The Vietnamese Marine Corps had its origins during French rule of
Indochina. The
1949 Franco-Vietnamese Agreement stated that the
Vietnamese Armed Forces were to include naval forces whose organization and training would be provided by the French Navy. In March 1952, the
Navy of Vietnam was established. In 1953, the French and Vietnamese governments agreed to increase the size of Vietnamese National Army, so an increase in the size of the Vietnamese Navy was also deemed necessary. As they debated whether the Army or Navy would control the river flotillas, French
Vice Admiral Philippe Auboyneau proposed for the first time the organisation of a Vietnamese Marine Corps. When the French withdrew from Vietnam in 1954, the Vietnamese Marine Corps was a component of the Vietnamese Navy. The Marine Corps consisted of a headquarters, four river companies, and one battalion landing force. On 13 October 1954, Prime Minister
Ngo Dinh Diem signed a government decree formally creating within the naval establishment a section of infantry, then of brigade strength, later to be designated as the Marine Corps (VNMC).
1965 On 7 April in a five-hour battle, the
Vietcong (VC) prevented an engineer company that was advancing north from
Hoài Nhơn from linking up with a marine company garrisoning An Thai on Highway 1. As the battle unfolded, the marines reinforced An Thai with two additional companies and a battalion headquarters. The fighting only ended when howitzers and US Army
UH–1B gunships suppressed the VC at 16:00. At midnight on 7/8 April, the VC attacked An Thai and were repulsed by the Marines in repeated attacks lasting until 05:00 when they succeeded in penetrating the western perimeter, and slowly pushed the marines back from one house or foxhole to another. At dawn the marine commander launched a counterattack using troops from the relatively quiet southeastern perimeter. The rest of the battalion joined in, and, by 07:00, the VC were in retreat. The VC attacked once more at 04:00 on 9 April. This time, they came from the south, using two companies backed by mortars probably to cover the withdrawal of the rest of their force. Marine losses were five dead, 36 wounded, and 20 missing. The VC lost 231 dead, 12 captured and six machine guns, a mortar, and 105 individual weapons. Half the prisoners were recently infiltrated Northerners. The other half were Southerners, who claimed that they had received just 15 days of training. On 18 April the ARVN
2nd Division massed six battalions and six platoons of artillery backed by aircraft to target the headquarters of the VC 1st Regiment, four infantry battalions, and an artillery company in the Viet An area of
Quang Tin province. Two columns moved southwest from Thang Binh district town into the hilly piedmont. The southern axis met stiff and mounting resistance by an estimated two battalions deployed on three hills. After a series of airstrikes, a company from the 3rd Marine Battalion made a lodgment on one of the hills while the rest of the battalion and two troops of
M113 armored personnel carriers swept around the VC southern flank and hit the main position on a second knoll. Considerable amounts of bloody clothing found near the combat hamlet of Thanh Yen supported villager reports that the airstrikes had killed about 150 VC. The ARVN spent the night on the battlefield. On the following afternoon an observation aircraft reported seeing VC moving further west toward the hamlet of Chien Son. After a brief artillery bombardment, the 3rd Marine Battalion and the two cavalry troops advanced in line across a field toward the hamlet. At 17:25, the VC unleashed a bombardment including heavy 4.2 inch mortars. Surprised by the large explosions the M113s turned about and drove off the battlefield, causing the marines to panic and flee. Friendly artillery stopped firing, and the
USAF forward air controller on the scene was unable to persuade two
Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF)
A-1s on station to attack. The Marine officers and their advisers could not stop the rout, but they did manage to steer the mob toward an abandoned VC trench where the marines stopped to take shelter. Here, allied officers organized a defense. The respite was brief as VC troops adjusted their bombardment to hit the new position, and a large column maneuvered to attack. Four advisers fell wounded, and, despite the best efforts of the remaining officers and advisers, the marines broke again. The division headquarters again rejected calls for artillery support on the supposition that the VC was too close to the marines, but the commander of the 2nd Division, General
Hoàng Xuân Lãm, ordered a ranger battalion and an infantry battalion to come to their aid. That plan backfired when the panic that infected the marines spread to the new battalions, which quickly joined the rout. The debacle cost the allies 26 dead, 86 wounded, 28 missing, and eight crew-served and 25 individual weapons lost. The allies counted 53 VC dead and estimated they had killed 297 more, but MACV considered the latter number highly speculative. The VC first attacked the 2nd Battalion, 51st Infantry and then ambushed the 3rd Marine Battalion as it attempted to support the 2/51st forcing both units to retreat to Phuoc Loc. On the morning of 31 May the VC renewed their attacks capturing Phuoc Loc and attacking the 39th Rangers inflicting heavy casualties. Total South Vietnamese losses were 392 men killed and missing. From 6–15 January 1967 the 3rd and 4th Marine Battalions participated in
Operation Deckhouse Five with the
1st Battalion, 9th Marines in
Kiến Hòa Province. From 27 to 31 July 1967 the 3rd Marine Battalion participated in
Operation Coronado II with the 44th Ranger Battalion and the US
Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) against VC units in the Mekong Delta. From 15 to 19 November 1967 the 5th Marine Battalion participated in
