Background Until after the
Second World War the landlocked British possession of
Southern Rhodesia was not developed as an indigenous African territory, but rather as a unique state that reflected it's large
settler population. This situation made it different from other lands that existed under colonial rule, as many Europeans had arrived to make permanent homes, populating the towns as traders or settling to farm the most productive soils. In 1922, faced with the decision to join the
Union of South Africa as a fifth province or accept nearly full internal autonomy, the electorate cast its vote against South African integration. In view of the outcome of the referendum, the territory was annexed by the United Kingdom on 12 September 1923. Shortly after annexation, on 1 October 1923, the first constitution for the new Colony of Southern Rhodesia came into force. Under this constitution, Southern Rhodesia was given the right to elect its own thirty-member
legislature,
premier, and cabinet—although the British government retained a formal veto over measures affecting natives and dominated foreign policy. Over the course of the next three decades, Southern Rhodesia experienced a degree of economic expansion and industrialisation almost unrivalled in sub-Saharan Africa. Its natural abundance of mineral wealth—including large deposits of
chromium and
manganese—contributed to the high rate of conventional economic growth. As the white population increased, so did capital imports, especially in the wake of the Second World War. The considerable investment made by white Rhodesians in the economy financed the development of Southern Rhodesia's export industries as well as the infrastructure necessary to integrate it further with international markets. As it began to appear that decolonisation was inevitable and indigenous black populations were pressing heavily for change,
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965) Although prepared to grant formal independence to Southern Rhodesia (now Rhodesia), the
British government had adopted a policy of
no independence before majority rule (NIBMR), dictating that colonies with a significant, politically active population of European settlers would not receive independence except under conditions of
majority rule. White Rhodesians balked at the premise of NIBMR; many felt they had a right to absolute political control, at least for the time being, despite their relatively small numbers. They were also disturbed by the chaos of the post-colonial political transitions occurring in other African nations at the time, such as the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. A vocal segment of the white populace was open to the concept of gradually incorporating black Rhodesians into civil society and a more integrated political structure in theory, although not without qualification and equivocation. A greater degree of social and political equality, they argued, was acceptable once more black citizens had obtained higher educational and vocational standards.
Harold Wilson and his incoming
Labour government took an even harder line on demanding that these points be legitimately addressed before a timetable for independence could be set. Smith, the colony's first Rhodesian-born leader, soon came to personify resistance to liberals in British government and those agitating for change at home. A
Rhodesian Trade Office was opened in Lisbon in order to co-ordinate breaking the anticipated sanctions in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence later that year, which encouraged Smith not to compromise. implying instead that Rhodesia was already legally entitled to independence—a claim that was overwhelmingly endorsed by the predominantly white electorate in a
referendum. Emboldened by the results of this referendum and the subsequent general election, the Rhodesian government threatened to declare independence without British consent.
