The Orientalist Harold Bowen described al-Mu'tadid at his accession as follows: Like his father's, al-Mu'tadid's power rested on his close relations with the military. As the historian
Hugh N. Kennedy writes, he "came to the throne, essentially, as a usurper [...] not by any legal right, but because of the support of his , who ensured not only that he became caliph, but also that their rivals in the military were humiliated and disbanded". Thus, not surprisingly, military activities consumed his interest, especially as he usually led his army in person on campaign. This secured his reputation as a warrior-caliph and champion of the Islamic faith ); as the historian
Michael Bonner comments, "[t]he role of 'ghazī caliph', invented by
Harun al-Rashid and enhanced by
al-Mu'tasim, now had its greatest performance, in al-Mu'tadid's tireless campaigning". From the start of his reign, the new Caliph set out to reverse the fragmentation of the Abbasid Caliphate, a goal towards which he worked with a mixture of force and diplomacy. Although an active and enthusiastic campaigner, al-Mu'tadid was also "a skilful diplomat, always prepared to make compromises with those who were too powerful to defeat", according to Kennedy.
Relations with the Tulunids This policy became immediately evident in the conciliatory attitude the new Caliph adopted towards his most powerful vassal, the Tulunid regime. In spring 893, al-Mu'tadid recognized and reconfirmed Khumarawayh in his office as autonomous
emir over Egypt and Syria, in exchange for an annual tribute of 300,000
dinars and a further 200,000 dinars in arrears, as well as the return to caliphal control of the two Jaziran provinces of
Diyar Rabi'a and
Diyar Mudar. To seal the pact, Khumarawayh offered his daughter,
Qatr al-Nada ("Dew Drop") as bride to one of the Caliph's sons, but al-Mu'tadid chose to marry her himself. The Tulunid princess brought with her a million dinars as her dowry, a "wedding gift that was considered the most sumptuous in medieval Arab history" (
Thierry Bianquis). Her arrival in Baghdad was marked by the luxury and extravagance of her retinue, which contrasted starkly with the impoverished caliphal court. According to a story, after a thorough search, al-Mu'tadid's chief eunuch could find only five ornate silver-and-gold candlesticks to decorate the palace, while the princess was accompanied by 150 servants each carrying such a candlestick. Thereupon al-Mu'tadid is said to have remarked "come let us go and hide ourselves, lest we be seen in our poverty". On the other hand, the whole affair may have been deliberately plotted by al-Mu'tadid as a "financial trap", as the enormous dowry almost bankrupted the Tulunid treasury. Apart from the honour of being linked to the caliphal dynasty, the Tulunids received little in return: Qatr al-Nada died soon after the wedding, and the murder of Khumarawayh in 896 left the Tulunid state in the unsteady hands of Khumarawayh's under-age sons. Al-Mu'tadid swiftly took advantage of this and in 897 extended his control over the border emirates of the Thughur, where, in the words of Michael Bonner, "[he] assumed, after a long hiatus, the old caliphal prerogative of commanding the annual summer expedition and arranging the defence against the Byzantine Empire". In addition, to secure caliphal recognition of his position, the new Tulunid ruler
Harun ibn Khumarawayh () was forced into further concessions, handing back all of Syria north of
Homs, and increasing the annual tribute to 450,000 dinars. Over the next few years, increasing domestic turmoil in the remaining Tulunid domains, and the escalation of Qarmatian attacks, encouraged many Tulunid followers to defect to the resurgent Caliphate.
