Fortification of Golden Temple An arsenal had been created within the Akal Takht over a period of several months. It was reported that trucks engaged for
kar seva (religious service) and bringing in supplies for the daily langar were smuggling in guns and ammunition. The police never attempted to check these vehicles entering the Golden Temple, on instructions from superiors. During a random check one such truck was stopped and many
Sten guns and ammunition were found. The Indian government White Paper alleged that after Operation Blue Star it was found that the militants had set up a grenade manufacturing facility, and a workshop for the fabrication of Sten guns inside the Temple Complex. However, the allegations of the militants being in possession of weapon workshops was never made prior to Operation Blue Star, and only after, with only the Army making these statements. The statements of multiple civilian eyewitnesses instead were consistent that the militants were a small number of men and had limited arms that were used sparingly.
The Third Agency A cover story in
Surya magazine, published soon after the Army operation, quoted "highly placed and highly disillusioned sources in the Research and Analysis Wing," claiming that most of the arms inside the complex had been smuggled in under the supervision of the Third Agency, created out of the outfit and controlled directly by the director of the Prime Minister's secretariat, to justify an assault. One week before the operation, the Punjab Police had intercepted two truck loads of weapons and ammunition in the Batala sub-division of Gurdaspur district. But the Third Agency officer in charge of Amritsar persuaded the director general of police (DGP) to release them and ensure their passage to the Darbar Sahib complex. I.G. Bhinder, a personal friend of the Gandhi family, had informed the central government upon discovering that weapons being transferred into the complex, publicly confirming that the government had full knowledge of the weapons. According to former IPS and IAS officer Gurtej Singh, the weapons had been smuggled by Indira Gandhi's own Third Agency to be deposited into the complex; he himself had been approached by the government agency to be a possible smuggler in the summer of 1983. A brigadier posing as a Sikh, accompanied by a mutual acquaintance, had feigned concern that potentially facing an imminent army operation, Bhindranwale had no weapons, and had offered Gurtej Singh a truckload of weapons to take to the complex in a kar-sewa truck, which Gurtej Singh declined. Singh would later learn that the weapons were deposited by the acquaintance himself.
JS Aurora When Lieutenant General
J S Aurora had visited the Golden Temple with his wife in December 1983, while Bhindranwale was living in the Guru Nanak Niwas, and looked at various areas of the complex, he had noticed no defensive preparations anywhere. Visiting again on 24 February 1984, while Bhindranwale resided at the Akal Takht building, he only saw sandbags on the
langar complex which "did not appear very formidable", which he was told was placed for protection after the CRPF had fired on the complex that month. He would visit again a month after the operation, attributing the professional defenses that had been built between March and June to
Shabeg Singh who had served under him. After Blue Star, Aurora would debunk reports of large amounts of sophisticated weapons stockpiled in the complex, commenting on the lack of sophisticated weapons, mentioning a number of light machine guns and two rocket launchers, but the lack of medium machine guns or mortars, with the only weapons bearing foreign markings being 60 self-loading rifles. He would ascribe most of the weaponry to either simply having been picked up from misplaced weapons drops during border wars, issued by the government to people living close to the border for security purposes, government gun-running, or from Punjab's long-established rural trade of unaccounted guns, used in family feuds, property disputes,
dacoit bands and the like. Describing the weaponry seized after the operation, he stated, "Quite a lot, yes, but the impression that has been built up in the public mind of foreign governments deliberately arming the terrorists with a view to overthrowing the government is grossly overdone." The Harmandir Sahib compound and some of the surrounding houses were fortified under the guidance of Major General
Shabeg Singh, who had joined Bhindranwale's group after dismissal from the army. During their occupation of Akal Takht, Bhindranwale's group had begun fortifying the building.
The Statesman reported that
light machine guns and
semi-automatic rifles were known to have been brought into the compound, and strategically placed to defend against an armed assault on the complex. Amidst claims of foreign involvement and the heavier weapons having Pakistani or Chinese markings on them, according to Aurora only 60 self-loading riles were foreign made. The rest were Indian. He also said that there were no medium machine guns and only two RPGs. Arora says that the arsenal was not truly sophisticated. A Lt. Colonel part of the Operation later revealed that militants only had 4 light machine gun magazines. According to him a single light machine gun carries 12 magazines. He revealed that the main gun that was kept and used by militants was AK-47s.
