The most prominent case of PSI occurred in the process of the sovereign-debt restructuring of
Greece, after a significant
haircut of it was agreed, in early 2012. The so-called "world's biggest debt-restructuring deal in history"
EU member-states agreed to a new €100 billion loan and a retroactive lowering of the bailout interest rates, while the
International Monetary Fund would provide "a significant contribution" to that loan. Eventually, private-sector involvement reached 83,5% of Greek bond holders. The
Bank of Greece, in its 2011–12 report, commented that "the successful completion of the PSI, creates a new operating framework for the Greek economy in the years ahead." The PSI was proclaimed a "great success", justified as providing the Greek economy with breathing space, although it hit the value of Greek holders of debt paper, as well as the reserves of Greek pension funds, most severely penalizing small private bondholders (i.e. private individuals holding less than 100k face value), whose losses were not even recognized for a
tax deferral. (The law 4046/2012, article 3, paragraph 5, only recognized losses of corporations for tax write-offs). At the same time, Greek sovereign bonds held by the ECB and other EU central banks as a result of the SMP Programme (and ANFAs operations) were excluded from the PSI step through a secretly agreed swap agreement between the ECB and the Hellenic Republic in February 2012. During the following years, Eurosystem central banks were subsequently paid back at face value, generating a substantial 18 billion euros of profits, which were partly retroceded to the Greek government. ==Legal aspects==