In September 1940, Williams became Operations Officer of the
3rd Bombardment Group (Light), of which the 90th Bombardment Squadron was a part. He became its commander in December 1940, and was promoted to
lieutenant colonel. In July 1941, he became commander of the
27th Bombardment Group. He was promoted to
colonel on 5 January 1942. From May to November 1942 Williams was involved with the organisation of the
Eighth Air Force in the
United Kingdom. Williams reached North Africa by air on 15 November 1942. On 28 November Williams personally led forty-forty aircraft of the 62nd and 64th Troop Carrier Groups carrying 530 paratroops of the British
2nd Parachute Battalion. The battalion commander,
Lieutenant Colonel John Dutton Frost rode with Williams in the lead aircraft. Williams picked his landmarks carefully and successfully navigated his way to
Depienne Airfield, dropping the paratroops nearby. All his aircraft returned safely. Frost and his paratroops were not so lucky; half of them were killed or captured fighting their way back to Allied line. On 21 January 1943, Williams became head of
XII Air Support Command, the ground support aircraft operating in support of
II Corps on the
Tunisian front. Nominally the XII Air Support Command had a strength of 52
P-40s, 23
P-39s, 27
A-20s and eight
DB-7s. Williams' assumption of command coincided with an increase in German activity. Reacting to a concentration of German armor around Faïd, Williams' aircraft bombed and strafed it all day on 26 January, claiming twelve German tanks destroyed. However, German opposition was increasing in the air as well. On 2 February, six P-40s and four P-39s encountered twenty to thirty
Stukas escorted by eight to ten
Bf 109s. A Stuka was shot down; but so were five P-40s. His most experienced group, the
33d Fighter Group took so many losses that it had to be withdrawn to
Morocco to rebuild. Then reverses suffered by the ground forces in the
Battle of the Kasserine Pass forced Williams to evacuate his forward airfields around
Thélepte. Eighteen aircraft, of which five were irreparable, were destroyed to prevent their capture. On 22 and 23 February, Williams attempted to launch an all-out attack on German forces withdrawing through Kasserine Pass, but the weather hampered his efforts.
Sicily Williams was promoted to
brigadier general on 18 March 1943. In addition to the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, the Troop Carrier Command included the
52nd Troop Carrier Wing and No. 38 Wing,
RAF. Getting this force ready for action was a major challenge. The 51st was assigned to work with the British and the 52nd with the Americans because the 51st had prior experience working with the British in North Africa, and its aircraft had been modified to work with British troops. However the British plan called for a
glider infantry mission and the 51st had no experience with gliders, whereas the 52nd had conducted training with gliders before leaving the United States, but was committed to a parachute mission. Gliders were delivered disassembled and a major effort was required to assemble the required number of gliders. In the meantime, valuable training time was lost. Williams had not been involved with experiments that had been carried out by troop carriers over the previous months and was therefore not up to speed on the latest
pathfinder equipment and tactics, which were neglected during the planning phase of HUSKY. Moreover, the route chosen for the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing's operation was particularly difficult, involving three sharp turns over water in dim moonlight. Williams was unable to secure the necessary agreement from the naval commander,
Vice Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt for a straighter route. Nor was he able to persuade the
Twelfth Air Force to provide a fighter escort for his troop carriers or to fly
searchlight neutralisation missions, although the RAF agreed to fly some missions against searchlights. On 21 May, Williams moved his headquarters from
Casablanca to
Oujda in order to observe the progress of training of the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing and the
82nd Airborne Division. At least one of his group commanders felt that Williams was over-optimistic about the proficiency of his crews. The British glider operation, codenamed
Operation LADBROKE on the night of 9/10 July 1943 was poorly executed. The aircrew of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing had difficulty with navigation and formation flying at night. The aircraft were buffeted by high winds, subjected to
flak which caused some aircraft to veer off course, and encountered poor visibility. No aircraft were lost but only 12 of the 133 gliders reached the
landing zone, while 47 came down in the sea. The simultaneous American operation, which involved 226 C-47s of the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing carrying 2,781 paratroops, encountered similar problems, resulting in the drop being widely scattered. Less than one-sixth of the paratroops landing on or near the intended
drop zone. The 82nd Airborne Division's commander,
Major General Matthew Ridgway, felt that the operation had "demonstrated beyond any doubt that the Air Force... cannot at present put parachute units, even as large as a battalion within effective attack distance of a chosen drop zone at night." The HUSKY mission on 11 July was far less successful. The 144 C-47s of the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing that took part had to fly at night over the front line. Moreover, Allied naval vessels had not been cleared from the approach corridor. The troop carriers came under heavy flak from friend and foe alike. Some 23 aircraft were lost and half of those that did return suffered damage. The paratroops of the
504th Parachute Infantry were widely scattered and suffered heavy casualties. A mission codenamed
Operation FUSTIAN, flown on 13 July in support of the British, cost 11 C-47s destroyed and 50 damaged out of 124 participating. After the costly failures in Sicily,
Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, the commander of
Army Ground Forces, was prepared to break up the airborne divisions, but Williams retained his faith in the possibilities of airborne operations.
