Beginnings (1963–1966) The idea of a Spanish atomic bomb was first envisioned by
Agustín Muñoz Grandes. A hardline
Falangist, Muñoz Grandes aspired to break from the previous
atlanticism promoted during the 50s to make the country independent of both
NATO and the United States. In 1963, he approached general director of the JEN, , about preparing a Spanish foray into atomic weaponry. This new project, christened after the
bull which felled the famous bullfighter
Manolete, would be helmed by
Spanish Air Force general , selected for possessing the scientific background and acumen necessary to conduct the project's research. Velarde was a major general and pilot in the
Spanish Air Force, as well as president of the Nuclear Fusion Institute of the
Polytechnic University of Madrid. He joined the Theoretical Physics Section of the Nuclear Energy Board, where he would remain as Director of Technology until 1981. He had studied Nuclear Energy at both
Pennsylvania State University and the
Argonne National Laboratory of the
University of Chicago. The work was divided into two phases: the atomic bomb project itself, and the construction of a nuclear reactor, the fuel of which would be extracted for plutonium in order to construct the bombs. While the reactors could be built with help from the French —
General de Gaulle supported the idea of an atomic Spain – the matter of what material to use for the bombs themselves, as well as how to actually construct them, was one of consideration. The first results were a fiasco. The JEN specialists, all military, declared themselves incapable of knowing both the technical details for manufacturing the device and, above all, how to obtain the necessary plutonium.
Palomares incident Their question was answered on 17 January 1966, when (in what would later be known as the
Palomares incident) a B-52G bomber from the United States accidentally crashed while carrying four
B28FI Mod 2 Y1 thermonuclear (hydrogen) bombs. Three were found on land near the small fishing village of
Palomares in the municipality of
Cuevas del Almanzora,
Almería, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two of the weapons detonated upon impact with the ground, resulting in the
contamination of a area with radioactive
plutonium. The fourth, which fell into the
Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a search lasting two and a half months. The Spanish state conducted secret research on the debris zones of the incident, with technicians led by Velarde finding remains of the bomb and the detonators in the area. This enabled to the project to use
plutonium-239 — a boon due to its relative cheapness.
Setbacks (1966–1971) Yet later that year, Franco held a meeting with Velarde in which he ordered to indefinitely postpone the physical, but not theoretical, development of the project due to fears that it would be impossible to keep a secret, and with the recent creation of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), publicity would lead to increased economic sanctions on Spain. He did, however, allow the research to go ahead, albeit detached from the Armed Forces. Franco also pledged not to sign an international agreement being negotiated at the time to prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Thus on 1 July 1968, when almost fifty countries signed the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Spain did not number among them. Meanwhile, Spain began to embrace the power of the atom elsewhere. In
Guadalajara, the construction of Spain's first nuclear power plant, the
José Cabrera Nuclear Power Station, was underway, and JEN installed the first Spanish reactor with capacity to produce plutonium for bombs, Coral-I, able to operate with either plutonium-239 or with 90% enriched uranium (
U-235), although with waste still containing almost as much fuel as is consumed. Nevertheless, in 1969, the first grams of Spanish plutonium – the only ones in the world not under IAEA authority – were obtained. However, the secrecy surrounding the Spanish nuclear program did not bode well with their American allies. The Spanish projects had aroused particular interest among the
CIA, but with the ascension of Carrero Blanco to
Prime Minister of Spain, this interest quickly turned to concern. Although a convinced
Anti-Communist, Carrero Blanco had little inclination for the United States and even less for Israel, being in favor of a better understanding with the
Arab World. Above all else, Carrero Blanco proposed to revise relations between Spain and the United States, demanding that the two nations be treated as equals, that Spain be supplied with advanced military technology, and that the United States enter into a commitment to defend Spain – all prerequisites for authorization to continue using military bases on Spanish territory. That same day, Kissinger left Madrid in a hurry, and the next morning on 20 December 1973, Carrero Blanco was be
murdered. Involvement of the CIA in the attack has been suggested by certain scholars, with a potential motivation being the desire to remove Carrero Blanco and to put an end to the program.
Aftermath . Soon after, the project began to falter when
Gregorio López-Bravo blocked its completion. The minister had spoken to
Franco to convince him to put an end to it, arguing that the Americans would eventually get wind of the project and that this would cause Spain an endless series of problems.
Muñoz Grandes, already very ill at the time, failed to convince Franco of his plans to use the atomic bomb and French alliance as a way to gain greater independence from the United States. Franco saw it as a costly operation involving a challenge to Washington, whose support he considered more important than having his own bomb or drawing closer to France. Franco put an end to the heated discussions by ordering a halt to the research and forbidding the military project to be set in motion, informing Velarde that "Spain could not support a new international blockade unleashed by the United States, and the benefits of having a small arsenal did not outweigh the damage". Yet neither Carrero Blanco's death, nor the abrupt dismissal of
Díez-Alegría on 13 June 1974, nor even Franco's death on 20 November 1975, would bring the project to a halt. Carrero Blanco's successor,
Carlos Arias Navarro, wanted to give a new impetus to the Islero project, == Legacy ==