Harold Wilson countered by warning that such an irregular procedure would be considered
treasonous, although he specifically rejected using armed force to quell a rebellion by English "kith and kin", or white Rhodesians of predominantly British descent and origin, many of whom still possessed sympathies and family ties to the United Kingdom. Wilson's refusal to consider a military option further encouraged Smith to proceed with his plans. Talks quickly broke down, and final efforts in October to achieve a settlement floundered; the Smith government remained unwilling to accept the five principles of independence, and the British government argued it would settle for nothing less. The UDI was immediately denounced as an "act of rebellion against the Crown" in the United Kingdom, and Wilson promised that the illegal action would be short-lived. However, given its self-governing status Rhodesia had no longer been within the United Kingdom's direct sphere of influence for some time, and the façade of continued British rule was rendered a constitutional fiction by UDI. After UDI was proclaimed, UN officials branded the Rhodesian government as an "illegal racist minority regime" and called on member states to voluntarily sever economic ties with Rhodesia, recommending
sanctions on petroleum products and military hardware. Some Western nations, such as Switzerland and
West Germany, which were not UN member states, continued to conduct business openly with Rhodesia – the latter remained the Smith government's largest trading partner in Western Europe until 1973, when it was admitted to the UN. Portugal served as a conduit for Rhodesian goods, which it exported through Mozambique with false
certificates of origin. South Africa, too, refused to observe the UN sanctions. In 1971, the
Byrd Amendment was passed in the United States, permitting American firms to go on importing Rhodesian chromium and nickel products as normal. Despite the poor showing of sanctions, Rhodesia found it nearly impossible to obtain diplomatic recognition abroad. In 1970, the United States declared it would not recognise UDI "under [any] circumstances". South Africa and Portugal, Rhodesia's largest trading partners, also refused to extend diplomatic recognition, and did not open embassies in the Rhodesian capital,
Salisbury, preferring to conduct diplomatic activities through "accredited representatives". This allowed the South African and Portuguese governments to maintain they were continuing to respect British sovereignty while also accepting the practical authority of the Smith administration. Initially, the Rhodesian state retained its pledged loyalty to Queen
Elizabeth II, recognising her as Queen of Rhodesia. He had effectively been superseded before then; the Smith government stated that if the Queen did not appoint a Governor-General, it would name Dupont as "
Officer Administering the Government". Smith had intended to have Dupont named Governor-General, but Queen Elizabeth II would not even consider this advice. With few exceptions, the international community backed Whitehall's assertion that Gibbs was the Queen's only legitimate representative, and hence the only lawful authority in Rhodesia. In September 1968, the
Appellate Division of the
High Court of Rhodesia ruled that Ian Smith's administration had become the
de jure government of the country, not merely the
de facto one. To support his decision, Chief Justice Sir
Hugh Beadle used several statements made by
Hugo Grotius, who maintained that there was no way that a nation could rightly claim to be governing a particular territory – if it was waging a war against that territory. Beadle argued that due to Britain's economic war against Rhodesia, she could not (at the same point) be described as
governing Rhodesia. The ruling set the precedent that despite the UDI, the incumbent Smith government "could lawfully do anything its predecessors could lawfully have done". A Salisbury commission chaired by prominent lawyer W.R. Waley was appointed to study constitutional options open to the Rhodesian authorities as of April 1968, including on the topic of majority rule, but reopening negotiations with the British on a settlement was ruled out early on. The Waley Commission found that in practical as well as legal terms, "Europeans must surrender any belief in permanent European domination", pointing out that minority rule was not permanently sustainable. Both efforts failed to achieve agreement, although Harold Wilson added a sixth principle to the five he had previously enunciated: "it would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of the majority by the minority or of [any] minority by the majority." Rhodesian resolve stiffened following a failure to reach a new settlement, with more radical elements of the Rhodesian Front calling for a republican constitution. Some in the Rhodesian government had hoped in vain that the declaration of a republic would finally prompt other nations to grant recognition.
