s Understanding how cooperative hunting could evolve requires considering the circumstances that would make it beneficial.
Evolutionary models Conventional model: Packer and Ruttan Game Theory In 1988, the ecologists
Craig Packer and Lore Ruttan surveyed documented instances of cooperative hunting to make a
game-theoretical model to explain under what circumstances cooperative hunting might evolve. In their model, individuals can engage in one of four hunting strategies: • A
cooperator engages prey both when it is alone or with a companion. • A
cheater only engages when it is the first to find prey, but lets another individual make the kill if it arrives second. • A
scavenger never hunts and waits for another individual to make a kill. • A
solitary avoids others and always hunts alone. Each of these strategies has a certain efficiency based on the size and number of prey that can be captured in a hunt. The model shows that cooperative hunting for a single large prey is an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)—a strategy that an individual adopts because failure to do so reduces its fitness—only when solitary hunting is much less efficient. This is usually due to a prey species being too large to be taken down by a single individual predator, meaning hunting efficiency is low and hunting cost is high. In this case, the increased benefit in hunting efficiency from cooperation must compensate for the division of available meat among cooperators. Furthermore, cooperatively hunting groups are prone to invasion by cheaters and scavengers who avoid the drawbacks of hunting, so the added benefit of cooperative hunting must also outweigh these costs. Otherwise, cheating and scavenging can also be evolutionarily stable strategies. The proportion of these strategies increases in larger groups, since only a certain number of individuals are required to help make the kill, allowing others to directly benefit without participating in the hunt. When a species hunts a single prey small enough to be monopolized by an individual, cooperative hunting is rarely ever an ESS, since group members in essence all compete for a single meal. Unless individual prey-tracking and capture-efficiency is extremely low, solitary hunting is always the dominant strategy, since solitaries don't have to share their kill. Cheaters and scavengers never prosper in this situation, since the original captor monopolizes all the food. The model predicts that the only way cooperative hunting is an ESS for single small prey is if the predators are already constrained to live in groups—so they must share what they get in order to keep the group stable. On the other hand, cooperative hunting is always an ESS when attacking multiple prey, both large and small. This is because cooperators no longer have to pay costs of dividing meat if they can each make their own kill. Another benefit is that when prey is sufficiently large it can be shared among cooperators if one member was unable to make a kill. Moreover, cheaters and scavengers only do well when hunting costs are very high, since they forgo the chance to get their own prey. In these parts of the model, cooperative hunting is always favorable, as long as there is some form of increase in net efficiency over solitary hunting. However, in their body of research, Packer and Ruttan found very few instances of this clear advantage over solitaries. They concluded that cooperative hunting in multiple-prey situations is more likely to be a result of pre-existing social bonds rather than an evolutionary
adaptation, but that this hunting behavior is still important for establishing the social fabric of the group.
Revised model: Boesch's chimpanzees must carry her young through the trees, meaning it could be put in danger if she decides to pursue prey. In 1994,
Christophe Boesch condensed Packer and Ruttan's model to two basic conditions and added a crucial third component based on his study of chimpanzees (
Pan troglodytes) in the
Taï National Park of
Côte d'Ivoire: • For hunting to evolve, in single individuals the rewards for hunting (meat intake) exceed the costs of hunting (energy used up, injury, illness). • For cooperative hunting to evolve, in single hunters the net gain (benefits less costs) of hunting together exceeds the net gain of hunting alone. • For cooperative hunting to remain stable, there must be some mechanism to prevent cheaters and scavengers from taking an unfair portion of the meat. Following his study of the Taï chimpanzees, Boesch showed that the meat is distributed in a manner proportional to an individual's contribution to the hunt. This social mechanism is thought to prevent cheaters from destabilizing the cooperative hunting paradigm by getting more that the net benefit of hunters. Additionally, this meat-sharing behavior is not related to the social hierarchy of the group, suggesting that it depends solely on participation in the hunt. Curiously, among female Taï chimpanzees, cheating has become an ESS because there are substantially more costs associated with hunting, including the risk of dropping infants from trees and injuring them. Therefore, it pays females to be bystanders rather than hunt; in fact, the male strategy allows the female strategy to be stable provided the males provision their female partners with food. On the other hand, in the chimpanzees of
Gombe Stream National Park in
Tanzania, cooperative hunting is not a stable strategy. The predator-prey interactions differ in Gombe chimpanzees in a way that has prevented cooperative hunting from evolving. Both Taï and Gombe chimps hunt small
red colobus monkeys that live in trees; however, the trees are much smaller at Gombe, such that it is very easy for one chimp to capture its prey. At Taï, the trees are much taller (by about 30–40 meters), and it thus takes a larger effort to capture the prey. This disparity in height would favor the evolution of cooperative hunting at Taï (where multiple chimps can help one another out), but not at Gombe (where the benefits of cooperative hunting do not outweigh the costs of meat-sharing). In fact, single hunters gain much more meat than cooperative hunters in the Gombe population. It is therefore plausible that cooperative hunting evolved at Taï as a response to the more difficult distribution of monkeys in taller trees. The results above suggest that social living in chimps may not be a necessary prerequisite for the evolution of cooperative hunting; instead, the distribution of resources is a critical determining factor.
Importance of resource distribution The distribution of prey species is often the determining factor for whether populations hunt cooperatively. When prey is abundant throughout a habitat, cooperative hunting is not an effective strategy. Solitary hunters can easily find food on their own and do not share their kill. This case arises when prey is small enough to be captured by an individual. In contrast, when patches of prey are focused in small areas of a habitat, predators are likely to live in groups, to coordinate large attacks, and to kill more prey. This strategy illustrates the importance of group living in establishing cooperative hunting efforts. In this respect, cooperative hunting is not just a function of the species, but also of its environment. Consequentially, cooperative hunting most likely evolved in areas with scarce prey distribution, and patterns of this behavior are likely to vary with seasonal fluctuation of available resources. Even species that normally exhibit solitary hunting behavior have been shown to engage in cooperative hunting when the distribution of prey makes it difficult for solitary hunters to be successful. For example, in
aplomado falcons individuals generally hunt alone when searching for
insects, as these hunts are simple and these insects are easy to find. However, the aplomado falcons generally hunt cooperatively when targeting smaller
rodents and
birds, as these hunts are lengthy and require high-speed chases. Thus the switch to hunting cooperatively often depends upon the resource distribution in certain species.
Implications on sociality When resources are distributed in a way that supports group living, populations may develop social groups. Cooperative hunting is often a major feature of these groups, and it is one of the primary bases for the evolution of sociality in the order
Carnivora. While alternate theories have concluded that cooperative hunting may not be as important a factor in sociality as
territory-sharing and mutual protection of
offspring, they still agree that it plays an important role in developing social groups. For example, as a result of cooperative hunting, aplomado falcons defend the nest together and share the food with offspring after the hunt. Cooperative hunting has thus proven to hold certain social groups together since it can be disadvantageous to hunt alone in particular situations. Future research may quantify the contribution of cooperative hunting to the evolution of sociality, as it is currently difficult to ascertain how much cooperative hunting is a cause or a consequence of social behavior.
Evolution of group strategies and tactics == Adaptive significance ==