After China's withdrawal from Vietnam, Sino-Soviet relations remained locked in tense military confrontation along the border, while diplomatic relations remained frozen. While the Soviet Union continued to supply and support the Vietnamese government in Cambodia, China remained opposed to all Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia; the regime continued to lambaste Soviet and Vietnamese "regional hegemony." Minor skirmishes continued along the southern border with Vietnam and the northern border remained heavily militarized. Historian Péter Vámos estimates that "about one fourth of Soviet ground forces and one third of its air force were stationed along or in the region of the Sino-Soviet border" in the early 1980s. Many of these units were stationed in the nominally independent People's Republic of Mongolia, as per the 1980 Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Defense treaty. The massive troop build-up along the border into the 1980s led to an imbalance of military power; the Chinese remained overwhelmed by the Soviet show of force. The growing semi-official military alliance with the United States allowed the Chinese to strike back at the Soviets. The US and PRC established joint intelligence listening posts in Manchuria to monitor the Soviet Union, and these facilities remained staffed by Chinese intelligence. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raised tensions between the US and USSR, and provided another realm for Sino-US military cooperation. It also opened another military front on the Sino-Soviet border, and while this border was never the site of direct confrontations, the PRC was worried about the additional Soviet presence. In 1980, the US and PRC jointly opened two further listening stations in Xinjiang, specifically focused on tracking Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Xinjiang became the base of Chinese aid to the
Mujahideen, with PLA soldiers training and providing weapons to the anti-Soviet guerillas. According to Yitzhak Shichor, "PLA personnel provided training, arms, organization, financial support, and military advisers to the Mujahideen resistance throughout nearly the entire Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, with the active assistance and cooperation of the CIA." These PLA and CIA joint training camps were located near Kashgar and Khotan, spending $200–400 million training and arming the rebels. In the wake of the invasion, China solidified its terms for establishing bilateral relations, demanding the end of Soviet military deployment in Mongolia and along PRC borders, the cessation of Soviet aid in support of Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia, and total withdrawal from Afghanistan; making a total of "three major obstacles." There was more to the Afghanistan conflict than just another front for border confrontations. Historian Péter Vámos argues that "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which had initially seemed so threatening to China’s security, led to a change in the balance of forces between the superpowers and made the prospects of war seem more distant, partly as a result of a tacit strategic partnership between China and the United States described euphemistically as the pursuit of parallel actions." The new listening posts and cooperation between the US and PRC counter-balanced Soviet threats in the West, while the increasing quagmire of the Soviet war appeared to weaken the Soviet Army. In 1981–82, Chinese fears of Soviet encirclement and a coming war diminished; however, the desire to remove these threats remained the top priority for normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. In 1982, Leonid Brezhnev took a big step towards normalization with a speech in Tashkent, Uzbek SSR. In this speech, "the Soviet leader called China a socialist country, supported China’s position on Taiwan, expressed his willingness to improve relations with China, and proposed consultations between the two sides." - Yu HongliangThe PRC remained focused on overcoming the "three major obstacles" for diplomatic relations, but this note added flexibility, recognizing that these issues could be solved over time. Vietnam and Cambodia remained the top priority. The Soviets responded positively, agreeing to work towards resolving these obstacles, beginning formal political level meetings at the vice-foreign minister level. Further warming occurred with the writing of the 1982 PRC Constitution, which removed references to "social imperialism" and "contemporary revisionism" which had been inserted during the height of the Sino-Soviet split. The first vice-foreign minister meeting was held in Beijing in October 1982, and eleven further semi-annual meetings were held up until 1988. The discussions which began with political lectures, warmed over the following years. The three major obstacles to normalized relations, however, remained. As evidence of the change in China's position since 1976, the PRC continued to lobby for the withdrawal of Soviet military forces and aid in Vietnam, insisting that peaceful coexistence between the PRC and USSR be the guideline for relations. Furthermore, the PRC announced to Eastern bloc diplomats that "China would be ready to re-establish inter-party relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries" as long as the Soviets ended military support to Vietnam. Trade between the two nations increased dramatically through the 1980s growing from 223 million Soviet rubles in 1982 to 1.6 billion rubles in 1985. From this point forward, the Chinese propaganda ministry backed away from its attacks on the USSR, ending decades of ideological warfare. In March 1985, while in Moscow for Konstantin Chernenko's funeral,
Li Peng met with the new Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, with both sides explicitly stating their desire to normalize all relations. The gradual warming continued through 1985. At the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the beginnings of perestroika in the USSR, radically reforming and restructuring the stagnant Soviet economy. In his speech, Gorbachev praised the earlier Chinese reforms, and simultaneously expressed an interest to further improve ties with the PRC. Furthermore, Gorbachev announced troop withdrawals from Mongolia, Afghanistan and the Russian Far East, announcing his intention to remove the "obstacles" to Sino-Soviet relations, while also recognizing the Chinese view of the northern border, accepting that the dividing line ran through the middle of the main channel of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. Gorbachev's
new political thinking of 1988 sped up the normalization process significantly. It recognized that disarmament was key to the economic survival of the USSR, including unilateral disarmament and equal participation in regional economic and diplomatic relations. == Bilateral Foreign Relations 1989 - 1991 ==