Uncertainty and confusion The Italian high commands, in the weeks leading to the armistice, had issued instructions for commanders and troops about their behaviour in case of a withdrawal from the war and possible German aggressions; these orders were Order No. 111 issued by the Staff of the Italian Army on 10 August, the OP 44 Memorandum issued on 26 August by General Mario Roatta (on Ambrosio's orders) to the major peripheral commands (only twelve copies), and the No. 1 and No. 2 Memorandums issued on 6 September by the Supreme Command to the Staffs of the three armed forces, containing indications about the deployment of the forces in the theaters of operations. These were however general guidelines, lacking details and nearly inapplicable (also due to excessive secrecy measures); they were ineffective and they contributed, along with the vagueness of Badoglio's message on the evening of 8 September, to the confusion of the peripheral commands of the Italian forces about the unexpected news of the change of sides and the aggressiveness of the German forces, thus resulting in insecurity and indecision among those commands. The situation of the Italian armed forces was worsened by the contradictory instructions issued by Ambrosio in the evening of 8 September, which restricted any initiative to mere defensive measures in case of German attacks, and by Roatta in the night of 9 September, who especially demanded to avoid turmoil and 'seditions' among the troops. Faced with the efficiency of the German units, which immediately demanded surrender or collaboration with threats and intimidations, most of the Italian commanders, also fearful of the impressive reputation of military capacity of the Wehrmacht and many times tired by a lengthy and disliked war, soon abandoned any intent of resistance; with a few exceptions, the troops, left with neither orders nor leaders, often dispersed. The situation of the German forces in Italy was actually a difficult one; Rommel, with his Army Group B, had the easier task of occupying the northern regions and neutralizing any resistance by Italian forces in that area, but Kesselring, in command of
Army Group C, was in great difficulty after September 8: after the bombing of Frascati, he barely managed to receive the communication of the coded word "Achse" and also learned of the Allied landing near Salerno, where only part of the 16th Panzer Division was stationed. At first, he feared that he would not be able to simultaneously contain the Allied advance and carry out his mission against Rome. Even the OKW considered the possibility of losing the eight German divisions in Southern Italy; Kesselring, however, showed great capability, and his forces fought with ability and effectiveness. Despite advice by Rommel to quickly withdraw from Southern Italy and retreat to the La Spezia–Rimini line, Kesselring managed to avoid the isolation and destruction of his forces and also to cause trouble to the Allied bridgehead at Salerno, to counterattack with some success (after massing there the 14th and 76th Panzerkorps, with three Panzer divisions and two Panzergrenadier divisions) and then to retreat with minimal losses north of Naples, while simultaneously carrying out Achse and capturing Rome with part of his forces.
Fall of Rome In order to defend the political and military leadership and to resist a possible German attack, Italian commanders had concentrated a considerable number of troops in the area around Rome; the main force consisted in the Motorized-Armored Army Corps (General Giacomo Carboni) composed of: •
10th Infantry Division "Piave" •
21st Infantry Division "Granatieri di Sardegna" •
135th Armored Cavalry Division "Ariete" •
136th Armored Legionary Division "Centauro" Other units tasked with the defense of Rome were • the
12th Infantry Division "Sassari" and • the
103rd Infantry Division "Piacenza" (part of the
XVII Italian Army Corps of General Giovanni Zangheri), • some battalions of the
13th Infantry Division "Re" and
7th Infantry Division "Lupi di Toscana" Overall, about 55,000 men and 200
armored fighting vehicles protected Rome and outnumbered the German forces in the area. The German forces near Rome consisted in the 11th Airborne Corps of General Kurt Student, headquartered in Pratica di Mare; the Corps comprised the 2nd Parachute Division under General Walter Barenthin, ready for action south of Rome, and the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division (General
Fritz-Hubert Gräser), reinforced by an armored battalion of the 26th Panzer Division (
