during the
battle of Tal Afar. The PMF were an important factor for the Iraqi government's victory over the Islamic State in the
war in Iraq and
the more global war on the militant group. The Popular Mobilization Forces have been involved in several battles of the
military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant since their founding, the most important being the
Second Battle of Tikrit. After the end of the battle of Tikrit, the complex of occupation forces handed over security issues to local police and security forces. On Monday April 6, 2015, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said that, while being heavily involved in the conquest of Tikrit, the Popular Mobilization Forces will not join the planned Mosul conquest. This statement was reversed in March 2016, when al-Abadi reportedly rejected calls by
Nineveh's provincial council to prohibit Popular Mobilization Forces from taking part in retaking Mosul. Shia volunteers reportedly entered
Al Anbar Governorate on the first days of May 2015, among heavy protests of Sunnite personalities, with limited operations continuing in 2016. In Autumn 2016, they participated in the
Mosul Offensive acting as left flank of the anti-IS forces, and by November had captured a number of smaller towns and villages from IS, expanding roughly along a line from Qayyarah to Tal Afar, while keeping a distance (20+ km) to the city of Mosul itself. In October 2017, the PMF was part of the Iraqi government forces that
recaptured Kirkuk, which had been under
Kurdish control since 2014.
Engagement in Syria Khomeinist PMF militia factions loyal to the
Iranian Supreme Leader have been heavily deployed in the
Syrian civil war on the side of the
Assad regime, often with the stated aim of defending Shi'ite shrines. Although at the time of the formation of the PMF, most of its component groups were primarily engaged in Iraq against ISIL, after the reduction of the immediate ISIL threat in Iraq from 2015, many returned to Syria. For instance, in January 2015, pro-Iran
Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada militant group announced the deaths of two of its fighters in defense of
Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque in
Damascus, and the militia's involvement in the
2015 Southern Syria offensive was documented by the Iraqi TV station Al-Anwar 2. Between 2013 and early 2016, 1,200 Iraqi fighters died in Syria, including combatants of pro-Iran militias
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and
Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, among them senior commanders
Abu al-Fadl and
Abu Haider al-Nazari. On the other hand,
pro-Sistani and
Sadrist PMF militias wary of Iranian influence in
Iraq are strongly opposed to the
intervention in Syria and have been resisting recruitment attempts made by pro-Iran factions to send Iraqis to die on the side of
Assad regime. The Baghdad-based spokesman of the U.S.-led coalition, Army Col. Ryan Dillon, dismissed the allegation, saying on Twitter that no coalition airstrikes took place in the area at the time. According to the militia's deputy, Ahmed al-Maksousi, they were hit by artillery fire in Syria's Jamouna area, about 12 kilometers (about 7.5 miles) from the Iraqi border. Along with 40 killed, many militiamen were wounded, al-Maksousi added. On 22 August 2019, The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), blamed the United States and Israel for a number of
bombings on their warehouses and bases. The group accused the US of permitting Israeli drones to join its forces for executing attacks on Iraqi territory. The group pledged to counter any attack in the future. On 23 August, a fatwa issued by Ayatollah
Kazem al-Haeri called for attacks against US troops in Iraq, "the presence of any US military force in Iraq is forbidden (haram) under any title: military training, advice or the rationale of fighting terrorism". On 29 December 2019, the United States
bombed the headquarters of PMF member
Kata'ib Hezbollah near
Al-Qa'im, killing 25 militiamen. On 3 January 2020, PMF commander
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, PMF PR head Mohammed Redha al-Jabri, and the
Quds Force head,
Qasem Soleimani, were among those killed in an
assassination near
Baghdad Airport. On 12 March 2020, the U.S. launched air raids against five Kata'ib Hezbollah weapons storage bases across Iraq in retaliation for the
2020 Camp Taji attacks. On 25 February 2021, a U.S. air raid killed one and wounded four while targeting PMF facilities on the Iraqi-Syrian border in Syria's eastern
Deir ez-Zor Governorate. The facilities were used by PMF forces combatting
ISIL in collaboration with the Iraqi and Syrian governments. U.S. officials described the PMF as an "Iranian-backed militia" and the air strike as a retaliation for purported Iranian military aggression against U.S. facilities in Iraq, while Iranian officials denied involvement. Iraqi officials repudiated any connection between the PMF and the insurgents who previously attacked U.S. facilities.
The Pentagon asserted that the air raid followed consultation with the Iraqi government and other partners in the region, but the Iraqi military denied providing the U.S. with information regarding locations within Syria. On 27 June 2021, U.S. forces bombed two locations after an increase in drone attacks. One location was a drone-making facility and the other a conventional weapons exchange depot. Four members of Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada faction were claimed to have been killed in the action. On 4 January 2024, U.S. airstrikes on PMF's logistical headquarters killed two people, including the organization's deputy head of operations in Baghdad,
Mushtaq Talib Al-Saeedi, and wounded five others. On 2 February 2024, U.S. airstrikes
targeted the headquarters of the PMF in
Akashat in
Anbar Governorate, killing 16 fighters and wounding 25. On 23 March 2026, U.S. airstrikes in Anbar Governorate killed "at least 15" fighters from the PMF and also struck the residence of
Falih Al-Fayyadh, located in Mosul, though he was not present.
2025 PMF Reform Bill In March 2025, the Iraqi parliament introduced a draft law aimed at reforming the PMF and more fully integrating them into the state security apparatus. A central provision of the proposed legislation is the formal subordination of the PMF to the authority of the Iraqi Prime Minister, who serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces - explicitly distancing the group from external influence, particularly from
Iran. The bill also includes measures such as a mandatory retirement age for senior commanders, which could lead to the replacement of key figures with longstanding ties to Tehran. The initiative reflects growing
U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government to assert national control over the PMF and curb Iranian influence within its ranks. In contrast, the close relationship between PMF leadership and Iran was underscored by a February 2025 visit by PMF Chairman
Falih al-Fayyadh to senior Iranian officials – a move widely interpreted as an attempt to rally support from Tehran against the proposed legislation, especially among hardline factions that often operate with considerable autonomy.
Iran War On 14 March 2026, a faction of the
IRI,
Kataib Hezbollah launched a drone that breached the air defenses of the
Camp Victory base and managed to strike it. On 17 March 2026, the
Saraya Awliya al-Dam faction of the
IRI published a footage of a reconnaissance drone flying above the US embassy compound in baghdad. According to an observer the footage is consistent with the footage obtained from a
Fiber optic drone suggesting that the group had acquired such advanced technology. On the 21st March 2026 the
Ashab al-Kahf faction of the
IRI claimed responsibility for killing a French soldier in an attack on a base in Iraq, and on the same day set the
Camp Victory base ablaze. On 28 March, 2026, it was reported that the Iranian back militia has begun mobilizing forces to Iran amid the
2026 Iran war. Videos showed a convoy on its way, later spotted at
Khorramshahr in southwestern Iran. == Terrorism ==