Plans for a new Berlin Airport (1990) After the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989, and following
German reunification in 1990, Berlin once again became the German federal capital; leaders made plans to recognise the city's increased importance by constructing a large commercial airport. The existing airports —
Tegel,
Schönefeld and
Tempelhof — were ageing and becoming increasingly congested with rising passenger numbers. To ensure the economic viability of the project, they pursued the
single airport concept: the new airport would become the sole commercial airport for Berlin and Brandenburg. They planned to close Tegel, Schönefeld and Tempelhof upon opening the new airport, then ban commercial aviation from any other airport in Brandenburg. On 2 May 1991, the
Berlin Brandenburg Flughafen Holding GmbH (BBF) was founded, owned by the states of Berlin and Brandenburg (37% each) and the Federal Republic of Germany (the remaining 26%).
Eberhard Diepgen, Mayor of Berlin, became the first chairman of the supervisory board. The holding company announced on 20 June 1993 that
Sperenberg Airfield,
Jüterbog Airfield and the area south of Schönefeld Airport, where the evaluation of the locations Sperenberg, Jüterbog East, Jüterbog West, Tietzow, Michelsdorf, Borkheide and Schönefeld South was carried out according to five criteria with different weighting. Each site was advocated by various factions in the ensuing political discussion. With regard to
land-use planning and
noise pollution, rural Sperenberg and Jüterbog were considered more suitable for construction of a large airport. Economic considerations favoured an airport located near the city centre, with existing road and rail links (as is the case with Schönefeld). On 28 May 1996, Mayor Diepgen, Minister-President of Brandenburg
Manfred Stolpe and
Federal Minister for Transport Matthias Wissmann committed to Schönefeld as the site for the new airport. This so-called
consensus decision was later affirmed by the respective state legislatures. The new airport would use some infrastructure, such as a runway, from the existing Schönefeld Airport.
Failed privatisation Originally, BBF anticipated that the new airport would be owned and operated by a private investor. They called for proposals, which led to two bidding consortia emerging as serious contenders. One was led by
Hochtief through its
Hochtief Airport subsidiary and included
ABB,
Fraport and
Bankengesellschaft Berlin as partners. The other consortium comprised
IVG,
Flughafen Wien AG, Dorsch-Consult,
Commerzbank and
Caisse des Dépôts. On 19 September 1998, BBF announced that the Hochtief consortium were the successful bidder. This saw them granted exclusive authority to negotiate the terms and conditions for an acquisition of the Berlin Brandenburg Airport holding and the construction and operation of the new airport for 50 years. On 31 March 1999, BBF officially commissioned Hochtief and its partners to construct the new airport, causing IVG to file a lawsuit. The Brandenburg
Oberlandesgericht acknowledged the concerns voiced by IVG. In its review, it found that in certain points the assessment of the applications had been biased towards Hochtief. This led to annulment of the
contract award on 3 August of that year. Hochtief Airport and IVG teamed up and created a plan for a joint bid on 10 November 2000 in an attempt to receive the contract to construct and operate the new airport. At the time BBF hoped that the planning approval could be completed in 2002, with the tentative opening in 2007. When Hochtief/IVG submitted its bid in February 2002, the BBF board consisted of
Manfred Stolpe, who would become Federal Minister of Transportation;
Klaus Wowereit, who replaced Eberhard Diepgen as Mayor of Berlin and chair of the board; and
Matthias Platzeck, who replaced Stolpe as Minister-President of Brandenburg. The board determined that the proposal would not be practical and voted 22 May 2003 to scrap the privatisation plan. Hochtief and IVG received approximately €50 million compensation for their planning effort.
Public ownership and construction permit The new Berlin airport would be planned, owned and operated by BBF Holding. Shortly afterwards BBF Holding became
Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg GmbH (FBB) and remained under the ownership of Berlin, Brandenburg and the federal government. On 13 August 2004, the Brandenburg state ministry for infrastructure and regional policy granted approval for the development of Schönefeld Airport into the new Berlin Brandenburg International Airport. A legal battle ensued, as local residents filed lawsuits against the ministry's decision. The dispute ended 16 March 2006, when the
Federal Administrative Court of Germany rejected the residents' arguments. The court imposed stipulations on flight operations at the new airport. The
construction permit was granted only under the condition that once operational, the number of people living in the approach path would be lower compared to the situation surrounding the three existing airports – Tegel, Schönefeld and Tempelhof. Therefore, it was mandatory for Tegel and Schönefeld to close (Tempelhof was already decommissioned in 2008) once Berlin's air traffic was concentrated at the new airport.