Jazira, Transcaucasia, and the Byzantine front (Upper
Mesopotamia), with its provinces, in medieval times; modern borders are also shown. In the Jazira the new Caliph struggled against a variety of opponents: alongside an
almost thirty-year-old Kharijite rebellion, there were various autonomous local magnates, chiefly the
Shaybani ruler of
Amid and
Diyar Bakr,
Ahmad ibn Isa al-Shaybani, and the
Taghlibi chief
Hamdan ibn Hamdun. In 893, while the Kharijites were distracted by internal quarrels, al-Mu'tadid captured
Mosul from the Shayban. In 895 Hamdan ibn Hamdun was evicted from his strongholds, hunted down and captured. Finally, the Kharijite leader Harun ibn Abdallah himself was defeated and captured by Hamdan's son
Husayn in 896, before being sent to Baghdad, where he was
crucified. This exploit marked the beginning of an illustrious career for Husayn ibn Hamdan in the caliphal armies, and the gradual rise of the
Hamdanid family to power in the Jazira. Ahmad al-Shaybani retained Amid until his death in 898, being succeeded by his son
Muhammad. In the next year, al-Mu'tadid returned to the Jazira, ousted Muhammad from Amid, and reunified the entire province under central government control by installing his oldest son and heir,
Ali al-Muktafi, as governor. Al-Mu'tadid was unable, however, to restore effective caliphal control north of the Jazira in
Transcaucasia, where
Armenia and
Adharbayjan remained in the hands of virtually independent local dynasties. Ibn Abu'l-Saj, who was now the caliphal governor of Adharbayjan, proclaimed himself independent around 898, although he soon re-recognized the Caliph's suzerainty during his conflicts with the Christian Armenian princes. When he died in 901, he was succeeded by his son
Devdad, marking the consolidation of the semi-independent
Sajid dynasty in the region. In 900, Ibn Abu'l-Saj was even suspected of plotting to seize Diyar Mudar province with the co-operation of the notables of
Tarsus, after which the vengeful Caliph ordered the latter arrested and the city's fleet burned. This decision was a self-inflicted handicap in the centuries-long
war against Byzantium; in recent decades the Tarsians and their fleet had played a major role in the raids against the Byzantine frontier provinces. While a Syrian fleet under the Byzantine convert to Islam
Damian of Tarsus sacked the port of
Demetrias around 900, and Arab fleets would go on to wreak havoc in the
Aegean Sea over the next two decades, the Byzantines were strengthened on land by an influx of Armenian refugees, such as
Melias. The Byzantines began to expand their control over the border regions, scoring victories and founding new provinces (
themes) in the former no-man's land between the two empires.
The East and the Saffarids In the Islamic East, the Caliph was forced to acknowledge the reality of the Saffarids' domination and established a
modus vivendi with them, perhaps hoping, according to Kennedy, to harness them in a partnership analogous to that which the Tahirids had enjoyed in previous decades. Consequently, the Saffarid ruler
Amr ibn al-Layth was recognized in his possession of Khurasan and eastern Persia as well as Fars, while the Abbasids were to exercise direct control over western Persia, namely Jibal,
Rayy and
Isfahan. This policy gave the Caliph a free hand to recover the territories of the
Dulafids, another semi-independent local dynasty, that were centred on Isfahan and
Nihavand. When the Dulafid Ahmad ibn Abd al-Aziz ibn Abi Dulaf died in 893, al-Mu'tadid moved swiftly to install his son al-Muktafi as governor in Rayy,
Qazvin,
Qum and
Hamadan. The Dulafids were confined to their core region around
Karaj and Isfahan, before being deposed outright in 896. Nevertheless, the Abbasid hold over these territories remained precarious, especially due to the proximity of the
Zaydi emirate in Tabaristan, and in 897 Rayy was handed over to Saffarid control. The Abbasid–Saffarid partnership in Iran was most clearly expressed in their joint effort against the general
Rafi ibn Harthama, who had made his base in Rayy and posed a threat to both caliphal and Saffarid interests in the region. Al-Mu'tadid sent Ahmad ibn Abd al-Aziz to seize Rayy from Rafi, who fled and made common cause with the Zaydis of Tabaristan in an effort to seize Khurasan from the Saffarids. However, with Amr mobilizing the anti-
Alid sentiments of the populace against him and the expected assistance from the Zaydis failing to materialize, Rafi was defeated and killed in
Khwarazm in 896. Amr, now at the pinnacle of his power, sent the defeated rebel's head to Baghdad, and in 897 the Caliph transferred control of Rayy to him. The partnership finally collapsed after al-Mu'tadid appointed Amr as governor of
Transoxiana in 898, which was ruled by his rivals, the
Samanids. Al-Mu'tadid deliberately encouraged Amr to confront the Samanids, only for Amr to be crushingly defeated and taken prisoner by them in 900. The Samanid ruler,
Isma'il ibn Ahmad, sent him in chains to Baghdad, where he was executed in 902, after al-Mu'tadid's death. Al-Mu'tadid in turn conferred Amr's titles and governorships on Isma'il ibn Ahmad. The Caliph also moved to regain Fars and
Kirman, but the Saffarid remnant under Amr's grandson
Tahir proved sufficiently resilient to thwart the Abbasid attempts to capture these provinces for several years. It was not until 910 that the Abbasids managed to regain the coveted Fars province.
