At the time of the Ratel's introduction, South African military officials were attempting to bring combined arms integration to the lowest tactical level, using brigade or even battalion-sized units as the standard all-arms unit rather than divisions. In this regard the SADF differed greatly from Western IFV doctrine–which confined the IFV's role to assisting the forward momentum of tanks–as well as Soviet IFV doctrine, which dictated that IFVs must occupy and hold terrain as needed. Although capable of operating independently, Ratel-based battle groups were not expected to occupy and hold static positions; their primary task was to outmanoeuvre an enemy unit before destroying it with a concentrated fire and movement tactic known as a
firebelt action. This doctrine was suited for the wide, densely wooded expanses of southern Angola which enabled the South African forces to carry out evasive manoeuvres and strike quickly from unexpected directions without being prematurely detected. The SADF's Ratels and other wheeled combat vehicles were hampered by thick mud, and the increased foliage cover provided PLAN with concealment from patrols. If the mechanised battle group was integrated with tanks—as during
Operation Hooper and
Operation Packer—the tanks spearheaded the formation to engage hostile armour, while the Ratel-20s and Ratel-90s followed closely on the flanks to suppress any accompanying infantry. This necessitated their being towed out with recovery vehicles or other Ratels, often under heavy fire. This gave PLAN ready access to the logistical and communications infrastructure of its local allies and increased the risk to SADF raids targeting those camps exponentially. The SADF remained conscious of this fact and established a number of improvised anti-tank platoons composed of Ratel-90s to engage Angolan armour if necessary. At least 354 Ratels were declared surplus to requirements and sold beginning in 2005. Much of the remaining Ratels have been handicapped by the SANDF's limited maintenance budget and inadequate numbers of trained maintenance personnel.
Foreign service After 1977, the domestic South African arms industry was driven by the economic realities of a universal
arms embargo imposed on the SADF as a result of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 418. The embargo deprived the SADF of many new weapons systems available to other major arms importers, curtailed its attempts to obtain defence technology on the open market, and raised the cost of obtaining spare parts and components for its preexisting equipment. The
Royal Moroccan Army became the first prospective client to show an interest in the Ratel; it was then purchasing arms from a vast array of sources for use in the
Western Sahara War. This was pursued as part of a massive re-armament programme being funded through generous military subsidies from
Saudi Arabia. Morocco received the first Elands in 1976 and obligingly placed orders for more vehicles, including a few dozen Ratels, from Sandock-Austral. They were deployed in counter-insurgency operations against the
Polisario Front, which captured several Ratel-20s and pressed them into service. In 2016, Morocco was still operating 30 Ratel-20s and 30 Ratel-90s. All of these were the Ratel Mk III variant. Export of the Ratel only resumed again in the early 2000s, when the SANDF declared hundreds of its own IFVs surplus to requirements and offered them for sale. Some Jordanian Ratel-20s have been retrofitted with a new Cummins QSM11-C330 diesel engine developing 329 hp (246 kW). In 2007, the SANDF committed to donate up to 18 This effort collapsed due to a variety of unforeseen problems: the SANDF was only willing to supply previously decommissioned Ratel-90s and insisted that the donation was contingent on the Central African government making its own arrangements to have them shipped to
Bangui. At least three local crews were trained between 2010 and 2013, after which the vehicles were formally adopted by the
Central African Army. == Description ==