one field commander.
Falaise pocket HQ, Normandy, 7 July 1944
Hitler's refusal to allow his army to flee the rapidly advancing Allied pincer movement created an opportunity to trap an entire German Army Group in northern France. After the German attempt to split the US armies at
Mortain (
Operation Lüttich), Bradley's Army Group and XV Corps became the southern pincer in forming the
Falaise pocket, trapping the
German Seventh Army and
Fifth Panzer Army in Normandy. The northern pincer was formed of Canadian (and Polish) forces, part of British
General Sir Bernard Montgomery's 21st Army Group. On 13 August 1944, concerned that American troops would clash with Canadian forces advancing from the north-west, Bradley overrode Patton's orders for a further push north towards Falaise, while ordering Major General
Wade H. Haislip's XV Corps to "concentrate for operations in another direction". Any American troops in the vicinity of
Argentan were ordered to withdraw. This order halted the southern pincer movement of Haislip's XV Corps. Though Patton protested the order, he obeyed it, leaving an exit—a "trap with a gap"—for the remaining German forces. escaped through the gap, avoiding encirclement and almost certain destruction. Bradley had incorrectly assumed, based on
Ultra decoding transcripts, that most of the Germans had already escaped encirclement, and he feared a German counterattack as well as possible friendly fire casualties. Though admitting that a mistake had been made, Bradley placed the blame on General Montgomery for moving the British and Commonwealth troops too slowly, though the latter were in direct contact with a large number of SS Panzer,
paratroopers, and other elite German forces.
Germany The American forces reached the "
Siegfried Line" or "Westwall" in late September. The success of the advance had taken the Allied high command by surprise. They had expected the German
Wehrmacht to make stands on the natural defensive lines provided by the French rivers, and had not prepared the
logistics for the much deeper advance of the Allied armies, so fuel ran short. General
George Marshall (center) and
Army Air Forces Commander General
Henry H. Arnold confer with Bradley on the beach at Normandy in 1944 Eisenhower faced a decision on strategy. Bradley favored an advance into the
Saarland, or possibly a two-thrust assault on both the Saarland and the
Ruhr Area. Montgomery argued for a narrow thrust across the Lower Rhine, preferably with all Allied ground forces under his personal command as they had been in the early months of the Normandy campaign, into the open country beyond and then to the northern flank into the Ruhr, thus avoiding the
Siegfried Line. Although Montgomery was not permitted to launch an offensive on the scale he had wanted, George Marshall and
Hap Arnold were eager to use the
First Allied Airborne Army to cross the Rhine, so Eisenhower agreed to
Operation Market Garden. Bradley opposed the operation, and bitterly protested to Eisenhower the priority of supplies given to Montgomery, but Eisenhower, mindful of British public opinion regarding damage from V-1 missile launches in the north, refused to make any changes. , Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, Major General
John S. Wood, Lieutenant General
George S. Patton and Major General
Manton S. Eddy being shown a map by one of Patton's armored battalion commanders during a tour near Metz, France, November 1944 Bradley's Army Group now covered a very wide front in hilly country, from the
Netherlands to
Lorraine. Despite having the largest concentration of Allied army forces, Bradley faced difficulties in prosecuting a successful broad-front offensive in difficult country with a skilled enemy. General Bradley and his First Army commander, General
Courtney Hodges, eventually decided to attack through a corridor known as the Aachen Gap towards the German township of Schmidt. The only nearby military objectives were the Roer River flood control dams, but these were not mentioned in contemporary plans and documents. Bradley and Hodges' original objective may have been to outflank German forces and prevent them from reinforcing their units further north in the
Battle of Aachen. After the war, Bradley would cite the
Roer dams as the objective. Since the Germans held the dams, they could also unleash millions of gallons of water into the path of advance. The campaign's confused objectives, combined with poor intelligence, resulted in the costly series of battles known as the
Battle of Hurtgen Forest, which cost some 33,000 American casualties. At the end of the fighting in the Hurtgen, German forces remained in control of the Roer dams in what has been described as "the most ineptly fought series of battles of the war in the west." Eisenhower turned red, took a breath, and replied evenly, "Brad, I—not you—am responsible to the American people. Your resignation therefore means absolutely nothing." Bradley paused, made one more protest, then fell silent as Eisenhower concluded, "Well, Brad, those are my orders." Others point out that both Secretary of War Stimson and General Eisenhower had desired to reward General Patton with a fourth star for his string of accomplishments in 1944, but that Eisenhower could not promote Patton over Bradley,
Devers, and other senior commanders without upsetting the chain of command (as Bradley commanded these people in the theater). A more likely explanation is that as Bradley commanded an Army Group and was the immediate subordinate of Eisenhower, who was promoted to five star rank on 20 December 1944, it was only appropriate that he should hold the next lower rank.