Rise of sectarianism and fragmentation in the periphery In the course of the 9th century, a range of new movements emerged, based on Shi'ite doctrines, which replaced Kharijism as the main focus for opposition to the established regimes. They gained their first successes in the periphery of the Abbasid empire: the Zaydi takeover in Tabaristan
was repeated in 897 in Yemen. Under al-Mu'tadid, a new danger appeared closer to the Caliphate's metropolitan areas: the Qarmatians. A radical
Isma'ili sect founded in
Kufa around 874, the Qarmatians were originally a sporadic and minor nuisance in the
Sawad (Lower Iraq), but their power grew swiftly to alarming proportions after 897. Under the leadership of
Abu Sa'id al-Jannabi, they seized
Bahrayn in 899 and in the next year defeated a caliphal army under
al-Abbas ibn Amr al-Ghanawi. In the years following al-Mu'tadid's death, the Qarmatians "were to prove the most dangerous enemies the Abbasids had faced since the time of the Zanj" (Kennedy). At the same time, a Kufan Isma'ili missionary,
Abu Abdallah al-Shi'i, made contact with the
Kutama Berbers during a
pilgrimage to
Mecca. His proselytization efforts made rapid headway among them, and in 902, he began attacks on the
Aghlabid emirate of
Ifriqiya, clients of the Abbasids. Its conquest was completed in 909, laying the foundations of the
Fatimid Caliphate.
Domestic government Fiscal policies The Abbasid army, following the reforms of al-Mu'tasim, was a smaller and more professional fighting force than the caliphal armies of the past. Although it proved effective militarily, it also posed a potential danger to the stability of the Abbasid regime: drawn from Turks and other peoples from the Caliphate's periphery and the lands beyond, it was alienated from the society of the Caliphate's heartlands, with the result that the soldiers were "entirely reliant on the state not just for cash but for their very survival" (Kennedy). As a result, any failure by the central government to provide their pay resulted in a military uprising and a political crisis; this had been repeatedly demonstrated during the Anarchy at Samarra. Consequently, ensuring the regular payment of the army became the prime task of the state. According to Kennedy, based on a treasury document from the time of al-Mu'tadid's accession: At the same time, the Caliphate's fiscal basis had shrunk dramatically after so many tax-paying provinces were lost from the central government's control. The caliphal government was now increasingly reliant on the revenue of the Sawad and the other areas of lower Iraq, which were witnessing a rapid decline in agricultural productivity due to the disruption of the civil wars and neglect of the irrigation network. In the reign of Harun al-Rashid (786–809) the Sawad had provided an annual revenue of 102,500,000
dirhams, more than double the revenue of Egypt and three times that of Syria; by the early 10th century it was providing less than a third of that figure. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that in the remaining provinces, semi-autonomous governors, grandees and members of the dynasty were able to establish virtual
latifundia, aided by the system of , a form of
tax farming in exchange for a fixed tribute, which they often failed to pay. To maximize their revenue from the territory remaining to them, the Abbasids increased the breadth and complexity of the central bureaucracy, dividing the provinces into smaller tax districts as well as increasing the number of the fiscal departments (s), which allowed for close oversight of both revenue collection and the activities of the officials themselves. To combat this fiscal crisis, the Caliph would often personally devote himself to the supervision of revenue, acquiring a reputation, according to F. Malti-Douglas, for "a spirit of economy, verging on avarice"; he was said to "examine petty accounts that a commoner would scorn to consider" (Harold Bowen). Fines and confiscations multiplied under his rule, with the resulting revenue, along with the income from the crown domain and even a portion of the provincial taxation, flowing to the caliphal privy purse (). The latter now acquired a leading role among the fiscal departments, and it frequently held more money than the public treasury (). By the end of al-Mu'tadid's reign, the once empty privy purse would contain ten million dinars. On the other hand, in a measure aimed to ease the tax burden of the farmers, in 895 the Caliph changed the start of the tax year from the
Persian New Year in March to 11 June—which became known as , 'al-Mu'tadid's New Year'—so the land tax () was now collected after the harvest and reflected the actual yields, instead of the usually unreliable estimates before.