Impact of UDI The years following Rhodesia's UDI saw an unfolding series of economic, military, and political pressures placed on the country that eventually brought about majority rule, a totality of these factors rather than any one the reason for introducing change. In 2005, a conference at the
London School of Economics that discussed Rhodesia's independence concluded that UDI was sparked by an existing racial conflict complicated by
Cold War intrigues. Critics of UDI maintained that Ian Smith intended to safeguard the privileges of an entrenched colonial ruling class at the expense of the impoverished black population. Smith defended his actions by claiming that the black Rhodesian majority was too inexperienced at the time to participate in the complex administrative process of what was, by contemporary African standards, a reasonably industrialised state. After the Rhodesian Front began introducing incentives accorded to domestic production, industrial output expanded dramatically. A rigid system of countermeasures enacted to combat sanctions succeeded in blunting their impact for at least a decade. Smith remained optimistic that Heath would do his utmost to remedy Anglo-Rhodesian relations, although disappointed that he continued to adhere publicly to the original "five principles" proposed by Alec Douglas-Home, now
foreign secretary. In November 1971, Douglas-Home renewed contacts with Salisbury and announced a proposed agreement that would be satisfactory to both sides – it recognised Rhodesia's 1969 constitution as the legal frame of government, while agreeing that gradual legislative representation was an acceptable formula for unhindered advance to majority rule. Implementation of the proposed settlement hinged on popular acceptance, but the Rhodesian government consistently refused to submit it to a universal referendum. In 1972, the commission began interviewing interest groups and sampling opinions – although concern was expressed over the widespread
apathy encountered. As many as thirty black Rhodesian chiefs and politicians voiced their opposition, prompting Britain to withdraw from the proposals on the grounds of the commission's report. Between January and September 1962, nationalists detonated 33 bombs and were implicated in 28 acts of arson, and 27 acts of sabotage against communications infrastructure. In July 1962, Nkomo visited Moscow and discussed plans for a ZAPU-led armed uprising in Rhodesia. It also passed draconian security legislation restricting the right to assembly and granting the security forces broad powers to crack down on suspected political subversives. ZANU's agenda was left-wing and
pan-Africanist; it demanded a one-party state with majority rule and the abolition of private property. After UDI, ZANU formed its own military wing, the
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). The action at Sinoia has been commemorated by supporters of the guerrillas since as "
Chimurenga Day", and occupies a place of pride in ZANU hagiography. The practical alliances between ZIPRA and MK, and later ZANLA and FRELIMO, prompted Rhodesia to look increasingly towards South Africa and Portugal for active assistance. In 1976, the population included 270,000 white Rhodesians of European descent and six million black Africans. International business groups involved in the country (e.g.
Lonrho) transferred their support from the Rhodesian government to black nationalist parties. Business leaders and politicians feted Nkomo on his visits to Europe. ZANU also attracted business supporters who saw the course that future events were likely to take. Funding and arms support provided by supporters, particularly from the Soviet Union and its allies in the latter 1970s, allowed both ZIPRA and the ZANLA to acquire more sophisticated weaponry, thereby increasing the military pressure that the guerrillas were able to place on Rhodesia. Until 1972, containing the guerrillas was little more than a police action. Even as late as August 1975 when Rhodesian government and black nationalist leaders met
at Victoria Falls for negotiations brokered by South Africa and Zambia, the talks never got beyond the procedural phase. Rhodesian representatives made it clear they were prepared to fight an all out war to prevent majority rule. However, the situation changed dramatically after the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique in 1975. Rhodesia now found itself almost entirely surrounded by hostile states and even South Africa, its only real ally, pressed for a settlement. At this point, ZANU's alliance with FRELIMO and the porous border between Mozambique and eastern Rhodesia enabled large-scale training and infiltration of ZANU/ZANLA fighters. The governments of Zambia and Botswana were also emboldened sufficiently to allow resistance movement bases to be set up in their territories. Guerrillas began to launch operations deep inside Rhodesia, attacking roads, railways, economic targets and isolated security force positions, in 1976.
9×19mm semi-automatic pistol; from a 1976 army recruitment poster The government adopted a
strategic hamlets policy of the kind used in
Malaya and
Vietnam to restrict the influence of insurgents over the population of rural areas. Local people were forced to relocate to protected villages (PVs) which were strictly controlled and guarded by the government against rebel atrocities. The protected villages were compared by the guerrillas to
concentration camps. Some contemporary accounts claim that this interference in the lives of local residents induced many of them who had previously been neutral to support the guerrillas. The war degenerated into rounds of increasing brutality from all three parties involved (ZANU and ZAPU, and the Rhodesian Army). Mike Subritzky, a former
New Zealand Army ceasefire monitor in Rhodesia, in 1980 described the war as "both bloody and brutal and brought out the very worst in the opposing combatants on all three sides." A major problem for the Rhodesian state in fighting the Bush War was always a shortage of manpower. Killing Rhodesian white citizens tended to have an "echo effect" as the ZANU and ZAPU had each estimated that for one white citizen killed, it caused about 20 to leave Rhodesia. In 1976, the South African government and
United States governments worked together to place pressure on Smith to agree to a form of majority rule. In response to the initiative of
United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in 1976 Ian Smith accepted the principle of black majority rule within two years. In the latter 1970s, the militants had successfully put the economy of Rhodesia under significant pressure while the numbers of guerrillas in the country were steadily increasing. The government abandoned its early strategy of trying to defend the borders in favour of trying to defend key economic areas and lines of communication with South Africa, while the rest of the countryside became a patchwork of "
no-go areas".
