Historical background Historically, there have been three methods used to raise military forces: a militia, a professional military, or conscription. Conscription, or involuntary service and the enforcement mechanisms required, was incompatible with colonial society. A professional or mercenary army carries with it the tremendous expense required to pay and equip personnel and not used. The militia concept, that of a decentralized military body dependent upon an armed population and residing among the people, was suited to the colonial period.
Early Colonial era (1565–1754) The early colonists of
British America considered the militia an important social institution, necessary to provide defense and public safety. The first muster took place on September 16, 1565, in
St. Augustine, Florida, when Spanish governor Pedro Menendez de Aviles assembled approximately 50 citizen-soldiers, thereby establishing the European militia concept on the North American mainland. In 1643, the
Plymouth Colony Court allowed and established a military discipline to be erected and maintained.
French and Indian War (1754–1763) , 1755 During the
French and Indian Wars, town militia formed a recruiting pool for the Provincial Forces. The legislature of the colony would authorize a certain force level for the season's campaign and set recruitment quotas for each local militia. In theory, militia members could be drafted by lot if there were inadequate forces for the Provincial Regulars; however, the draft was rarely resorted to because provincial regulars were highly paid (more highly paid than their regular British Army counterparts) and rarely engaged in combat. In September 1755,
George Washington, then
adjutant-general of the Virginia militia, upon a frustrating and futile attempt to call up the militia to respond to a frontier Indian attack: ... he experienced all the evils of insubordination among the troops, perverseness in the militia, inactivity in the officers, disregard of orders, and reluctance in the civil authorities to render a proper support. And what added to his mortification was, that the laws gave him no power to correct these evils, either by enforcing discipline, or compelling the indolent and refractory to their duty ... The militia system was suited for only to times of peace. It provided for calling out men to repel invasion; but the powers granted for effecting it were so limited, as to be almost inoperative. ... they recommended to the militia to form themselves into companies of
minute-men, who should be equipped and prepared to march at the shortest notice. These minute-men were to consist of one quarter of the whole militia, to be enlisted under the direction of the field-officers, and divide into companies, consisting of at least fifty men each. The privates were to choose their captains and subalterns, and these officers were to form the companies into battalions, and chose the field-officers to command the same. Hence the minute-men became a body distinct from the rest of the militia, and, by being more devoted to military exercises, they acquired skill in the use of arms. More attention than formerly was likewise bestowed on the training and drilling of militia. This marked the beginning of the war. It was "three days after the affair of Lexington and Concord that any movement was made towards embodying a regular army". In 1777, the Second
Continental Congress adopted the
Articles of Confederation, which contained a provision for raising a confederal militia that consent would be required from nine of the 13 States. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation states, ... every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage. Some militia units appeared without adequate arms, as evidenced in this letter from John Adams to his wife, dated August 26, 1777: The militia are turning out with great alacrity both in Maryland and Pennsylvania. They are distressed for want of arms. Many have none, we shall rake and scrape enough to do
Howe's business, by favor of the Heaven. The initial enthusiasm of Patriot militiamen in the beginning days of the war soon waned. The historian Garry Wills explains, The fervor of the early days in the reorganized militias wore off in the long grind of an eight-year war. Now the right to elect their own officers was used to demand that the men not serve away from their state. Men evaded service, bought substitutes to go for them as in the old days, and had to be bribed with higher and higher bounties to join the effort – which is why Jefferson and
Samuel Adams called them so expensive. As wartime inflation devalued the currency, other pledges had to be offered, including land grants and the promise of "a healthy slave" at the end of the war. Some men would take a bounty and not show up. Or they would show up for a while, desert, and then, when they felt the need for another bounty, sign up again in a different place. ... This practice was common enough to have its own technical term – "bounty jumping". The burden of waging war passed to a large extent to the standing army, the
Continental Army. The stay-at-home militia tended then to perform the role of the internal police to keep order. British forces sought to disrupt American communities by instigating slave rebellions and Indian raids. The militia fended off these threats. Militias also spied on Loyalists in the American communities. In
Albany County, New York, the militia established a
Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies to look out for and investigate people with suspicious allegiances.
Confederation period (1783–1787) Politically, the militia was highly popular during the postwar period, though to some extent, based more on pride of victory in the recent war than on the realities. Robert Spitzer, citing Daniel Boorstin, describes this political dichotomy of the public popularity of the militia versus the military value: At the end of the Revolutionary War, a political atmosphere developed at the local level where the militia was seen with fondness, despite their spotty record on the battlefield. Typically, when the militia did act well was when the battle came into the locale of the militia, and local inhabitants tended to exaggerate the performance of the local militia versus the performance of the Continental Army. The Continental Army was seen as the protector of the States, though it also was viewed as a dominating force over the local communities.
