Phenomenalism is a radical form of
empiricism. Its roots as an
ontological view of the nature of existence can be traced back to
George Berkeley and his
subjective idealism, upon which
David Hume further elaborated.
John Stuart Mill had a theory of perception which is commonly referred to as classical phenomenalism. This differs from Berkeley's idealism in its account of how objects continue to exist when no one is perceiving them. Berkeley claimed that an omniscient God perceived all objects and that this was what kept them in existence, whereas Mill claimed that permanent possibilities of experience were sufficient for an object's existence. These permanent possibilities could be analysed into
counterfactual conditionals, such as "if I were to have
y-type sensations, then I would also have
x-type sensations". As an
epistemological theory about the possibility of knowledge of objects in the external world, however, the most accessible formulation of phenomenalism is perhaps to be found in the
transcendental idealism of
Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, space and time, which are the
a priori forms and preconditions of all sensory experience, "refer to objects only to the extent that these are considered as phenomena, but do not represent the things in themselves". While Kant insisted that knowledge is limited to
phenomena, he never denied or excluded the existence of objects which were not knowable by way of experience, the things-in-themselves or
noumena, though his proof of
noumena had many problems and is one of the most controversial aspects of his Critiques. Kant's "epistemological phenomenalism", as it has been called, is therefore quite distinct from Berkeley's earlier ontological version. In Berkeley's view, the so-called "things-in-themselves" do not exist except as subjectively perceived bundles of sensations which are guaranteed consistency and permanence because they are constantly perceived by the mind of
God. Hence, while Berkeley holds that objects are merely bundles of sensations (see
bundle theory), Kant holds (unlike other bundle theorists) that objects do not cease to exist when they are no longer perceived by some merely
human subject or mind. In the late 19th century, an even more extreme form of phenomenalism was formulated by
Ernst Mach, later developed and refined by Russell, Ayer and the logical positivists. Mach rejected the existence of
God and also denied that phenomena were data experienced by the mind or consciousness of subjects. Instead, Mach held sensory phenomena to be "pure data" whose existence was to be considered anterior to any arbitrary distinction between mental and physical categories of phenomena. In this way, it was Mach who formulated the key thesis of phenomenalism, which separates it from bundle theories of objects: objects are
logical constructions out of sense-data or ideas; whereas according to bundle theories, objects are made up of sets, or bundles, of
actual ideas or perceptions. That is, according to bundle theory, to say that the pear before me exists is simply to say that certain properties (greenness, hardness, etc.) are being perceived at this moment. When these characteristics are no longer perceived or experienced by anyone, then the object (pear, in this case) no longer exists. Phenomenalism as formulated by Mach, in contrast, is the view that objects are
logical constructions out of perceptual properties. On this view, to say there is a table in the other room when there is no one in that room to perceive it, is to say that
if there were someone in that room,
then that person would perceive the table. It is not the
actual perception that counts, but the conditional
possibility of perceiving.
Logical positivism, a movement begun as a small circle which grew around the philosopher
Moritz Schlick in Vienna, inspired many philosophers in the English speaking world from the 1930s through the 1950s. Important influences on their brand of empiricism included Ernst Mach — himself holding the Chair of Inductive Sciences at the University of Vienna, a position Schlick would later hold — and the Cambridge philosopher
Bertrand Russell. The idea of some logical positivists, such as
A. J. Ayer and
Rudolf Carnap, was to apply phenomenalism in linguistic terms, enabling reliable discourse of physical objects, such as tables, in strict terms of either actual or possible sensory experiences. 20th century American philosopher
Arthur Danto asserted that "a phenomenalist, believ[es] that whatever is finally meaningful can be expressed in terms of our own [sense] experience.". He claimed that "The phenomenalist really is committed to the most radical kind of empiricism: For him reference to objects is always finally a reference to
sense-experience ... ." Following
George Berkeley's lead, the 20th century Australian philosopher
Colin Murray Turbayne also argued in favor of a robust form of phenomenalism by developing a "
language model" as an alternative to the commonly accepted "geometric model" which underlies both the modern theory of
visual sensation in particular and the classical
mechanical philosophy in general. To the phenomenalist, objects of any kind must be related to experience. "
John Stuart Mill once spoke of physical objects as but the 'permanent possibility of experience' and this, by and large, is what the phenomenalist exploits: All we can mean, in talking about physical objects — or nonphysical objects, if there are any — is what experiences we would have in dealing with them ... ." However, phenomenalism is based on mental operations. These operations, themselves, are not known from sense experience. Such non-empirical, non-sensual operations are the "...nonempirical matters of space, time, and continuity that empiricism in all its forms and despite its structures seems to require ... ." ==Criticisms==