Late 1970s By the late 1970s, Rhodesia's front-line forces contained about 25,000 regular troops and police – backed up by relatively strong army and police reserves. Its mechanised contingent consisted of light armoured cars and improvised
mine-protected armoured personnel carriers, complemented by eight tanks (Polish built
T-55LD tanks), delivered in the last year of the war. The
Rhodesian Air Force operated an assortment of both
Canberra light bombers,
Hawker Hunter fighter bombers, older
de Havilland Vampire jets as well as a somewhat antiquated, but still potent, helicopter arm. These forces, including highly trained special operations units, were capable of launching devastating raids on resistance movement camps outside the country, as in
Operation Dingo in 1977 and other similar operations. Nevertheless, guerrilla pressure inside the country itself was steadily increasing in the latter 1970s. By 1978–1979, the war had become a contest between the guerrilla warfare placing ever increasing pressure on the Rhodesian regime and civil population, and the Rhodesian government's strategy of trying to hold off the militants until external recognition for a compromise political settlement with moderate black leaders could be secured. By this time, the need to cut a deal was apparent to most Rhodesians, but not to all. Ian Smith had dismissed his intransigent Defence Minister,
P. K. van der Byl, as early as 1976. Van der Byl was a hard-line opponent of any form of compromise with domestic opposition or the international community since before UDI. Van der Byl eventually retired to his country estate outside
Cape Town, but there were elements in Rhodesia, mainly embittered former security force personnel, who forcibly opposed majority rule up to and well beyond the establishment of majority rule. New white immigrants continued to arrive in Rhodesia right up to the eve of majority rule.
Intensification of the Bush War The work of journalists such as
Lord Richard Cecil, son of
Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 6th Marquess of Salisbury, stiffened the morale of Rhodesians and their overseas supporters. Lord Richard produced news reports for
ITN which typically contrasted the "incompetent" insurgents with the "superbly professional" government troops. A group of ZANLA fighters killed Lord Richard on 20 April 1978 when he was accompanying a Rhodesian airborne unit employed in
Fire Force Operations. The shooting down on 3 September 1978 of the civilian
Air Rhodesia airliner, a
Vickers Viscount named the
Hunyani, in the
Kariba area by ZIPRA fighters using a
surface-to-air missile, with the subsequent massacre of 10 of its 18 survivors, is widely considered to be the event that finally destroyed the Rhodesians' will to continue the war. Although militarily insignificant, the loss of this aircraft (and a second Viscount, named the
Umniati, in 1979) demonstrated the reach of resistance movements extended to Rhodesian civil society. The Rhodesians' means to continue the war were also eroding fast. In December 1978, a ZANLA unit penetrated the outskirts of Salisbury and fired a volley of rockets and
incendiary device rounds into the main oil storage depot – the most heavily defended economic asset in the country. The storage tanks burned for five days, giving off a column of smoke that could be seen away. of petroleum product (comprising Rhodesia's strategic oil reserve) were lost. The government's defence spending increased from R$30 million, 8.5% of the national budget in 1971 to 1972, to R$400 m in 1978 to 1979, 47% of the national budget. In 1980, the post-independence government of Zimbabwe inherited a US$500 million national debt.