Kampfgruppe Büsing), stationed between
Orvieto and
Lake Bolsena, north of Rome. These units comprised about 26,000 men and some hundreds of armored fighting vehicles, and were activated by Kesselring in the evening of 8 September: already at 20:30 they attacked the
Mezzocammino fuel depot, and the German paratroopers immediately started advancing south, overcoming sporadic resistance by the Piacenza Division in
Lanuvio,
Albano Laziale, and
Ardea. After reaching the
EUR district at 21:30, the 2nd Parachute Division overpowered some units of the Piacenza and Granatieri di Sardegna Divisions and after half an hour, advancing along the
Via Ostiensis, reached the
Magliana bridge. Meanwhile, the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division advanced from north along the
Via Aurelia,
Via Cassia, and
Via Flaminia, but was halted near
Lake Bracciano by the Ariete II Division (General
Raffaele Cadorna) and suspended its advance after some negotiations. The paratroopers, instead, went ahead with their action; fierce fighting erupted at Magliana between the German forces and the Granatieri di Sardegna, supported by armored units of the Ariete II Division, but at 02:00 on 9 September the
Ciampino airport was captured, and an hour later news came that German troops had arrived in
Tor Sapienza, along
Via Prenestina, just eight km away from the city center. More and more alarming news pushed the political and military leadership, after some uncertain orders by Ambrosio to try to contact Kesselring, to decide to abandon the city. Roatta exhorted the king and Badoglio to leave Rome by the
Via Tiburtina, then he ordered his forces to try to retreat to
Tivoli and finally he abandoned the city himself, leaving Carboni without any order. Carboni in turn fled in civilian clothes, then re-entered the city in the morning of 10 September, when the situation was definitely compromised. General
Umberto Utili, head of the Operations Division of the General Staff, declared the General Staff as formally dissolved in the morning of 9 September; the subordinate commands and the troops showed signs of bewilderment and confusion. At 05:10 on 9 September the King and Badoglio, along with high-ranking officers, dignitaries and family members, fled Rome in seven cars; without encountering any difficulties, they passed Tivoli and
Avezzano and reached
Pescara and later
Ortona, where more fleeing officers had gathered. There the King, his relatives, Badoglio, Ambrosio, and Roatta boarded the
corvette Baionetta, which reached
Brindisi at 14:30 on 10 September, the city having already been reached by Allied troops which had safely landed in Italian-controlled
Taranto (the British
1st Airborne Division), Brindisi, and Bari (two divisions of the 5th Corps) during
Operation Slapstick. The defenses of Rome had completely collapsed; in the south, the German paratroopers fought a series of sporadic fights against the Granatieri di Sardegna and units of the Ariete II at Magliana and Cecchignola; at 17:00 on 9 September, Magliana was abandoned by Italian forces and the 2nd Parachutist Division proceeded with its advance, arriving near
Porta San Paolo in the evening. In the north, the armored fighting vehicles of the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division had restarted their advance; after fighting against the bulk of the Ariete II, they captured
Manziana,
Monterosi (at 14:00), and
Bracciano (at 17:00), while more German units of the same Division advanced towards
Civitavecchia and
Kampfgruppe Büsing reached
Cesano and
La Storta. At 20:00 the Piave and Ariete II divisions, as they had been ordered, left their positions and retreated towards Tivoli, while units of the Sassari and Re divisions were deployed along the Via Cassia and Via Salaria. The parachutists of Major
Walter Gericke, whom had been parachuted at 09:00 over
Monterotondo with the task of capturing the Italian Army headquarters (which however had already been abandoned), were engaged in hard fighting, which they ended in success in the evening of 9 September; meanwhile, units of the 2nd Parachute Division attacked Porta San Paolo, two kilometers from
Piazza Venezia, held by Granatieri di Sardegna units and groups of civilian volunteers. The German troops, mainly consisting in veterans, overcame this resistance after some fierce fighting, and reached the center of Rome in the morning of 10 September. General
Siegfried Westphal, Chief of Staff of Army Group C, had started negotiations with Colonel Giaccone of the Centauro (the former 1st CC.NN. Armored Division "M", composed of
