Following the defeat of the
Italian Forces and Afrika Korps in
North Africa, there was disagreement between the
Allies as to what the next step should be.
Winston Churchill, the
British Prime Minister, in particular wanted to invade Italy, which he called the "underbelly of Europe" (commonly misquoted as "soft underbelly"). Popular support in Italy for the war was declining, and he believed an invasion would remove Italy, and thus the influence of the Italian Navy (
Regia Marina) in the
Mediterranean Sea, opening it to Allied traffic. This would make it much easier to supply Allied forces in the
Middle East and
Far East, and increase British and American supplies to the
Soviet Union. In addition, it would tie down German forces, keeping them away from the planned Allied invasion of Normandy – codenamed
Operation Overlord. However, General
George C. Marshall, the
Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and much of the American staff wanted to undertake no operations that might delay the Normandy invasion. When it became clear that Operation Overlord could not be undertaken in 1943, it was agreed forces in North Africa should be used to invade
Sicily, with no commitment made to any follow-up operations. Joint
Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) were operationally responsible for all Allied land forces in the
Mediterranean theatre and it was they who planned and commanded the invasion of Sicily and the Italian mainland. The
Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943, codenamed Operation Husky, was highly successful, although many of the Axis forces there were allowed to avoid capture and escape to the mainland. More importantly a
coup deposed
Benito Mussolini as head of the Italian government, which then began approaching the Allies to make peace. It was believed a quick invasion of Italy might hasten an Italian surrender and produce quick military victories over the German troops that would now be trapped fighting in a hostile country. However, Italian (and more so German) resistance proved relatively strong, and fighting in Italy continued even after the fall of Berlin. In addition, the invasion left the Allies in a position of supplying food and supplies to conquered territory, a burden that would otherwise have fallen on Germany. As well, Italy occupied by a hostile German army would have created additional problems for the German Commander-in-Chief
Albrecht von Kesselring.
The plan A diversion operation was designed to support the landings at Salerno, named Operation Boardman. The operation began on June 30, 1943, and ended on August 31, 1943. The plan for the operation was for the
Abwehr to intercept radio transmissions which contained false plans for invasions of
Sardinia,
Corsica,
Apulia,
Southern France or Northwestern Italy, and finally
Greece in that order. Essentially, the plan sought to weaken German and Italian forces in
Southern and
Central Italy by shifting Axis focus away from those regions. Also part of this operation was the use of dummies previously used in
Operation Waterfall. The dummies were refurbished and set up in
Cyrenaica in a way that would suggest an invasion of the
Peloponnese. The main landings were scheduled after the success at Sicily for September 9. The main force would land around
Salerno on the western coast in Operation Avalanche. It would consist of the U.S. Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, comprising the U.S. VI Corps under Major General
Ernest J. Dawley, the X British Corps under Lieutenant-General
Richard McCreery, and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division in reserve, a total of about nine divisions. Its primary objectives were to seize the port of
Naples to ensure resupply, and to cut across to the east coast, trapping
Axis troops further south. The inclusion of the 82nd Airborne Division as a reserve force was possible only with the cancellation of Operation Giant II. The 1st British Airborne Division would be landed by sea near
Taranto, on the "heel" of Italy in
Operation Slapstick, as a diversion for Salerno. Their task was to capture the port and several nearby airfields and link with the Eighth Army before pressing north to join the Fifth Army near
Foggia. The plan was deeply flawed. The Fifth Army would be landing on a very broad 35-mile front, using only three assault divisions, and the two corps were widely separated both in distance and by a river. Furthermore, the terrain was highly favorable to the defender. A
U.S. Army Ranger force under Colonel
William Orlando Darby consisting of three Ranger
battalions and two
British Commando units was tasked with holding the mountain passes leading to
Naples, but no plan existed for linking the Ranger force with X Corps' follow-up units. Finally, Clark ordered that no naval preparatory bombardment take place, concerned that surprise would be lost and reinforcements summoned if a bombardment was made. Approximately eight German divisions were positioned to cover possible landing sites, including the
Hermann Goering Division, 26th and 16th
Panzer, the 15th and 29th
Panzergrenadier, and the 1st and 2nd
Fallschirmjäger. == Order of battle ==