Joseph Reed, president of Pennsylvania viewed this jealousy between the militia forces and the standing army as similar to the prior frictions between the militia and the British Regular Army a generation before during the
French and Indian War. Tensions came to a head at the end of the war when the Continental Army officers demanded pensions and set up the
Society of the Cincinnati to honor their own wartime deeds. The local communities did not want to pay national taxes to cover the Army pensions, when the local militiamen received none.
Constitution and Bill of Rights (1787–1789) The delegates of the Constitutional Convention (the Founding Fathers/Framers of the
U.S. Constitution) under Article 1; section 8, clauses 15 and 16 of the federal constitution, granted Congress the power to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia", as well as, and in distinction to, the power to raise an army and a navy. The U.S. Congress is granted the power to use the militia of the U.S. for three specific missions, as described in Article 1, section 8, clause 15: "To provide for the calling of the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." The
Militia Act of 1792 clarified whom the militia consists of:
Civilian control of a peacetime army At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, a political sentiment existed in the newly formed United States involving suspicion of peacetime armies not under civilian control. This political belief has been identified as stemming from the memory of the abuses of the standing army of
Oliver Cromwell and King
James II, in Great Britain in the prior century, which led to the
Glorious Revolution and resulted in placing the standing army under the control of Parliament. During the Congressional debates,
James Madison discussed how a militia could help defend liberty against tyranny and oppression. (Source I Annals of Congress 434, June 8, 1789) However, during his presidency, after enduring the failures of the militia in the
War of 1812, Madison came to favor the maintenance of a strong standing army.
Shift from states' power to federal power A major concern of the various delegates during the constitutional debates over the U.S. Constitution and the
Second Amendment to the Constitution revolved around the issue of transferring militia power held by the states (under the existing
Articles of Confederation) to federal control.
Political debate regarding compulsory militia service for pacifists Records of the constitutional debate over the early drafts of the language of the Second Amendment included significant discussion of whether service in the militia should be compulsory for all able bodied men, or should there be an exemption for the "religiously scrupulous" conscientious objector. The concern about risks of a "religiously scrupulous" exemption clause within the second amendment to the Federal Constitution was expressed by
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts (from 1 Annals of Congress at 750, 17 August 1789): The "religiously scrupulous" clause was ultimately stricken from the final draft of second amendment to the Federal Constitution though the militia clause was retained. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld a right to conscientious objection to military service.
Concern over select militias William S. Fields and David T. Hardy write: While in The Federalist No. 46, Madison argued that a standing army of 25,000 to 30,000 men would be offset by "a militia amounting to near a half million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves ..." [119] The Antifederalists were not persuaded by these arguments, in part because of the degree of control over the militia given to the national government by the proposed constitution. The fears of the more conservative opponents centered upon the possible phasing out of the general militia in favor of a smaller, more readily corrupted, select militia. Proposals for such a select militia already had been advanced by individuals such as
Baron Von Steuben, Washington's Inspector General, who proposed supplementing the general militia with a force of 21,000 men given government- issued arms and special training. [120] An article in
the Connecticut Journal expressed the fear that the proposed constitution might allow Congress to create such select militias: "[T]his looks too much like Baron Steuben's militia, by which a standing army was meant and intended." [121] In Pennsylvania, John Smiley told the ratifying convention that "Congress may give us a select militia which will in fact be a standing army", and worried that, [p.34] with this force in hand, "the people in general may be disarmed". [122] Similar concerns were raised by Richard Henry Lee in Virginia. In his widely-read pamphlet, Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, Lee warned that liberties might be undermined by the creation of a select militia that "[would] answer to all the purposes of an army", and concluded that "the Constitution ought to secure a genuine and guard against a select militia by providing that the militia shall always be kept well organized, armed, and disciplined, and include, according to the past and general usage of the states, all men capable of bearing arms." Note: In Federalist Paper 29 Hamilton argued the inability to train the whole Militia made select corps inevitable and, like Madison, paid it no concern.
Federalist period (1789–1801) In 1794, a militia numbering approximately 13,000 was raised and personally led by President George Washington to quell the
Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania. From this experience, a major weakness of a States-based citizen militia system was found to be the lack of systematic army organization, and a lack of training for engineers and officers. George Washington repeatedly warned of these shortcomings up until his death in 1799. Two days before his death, in a letter to General Alexander Hamilton, George Washington wrote: "The establishment of a Military Academy upon a respectable and extensive basis has ever been considered by me as an object of primary importance to this country; and while I was in the chair of government, I omitted no proper opportunity of recommending it in my public speeches, and otherwise to the attention of the legislature."