blackshirts whose allegiances were highly doubtful, which had led the Italian commands to decide to keep it away from the battle), on instructions from Kesselring and Student, in the evening of 9 September. After a series of threats and an ultimatum, Westphal obtained the capitulation of Rome by the afternoon of 10 September, after discussions with Generals Carboni and Sorice and Marshal
Enrico Caviglia, while German artillery was already firing directly inside the city. Westphal promised to spare the city and authorized the creation of a provisional Italian command under General
Giorgio Calvi di Bergolo. This evanescent agreement was soon revoked by the Germans; by 15 September all Italian troops were disarmed, on 23 September Calvi di Bergolo was arrested and the German and
RSI forces, under Generals
Stahel and Chieli, respectively, assumed control of the city; despite this, they stated that the status of "
open city" was maintained. This status was never recognized by the Allies, and the Germans exploited it to use Rome as a key logistic junction for the supplies sent to the frontline. Meanwhile, the Italian units that had retreated towards Tivoli dissolved; a considerable part of the Sassari and Piacenza divisions and of the
211th Coastal Division escaped capture and crossed the frontline, thus joining the Allies, but most of the men of the ten Italian divisions in the area were disarmed. Only a small part of them, however, were interned or deported; the majority was allowed to return to their homes. Overall German casualties for the capture of Rome were about a hundred dead and about 500 wounded, while Italian casualties were 984 killed, of whom 659 were soldiers, 121 civilians, and 204 "unidentified".
Disintegration of Italian forces in southern Italy Field Marshal Kesselring, despite being busy with avoiding the isolation of his forces and containing the Allied attacks launched in three different landing areas (Salerno, Apulia and Calabria), still managed to retain control of the situation and to carry out the tasks assigned within the "Achse" plan. He managed to quickly dissolve the Italian forces stationed in his area, to capture Rome, and to disengage mobile units that were to be sent south against the Allies (the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division, after capturing Rome, reached Salerno on 12 September), but he had to restrict himself to summarily disarming the majority of the captured soldiers, then sending them back to their homes. Only 24,294 of the 102,340 Italian soldiers captured by Army Group C were held captive. Italian forces in
Campania were weak and were quickly overwhelmed by the German troops; the Naples garrison was destroyed after two days of resistance by a German armored column, and its commander, Colonel Olivier, was executed. The
XIX Italian Army Corps was dissolved on 11 September after its commander,
General Del Tetto, abandoned his command post to take shelter in a monastery; the
9th Infantry Division "Pasubio" (stationed in the Naples area), which was still being re-formed after its near destruction on the Eastern Front, was immediately disarmed, while in the Salerno area the
222nd Coastal Division was attacked and dispersed by the 16th Panzer Division, and its commander, General
Ferrante Vincenzo Gonzaga, was killed after refusing to surrender. The
7th Italian Army of General Mario Arisio was stationed in Calabria,
Basilicata and Apulia; German forces in these regions were scarce, and were being moved north. On 9 September, the 7th Army headquarters in
Potenza were attacked by surprise and captured by German troops, but the overall weakness of the German forces and the swift intervention of the Allied forces helped the Italian units, the majority of whom maintained unit cohesion. The
IX Italian Army Corps (General Roberto Lerici) held central and northern Apulia, despite the collapse of the
209th Coastal Division; General
Nicola Bellomo held the harbour of Bari until Allied forces arrived, while to the south the
58th Infantry Division "Legnano", the
152nd Infantry Division "Piceno" and the
210th Coastal Division held their positions between
Grottaglie and
Lecce. More to the north, Foggia was occupied by German troops, and the local garrison commander, General
Felice Caperdoni, shot himself after ordering his men to lay down their weapons. The situation of the
XXXI Italian Army Corps (General Mercalli), stationed in Calabria with three coastal divisions and the
