Penkovsky approached American students on the
Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge in Moscow in July 1960 and gave them a package in which he offered to spy for the United States. He asked them to deliver it to an intelligence officer at the US Embassy. The
CIA delayed contacting him. When the US Embassy in Moscow refused to cooperate, fearing an international incident, the CIA contacted
MI6 for assistance.
Greville Wynne, a British salesman of industrial equipment to countries behind the
Iron Curtain, was recruited by MI6 to communicate with Penkovsky. The first meeting between Penkovsky and two American and two British intelligence officers occurred during a visit by Penkovsky to London in April 1961. For the following 18 months, Penkovsky supplied a tremendous amount of information to the CIA–MI6 team of handlers, including documents demonstrating that the Soviet nuclear arsenal was much smaller than
Nikita Khrushchev claimed or the CIA had thought and that the Soviets were not yet capable of producing a large number of ICBMs. This information was invaluable to President
John F. Kennedy in negotiating with Nikita Khrushchev for the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba.
Peter Wright, a former British
MI5 officer known for his scathing condemnation of the leadership of British intelligence during most of the Cold War, believed that Penkovsky was a
fake defection. Wright noted that, unlike
Igor Gouzenko and other earlier defectors, Penkovsky did not reveal the names of any Soviet agents in the West but only provided organisational detail, much of which was known already. Some of the documents provided were originals, which Wright thought could not have been easily taken from their sources. Wright was bitter towards British intelligence, reportedly believing that it should have adopted his proposed methods to identify British/Soviet double agents. In Wright's view, the failure of British intelligence leaders to listen to him caused them to become paralysed when such agents defected to the Soviet Union; in his book,
Spycatcher, he suggests that his hypothesis had to be true, and that the Soviets were aware of this paralysis and planted Penkovsky. In his memoir
Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (1987), written with journalist
Paul Greengrass, Wright says: Former
KGB major-general
Oleg Kalugin does not mention Penkovsky in his comprehensive memoir about his career in intelligence against the West. The KGB defector Vladimir N. Sakharov suggests Penkovsky was genuine, saying: "I knew about the ongoing KGB reorganisation precipitated by Oleg Penkovsky's case and
Yuri Nosenko's defection. The party was not satisfied with KGB performance ... I knew many heads in the KGB had rolled again, as they had after Stalin". While the weight of opinion seems to be that Penkovsky was genuine, the debate underscores the difficulty faced by all intelligence agencies of determining information offered from the enemy. In a meeting with US Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta, the head of Russia's foreign intelligence service,
Mikhail Fradkov, named Penkovsky as Russia's biggest intelligence failure. ==The "Zepp" Incident==