Construction progress and issues Berlin Brandenburg Airport was originally planned to open in October 2011, five years after starting construction in 2006. However, the project encountered a series of successive delays due to poor construction planning, execution, management, and corruption. The Airport finally received its operational licence in May 2020, Inspectors uncovered flaws in the wiring, programming and implementation of the highly complex system designed by
Siemens and
Bosch. The system automatically controls sprinklers, smoke extractors and fire doors. For aesthetic reasons, designers decided that the terminal would have smoke extraction ducts in its ceiling but that they would not exhaust to its rooftop. During a fire, smoke would be pumped from the ceiling into a shaft running down and through the basement
below the structure. This required the natural rising behaviour of hot air in the shaft to be reversed. Achieving this on the scale necessary for this airport is a unique undertaking and so far this elaborate smoke extraction system has not worked as planned. It emerged that Alfredo di Mauro, who designed the fire safety system, was not a qualified engineer. While his business cards stated he was an engineer, he was actually qualified as an engineering
draughtsman. Di Mauro was dismissed by the airport company in early May 2014. In the termination notice, the company cited "serious defects" in his work and that trust in their relationship was "now finally shattered". The airport company went on to state that Di Mauro's plans would be "disposed of". The system was to be rebuilt and divided into three areas in order to make it "manageable". The cost of this work was reported as being a nine-digit figure. Another major factor impacting on the construction of the airport was insolvency of general planner
Planungsgemeinschaft Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg International (pg bbi) and the dismissal of the
Gerkan, Marg and Partners architects. Inspectors have uncovered many examples of poor workmanship due to a lack of proper supervision and documentation, most notably concerning the wiring. Reports have surfaced about cable conduits that held too many cables or held cables in incompatible combinations, such as phone lines next to high voltage wires. A total of of cooling pipes were allegedly installed with no thermal insulation. To correct this, the demolition of numerous walls was necessary. Furthermore, exterior vents appeared to be in improper locations, which allowed rainwater from the western facade to enter them. During construction, it became clear that the airport's costs would significantly increase as a result of initial underestimates, construction flaws, and increased expenses for soundproofing nearby homes. By 2012, the series of delays in opening was expected to lead to a number of lawsuits against FBB with the now defunct
Air Berlin announcing its intentions of such a move. By late 2012, expenditures for Berlin Brandenburg Airport totaled €4.3 billion, almost twice the originally anticipated figure. It became clear in November 2015 that the financial concept of the airport was fundamentally flawed. The main purpose of the many stores planned at the airport was to serve passengers who were changing planes, assuming that Berlin would be a big international hub. It was acknowledged in 2015 that competition between the hubs was already too intense.
Frankfurt Airport and
London Heathrow would resist losing passenger shares without a price war and that few if any airlines would abandon their hubs for Berlin. The only remaining potential airline for operating a hub was Air Berlin, which was in financial difficulties and did not plan to provide long-distance service. German Railways
Deutsche Bahn also sued for non-usage of the
ghost station below the airport in 2012, with the airport having to pay damages. In November 2015, auditors with the
Brandenburg Comptroller concluded that financial control executed by
Berlin,
Brandenburg, and
Germany over the airport as owners was insufficient and inefficient. The Comptroller published a 400-page report in February 2016 describing the flawed opening including several construction lapses. This led the BER boss to retaliate publicly against the comptroller on 27 February decrying the release of the numbers.