Victory (commanding the
British Second Army); General Omar Bradley (C-in-C 12th Army Group); Field Marshal
Sir Bernard Montgomery (C-in-C
21st Army Group); Lieutenant General
William H. Simpson (commanding the
U.S. Ninth Army) Bradley used the advantage gained in March 1945—after Eisenhower authorized a difficult but successful Allied offensive (on a broad front with British
Operation Veritable to the north and American
Operation Grenade to the south) in February 1945—to break the German defenses and cross the Rhine into the industrial heartland of the Ruhr. Aggressive pursuit of the disintegrating German troops by the
9th Armored Division resulted in the capture of a bridge across the
Rhine River at
Remagen. Bradley quickly exploited the crossing, forming the southern arm of an enormous
pincer movement encircling the German forces in the Ruhr from the north and south. Over 300,000 prisoners were taken. American forces then met up with the Soviet forces near the
Elbe River in mid-April. By
V-E Day, the 12th Army Group was a force of four armies (First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth) that numbered over 1.3 million men.
Command style ,
George S. Patton,
Carl Spaatz,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar Bradley,
Courtney Hodges, and
Leonard T. Gerow; standing are (from left to right)
Ralph F. Stearley,
Hoyt Vandenberg,
Walter Bedell Smith,
Otto P. Weyland, and
Richard E. Nugent Unlike some of the more colorful generals of World War II, Bradley was polite and courteous in his public appearances. A reticent man, Bradley was first favorably brought to public attention by
war correspondent Ernie Pyle, who was urged by General Eisenhower to "go and discover Bradley". Pyle subsequently wrote several dispatches in which he referred to Bradley as the '''GI's general'
, a title that would stay with Bradley throughout his remaining career. Will Lang Jr. of Life'' magazine said "The thing I most admire about Omar Bradley is his gentleness. He was never known to issue an order to anybody of any rank without saying 'Please' first." While the public at large never forgot the image created by newspaper correspondents, a different view of Bradley was offered by combat historian
S. L. A. Marshall, who knew both Bradley and George Patton, and had interviewed officers and men under their commands. Marshall, who was also a critic of George S. Patton, noted that Bradley's "common man" image "was played up by Ernie Pyle...The GIs were not impressed with him. They scarcely knew him. He's not a flamboyant figure and he didn't get out much to troops. And the idea that he was idolized by the average soldier is just rot." While Bradley retained his reputation as the ''GI's general'', he was criticized by some of his contemporaries for other aspects of his leadership style, sometimes described as "managerial" in nature. British General
Bernard Montgomery's assessment of Bradley was that he was "dull, conscientious, dependable, and loyal". He had a habit of peremptorily relieving senior commanders who he felt were too independent, or whose command style did not agree with his own, such as the colorful and aggressive General
Terry Allen, commander of the
U.S. 1st Infantry Division (who was relocated to a different command because Bradley felt that his continued command of the division was making it unmanageably elitist, a decision with which Eisenhower concurred). While Patton is often viewed today as the archetype of the intolerant, impulsive commander, Bradley actually sacked far more generals and senior commanders during World War II, whereas Patton relieved only one general from his command—
Orlando Ward—for cause during the entire war (and only after giving General Ward two warnings). One controversy of Bradley's leadership involved the lack of use of specialized tanks (
Hobart's Funnies) in the Normandy invasion. After the war
Chester Wilmot quoted correspondence with the developer of the tanks, Major General
Percy Hobart, to the effect that the failure to use such tanks was a major contributing factor to the losses at Omaha Beach, and that Bradley had deferred the decision whether to use the tanks to his staff who had not taken up the offer, other than in respect of the
DD (swimming) tanks. However a later memo from the 21st Army Group is on record as relaying two separate requests from the First Army, one dealing with the DD tanks and "Porpoises" (towed waterproof trailers), the other with a variety of other Funnies. The second list gives not only items of specific interest with requested numbers, but items known to be available that were not of interest. The requested items were modified Shermans, and tank attachments compatible with Shermans. Noted as not of interest were Funnies that required
Churchill or
Valentine tanks, or for which alternatives were available from the US. Of the six requested types of Funnies, the Sherman flamethrower version of the
Churchill Crocodile is known to have been difficult to produce, and the Centipede never seems to have been used in combat. Richard Anderson considers that the press of time prevented the production of the other four items in numbers beyond the Commonwealth's requirements. Given the heavier surf and the topography of Omaha Beach, it is unlikely that the funnies would have been as useful there as they were on the Commonwealth beaches. The British had agreed to provide British-crewed Funnies to operate with the American forces but were unable to train the crews and deliver the vehicles in time. ==Post-war==