104th Infantry Division "Mantova", was more difficult: it was attacked by the 76th Panzerkorps and sustained casualties, and the III Battalion/
185th Infantry Regiment "Nembo" sided with the Germans and joined the 1st German Parachute Division. General
Frido von Senger und Etterlin, the German commander in Sardinia, was ordered by Kesselring to withdraw to
Corsica with the 90th Panzergrenadier Division. This manoeuvre was a complete success; the Italian forces present in the area (consisting of the
30th Infantry Division "Sabauda", the
31st Infantry Division "Calabria", the
47th Infantry Division "Bari", the
184th Infantry Division "Nembo", the
203rd Coastal Division, the
204th Coastal Division and the
205th Coastal Division), under General Antonio Basso, lacked mobility and did not go into action until 12 September; due to previous agreements made with the German commands, they did not impede the transfer of the German forces to Corsica, which was completed by 18 September with a few wounded caused by a skirmish near Oristano. The XII Battalion of the Nembo Division, which had reacted negatively to the news of the armistice, mutinied, killed the divisional chief of staff, Colonel Alberto Bechi Lucerna, and joined the 90th Panzergrenadier Division. In Corsica, after initial confusion and fruitless negotiations, General
Giovanni Magli, commander of the
VII Italian Army Corps (
20th Infantry Division "Friuli" and
44th Infantry Division "Cremona"), attacked the Waffen-SS "Reichführer-SS" brigade, while some French units landed at
Ajaccio on 12 September. On 13 September, following the arrival of the 90th Panzergrenadier Division from Sardinia,
Bastia (where
a previous German attempt to capture the port and Italian shipping had been thwarted by Italian ships) fell in German hands, but the Wehrmacht Supreme Command ordered General Von Senger und Etterlin to leave the island and withdraw to
Piombino. The German forces were evacuated from Corsica by 4 October, despite attacks by the Italian and French forces (the latter consisting of the
4th Moroccan Mountain Division). On 12 September, paratrooper units under Major
Harald Mors, which also included the SS officer Otto Skorzeny (who had located the different prisons where Mussolini had been held), carried out
Operation Eiche and freed Mussolini from detention in Campo Imperatore,
Gran Sasso; this was an essential premise for the creation of a new fascist collaborationist government wanted by Hitler.
Disintegration of Italian forces in central and northern Italy The strategic situation in central and northern Italy was much more favorable to the Germans than in the south. Army Group B, under Field Marshal Rommel, had a considerable number of troops, was far away from possible Allied intervention, and its units were deployed so as to be ready to intervene against Italian units, which were much less prepared and lacked clear orders. Moreover, the behavior of many of the Italian commanders further favored the success of the "Achse" plan: the local Italian superior commands, mostly concerned with avoiding riots, devastation, and popular insurrections, refused the help of civilians in the resistance, sometimes autonomously dissolved their units, and started negotiations with the Germans for an uneventful handover. Even the civilian leadership of the major cities carried out the instructions of the chief of police,
Carmine Senise, mostly aimed at avoiding riots, and thus collaborated with the German authorities. Under such circumstances, Rommel carried out his task with speed and efficiency, while many Italian units quickly disintegrated and offered little resistance; Army Group B strictly carried out the orders about the internment of Italian troops, and by 20 September, 183,300 of the 13,000 officers and 402,000 soldiers captured had already been sent to Germany. German units in
Piedmont quickly neutralized the Italian units; in
Turin (where General
Rossi refused to arm the civilians – on 18 August, he had ordered his men to fire on the crowd during a popular demonstration – and immediately initiated negotiations) and
Novara (where General Casentino surrendered his entire command) the high commands did not attempt any resistance, immediately handed over their weapons and surrendered with their disintegrating units; Rossi surrendered as soon as German armored units entered Turin (he later joined the Italian Social Republic). In Liguria, by 11 September the German troops of the 87th Corps (76th and 94th Infantry Division) and the 51st Corps (65th and 305th Infantry Division) occupied all positions, while the