Italy Because no British airborne operations were contemplated for the
Allied Invasion of Italy, Williams directed both the 51st and 52nd Troop Carrier Wings to train with the 82nd Airborne Division. Taking the lessons of Sicily to heart,
pathfinders were created. These were aircrew with the best available navigators carrying specially trained paratroops equipped with navigational aids. These included the British
Rebecca/Eureka transponding radar and
flashing Krypton lamps. The pathfinders' role was to locate and mark the drop zones for other airborne units. pathfinder training was conducted in
Tunisia and encouraging results led to Williams' decision to employ Eureka in upcoming operations. The Troop Carrier Command moved from Tunisia to Sicily in early September and Williams opened his headquarters at
Licata. Two airborne operations were planned. GIANT I was an airborne assault on the
Volturno River crossing. It was cancelled as the risks to both paratroops and aircraft were considered too great. GIANT II was an airborne assault on
Rome area. Williams planned parachute drops on airfields at
Poligono di Furbara and
Cerveteri, northwest of the city. It too was cancelled amid doubts as to whether the Italian Rome garrison could hold the area. However, in response to the deteriorating situation in the
Battle of Salerno, Lieutenant General
Mark Clark called for an emergency mission to bring the 82nd Airborne Division. The 51st and 52nd Troop Carrier Wings were given only hours to prepare but Williams was able to improvise by using the plans for GIANT I. This time extraordinary measures were taken to silence Allied anti-aircraft guns afloat and ashore. Three pathfinder aircraft led the way, dropping fifty paratroops equipped with Rebecca/Eureka and Krypton lamps precisely on the drop zone behind Allied lines. Most of the paratroops landed within of the drop zone, and no troops or aircraft were lost. A second drop the following night was just as successful. This encouraged Allied commanders to attempt a battalion-sized drop behind enemy lines at
Avellino the night after but the hilly terrain made it difficult for the pathfinders'
Aldis lamps and radio transmitters and the drop was scattered.