Early republic (1801–1812) In 1802, the federal military academy at
West Point was established, in part to rectify the failings of irregular training inherent in a States-based militia system. During the war, American militia units participated in the numerous conflicts fought on the
Canada–United States border, including several failed US invasions of Canada. Contemporaries noted the "lack of discipline, poor training, and unreliability under combat conditions" of American militiamen, which was exacerbated by state governments, which often neglected to sufficiently equip and train their own militia units. State militias from the American frontier and New England performed better than those from other states due to a variety of reasons, including the constant threat of warfare with
Native Americans. American commanders repeatedly faced difficulties organizing and moving militia, which sometimes resulted in a lack of supplies and the spread of disease among US troops, weakening morale. There were several instances of American militiamen refusing to cross the border into Canada, demonstrating "problems inherent in using militia forces... militiamen were best at defending their home regions rather than conducting offensive operations, or in this case, invading the territory of another sovereign state." One of the worst performances by American militiamen during the war was the 1814
Battle of Bladensburg. Prior to the battle, 500 US regulars under General
William H. Winder were reinforced around 6,500 Southern militiamen. However, when British forces under Major General
Robert Ross attacked Winder's army, the American militia units quickly fled, forcing the entire US army to retreat and leading the battle to be nicknamed the "Bladensburg Races". Ross's troops proceeded to
capture and burn Washington. However, the militia performed well in other battles, including the battles of
the Thames,
North Point,
Plattsburgh and
New Orleans. Ultimately, despite the poor quality of most American militia units they were relied upon by US commanders as country's regular forces were also in a poor state. Despite their relatively unimpressive performance, the militia "performed well enough to defend America from military conquests and preserve the nation’s independence."
Antebellum era (1815–1861) By the 1830s, the
American frontier expanded westwards, with the
Indian Wars in the eastern U.S. ending. Many states let their unorganized militia lapse in favor of volunteer militia units such as
city guards who carried on in functions such as assisting local law enforcement, providing troops for ceremonies and parades or as a social club. The groups of
company size were usually uniformed and armed through their own contributions. Volunteer units of sufficient size could elect their own officers and apply for a state charter under names that they themselves chose. cents per day. Text reads: "A List of that Part of the Millitia Commanded by Elisha Burk an went after the Runaway Negroes. ... The within is a True Return of that part of the Millitia Commanded by Elisha Burk While out after the Runaway Negroes: Given under my hand this 15th day of August 1826". (signed) Elisha Burk Captain. The states' militia continued service, notably, in the slave-holding states, to maintain public order by performing slave patrols to round up fugitive slaves. A Mississippi town history described their militia of the 1840s: "The company musters of the citizen soldiers were held four times a year...After a brief parade, which consisted in a blundering execution of unwarlike antics, these men would start drinking and usually several fights occurred." Responding to criticisms of failures of the militia, Adjutant General William Sumner wrote an analysis and rebuttal in a letter to John Adams, May 3, 1823: The disasters of the militia may be ascribed chiefly, to two causes, of which the failure to train the men is a principle one; but, the omission to train the officers is as so much greater, that I think the history of its conduct, where it has been unfortunate, will prove that its defects are attributable, more to their want of knowledge or the best mode of applying the force under their authority to their attainment of their object than to all others. It may almost be stated, as an axiom, that the larger the body of undisciplined men is, the less is its chance of success; ... During this inter-war period of the nineteenth century, the states' militia tended towards being disorderly and unprepared. The demoralizing influences even of our own militia drills has long been notorious to a proverb. It has been a source of general corruptions to the community, and formed habits of idleness, dissipation and profligacy ... musterfields have generally been scenes or occasions of gambling, licentiousness, and almost every vice. ... An eye-witness of a New England training, so late as 1845, says, "beastly drunkenness, and other immoralities, were enough to make good men shudder at the very name of a muster".