End of UDI (1979) ,
Jeremiah Chirau and
Ndabaningi Sithole) The Rhodesian army continued its "mobile counter-offensive" strategy of holding key positions ("vital asset ground") while carrying out raids into the no-go areas and into neighbouring countries. While often extraordinarily successful in inflicting heavy guerrilla casualties, such raids also on occasion failed to achieve their objectives. In April 1979 special forces carried out a raid on
Joshua Nkomo's residence in
Lusaka,
Zambia, with the stated intention of assassinating him. Nkomo and his family left hastily a few hours before the raid – having clearly been warned that the raid was coming. In 1979, some special forces units were accused of using counterinsurgent operations as cover for ivory poaching and smuggling. Colonel
Reid-Daly (commander of the
Selous Scouts) discovered that his phone was bugged and after challenging a superior officer on this issue was court martialled for insubordination. He received the lightest sentence possible, a caution, but he continued to fight his conviction and eventually resigned his commission and left the Army. By 1978–1979, up to 70% of the regular army was composed of black soldiers (though both the army and police reserves remained overwhelmingly white). By 1979 there were also 30 black commissioned officers in the regular army. While there was never any suggestion of disloyalty among the soldiers from predominantly black units (in particular within the Selous Scouts or the
Rhodesian African Rifles – RAR), some argue that, by the time of the 1980 election, many of the RAR soldiers voted for Robert Mugabe. As the result of an
Internal Settlement signed on 3 March 1978 between the Rhodesian government and the moderate African nationalist parties, which were not in exile and not involved in the war, elections were held in April 1979. The
United African National Council (UANC) party won a majority in this election, and its leader,
Abel Muzorewa (a
United Methodist Church bishop), became the country's first black prime minister on 1 June 1979. The country's name was changed to
Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The internal settlement left control of the country's police, security forces, civil service and judiciary in white hands, for the moment. It assured whites of about one-third of the seats in parliament. It was essentially a power-sharing arrangement between white people and black people which, in the eyes of many, particularly the insurgents, did not amount to majority rule. However, the
United States Senate voted to end economic sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia on 12 June. While the 1979 election was described by the Rhodesian government as non-racial and democratic, it did not include the main nationalist parties ZANU and ZAPU. In spite of offers from Ian Smith, the latter parties declined to participate in an election in which their political position would be insecure and under a proposed constitution which they had played no part in drafting and which was perceived as retaining strong white minority privilege. Bishop Muzorewa's government did not receive international recognition. The Bush War continued unabated and sanctions were not lifted. The international community refused to accept the validity of any agreement which did not incorporate the main nationalist parties. The British government (then led by the recently elected
Margaret Thatcher) issued invitations to all parties to attend a peace conference at
Lancaster House. These negotiations took place in London in late 1979. The three-month-long conference almost failed to reach conclusion, due to disagreements on
land reform, but resulted in the
Lancaster House Agreement. UDI ended, and Rhodesia temporarily reverted to the status of a British colony (the 'Colony of Southern Rhodesia'). As per the agreement,
Lord Soames became governor with full legislative and executive powers. The Lancaster House Agreement further provided for a ceasefire which was followed by an internationally supervised general election, held in
February 1980. ZANU led by
Robert Mugabe won this election, some alleged, by terrorising its political opposition, including supporters of ZAPU, through former insurgents that had not confined themselves to the designated guerrilla assembly points, as stipulated by the Lancaster House Agreement. The observers and Soames were accused of looking the other way, and Mugabe's victory was certified. Nevertheless, few could doubt that Mugabe's support within his majority Shona tribal group was extremely strong. The Rhodesian military seriously considered mounting a coup against a perceived stolen election ("
Operation Quartz") to prevent ZANU from taking over the country. The alleged coup was to include the assassination of Mugabe and coordinated assaults on guerrilla assembly points throughout the country. The plan was eventually scuttled, as it was obvious that Mugabe enjoyed widespread support from the black majority despite voter intimidation, as well as the fact that the coup would gain no external support, and a conflagration which would engulf the country was seen as inevitable.
Republic of Zimbabwe (1980) On 18 April 1980, the country became independent within the
Commonwealth of Nations as the Republic of Zimbabwe, and its capital, Salisbury, was renamed
Harare two years later. == Geography ==