Normandy , artillery commander of the 101st Airborne Division, gives his various glider pilots last minute instructions before the take-off on D minus 1. Planning for
Operation OVERLORD, the
invasion of Normandy, had begun years before and had included the prospect of airborne operations. To control them, Major General
Lewis H. Brereton's
Ninth Air Force activated the
IX Troop Carrier Command in October 1943 under Brigadier General
Benjamin F. Giles. However, even before Giles assumed command, it was understood that Williams would be in charge of the operations. He took over on 25 February 1944, bringing with him a number of experienced officers from the Mediterranean. When Giles assumed command, IX Troop Carrier Command consisted of the
50th Troop Carrier Wing, with the
315th and
434th Troop Carrier Groups. The
53rd Troop Carrier Wing arrived from the United States in February followed by the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing from Sicily in March. This brought the IX Troop Carrier Command's strength to three wings with fourteen groups. By the end of May, it had 1,116 crews and 1,207 operational aircraft. In addition, it had 1,118 operational
Waco and 301 operational
Horsa gliders. Williams paired the 52nd Troop carrier Wing with the 82nd Airborne Division and the 53rd Troop Carrier Wing with the
101st Airborne Division. With so many inexperienced units and personnel, the IX Troop Carrier Command embarked on an intensive training regime as a matter of urgency. A Command Pathfinder School opened at
Cottesmore on 26 February and one of Williams' first appointments was Lieutenant Colonel Joel L. Crouch as its commandant. A major command exercise called EAGLE was conducted on the night of 11 May. Except for some serious failures by the very inexperienced
315th and
442nd Troop Carrier Groups, the exercise went very well. Even
Air Chief Marshal Sir
Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the commander of the
Allied Expeditionary Air Force, seemed impressed, For Williams, who had already predicted that, barring pathfinder failure or heavy flak, over 90% of the paratroops would land in their correct drop zones in
Normandy, the exercise affirmed his opinion. During the final days before the operation, Williams visited his groups, giving pep talks. On D-Day and D+1, IX Troop Carrier Command flew 1,606 aircraft and 512 glider sorties. Losses of 41 aircraft and 9 gliders was lighter than expected, and Leigh-Mallory was quick to admit that he had been wrong. However, the drop was still scattered. Clouds and flak broke up the formations and fog made identification of the drop zones difficult, and in some areas the enemy prevented the pathfinders from marking the drop zones correctly. In all, some 13,348 paratroops had been embarked for Normandy, of whom 90 were brought back for various reasons and 18 were in a plane that ditched before reaching Normandy. Perhaps as many as 140 were killed when their planes were shot down. Of the rest, about 10% landed on the drop zone, 25-30% within a of their beacon, and 15-20% within .
Southern France The next major operation was
Operation DRAGOON, the invasion of southern France. The Mediterranean theatre's troop carrying aircraft had been drawn down by the requirements of OVERLORD, and the XII Troop Carrier Command (Provisional) had been disbanded. All that remained was the
51st Troop Carrier Wing, albeit at full strength following the return of a detachment from
China Burma India Theater. General Eisenhower agreed to send the
50th Troop Carrier Wing and
53rd Troop Carrier Wing with a total of 416 aircraft. In addition, 12 pathfinder planes were sent, bringing with them radar and visual aids, and
pathfinder teams from the
82nd and
101st Airborne Divisions. The planes flew from the United Kingdom to Italy via
Gibraltar or
Marrakesh and moved to recently captured airfields in the Rome area. They brought with them 225 glider pilots. To provide co-pilots for the gliders, another 375 despatched by the
Air Transport Command. Only about 140 gliders were on hand, but the
US War Department agreed to ship another 350 on the next convoy. They had to be given special priority in order to clear the congested port of Naples, but by 9 August, 327 gliders had been delivered and assembled. Williams and Brigadier General
Robert T. Frederick, the commander of the 1st Airborne Task Force, began to jointly plan the operation, codenamed of Operation RUGBY, on 13 July. Williams was convinced that a daylight operation conferred a number of advantages. The transport aircraft would have the cover of darkness as they approached the drop zones, as well as surprise, and the airborne troops would be able to begin their assaults before the amphibious landings took place; they would also drop sufficiently late that the Germans would not have enough time to prepare to counter the beach landings. Having the remainder of the 1st Airborne Task Force land by glider in the afternoon would give aircraft crews a rest after the initial drops, and would also give the airborne troops time to clear the landing zones for the gliders. In all, the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division flew 444 paratroop, 372 Waco and 36 Horsa sorties, delivering 6,488 paratroops and 2,611 glider troops. Thanks to the daylight and use of navigational aids, 50% of the paratroops and over 90% of the glider troops landed on or near their drop zone. Flak was minimal but fog still caused problems. General Frederick, whose troops took most of its objectives, considered that it had been "a wonderful operation."