Presence of troops According to Congress claims, holes were smashed through the marble walls of Akal takht to create
gun positions. Walls were broken to allow entry points to the tiled courtyards. Secure
machine gun nests were created. All of these positions were protected by sandbags and newly made brick walls. The windows and arches of Akal Takht were blocked with bricks and
sandbags. Sandbags were placed on the turrets. Every strategically significant building of the temple complex, apart from the Harmandir Sahib in the center, had been fortified in a similar manner and allegedly defaced. The fortifications also included seventeen private houses in the residential area near the Temple. All the high rise buildings and towers near the temple complex were occupied. The militants manning these vantage points were in wireless contact with Shabeg Singh in Akal Takht. During this period police and security forces stationed around the temple complex were allowed only within 200 yards. This was to avoid the 'desecration' of the temple by their presence. The security forces were prevented by the politicians from taking action in enforcing the law. Even self-defence from the militants was made difficult. On 14 February 1984, a police post near the entrance of the Temple was attacked by a group of militants. Six fully armed policemen were captured and taken inside. After twenty four hours the police responded and sent in a senior police officer for negotiation. He asked Bhindranwale to release his men, along with their weapons. Bhindranwale agreed and delivered the dead body of one of the hostages who had been killed. Later the remaining five policemen were released alive, but their weapons were kept. The fortifications of the temple denied the army the possibility of commando operations. The buildings were close together and had labyrinthine passages all under the control of the militants. Militants in the temple premises had access to langars, food supplies, and water from the Sarovar (temple pond). Militants were well stocked with weapons and ammunition. Any siege under these circumstances would have been long and difficult. The option of laying down a long siege was ruled out by the army due to the "fear of uprisings in the countryside".
Intensification Police methods normally used on common criminals were used on protesters during the
Dharam Yudh Morcha, creating state repression affecting a very large segment of Punjab's population. This resulted in retaliatory violence from a section of the Sikh population and the widening the scope of the conflict, creating fresh motives for Sikh youth to turn to insurgency. The concept of Khalistan was still vague even while the complex was fortified under the influence of former Sikh army officials alienated by government actions who now advised Bhindranwale, Major General
Shabeg Singh and retired Major General and Brigadier Mohinder Singh, and at that point the concept was still not directly connected with the movement he headed. In other parts of Punjab, a "state of chaos and repressive police methods" combined to create "a mood of overwhelming anger and resentment in the Sikh masses against the authorities," making Bhindranwale even more popular, and demands of independence gain currency, even amongst moderates and Sikh intellectuals. On 12 May 1984, Ramesh Chander, son of
Lala Jagat Narain and editor of media house
Hind Samachar group, was murdered by pro-Bhindranwale militants. In addition, seven editors and seven news hawkers and newsagents were killed in a planned attack on the freedom of media house, to cripple it financially. Punjab Police had to provide protection for the entire distribution staff. Violent incidents including arson, bombings, and shootings increased over the following months. The total number of deaths was 410 in violent incidents and riots, and 1,180 people were injured. On 30 May 1984, soon after Longowal had announced the
Grain Roko Morcha to stop tax revenue and grain from leaving Punjab in protest, set for 3 June, Indira Gandhi had Zail Singh authorize military rule in Punjab. While he had reportedly remained unaware of the planned attack on the Darbar Sahib, some Akali leaders had known of the plan through secret communications with New Delhi. Tohra would inform G.S. Grewal, "I've come from meeting the Governor, I've told him it's not within our capacity to control Jarnail Singh now, if you want to do it, do it," though he and the other Akalis likely did not comprehend the nature and scale of the attack, as they barricaded themselves to save their lives in the complex for days during the operation.
Government claims According to government figures released after the operation in the White Paper, the combined figure of Sant Nirankaris and Hindu deaths before the operation was 165. According to police records, over "fifty persons lost their lives or received serious injuries" in the period before the army action in Amritsar, including police informers and Hindus including Arya Samaj news editor
Lala Jagat Narain, his son and successor Ramesh Chander, and BJP MLA
Harbans Lal Khanna, There were claims of "killer squads", which had originated when the media had sensationalized Bhindranwale's calls for youth self-defense against the police during the Dharam Yudh Morcha. Almost all the murders remained unsolved, and the incidents were regularly denounced by "all segments of the Sikh religio-political spectrum." The government never provided evidence of the supposedly planned massacre of Hindus, which had been "the government's explanation for starting the operation," alleged by a single MP, that triggered Operation Blue Star, although the pace of attacks was increasing. Congress member of parliament Amarjit Kaur, who referred to the Akali Dal as "the enemy within" and who had opposed the creation of the
Punjabi Suba, alleged that Bhindranwale wanted to start a civil war between the Hindus and Sikhs. Militants had already started the movement to drive Hindus out of certain areas to make way for Sikhs coming in from other states. Due to the increased incidents of religious violence, exchange of population had already started in Punjab. New Khalistani currency was being printed and distributed.
Army preparations According to the then-
Vice Chief of the Army Staff,
S. K. Sinha the army had begun preparations for an attack on the Golden Temple 18 months prior. Two months prior to the Operation the
Air Force had helicopters flying above the temple taking photographs. The
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) had surrounded the temple two months prior to the Operation. The facetious nature of the naming of the operation was revealed to Kirpal Dhillon, who would be appointed
director general of police three weeks after the operation, by a semiretired major general who had held a key position in the army headquarters at the time, who had been discussing rumors of an army action (which had become common by early 1984) and its name with a junior deputy while passing by an advertisement for Blue Star air conditioners. == Operation ==