Pre-war '' announces the election of Poincaré (1913). Poincaré won election as
President of the Republic in 1913, in succession to
Armand Fallières. The strong-willed Poincaré was the first president of the Third Republic since
MacMahon in the 1870s to attempt to make that office into a site of power rather than an empty ceremonial role. He asserted his personality and took a special interest in foreign policy. On 20 January 1914, he became the first French president to visit the German embassy in Paris, a gesture clearly meant to show that he wanted to continue a policy of trying to improve German understanding of French aims. In early 1914, Poincaré found himself caught up in scandal when the leftist politician
Joseph Caillaux threatened to publish letters showing that Poincaré was engaged in secret talks with the Vatican using the Italian government as an intermediary, which would have outraged anti-clerical opinion in France. Caillaux refrained from publishing the documents after the President pressured
Gaston Calmette, editor of
Le Figaro, not to publish documents showing that Caillaux had been unfaithful to his first wife, was involved in questionable financial dealings implicating a pro-German foreign policy. The matter might have remained settled had not the second Madame Caillaux, upset that Calmette might publish love letters written to her while her husband was still married to her predecessor, gone to Calmette's office on 16 March 1914 and shot him dead. The resulting scandal known as the
Caillaux affair was the major French news story of the first half of 1914 causing Poincaré to joke that from now on he might send out
Madame Poincaré to murder his political enemies since this method was working so well for Caillaux.
July Crisis On 28 June 1914, Poincaré was at the
Longchamps racetrack when he received news of the
assassination of the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand in
Sarajevo, at 17:30 by his assistance. The President remarked that the assassination was a tragedy, ordered an aide to draft a message of condolence to the people of Austria-Hungary and stayed on to enjoy the rest of the races. The American historian,
David Fromkin, has noted that the term "
July Crisis" is actually a misnomer as it suggests that Europe was plunged into a crisis with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June, but in fact the July crisis
only began with the Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum to
Serbia, containing terms patently intended to inspire rejection, on 23 July 1914. The crisis was caused not by the assassination but rather by the decision in Vienna to
use it as a pretext for a war with Serbia that many in the Austro-Hungarian government had long advocated. In 1913, it had been announced that Poincaré would visit St. Petersburg in July 1914 to meet Tsar
Nicholas II. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister,
Count Leopold von Berchtold, decided it was too dangerous for Austria-Hungary to present the ultimatum while the Franco-Russian summit was in progress and decided to wait until Poincaré was on board the battleship
France that would take him home. Accompanied by Premier
René Viviani, Poincaré went to Russia for the second time (but for the first time as president) to reinforce the
Franco-Russian Alliance. The transcripts of the St. Petersburg summit have been lost, but the surviving documentary evidence suggests that neither Nicholas nor Poincaré were particularly concerned about the situation in the Balkans. At the time of the St. Petersburg summit, there were rumours, but little hard evidence, that Vienna might use the assassination to start a war with Serbia. When the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was presented to Serbia on 23 July, the French government was in the hands of
Jean-Baptiste Bienvenu-Martin, Minister of Justice and acting Premier. Bienvenu-Martin's inability to make decisions was especially exasperating to
Philippe Berthelot, the most senior man in the Quai d'Orsay present in Paris, who complained that France was doing nothing while Europe was threatened with the prospect of war. Furthermore, Poincaré's attempts to communicate with Paris were blocked by the Germans who jammed the radio messages between his ship and Paris. It was not until Poincaré had arrived back in Paris on 30 July 1914 that he finally learned of the crisis, and immediately attempted to stop matters from escalating into war. With Poincaré's full approval, Viviani sent a telegram to Nicholas affirming that: in the precautionary measures and defensive measures to which Russia believes herself obliged to resort, she should not immediately proceed to any measure which might offer Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces. Additionally, orders were given for French forces to pull back six miles from the frontier with Germany. The next day, 31 July, the German ambassador in Paris, Count
Wilhelm von Schoen, presented to Viviani an ultimatum warning that, if Russian mobilisation continued, Germany would attack both France and Russia within the next 12 hours. The ultimatum also demanded that France abrogate at once the alliance with Russia, allow German troops to march into France unopposed and turn over the fortresses in Verdun and Toul to the Germans to be occupied as long as Germany was at war with Russia. In response, the French government ordered its ambassador in St. Petersburg,
Maurice Paléologue, to find what was going on in Russia while refusing a request from General
Joseph Joffre to order French mobilisation. However, the German ultimatum of 31 July 1914 left the French with two options: either to accept the humiliation of accepting the ultimatum, which would be the effective end of France as an independent nation, or go to war with Germany. The American historian
Leonard V. Smith, together with the French historians
Annette Becker and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, wrote that France had no option but to go to war as the prospect of accepting Schoen's ultimatum was too humiliating for the vast majority of the French people. After Germany declared war on France following the rejection of the ultimatum, Poincaré appeared before the National Assembly to announce that France was now at war forming the doctrine of the
union sacrée in which he announced that: "nothing will break the
union sacrée in the face of the enemy."
Later war , France, August 1916. From left to right:
Joseph Joffre, Raymond Poincaré, King
George V, General
Ferdinand Foch; General
Sir Douglas Haig. Poincaré became increasingly sidelined after the accession to power of
Georges Clemenceau as prime minister in 1917. He believed the
Armistice happened too soon and that the French Army should have penetrated far deeper into Germany. At the
Paris Peace Conference of 1919, negotiating the
Treaty of Versailles, he wanted France to wrest the
Rhineland from Germany to put it under Allied military control.
Ferdinand Foch urged Poincaré to invoke his powers as laid down in the constitution and take over the negotiations of the treaty due to worries that Clemenceau was not achieving France's aims. He did not, and when the French Cabinet approved of the terms which Clemenceau obtained, Poincaré considered resigning, although again he refrained. ==Second premiership==