Soundproofing nearby homes would be €50million more expensive because of a verdict of the main administrative courts of the states of
Berlin and
Brandenburg. On 5 May 2016, the
Federal Administrative Court decided in favour of 25,500 plaintiffs. The key directive of the verdict was that rooms must be provided with adequate ventilation if windows are closed for noise, and the airport authority must also determine how air inside the structures can be vented. The airport avoided liability claims against Imtech and other firms involved in the construction of the fire exhaust system. By 2015, total costs amounted to €5.4 billion. Revised plans suggest additional costs amounting to an extra €2.19 billion. On 3 June 2015, Germany applied for a €2.5 billion spending approval from the EU, to be added to the previous total of €4.3 billion, bringing total costs to €6.8 billion. Financing for the entire airport appeared headed toward bankruptcy when the EU was unwilling to approve the pending request. If the request were to be denied, the airport authority stated it would be bankrupt by August 2016. The EU would only permit an additional €2.2 billion, which it did on 3 August 2016. A €2.4 billion loan was signed on 13 February 2017 containing €1.1 billion for financing and €1.3 billion to resolve old bad loans. The German federal government and the states of Berlin and Brandenburg guaranteed the debt. Although the airport had yet to open, officials were already planning a possible third runway for approximately €1 billion, and other new projects, such as an additional terminal, expanded baggage system and another freight facility. The total additional spending would amount to €3.2 billion. The board warned of a further rise in costs because the airport would not open before 2017: the current cost frame at that time was limited to 2016; the estimated cost of €6.9 billion was current as of May 2016. The airport company reportedly made the assurance to the
European Investment Bank that the airport would open in September 2019. However, forecasts estimated the airport would not be ready to open until 2020. This would require an additional €500 million refinancing to bridge the gap between 2019 and 2020. The airport published a need for another billion euros up until 2020. Thus the three years of work from 2018 onwards would cost at least €900 million. The total cost of the airport will top €6.5 billion. On 13 January 2018, the company requested an additional €2.8 billion for extensions until 2030. Taking that into account, the total cost came to €9.4 billion, with a total of €10.3 billion if the €900 million in overhead costs for 2019–2020 were factored in. An economical estimate determined the costs for the overhead at a conservative figure of €770 million. The airport was planning to borrow €400 million. Another issue arose when it became public that the airport head was earning an annual salary of €500,000. A new loan was granted by the German parliament on 30 June 2018 totaling €132 million. With the other two owners, the states of Brandenburg and Berlin, permitting their shares of the loan as well, the loan would total €500 million. The board postponed a decision concerning the loan until the end of August 2018, which left the entire finance planning in jeopardy. At the end of August 2018, Berlin's head of finance, Matthias Kollatz, remarked that the airport may face abrupt bankruptcy on 1 January 2019 if no immediate measures were to be taken. The financial head resigned from the holding company of Berlin's airports at the end of September 2019. According to projections the airport was in dire need of additional €508 million from 2021 onwards. Reports indicated another need for financial support from authorities for the next 2 years as of 29 April 2020 amounting to €1.8 billion. A new study claimed that the net worth of the current building was far lower than the credited €4.866 billion and would be settled at €3 billion less. The financial gap due to the COVID-19 pandemic was estimated to be €300 million for Tegel and Schönefeld combined, thus the new airport would be in need for financial support for years to come. The 2019 annual report from BER's operating firm was criticised by
The Left as extremely short and not transparent. Cash flow concerns amounted to an immediate €1.5 billion by 20 June 2020. On 13 July 2020, prosecutors filed a complaint on suspicion of falsifying the balance sheet. The financial auditors for FBB were the same as for the now insolvent
Wirecard company, raising doubts about the validity of the audits. The plan to generate profits starting in 2023/2024 had been interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, according to airport head . The FBB announced on 9 October 2020 a need for €375 million for 2021 to cover current costs for BER. An additional €552 million were needed as a stabilization for missing passengers.
Naming , former
mayor of
West Berlin and
chancellor of West Germany. During much of the planning and construction phase the new airport was known as
Berlin Brandenburg International Airport, abbreviated
BBI. It was then discovered that the
IATA code BBI already referred to
Biju Patnaik Airport (also known as Bhubaneswar Airport) in India. When the planned opening date of 2 June 2012 drew nearer, the FBB launched a marketing campaign introducing the
BER branding, reflecting the new
airport code. In 2007, the FBB board decided that Berlin Brandenburg Airport would be given a second name, honouring a person with a distinctive link to the city of Berlin. On 11 December 2009, the decision was made in favour of
Willy Brandt. The
Nobel Peace laureate of 1971 served as mayor of
West Berlin from 1957 to 1966 and as
West German chancellor from 1969 to 1974. Berlin mayor
Klaus Wowereit and Minister-President of Brandenburg
Matthias Platzeck, both members of the
SPD (which Brandt led from 1964 to 1987) led the effort to add Brandt's name to the airport. Other suggested honorees included
Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg,
Albert Einstein and
Marlene Dietrich (suggested by members of the
Christian Democratic Union),
Gustav Stresemann (nominated by the
Free Democratic Party), and
Otto Lilienthal (advocated by the
Green Party). ==Terminals==