Joseph Story lamented in 1842 how the militia had fallen into serious decline: And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our National Bill of Rights. Due to rising tensions between Latter-day Saints and their Missourian neighbors, in 1838, General
David R. Atchison, the commander of the state militia of Northwestern Missouri, ordered
Samuel Bogart to "prevent, if possible, any invasion of Ray County by persons in arms whatever". Bogart, who had participated in former anti-Mormon
vigilante groups, proceeded to disarm resident Latter-day Saints and forced them to leave the county. In response
David W. Patten led the Caldwell County militia to rescue Latter-day Saint residents from what they believed was a "mob". The confrontation between these two county militias (Ray and Caldwell) became known as the
Battle of Crooked River and is a primary cause for Governor
Lilburn Boggs issuing
Missouri Executive Order 44. This order, often called the "Extermination Order", told the commander of the Missouri State Militia, General
John Bullock Clark, that, "The Mormons must be treated as enemies, and must be exterminated or driven from the state if necessary for the public pease—their outrages are beyond description." In the following days, Missouri militia killed 17 Latter-day Saints at
Haun's Mill, laid siege to
Far West, Missouri and jailed Latter-day Saint church leaders, including
Joseph Smith. The Latter-day Saints would later relocate to
Illinois and form their own state-authorized militia, the
Nauvoo Legion. After conflicts again rose between the Latter-day Saints and the other residents of Illinois, resulting in the murders of
Joseph and Hyrum Smith, Latter-day Saints migrated west to
Utah in an attempt to flee the United States. The
Utah Territorial Militia, the successor of the Nauvoo Legion, prevented U.S. federal troops from entering the Salt Lake Valley during the
Utah War. This war was largely a stand-off between the two forces during 1857 and 1858 as both sides resolved disagreements over governance and calmed Latter-day Saint fears of extermination. The Utah militia mostly engaged in sabotage of U.S. Army supply shipments, and other stratagem to "annoy them in every possible way." During the
violent political confrontations in the
Kansas Territory involving anti-slavery
Free-Staters and pro-slavery "
Border Ruffians" elements, the militia was called out to enforce order on several occasions, notably during the incidents referred to as the
Wakarusa War. During
John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry, local militia companies from villages within a 30-mile radius of Harpers Ferry cut off Brown's escape routes and trapped Brown's men in the armory.
American Civil War At the beginning of the
American Civil War, neither the North or the South was nearly well enough prepared for war, and few people imagined the demands and hardships the war would bring. Just prior to the war the total peacetime army consisted of a paltry 16,000 men. Both sides issued an immediate call to forces from the militia, followed by the immediate awareness of an acute shortage of weapons, uniforms, and trained officers. State militia regiments were of uneven quality, and none had anything resembling combat training. The typical militia drilling at the time amounted to, at best, parade-ground marching. The militia units, from local communities, had never drilled together as a larger regiment, and thus lacked the extremely important skill, critically necessary for the war style of the time, of maneuvering from a marching line into a fighting line. Yet both sides were equally unready, and rushed to prepare.
Confederate militia Union militia . Following South Carolina's declaration of secession, the Battle of
Fort Sumter, and the beginning of the Civil War, President
Abraham Lincoln called up
75,000 state militiamen to retake the former U.S. federal fort and found that the militia "strength was far short of what the Congressional statute provided and required". In the summer of 1861, military camps circled around Washington, D.C. composed of new three-year army volunteers and 90-day militia units. The generals in charge of this gathering had never handled large bodies of men before, and the men were simply inexperienced civilians with arms having little discipline and less understanding of the importance of discipline. In the West, Union state and territorial militias existed as active forces in defense of settlers there.
California especially had
many active militia companies at the beginning of the war that rose in number until the end of the war. It provided the most volunteers from west of the Rocky Mountains: eight regiments and two battalions of infantry, two regiments and a battalion of cavalry. It also provided most of the men for the infantry regiment from
Washington Territory.
Oregon raised an infantry and a cavalry regiment.
Colorado Territory militias were organized to resist both the Confederacy and any civil disorder caused by secessionists,
Copperheads,
Mormons, or most particularly the native tribes. The
Colorado Volunteers participated in the
Battle of Glorieta Pass, turning back a Confederate invasion of
New Mexico Territory. Later they initiated the
Colorado War with the
Plains Indians and committed the
Sand Creek massacre. The
California Volunteers of the
California Column were sent east across the southern deserts to drive the Confederates out of southern Arizona, New Mexico, and west
Texas around
El Paso, then fought the
Navajo and
Apache until 1866. They also were sent to guard the
Overland Trail, keep the
Mormons under observation by the establishment of
Fort Douglas in
Salt Lake City, and fought a campaign against the
Shoshone culminating in the
Battle of Bear River. In Nevada, Oregon and
Idaho Territory, California,
Oregon and
Washington Territorial Volunteers tried to protect the settlers and pacified tribes, fighting the
Goshute,
Paiute,
Ute and hostile
Snake Indians in the
Snake War from 1864 until 1866. In California, volunteer forces fought the
Bald Hills War in the northwestern forests until 1864 and also the
Owens Valley Indian War in 1862–1863.
