In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Britain continued its policy of "
splendid isolation", with its primary focus on defending its massive
overseas empire. However, by the early 1900s, the German threat had increased dramatically, and Britain thought it was in need of allies. London made overtures to Berlin which were not reciprocated, so London turned to Paris and St. Petersburg instead. In 1904, Britain and France signed a series of agreements, the
Entente cordiale, mostly aimed toward resolving colonial disputes. That heralded the end of British splendid isolation. France and Britain had signed five separate agreements regarding spheres of influence in
North Africa in 1904, the
Entente cordiale. The
Tangier Crisis later encouraged co-operation between the two countries from their mutual fear of apparent German expansionism.
Naval race with Germany Britain, traditionally having control of the seas, by 1909 saw the German navy as a serious threat to its Royal Navy. Britain was well ahead in terms of
Dreadnought technology and responded with a major building program. They built a Royal Navy that Germany could never rival. The British sent
war minister Lord Haldane to Berlin in February 1912 to reduce friction stemming from the
Anglo-German naval arms race. The mission was a failure because the Germans attempted to link a "naval holiday" with a British promise to remain neutral if Germany should become engaged in a war where "Germany could not be said to be the aggressor."
Zara Steiner says, "It would have meant abandoning the whole system of ententes which had been so carefully nurtured during the past six years. There was no German concession to counter the fear of German aggression." Essentially, the British reserved the right to join whatever country was attacking Germany even if Germany did not start the conflict, dooming the talks to failure. According to German historian Dirk Bönker, "To be sure, the [naval] race was decided early on; political leaders and diplomats learned to bracket it as an issue, and it did not cause the decision for war in 1914. But the naval competition nonetheless created an atmosphere of mutual hostility and distrust, which circumscribed the space for peaceful diplomacy and public recognition of shared interests, and helped to pave the twisted road to war in Europe."
Not an alliance The Entente, unlike the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, was not an alliance of mutual defense and so Britain was free to make its own foreign policy decisions in 1914. As British Foreign Office Official
Eyre Crowe minuted, "The fundamental fact, of course, is that the Entente is not an alliance. For purposes of ultimate emergencies, it may be found to have no substance at all. For the Entente is nothing more than a frame of mind, a view of general policy which is shared by the governments of two countries, but which may be, or become, so vague as to lose all content". Britain’s engagement in the marked a significant shift from its "splendid isolation" towards a strategic partnership, A move seen as both necessary and controversial at the time. While some contemporaries and historians have characterized this partnership as an "
unholy alliance" due to its informal nature and former rivalries. ==Anglo-Russian Convention==