After the foundation of the
Soviet Union the
People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS) (after 1946 renamed the
Ministry of Railways (МПС)), the railway network expanded to a total length of 106,100 km by 1940 (vs. 81,000 km in 1917 which was exceeded in length only by the United States). The volume of freight hauled (in tonne-km) increased over fourfold during this period. Railways and control of railways had been a major factor in the
Russian Civil War and the
Red Army's eventual victory in the conflict. A notable project of the late 1920s, which became one of the centrepieces of the
first five-year plan, was the
Turkestan–Siberia Railway, linking
Western Siberia via Eastern
Kazakhstan with
Uzbekistan. In the late 1920s, the young
Soviet Union under
Joseph Stalin embarked on a programme of rapid industrialization. In a 1931 speech, in which Stalin promoted intensive industrialization, he concluded that "We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed." But if industrialization generally was to be given first priority, the question arose as to what priority should be given to railway development specifically, keeping in mind that industrialization requires greatly increased rail transportation of goods, e.g. iron ore and coal for steel mills. An example of this was the "Ural-Kuznetsk metallurgical combine" (approved in 1928) where the source of coal was located over 2000 km from the source of iron ore. Not only that, but the steel output had to be transported long distances to its final point of use. A British railway historian claims that the Soviet objective was to limit investment in railway improvements so that railways could barely meet the new and heavy demands for increased transport placed on them by industrialization, thereby allowing more capital for such industrialization. While there were significant investments made in railways, they were not enough to avoid the failure at times to transport all the goods, especially in early 1931 and 1933. Some of the resulting supply-line crises resulted in production shut-downs. However, in other cases "crisis" was used to describe a situation where the stocks of inputs stored at a plant (such as iron ore at a steel mill) almost ran out due to the railway's failure to deliver on time; no substantial harm would be done to production output, but it would be a close call. Near the start of first five-year plan of industrialization (1928) there were four main railway decision makers: the government, the party,
Gosplan (the Soviet
central planning agency), and the railway ministry (known as NKPS). When the NKPS didn't seem to be able to cope with a situation, the party or government would intervene. The majority agreed on increasing investments, but there was no clear consensus on how these investments were to be used.
Gosplan advocated the
rationalization of the railways, coupled with
tariffs based on actual cost, which would reduce traffic demand and provide funds for investment. In 1931, in a
Central Committee (CC)
resolution proposed recapitalization (replacing all the ties, rails, and renewing the ballast by either cleaning or new ballast) to create some "super mainlines" which would be electrified. This resolution was never adequately carried out, and the actual electrification achieved was only about a tenth of that proposed. The Central Committee sent
Lazar Kaganovich to solve the railway crisis in 1935. Kaganovich first prioritized
bottleneck areas over other less-traveled lines; his second priority was investing in heavy traffic lines, and thirdly, other lines (which were also burdened with increased traffic) were left to fend for themselves. Another problem facing rail transport was the
massive industrialization efforts pushed on by the authorities. This industrialization placed a heavy burden upon the railways, and
Vyacheslav Molotov and Kaganovich even admitted this to the
18th party congress.
Modal shares in 1940; rail dominates At the end of the pre-war period in 1940, railroads held an 85% share of freight transport (tonne-km) and a 92% share of intercity passenger transport (passenger-km). For non-rail transport it was: Freight (in tonne-km): river 7%, sea 5%, truck 2%, pipeline under 1%. For passengers: Bus 3.5%, river 3%, sea 1%, air 0.2%. So rail was by far the dominant mode of transportation for both passengers and freight. In the United States in 1940, rail still dominated freight with a 61% share, but only had a 7.5% share of passenger travel, having lost most of this traffic to the automobile. ==Rail traffic in the Soviet Union==