In June 1999
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet named Black director of the CIA's
Counterterrorist Center (CTC). In this capacity, Black served as the CIA Director's Special Assistant for Counterterrorism as well as the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism. Black's promotion was a part of Tenet's "grand plan" for dealing with Al Qaeda. Black was the operational chief in charge of this effort. Tenet also put "Richard," one of his own assistants, in charge of the CTC's
bin Laden tracking unit. Black still headed the CTC at the time of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.
Al-Qaeda strategy, 1999–2001 In December 1998, CIA chief Tenet "declared war" on
Osama bin Laden. Early in 1999 Tenet "ordered the CTC to begin a 'baseline' review of the CIA's operational strategy against bin Laden." In the spring, he "demanded 'a new, comprehensive plan of attack' against bin Laden and his allies." The CTC had produced a "comprehensive plan of attack" against bin Laden and previewed the new strategy to senior CIA management by the end of July 1999. By mid-September, it had been briefed to CIA operational level personnel, the
NSA, the
FBI, and other partners. The strategy was referred to as "the Plan." ... [Cofer] Black and his new bin Laden unit wanted to "project" into Afghanistan, to "penetrate" bin Laden's sanctuaries. They described their plan as military officers might. They sought to surround Afghanistan with secure covert bases for CIA operations—as many bases as they could arrange. Then they would mount operations from each of the platforms, trying to move inside Afghanistan and as close to bin Laden as they could to recruit agents and to attempt capture operations. Black wanted recruitments and he wanted to develop commando or paramilitary strike teams made up of officers and men who could "blend" into the region's Muslim populations. Parallel with these developments, in November–December 1999,
Mohamed Atta,
Marwan al-Shehhi,
Ziad Jarrah, and
Nawaf al-Hazmi visited Afghanistan, where they were selected for the "planes operation" that was to become known as
9/11. Working with a Malaysian security unit, the CIA watched al-Hazmi and his companion
Khalid al-Mihdhar as they attended a January 2000 Al Qaeda conference in
Kuala Lumpur, later determined to be where decisions about the "planes operation" were made. According to an internal CIA report on the performance of the agency prior to the 9/11 attacks, Black was criticized for not informing the FBI that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had subsequently entered the United States. In addition, the
9/11 Commission found that while Black testified before Congress's Joint Inquiry into 9/11 that the FBI had access to information on the two hijackers, the 9/11 Commission found no such evidence of this. The CIA increasingly concentrated its resources on counter-terrorism, so that resources for this particular activity increased sharply. Some of the Plan's more modest aspirations were translated into action. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and Al Qaeda increased significantly from 1999. "By 9/11," said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human [reporting] networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan." During the summer of 2001, Tenet, Black, and one of Black's top assistants—"Rich B" (i.e. "Richard")—were active in conveying the dangers of Al Qaeda to the new Bush administration. At a meeting with National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice and others on July 10, 2001, "Rich" predicted a "spectacular" terrorist attack against US interests "in the coming weeks or months" ... "Multiple and simultaneous attacks are possible." After the meeting, "Rich and Cofer congratulated each other," feeling that at last the CIA had gotten the full attention of the administration. At an internal CIA update in late July, "Rich" dramatically predicted, "They're coming here!" (i.e. the United States). One of the ways by which CIA/CTC surveilled
Osama bin Laden in his Afghan base was the
Predator reconnaissance drone. A joint CIA-
Air Force program of flights in autumn 2000 (dubbed "Afghan Eyes") produced probable sightings of the Al Qaeda leader. Black became a "vocal advocate" of arming the aircraft with missiles to
target bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. Throughout 2001, Black and "Richard" continued to press for Predators armed with adapted
Hellfire anti-tank missiles. Legal and technical issues delayed the program. Black urged Tenet to promote the matter at the long-awaited Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001. The CIA chief did so. The CIA was authorized to "deploy the system with weapons-capable aircraft."
September 11, 2001 After the attacks on the
World Trade Center and
the Pentagon, some CTC staff refused an order to evacuate the
CIA headquarters at
Langley. This included the shift of the Global Response Center on the exposed sixth floor, which Black would eventually argue had "a key function in a crisis like this." CIA director Tenet finally accepted that Black wouldn't leave, and that their lives would be put at risk. The CTC obtained passenger lists from the planes that had been turned into weapons that morning, noting the presence of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. This was the first "absolute proof" that the attacks were an Al Qaeda plot. The CTC had first come across the names in connection with potential terrorist activity in the winter of 1999–2000 (see above). Despite his well-known statement "after 9/11 the gloves come off", Black was cautious about legal authorizations. He compared vague hints dropped by the president, of a nature that might not carry immunity, to
Henry II's indirect order: "
Who will rid me of this meddlesome priest?".
Post 9/11: Global War on Terror On September 13, 2001, Black briefed President George W. Bush in the White House Situation Room and outlined a CIA-led campaign in Afghanistan in which small teams of CIA officers and Green Berets would work with the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban government and expel Al Qaeda. Black told Bush: "When we're through with them, they will have flies walking across their eyeballs." Black told Bush that the CIA's planning efforts had put them in a better position to respond after the attacks. Tenet later said, How could [an intelligence] community without a strategic plan tell the president of the United States just four days after 9/11 how to attack the Afghan sanctuary and operate against
al-Qa'ida in ninety-two countries around the world? A "war council" (i.e. a restricted group of the
National Security Council) chaired by President Bush at
Camp David was convened on September 15, 2001. Black was present. Tenet proposed first to send CIA teams into Afghanistan to collect intelligence and mount covert operations. The teams would act jointly with military
Special Operations units. President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been "a turning point in his thinking." Black and
Armitage then flew to Moscow to seek help from Russian diplomatic and intelligence officers, as Afghanistan was in their sphere of influence. The Russians indicated their willingness to help and would not obstruct CIA activities. They warned Black about guerilla fighters being a major problem for the Russian army in Afghanistan, and provided a team to the CIA to assist with extensive on-the-ground intelligence, especially about topography and caves. The CIA geared up to take the lead in the attack on Al Qaeda and the
Taliban in Afghanistan. The Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team, led by
Gary Schroen, entered the country on September 26, 2001. A new branch was added to the CTC—CTC Special Operations, or CTC/SO.
Hank Crumpton, the former head of CTC operations, was recalled to head it. Black told him, "Your mission is to find al-Qa'ida, engage it, and destroy it." Testifying at the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks in 2002, Black declined the offer of anonymity because "I want to look the American people in the eye." During the "war on terror" Black is said to have played a "leading role in many of the [CIA]'s more controversial programs, including the
rendition/kidnapping and torture /
interrogation of al-Qaeda suspects and the detention of some of them in
secret prisons [outside the USA]." A small group of officials within the CIA's Counter-terrorism Center was put in charge of supporting the prisons and managing the interrogations. By some accounts,
Abu Zubaydah was taken into custody in March 2002 in Pakistan, and after initial U.S. interrogation and treatment for gunshot wounds, sent to a secret CIA torture center in Thailand, where he was waterboarded in April or May 2002. ==Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (2002–2004)==