XVI Italian Army Corps (
105th Infantry Division "Rovigo" and
6th Alpine Division "Alpi Graie") dissolved; German units also entered the naval base of La Spezia but the Italian fleet had already sailed, while ships unable to sail had been scuttled or sabotaged. In
Milan, General Vittorio Ruggero, commander of the garrison, bought time for 48 hours and then reached an agreement with a German colonel of the 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler"; Ruggero dissolved without a fight the
5th Infantry Division "Cosseria", which was being re-formed after the heavy losses suffered in
Russia, and already on the following day the Waffen-SS units broke the agreement, occupied Milan and arrested Ruggero, who was sent to POW camps in Germany along with his soldiers. After a brief resistance, the garrison of
Verona and its commander, General Guglielmo Orengo, were disarmed and deported by the German forces. Despite the
Alpine Wall fortifications, Italian units quickly disintegrated also in
Trentino-
South Tyrol: by 9 September, the two alpine divisions of
XXV Army Corps of General Alessandro Gloria (
2nd Alpine Division "Tridentina" and
4th Alpine Division "Cuneense"), both under re-constitution after their destruction on the Eastern Front) were immediately attacked and disarmed by the 44th German Infantry Division, which was already deployed south of Brenner Pass and by the "Doelha" Brigade; only in
Rovereto did some units resist until the morning of 10 September, before surrendering. In
Emilia, the 2nd SS-Panzerkorps of General Paul Hausser occupied the territory and destroyed the weak Italian units in the area without difficulty: the 24th Panzer Division and "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" quickly entered Modena and Bologna, the
3rd Cavalry Division "Principe Amedeo Duca d'Aosta", which was being re-formed after the losses suffered in Russia, was disarmed, and the soldiers taken prisoner. The 71st German Infantry Division encountered more difficulty in occupying Friuli and the Julian March whereas the
3rd Alpine Division "Julia" and the
2nd Infantry Division "Sforzesca", both being re-formed after their destruction in Russia, were soon disarmed, the
52nd Infantry Division "Torino" put up resistance in Gorizia, where workers formed the first partisan groups. Meanwhile, Slovene partisan formations invaded part of this region, where they often inflicted bloody reprisals against the Italian civilian population. Only towards the end of the month, the 71st German Infantry Division, assisted by Italian collaborationist soldiers of the Italian Social Republic, regained control of the situation, repelled the Yugoslav partisans and occupied all the territory. In
Trieste, General
Alberto Ferrero, after fruitless talks with anti-fascist representatives, started negotiations with the Germans and then abandoned the city, and 90,000 Italian soldiers in the area, abandoned without orders, surrendered without a fight. In central Italy north of Rome, the
5th Italian Army of General
Mario Caracciolo di Feroleto, headquartered in
Orte, was dissolved on 11 September, and its soldiers were disarmed and interned; the
3rd Infantry Division "Ravenna", headquartered in
Grosseto, and the coastal formations of the northern
Tyrrhenian Sea disintegrated, and German units entered the cities;
Livorno was captured on 10 September. In
Florence, General
Armellini Chiappi immediately allowed the Germans to enter the city; Colonel Chiari in
Arezzo and Colonel Laurei in
Massa gave up their forces without attempting any resistance. Italian units and civilian volunteers in Piombino repelled a German landing attempt between 10 and 11 September, killing or capturing some hundreds of German soldiers, but on 12 September the Italian superior commands surrendered the town to the Germans. Army Group B completed its task by 19 September, occupying all of central and northern Italy, disarming and capturing a great part of the Italian troops and sizable booty, that included 236 armored fighting vehicles, 1,138
field guns, 536
anti-tank guns, 797
anti-aircraft guns, 5,926
machine guns and 386,000 rifles. Along with 13,000 officers and 402,000 Italian soldiers, 43,000 Allied prisoners, previously held by the Italians, were also captured. Rommel organized a quick transfer to Germany of the captured Italian soldiers, which were sent through the Brenner Pass, partly by train, partly on foot. == Disintegration of Italian forces abroad ==