The Netherlands Williams was promoted to Major general on 26 August, shortly after returning to the European Theater to resume command of the IX Troop Carrier Command. While he had been away, operational control of IX Troop Carrier Command had been transferred from the Allied Expeditionary Air Force to the
First Allied Airborne Army, a newly formed formation under Brereton's command. On 10 September Brereton held a conference with his troop carrier and airborne commanders and their staffs at his headquarters at Sunnyhill Park, near
Ascot, Berkshire, where they were briefed on
Operation MARKET, an airborne operation to seize a series of bridges in the Netherlands to enable the
21st Army Group to cross the
Rhine River. At the conference Williams was given operational control of the Nos 38 and 46 Groups RAF, which he would exercise from his command post at
Eastcote. Brereton ordered MARKET to be flown in daylight. The conference allocated directives to the three airborne divisions, giving the southernmost objectives to the 101st Airborne Division so that the flight paths of aircraft bringing it from its bases in southern England would not cross those bring the 82nd Airborne Division from the
Grantham area. Another fateful decision taken at the conference was to only have C-47s tow a single glider. Double-towing gliders was difficult and dangerous, but single-towing meant stretching the glider lift out over four days. The next day, Williams held a conference with his wing and group commanders. Two routes were considered, a northern one that ran across the occupied Netherlands, and a southern route that approached through Belgium. The northern route was shorter and simpler but the southern was safer. In the end Williams decided to use both, with the
British 1st Airborne Division and the 82nd Airborne Division taking the northern route and the 101st Airborne Division using the southern one. The gamble to carry out the operation in daylight proved successful. Daylight not only helped the aircraft to navigate better, but also greatly reduced the time required for units to assemble on the drop zones. This was achieved with over 5,200 sorties by fighters and bombers devoted to warding off the
Luftwaffe and suppressing German flak batteries. However, it did not eliminate the need for pathfinders. The recovery rate for airdropped supplies also improved but was still poor. The 101st Airborne Division retrieved less than 50% of its supplies, while the 82nd Airborne Division, greatly aided by Dutch civilians, still managed less than 70%. The beleaguered British 1st Airborne Division retrieved less than 15% of its supplies. Major General James M. Gavin of the 82nd Airborne Division estimated that collecting all of the airdropped supplies would have required a third of men. Nothing like that was available in battle. In all, IX Tactical Air Command flew 4,242 aircraft and 1,899 glider sorties, losing 98 aircraft and 137 gliders. Nos 38 and 46 Groups RAF flew 1,340 aircraft and 627 glider sorties, losing 55 aircraft and two gliders.
Germany Operation VARSITY was another airborne operation to assist the crossing of the Rhine by the British
21st Army Group. Starting at 0709 on 24 March 1945, transport aircraft carrying the 14,365 troops of the
British 6th Airborne Division and the US
17th Airborne Division Varsity took off from airbases in England and France and rendezvoused over Brussels, before turning northeast for the Rhineland dropping zones. The airlift consisted of 540 transport aircraft containing paratroops, and a further 1,050 troop-carriers towing 1,350 gliders. The 17th Airborne Division consisted of 9,387 personnel, who were transported in 836 C-47 transports, 72
C-46 Commando transports, and more than 900 Waco gliders. The 6th Airborne Division consisted of 7,220 personnel transported by 42
Douglas C-54 and 752 C-47 Dakota transport aircraft, as well as 420 Horsa and
Hamilcar gliders. This immense armada, which stretched for more than across the sky and took over two and a half hours to pass any given point, was protected by 1,253
Ninth Air Force and 900
RAF Second Tactical Air Force fighters. The combination of the two divisions in one lift made this the largest single day airborne drop in history. General Brereton rated Operation VARSITY a "tremendous success." But the cost was not light: seven British and 46 American aircraft were lost. The flammability of the C-46 caused an unacceptable loss rate of 28%. Williams returned to the United States in July 1945. He remained in command of the IX Troop Carrier Command, which moved to
Stout Air Force Base, Indiana. ==Post-war==