New classical economics had pointed out the inherent contradiction of the neoclassical synthesis: Walrasian microeconomics with market clearing and general equilibrium could not lead to Keynesian macroeconomics where markets failed to clear. New Keynesians recognized this paradox, but, while the new classicals abandoned Keynes, new Keynesians abandoned Walras and market clearing. During the late 1970s and 1980s, new Keynesian researchers investigated how market imperfections like
monopolistic competition,
nominal frictions like sticky prices, and other frictions made microeconomics consistent with Keynesian macroeconomics. New Keynesians often formulated models with rational expectations, which had been proposed by Lucas and adopted by new classical economists.
Nominal and real rigidities Stanley Fischer (1977) responded to
Thomas J. Sargent and
Neil Wallace's monetary ineffectiveness proposition and showed how monetary policy could stabilize an economy even in a model with rational expectations. Fischer's model showed how monetary policy could have an impact in a model with long-term nominal wage contracts.
John B. Taylor expanded on Fischer's work and found that monetary policy could have long-lasting effects—even after wages and prices had adjusted. Taylor arrived at this result by building on Fischer's model with the assumptions of
staggered contract negotiations and contracts that fixed nominal prices and wage rates for extended periods. These early new Keynesian theories were based on the basic idea that, given fixed nominal wages, a monetary authority (central bank) can control the employment rate. Since wages are fixed at a nominal rate, the monetary authority can control the
real wage (wage values adjusted for inflation) by changing the money supply and thus impact the employment rate. By the 1980s new Keynesian economists became dissatisfied with these early nominal wage contract models since they predicted that real wages would be
countercyclical (real wages would rise when the economy fell), while empirical evidence showed that real wages tended to be independent of economic cycles or even slightly
procyclical. These contract models also did not make sense from a microeconomic standpoint since it was unclear why firms would use long-term contracts if they led to inefficiencies. Instead of looking for rigidities in the labor market, new Keynesians shifted their attention to the goods market and the sticky prices that resulted from "
menu cost" models of price change. The term refers to the literal cost to a restaurant of printing new menus when it wants to change prices; however, economists also use it to refer to more general costs associated with changing prices, including the expense of evaluating whether to make the change. Since firms must spend money to change prices, they do not always adjust them to the point where markets clear, and this lack of price adjustments can explain why the economy may be in disequilibrium. Studies using data from the
United States Consumer Price Index confirmed that prices do tend to be sticky. A good's price typically changes about every four to six months or, if sales are excluded, every eight to eleven months. While some studies suggested that menu costs are too small to have much of an aggregate impact, Laurence Ball and
David Romer (1990) showed that
real rigidities could interact with nominal rigidities to create significant disequilibrium. Real rigidities occur whenever a firm is slow to adjust its real prices in response to a changing economic environment. For example, a firm can face real rigidities if it has market power or if its costs for inputs and wages are locked-in by a contract. Ball and Romer argued that real rigidities in the labor market keep a firm's costs high, which makes firms hesitant to cut prices and lose revenue. The expense created by real rigidities combined with the menu cost of changing prices makes it less likely that firm will cut prices to a market clearing level.
Coordination failure Coordination failure is another potential explanation for recessions and unemployment. In recessions a factory can go idle even though there are people willing to work in it, and people willing to buy its production if they had jobs. In such a scenario, economic downturns appear to be the result of coordination failure: The invisible hand fails to coordinate the usual, optimal, flow of production and consumption.
Russell Cooper and Andrew John (1988) expressed a general form of coordination as models with multiple equilibria where agents could coordinate to improve (or at least not harm) each of their respective situations. Cooper and John based their work on earlier models including
Peter Diamond's (1982)
coconut model, which demonstrated a case of coordination failure involving
search and matching theory. In Diamond's model producers are more likely to produce if they see others producing. The increase in possible trading partners increases the likelihood of a given producer finding someone to trade with. As in other cases of coordination failure, Diamond's model has multiple equilibria, and the welfare of one agent is dependent on the decisions of others. Diamond's model is an example of a "thick-market
externality" that causes markets to function better when more people and firms participate in them. Other potential sources of coordination failure include
self-fulfilling prophecies. If a firm anticipates a fall in demand, they might cut back on hiring. A lack of job vacancies might worry workers who then cut back on their consumption. This fall in demand meets the firm's expectations, but it is entirely due to the firm's own actions.
Labor market failures New Keynesians offered explanations for the failure of the labor market to clear. In a Walrasian market, unemployed workers bid down wages until the demand for workers meets the supply. If markets are Walrasian, the ranks of the unemployed would be limited to workers transitioning between jobs and workers who choose not to work because wages are too low to attract them. They developed several theories explaining why markets might leave willing workers unemployed. Of these theories, new Keynesians were especially associated with
efficiency wages and the
insider–outsider model used to explain
long-term effects of previous unemployment, where short-term increases in unemployment become permanent and lead to higher levels of unemployment in the long-run.
Insider–outsider model Economists became interested in hysteresis when unemployment levels spiked with the
1979 oil shock and early 1980s recessions but did not return to the lower levels that had been considered the natural rate.
Olivier Blanchard and
Lawrence Summers (1986) explained hysteresis in unemployment with insider–outsider models, which were also proposed by
Assar Lindbeck and
Dennis Snower in a series of papers and then a book. Insiders, employees already working at a firm, are only concerned about their own welfare. They would rather keep their wages high than cut pay and expand employment. The unemployed, outsiders, do not have any voice in the wage bargaining process, so their interests are not represented. When unemployment increases, the number of outsiders increases as well. Even after the economy has recovered, outsiders continue to be disenfranchised from the bargaining process. The larger pool of outsiders created by periods of economic retraction can lead to persistently higher levels of unemployment. The presence of hysteresis in the labor market also raises the importance of monetary and fiscal policy. If temporary downturns in the economy can create long term increases in unemployment, stabilization policies do more than provide temporary relief; they prevent short term shocks from becoming long term increases in unemployment.
Efficiency wages In efficiency wage models, workers are paid at levels that maximize productivity instead of clearing the market. For example, in developing countries, firms might pay more than a market rate to ensure their workers can afford enough
nutrition to be productive. Firms might also pay higher wages to increase loyalty and morale, possibly leading to better productivity. Firms can also pay higher than market wages to forestall shirking. Shirking models were particularly influential.
Carl Shapiro and
Joseph Stiglitz (1984) created a model where employees tend to avoid work unless firms can monitor worker effort and threaten slacking employees with unemployment. If the economy is at full employment, a fired shirker simply moves to a new job. Individual firms pay their workers a premium over the market rate to ensure their workers would rather work and keep their current job instead of shirking and risk having to move to a new job. Since each firm pays more than market clearing wages, the aggregated labor market fails to clear. This creates a pool of unemployed laborers and adds to the expense of getting fired. Workers not only risk a lower wage, they risk being stuck in the pool of unemployed. Keeping wages above market clearing levels creates a serious disincentive to shirk that makes workers more efficient even though it leaves some willing workers unemployed. == New growth theory ==