Rise of the bureaucracy During the 9th century, the Abbasid administrative system became increasingly professionalized. The provincial administration became a subject of careful study, with geographical works such as those of
Ibn Khordadbeh providing details on the Caliphate's provinces and their road networks, while men like
Ibn Qutayba developed the art of chancery writing into a highly elaborate system. Al-Mu'tadid's fiscal policies further strengthened the position of the civil bureaucracy, which now reached the apogee of its influence, and especially that of the vizier, whom even the army came to respect as the spokesman of the caliph. Al-Mu'tadid also introduced Tuesday and Friday as days of rest for government employees. In terms of personnel, al-Mu'tadid's reign was marked by continuity among the senior leadership of the state.
Ubayd Allah ibn Sulayman ibn Wahb remained vizier from the start of the reign until his death in 901, and was succeeded by his son,
al-Qasim, who had from the start been deputizing for his father during the latter's absences from the capital. The
freedman Badr, a veteran who had served under al-Muwaffaq and whose daughter married the Caliph's son, remained commander of the army. The fiscal departments, especially of the Sawad, were managed first by the
Banu'l-Furat brothers
Ahmad and
Ali, and after 899 by the Banu'l-Jarrah under Muhammad ibn Dawud and his nephew,
Ali ibn Isa. The original administrative team was so effective and harmonious, according to the 11th-century historian
Hilal as-Sabi, that it was said by subsequent generations that "there had never been such a quartet, Caliph, Vizier, Commander, and chief of the s, as al-Mu'tadid, Ubayd Allah, Badr and Ahmad ibn al-Furat". On the other hand, as Michel Bonner points out, the later reign of al-Mu'tadid "saw a growth of factionalism within this bureaucracy, observable also in the army and in urban civilian life". The intense rivalry between the two bureaucratic dynasties of the Banu'l-Furat and the Banu'l-Jarrah, with their extensive networks of clients, began at this time. Although a strong caliph and vizier could restrain this antagonism, it would come to dominate the Abbasid government during the following decades, with the factions alternating in office and often fining and torturing their predecessors to extract money according to the well-established practice known as . In addition, al-Qasim ibn Ubayd Allah was of an altogether different character than his father: soon after his appointment to the vizierate, al-Qasim plotted to have al-Mu'tadid assassinated, and tried to involve Badr in his scheming. The general rejected his proposals with indignation, but al-Qasim was saved from discovery and execution by the Caliph's sudden death. The Vizier then tried to dominate al-Muktafi, moved swiftly to have Badr denounced and executed, and was involved in yet more intrigues against the Banu'l-Furat.
Return of the capital to Baghdad Al-Mu'tadid also completed the return of the capital from Samarra to Baghdad, which had already served as his father's main base of operations. The city's centre, however, was relocated on the eastern bank of the Tigris and further downstream from the original
Round City founded by
al-Mansur () a century earlier; it has remained there up to modern times. As the 10th-century historian
al-Mas'udi wrote, the Caliph's two main passions were "women and building" (""), and accordingly he engaged in major building activities in the capital: he restored and expanded the
Great Mosque of al-Mansur which had fallen into disuse; enlarged the
Hasani Palace; built the new palaces of
Thurayya ('
Pleiades') and Firdus ('Paradise'); and began work on the
Taj ('Crown') Palace, which was completed under al-Muktafi. This marked the creation of a sprawling new caliphal palace complex, the Dar al-Khilafa, which would remain the residence of the Abbasid caliphs until the
Mongol sack of the city in 1258. Al-Mu'tadid also took care to restore the city's irrigation network by clearing the silted-up
Dujayl Canal, paying for this with money from those landowners who stood to profit from it.