Reconstruction era With passage of federal
reconstruction laws between 1866 and 1870 the U.S. Army took control of the former rebel states and ordered elections to be held. These elections were the first in which African Americans could vote. Each state (except Virginia) elected Republican governments, which organized militia units. The majority of militiamen were black. Racial tension and conflict, sometimes intense, existed between the Negro
freedmen and the ex-Confederate whites. In parts of the South, white paramilitary groups and rifle clubs formed to counter this black militia, despite the laws prohibiting drilling, organizing, or parading except for duly authorized militia. In Reconstruction Louisiana, the Knights of the White Camelia, the Ku Klux Klan, Swamp Fox Rangers, and a couple other paramilitary groups sought to counter official governments. These groups engaged in a prolonged series of retaliatory, vengeful, and hostile acts against this black militia. ... the militia companies were composed almost entirely of Negroes and their marching and counter-marching through the country drove the white people to frenzy. Even a cool-headed man like
General George advised the Democrats to form military organizations that should be able to maintain a front against the negro militia. Many indications pointed to trouble. A hardware merchant of
Vicksburg reported that with the exceptions of the first year of the war his trade had never been so brisk. It was said that 10,000
Spencer rifles had been brought into the State. The activity of the official black militia, and the unofficial illegal white rifle clubs, typically peaked in the autumn surrounding elections. This was the case in the race riot of
Clinton, Mississippi in September 1875, and the following month in
Jackson, Mississippi. An eyewitness account: I found the town in great excitement; un-uniformed militia were parading the streets, both white and colored. I found that the white people—democrats—were very much excited in consequence of the governor organizing the militia force of the state. ... I found that these people were determined to resist his marching the militia (to Clinton) with arms, and they threatened to kill his militiamen. Outright war between the state militia and the white rifle clubs was avoided only by the complete surrender of one of the belligerents, though tensions escalated in the following months leading to a December riot in
Vicksburg, Mississippi resulting in the deaths of two whites and thirty-five black people. Reaction to this riot was mixed, with the local Democrats upset at the influx of federal troops that followed, and the Northern press expressing outrage: "Once more, as always, it is the Negroes that are slaughtered while the whites escape."
Great Railroad Strike of 1877 The
Great Railroad Strike of 1877, beginning in July 1877 in
Martinsburg, West Virginia and spreading to 15 other states across the Midwest, was the first national labor strike in United States history. West Virginia Governor
Henry M. Mathews was the first state commander-in-chief to call up militia units to suppress the strike, and this action has been viewed in retrospect as an action that would transform the
National Guard by revealing the shortcomings of the state militias. In all, approximately 45,000 militiamen were called out nationwide.
Posse Comitatus Act In 1878, Congress passed the
Posse Comitatus Act intended to prohibit federal troops and federal-controlled militia from supervising elections. This act substantially limits the powers of the Federal government to use the military serving on active duty under
Title 10 for law enforcement, but does not preclude governors from using their National Guard in a law enforcement role as long as the guardsmen are serving under
Title 32 or on state active duty.
Spanish–American War Despite a lack of initial readiness, training, and supplies, the militias of the United States fought and achieved victory in the
Spanish–American War.
Ludlow massacre In 1914, in
Ludlow, Colorado, the militia was called out to calm the situation during a coal mine strike, but the sympathies of the militia leaders allied with company management and resulted in the deaths of roughly 19 to 25 people. The state National Guard was originally called out, but the company was allowed to organize an additional private militia consisting of Colorado Fuel & Iron Company (CF&I) guards in National Guard uniforms augmented by non-uniformed mine guards. The
Ludlow massacre was an attack by the Colorado National Guard and Colorado Fuel & Iron Company camp guards on a tent colony of 1,200 striking coal miners and their families at Ludlow, Colorado on April 20, 1914. In retaliation for Ludlow, the miners armed themselves and attacked dozens of mines over the next ten days, destroying property and engaging in several skirmishes with the Colorado National Guard along a 40-mile front from Trinidad to Walsenburg. The entire strike cost between 69 and 199 lives. Thomas Franklin Andrews described it as the "deadliest strike in the history of the United States".
Mexican Revolution American organized and unorganized militias fought in the
Mexican Revolution. Some campaigned in Mexico as
insurgent forces and others fought in battles such as
Ambos Nogales and
Columbus in defense of the interests of United States.
World War I • The Plattsburg Movement
Preparedness Movement. The Hays Law. ==Twentieth century and current==