He became chairman of the
International Control Commission in October 1962 assigned to supervise the
Geneva accords of 1954. Goburdhun was well suited for this role as an honest broker, establishing cordial relations with the leaders of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam. As Goburdhun was fluent in French, a language widely spoken by Vietnamese elites, he had no difficulty in communicating with Vietnamese elites. The American historian
Ellen Hammer called Goburdhun an "exuberant and assertive" man with a strong interest in finding a way to end the Vietnam war. Just after Goburdhun's arrival in Vietnam, the
Sino-Indian War of October–November 1962 saw China defeat and humiliate India in a sharp, short campaign in the
Himalayas. The spectacle seeing the
Indian Army being utterly crushed by the Chinese
People's Liberation Army and retreating in chaos back into India caused Indian diplomacy to take a pronounced anti-Chinese turn as the Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru never forgave
Mao Zedong for that humiliation. The British ambassador in Saigon, Henry Hohler, reported the Sino-Indian war was having "repercussions" on the Indian delegation to the ICC. Hohler reported to London after talking to Goburdhun that he had previously maintained that the ICC needed "positive objectivity", but after India's defeat, "he now considers it his duty to use his influence discreetly on the side of the free world-encouraging any activity which favors Western interests". However, the conclusion Goburdhun reached was that the war was pushing North Vietnam closer to China, and that ending the war would allow the traditional Sino-Vietnamese antagonism to reassert itself as Goburdhun knew from his contacts within Hanoi that North Vietnamese leaders were willing to accept Chinese help only because the United States was supporting South Vietnam. After the Sino-Indian war, the principal aim of Indian diplomacy was to reduce and weaken China's influence in Asia. Unlike the Americans who knew little about
Vietnamese history, the Indians were more familiar with the histories of near-by Asian states, and appreciated the full depth of the profound mistrust the Vietnamese had of China, a state had conquered Vietnam in 111 BC and ruled it as a Chinese province for the next thousand years. The Americans had hoped that after the Sino-Indian war that India would become an American ally in Asia as the two nations had common anti-Chinese foreign policies, but the conclusion reached by Nehru was that India should promote neutralism in Southeast Asia as the best way of reducing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. This was especially the case because after the Sino-Indian war on the principle that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend", Nehru took an advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to form a
de facto alliance with the Soviet Union against China. Because the Americans had a military alliance with India's archenemy Pakistan, from the Indian perspective this ruled out the possibility of an alliance with the United States and caused the Indians to reach out to the Soviet Union instead. Since the Soviet Union was also supporting North Vietnam, the Indians resisted the pressure from the Americans to have their ICC delegates condemn North Vietnam. Instead of taking the expected pro-American positions, Hohler reported in late 1962 that Goburdhun was engaged in "masterly inactivity" while "marking time for an infinite period". His daughter described Vietnam as the most difficult of his diplomatic assignments, recalling that he "spent long hours in his office and often returned in a bad mood or imprisoned in a pregnant silence. As soon as he got back, he would lock himself in his study or pace furiously along the long veranda that circled the house". Goburdhun lived in a house in Saigon built by a wealthy Chinese merchant, and notably refused to allow his children to leave the grounds of the house, saying that Saigon was too dangerous. Working closely with the French ambassador to South Vietnam, Roger Lalouette, and the Polish Commissioner to the ICC,
Mieczysław Maneli, Goburdhun met in the spring of 1963 with both Chairman
Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam and President
Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam to discuss a possible federation of the two Vietnams as a way to end the war. In March 1963, Maneli reported to Warsaw: "It would be desirable for the North and the guerrillas to give Diem some respite. Then, as Diem promised Goburdhun, he would get rid of the Americans by himself and would join the India line. It would be necessary to facilitate direct North-South contacts. This could take place in [New] Delhi, where the two sides have their representatives." In 1963, North Vietnam had suffered its worst drought in a generation, and the possibility of having rice exported from the fertile Mekong river valley, South Vietnam's "rice bowl", would have solved a number of problems in North Vietnam. At the same time, the
Sino-Soviet split with both
Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zeodong pressuring Ho to side with them left Ho in a precious position. At the same time, the
Buddhist crisis had caused a rift in the once warm relations between President
John F. Kennedy of the United States and Diem, with Kennedy pressuring Diem to disallow his younger brother and right-hand man,
Ngô Đình Nhu. On 24 April 1963, Maneli reported to Warsaw after meeting Goburdhun: "Today Ambassador [Ramchundur] Goburdhun left for India. He again reminded [me] that he would visit Ambassador
Przemysław Ogrodziński...They [the Indians] consider Diem, his brother [Ngo Dinh Nhu], and sister-in-law,
Madame Nhu, to be the main elements [which] strive to make the Americans withdraw. c) They are against the American-English conception of removing them from power by means of a possible coup, because they do not want an official government run by a military junta. d) [Jawaharlal] Nehru supposedly agreed to a wide political amnesty due to the Indian advice. The policy of so-called “open arms” has already been proclaimed towards the insurgents who resigned from the fight" In a meeting in Hanoi, Ho told Goburdhun that Diem was "in his own way a patriot", noting that Diem had opposed French rule over Vietnam, and ended the meeting saying that the next time he met Diem "shake hands with him for me". In May 1963, Ho publicly posted a ceasefire with the only condition being the withdrawal of all the American advisers from South Vietnam. In a meeting in Hanoi, the North Vietnamese Premier
Phạm Văn Đồng told Maneli that his government was prepared to accept a federation and would drop its demand for the National Liberation Front, the 'Viet Cong', to enter the government in Saigon as part of the price for peace. Reflecting the problems imposed by the drought in North Vietnam, Đồng told Maneli that he was willing to accept a ceasefire which would be followed up by a barter trade with coal from North Vietnam being exchanged for rice from South Vietnam. Maneli later wrote that he had the impression that the North Vietnamese were still angry with the outcome of the Geneva conference in 1954, believing that the Soviet Union and China had imposed an unfavorable settlement on them for the sake of better relations with the West. He felt that Đồng did not want the Soviets, the Chinese or the Americans involved in any new talks. In Saigon, Goburdhun renewed his friendship with Nhu, and uniquely was able to maintain a friendship with Nhu's abrasive wife,
Madame Nhu. Accordingly to one of Nhu's bodyguards, he saw at a dinner hosted by Goburdhun, Nhu talking to an unknown man with an "intellectual" demeanor and whose chest pocket had on it a yellow star on a red background, the symbol of North Vietnam. The fact that this account first appeared in a book published in 1971 in Saigon,
How Does One Kill a President?, co-written by Dr.
Trần Kim Tuyến, the spymaster under the Ngo brothers who had fallen out with them in 1963, has led many historians to dismiss this account. However, regardless if Goburdhun did set up a meeting between Nhu and a North Vietnamese official, on 25 August 1963 he arranged for Nhu to meet Maneli at a reception at the
Gia Long Palace. Goburdhun together with Lalouette formed a semi-circle who edged Maneli towards Nhu, who agreed to meet Maneli on 2 September. Through Goburdhun, Lalouette and Maneli all believed there was a chance for peace, the coup of 1–2 November 1963 that saw the Ngo brothers killed put an end to their plans. ==Later life==