Theological doctrines and promotion of science In terms of doctrine, al-Mu'tadid sided firmly with
Sunni traditionalist orthodoxy from the outset of his reign, forbidding theological works and abolishing the fiscal department responsible for property in
escheat, which
Hanbali legal opinion regarded as illegal. At the same time he also tried to maintain good relations with the Alids, to the point of seriously considering ordering the official cursing of
Mu'awiya, the founder of the
Umayyad Caliphate and
main opponent of
Ali; he was dissuaded only at the last moment by his advisers, who feared any unforeseen consequences such an act might have. Al-Mu'tadid also maintained good relations with the breakaway Zaydi imams of Tabaristan, but his pro-Alid stance failed to prevent the establishment of a second Zaydi state in Yemen in 901. Al-Mu'tadid also actively promoted the traditions of learning and science that had flourished under his early 9th-century predecessors
al-Ma'mun (), al-Mu'tasim, and
al-Wathiq (). Court patronage for scientific endeavours had declined under al-Mutawakkil, whose reign had marked a return to Sunni orthodoxy and an aversion to scientific inquiry, while his successors had lacked the luxury to engage in intellectual pursuits. Himself "keenly interested in natural sciences" and able to speak Greek, al-Mu'tadid promoted the career of one of the great
translators of Greek texts and mathematicians of the era,
Thabit ibn Qurra, and of the
grammarians Ibn Durayd and
al-Zajjaj, the latter of whom became tutor of the Caliph's children. Other notable figures associated with, and supported by, the Abbasid court at the time were the religious scholar
Ibn Abi al-Dunya, who served as the Caliph's advisor and was appointed as tutor for al-Muktafi; the translator
Ishaq ibn Hunayn; the physician
Abu Bakr al-Razi (Rhazes), who was named director of the newly established al-Mu'tadidi hospital in Baghdad; and the mathematician and astronomer
al-Battani. One of the leading intellectual figures of the period was al-Mu'tadid's own tutor,
Ahmad ibn al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsi, a pupil of the great philosopher
al-Kindi. Al-Sarakhsi became a close companion of the Caliph, who appointed him to the lucrative post of market supervisor of Baghdad, but was executed in 896, after angering the Caliph. According to one account, al-Qasim ibn Ubayd Allah—who is frequently featured as the villain in anecdotes of al-Mu'tadid's court—inserted al-Sarakhsi's name in a list of rebels to be executed; the Caliph signed the list, and learned of his mistake only after his old master had been executed.
Justice and punishment under al-Mu'tadid In the dispensation of justice, al-Mu'tadid was characterized by what Malti-Douglas describes as "severity bordering on sadism". While tolerant of error and not above displays of sentimentality and tenderness, when his wrath was aroused he resorted to torture in the most ingenious ways, and had special torture chambers constructed underneath his palace. Chroniclers such as al-Mas'udi and the
Mamluk-era historian al-Safadi describe in great detail the tortures inflicted by the Caliph on prisoners, as well as his practice of making an example of them by having them publicly displayed in Baghdad. Thus the Caliph is reported to have used
bellows to inflate his prisoners, or buried them upside down in pits. At the same time, chroniclers justify his severity as legitimate, being in the interests of the state. Malti-Douglas remarks that when al-Safadi compared al-Mu'tadid with the founder of the Abbasid state, calling him "
al-Saffah the Second", this was not only to emphasize his restoration of the Caliphate's fortunes, but also a direct allusion to the meaning of al-Saffah's name, "the Blood-Shedder". ==Death and legacy==