Operation Kien Giang 9-1 with the ARVN
7th and
9th Divisions and the MRF against the VC 263rd Battalion's Base Area 470 in western
Định Tường Province. The operation rendered the 263rd Battalion combat ineffective. On 4 December 1967 while participating in
Operation Coronado IX with the MRF, a flotilla of ATCs carrying the 5th Marine Battalion came under fire 12 km east of
Mỹ Tho from the VC 502nd Local Force Battalion in a fortified base on the west bank of the
Rach Ruong Canal. The VC attacked the boats with rockets and automatic weapons and the Marines were landed north of the VC position and proceeded to overrun the position killing over 100 VC and scattering the rest. Shortly afterward the US
3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment landed south of the VC. The fighting was intense and the 4/47th Infantry was landed by helicopter west of the VC position. To the south the 3/47th Infantry, encountered resistance from scattered VC bunkers that prevented it from linking with the Marines. There were 266 VC killed in total, mostly by Marines. On 14 February Marine Task Force A joined the battle. The operational plan was for the Marines to move west from
Tây Lộc Airfield and then turn south, however they were soon stopped by strong PAVN defenses; after two days the Marines had only advanced 400 metres. On 20 January they were replaced by Headquarters ARVN 52nd Regiment augmented by the ARVN 3/52nd Regiment and the 5th Marine Battalion. Following the conclusion of the operation the Marines were kept in I Corps instead of returning to their base in Saigon, presumably to prevent them spreading stories of the losses suffered in the operation. A US adviser who observed the Marines before and after the operation said that "These were brave men, well led, well supplied who had a certain elan and a certain confidence in themselves when they went in. When they came out, they'd been whipped. They knew they'd been whipped and they acted like they'd been whipped."
1972 In early 1972 two Marine brigades of the general reserve were stationed in Quảng Trị Province under the operational control of the recently formed
3rd Division. The 147th Marine Brigade was headquartered at
Mai Loc Camp and the 258th Brigade was at
Firebase Nancy. The Marines and 56th Regiment, 3rd Division presented a strong west-facing defense as this was assumed to be the most likely direction of attack. The offensive began at noon on 30 March 1972, when an intense artillery barrage rained down on the northernmost ARVN outposts just south of the DMZ. On 30 March the 258th Marine Brigade was deployed forward to Đông Hà. Early on the morning of 1 April under pressure from the PAVN the 4th Marine Battalion abandoned
Firebase Sarge and retreated to Mai Loc Camp. On 11 July, following preparatory B-52 strikes, the 1st Marine Battalion was deployed by HMM-164 and HMM-165 helicopters to two landing zones 2 km northeast of the city to cut Route 560, the main PAVN supply line. The operation began at 06:55 on 26 January with
Task Force Tango advancing in two columns.
1973–1975 In December 1974 the 147th Marine Brigade replaced the 2nd Airborne Brigade west of Huế. The Marine Division itself pulled two battalions out of forward positions northwest of Huế to constitute a heavier reserve and further thinning the force, sent one company from each battalion to Saigon to form the new 468th Marine Brigade for the JGS reserve effective 1 January 1975. Later in the month, Marine positions in Quảng Trị were taken over by Regional Force battalions, and three marine battalions were shifted south to
Thua Thien Province. In early March the 468th Brigade was deployed to
Tân An, Long An Province to stiffen the defenses of the Regional and Popular Forces there. At 04:00 on 27 April the
341st Division attacked Trang Bom, the initial attack was repulsed but by 08:00 attacks on the flanks broke through and the town was captured with the 18th Division suffering heavy casualties in their retreat. The PAVN then advanced to the town of Hố Nai (now
Tân Hòa), which was held by the Marines. Hố Nai was defended by the 6th Marine Battalion, an M48 tank from the 3rd Armored and Popular Forces. Following an artillery barrage the PAVN attacked Hố Nai, but were met by ARVN artillery losing 30 dead and one T-54 tank destroyed before they pulled back. On 28 April the 341st renewed their attack using 5 T-54s supported by an infantry regiment, but were repulsed in three separate attacks losing three T-54s and many soldiers. On 29 April the entire 341st Division attacked Hố Nai and were again repulsed in two hours of fighting. At midday the Marines were ordered to withdraw to defend Bien Hoa and Long Binh. Brigadier general
Trần Quang Khôi, commander of the 3rd Armored was given responsibility for defending Bien Hoa, although PAVN shelling had rendered the base unusable. Seeing the regular forces leaving Hố Nai the PAVN renewed their assault at midnight, but the town's Popular Forces fought back and were not subdued until dawn. The PAVN then advanced to Bien Hoa where they were met by the 3rd Armored, at this point the PAVN 4th Corps changed the axis of their advance to the south. On the morning of 30 April the 18th Division and Marines were ordered to retreat from
Long Binh to the west bank of the
Đồng Nai river, while the ARVN 81st Rangers held
Bien Hoa Air Base and the 3rd Armored held
Bien Hoa. The 3rd Armored was moving from Bien Hoa to attack PAVN forces when they heard the surrender broadcast of President
Dương Văn Minh and Khôi halted his advance and disbanded the unit. The 81st Rangers had abandoned the base and had moved west of the Đồng Nai river when they heard the surrender broadcast and then marched towards Saigon to surrender to the PAVN. ==Units==