;"Rethinking the Human-Animal Divide in the Anthropocene", Manuel Arias-Maldonado Arias-Maldonado argues that traditional appeals to the value of nonhuman animals have failed to be sufficiently motivating, and that, instead, human/nonhuman relationships are appropriately grounded upon the ideas of
human exceptionalism and human domination. These notions, he claims, can be the basis of political transformation for nonhuman animals. He argues that once these ideas are properly understood, they can ground an idea of human
sympathy for nonhuman animals, which is just one part of a caring and
sustainable Anthropocene. Even if an alternative politics might ultimately be preferable, Arias-Maldonado argues, a change to a focus on sympathy might be useful and realistic as a political strategy. ;"An Agenda for Animal Political Theory", Marcel Wissenburg For the purposes of his contribution, Wissenburg takes many standard contentions in animal ethics for granted. However, he challenges mainstream animal ethicists' tendency to adopt the language of
liberalism, which he suggests misconstrues nonhuman animals as individuals and posits
false dichotomies about their status. This adoption of liberal ideas can come in
Tom Regan's "old" form or Donaldson and Kymlicka's "new" form. Wissenburg challenges Donaldson and Kymlicka's extension of
citizenship to nonhuman animals, and instead sketches the outline of an alternative proposal that pays attention to individual animals' modes of being. This he labels, adapting a phrase from
Robert Nozick, "liberalism for humans and
feudalism for animals". ;"Public Reason and Animal Rights", Chad Flanders Flanders argues that nonhuman animals could be "below" politics, in that they do not have politically considerable interests, or "above" politics, in that they have
rights that trump political decision-making processes. Flanders argues that if animals are excluded from basic justice, as
John Rawls held, they can be defended on
metaphysical grounds (what Rawls refers to as on the basis of
comprehensive doctrines, as opposed to the
public reasons which must be used for arguments in the political realm). This is potentially liberating for animal advocates. Nonetheless, Flanders argues, animal issues may be matters of basic justice insofar as they affect humans or that animals themselves have rights. Alternatively, the wrongness of
animal cruelty may be a "fixed point" in our political reasoning. Flanders concludes that Rawlsianism provides a good starting point for the inclusion of animals in political decision-making. ;"Articulating Ecological Injustices of Recognition", Christie Smith Smith draws on
Val Plumwood to argue that rather than solely think about resituating animals in ethical terms, what is needed is the resituation of humans in ecological terms; both are needed, she argues, as the two tasks are linked. Smith rejects the
culture/nature dichotomy, and suggests that a
politics of recognition is an appropriate way to think about relationships. She draws upon
feminist and
ecofeminist literature to conceive of recognition theory beyond
intersubjective self/other relations, allowing recognition beyond the human self. Smith seeks to show that recognition theories should not be considered "soft" or "naive" as accounts of justice, and instead that they offer an appropriate mode for thinking about ecological and animal injustices. ;"Ecological Justice for the Anthropocene", David Schlosberg Schlosberg's contribution, is partly a response to challenges made to his
Defining Environmental Justice (2007). ;"Animal Deliberation", Clemens Driessen Driessen explores ways in which nonhuman animals might be understood to be engaging in political deliberation. His claim is
empirical rather than
normative, as he presents nonhuman animals as already being in political dialogue with humans; rather than arguing that rights should be extended to animals, he calls for a recognition of how interactions with animals have always been political. This is particularly noticeable, he argues, when humans are involved in the development of new technologies, analysing the example (following
Bruno Latour) of
Gaston Lagaffe building a door in dialogue with his boss and the office cat, and of farmers and cows using
milking robots. He argues that a recognition of this animal deliberation can lead to more thoughtful forms of both environmentalism and democracy. ;"Animal Party Politics in Parliament", Simon Otjes Otjes's approach is more empirical than that of many contributors to
Political Animals and Animal Politics. ;"The Limits of Species Advocacy", Kurtis Boyer Boyer observes the distinction between how nonhuman animals can receive political protection
as individuals and
as species. He argues that the latter form of protection is motivated by a desire to preserve human experience of the species rather than the experiences of the nonhuman animals themselves. Politically motivated species advocacy, Boyer argues, is highly
anthropocentric, as advocates present these animals as sharing in particular revered
virtues; as a result, the likes of habitat and genetic health are the focus of advocates, rather than the nonhuman animals themselves. Using the example of
polar bear preservation, Boyer illustrates how species advocacy becomes tied up with broader political goals concerning humans and competing visions of the value of animals. He concludes that the advancement of species advocacy can limit the achievement of the goals of the
animal welfare or animal rights movements. ;"Slaughter and Animal Welfarism in Sweden 1900–1944", Per-Anders Svärd Svärd, taking a more empirical approach than many other contributors, ;"The Rights of Nature: Theory and Practice", Mihnea Tanasescu Tanasescu explores the idea of
rights for nature, an idea that, though unorthodox, has seen success in implementation. He introduces the concept, with a focus on the differences between
moral and legal rights, before examining the particular case of Ecuador's entrenchment of rights for nature in its
2008 constitution, which is compared with other real-world cases. He finally addresses what can be learnt from these theoretical and practical considerations. He concludes that much work on the topic is left to be done, but the key lesson to be learnt is the significance of innovation; environmental politics, he claims, should remain both inventive and optimistic. ==Academic reception==