Struggle for power with Brezhnev When Khrushchev was removed from power in October 1964, Kosygin replaced him as Premier as part of a
collective leadership dynamic that included
Leonid Brezhnev as
general secretary and
Nikolai Podgorny who ultimately became
Chairman of the
Presidium. Overall, the new Politburo adopted a more conservative outlook than that under Khrushchev's rule. Kosygin, Podgorny and
Andrei Kirilenko were the most reformist members of the new Soviet leadership. Conversely, Brezhnev and
Arvīds Pelše belonged to the moderate faction while
Mikhail Suslov retained his leadership of the party's
Stalinist wing. In October 1964, at a ceremony in honour of
Soviet cosmonauts, Brezhnev called for the strengthening of the Party apparatus. This speech was only the beginning of a large campaign directed against Kosygin. Several newspapers, such as
Pravda and
Kommunist, criticized the work of the Council of Ministers, and indirectly Kosygin, its chairman, for planning the economy in an unrealistic fashion, and used the highly aggressive rhetoric previously used to condemn Khrushchev against Kosygin. Brezhnev was able to criticize Kosygin by contrasting him with
Vladimir Lenin, who – Brezhnev claimed – had been more interested in improving the conditions of
Soviet agriculture than improving the quality of
light industrial goods. Kosygin's support for producing more consumer goods was also criticized by Brezhnev, and his supporters, most notably
Konstantin Chernenko, for being a return to quasi
First World policies. At the
23rd Party Congress, Kosygin's position was weakened when Brezhnev's supporters were able to increase expenditure on defense and agriculture. However, Brezhnev did not have a majority in the Politburo, and could count on only four votes. In the Politburo, Kosygin could count on
Kiril Mazurov's vote, and when Kosygin and Podgorny were not bickering with each other, they actually had a majority in the Politburo over Brezhnev. Unfortunately for Kosygin this was not often the case, and Kosygin and Podgorny were constantly disagreeing on policy. Kosygin's position in the Soviet leadership was ultimately weakened following his enactment of several economic initiatives in 1965 that collectively came to be known within the Party as the "
Kosygin reforms". Due largely to coinciding with the political upheaval created by the
Prague Spring, the reforms provoked a backlash among the party's old guard who proceeded to flock to Brezhnev and strengthen his position within the Soviet leadership. By March 1971, it became apparent that Brezhnev was the leader of the country, with Kosygin as the spokesman of the five-year plan and Podgorny's position within the collective leadership strengthened.
Foreign policy at a visit to Cairo, May 1966 Early on in his tenure, Kosygin challenged Brezhnev's right as
general secretary to represent the country abroad, a function Kosygin believed should fall into the hands of the
head of government, as was common in non-communist countries. This was actually implemented for a short period, which led
Henry A. Kissinger to believe that Kosygin was the
leader of the Soviet Union. Kosygin, who had been the chief negotiator with the
First World during the 1960s, was hardly seen outside the
Second World after Brezhnev consolidated his position within the Politburo, but also due to Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko's dislike of Kosygin meddling into his own ministerial affairs. at the 1967
Glassboro Summit Conference The
Six-Day War in the Middle East had the effect of increasing Soviet–American cooperation; to improve relations even further, the
United States Government invited Kosygin to a summit with
Lyndon B. Johnson, the President of the United States, following his speech to the United Nations. At the summit, which became known as the
Glassboro Summit Conference, Johnson and Kosygin failed to reach agreement on limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, but the summit's friendly and even open atmosphere was referred to as the "Spirit of Glassboro". Relations between the two countries improved further when the
1970 Moscow Treaty was signed on 12 August 1970 by Kosygin, Gromyko,
Willy Brandt and
Walter Scheel who represented
West Germany. In 1971, Kosygin gave an extensive interview to the American delegation that included
David Rockefeller, presenting his views on US-Soviet relations, environmental protection, arms control and other issues. Kosygin developed a close friendly relationship with the President of
Finland Urho Kekkonen, which helped the USSR to maintain active mutual trade with Finland and to keep it away from
Cold War confrontation. In 1972, Kosygin signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the government of
Iraq, building on strong Soviet ties to the
Iraqi Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and previous close relations with Iraqi leader
Abd al-Karim Qasim. 1964–1980.
Andrei Gromyko and Kosygin are second and third from left, respectively. Kosygin protected
János Kádár's economic reforms and his position as leader of the
Hungarian People's Republic from intervention by the Soviet leadership. Polish leader
Władysław Gomułka, who was removed from all of his posts in 1970, was succeeded by
Edward Gierek who tried to revitalize the economy of the
People's Republic of Poland by borrowing money from the
First World. The Soviet leadership approved both countries' respective economic experiments, since it was trying to reduce its large Eastern Bloc subsidy programme in the form of cheap oil and gas exports. During the discussions within the Soviet leadership of a possible
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Kosygin reminded leaders of the consequences of the Soviet suppression of the
1956 Hungarian revolution. Kosygin's stance became more aggressive later on when he understood that the reforms in Czechoslovakia could be turned against his
1965 Soviet economic reform. Kosygin acted as a mediator between
India and
Pakistan in 1966, and got both nations to sign the
Tashkent Declaration. Kosygin became the chief spokesman on the issue of arms control. In retrospect, many of Kosygin's colleagues felt he carried out his work "stoically", but lacked "enthusiasm", and therefore never developed a real taste for
international politics. The
Sino–Soviet split chagrined Kosygin a great deal, and for a while he refused to accept its irrevocability; he briefly visited Beijing in 1969 due to increased tension between the USSR and
Maoist China. Kosygin said, in a close-knit circle, that "We are communists and they are communists. It is hard to believe we will not be able to reach an agreement if we met face to face". His view on China changed, however, and according to
Harold Wilson, former
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Kosygin viewed China as an "organized military dictatorship" whose intended goal was to enslave "
Vietnam and the whole of Asia". During an official visit by an Afghan delegation, Kosygin and
Andrei Kirilenko criticized Afghan leaders
Nur Muhammad Taraki and
Hafizullah Amin for
Stalinist-like repressionist behaviour. He promised to send more economic and military aid, but rejected any proposal regarding a possible Soviet intervention, as an intervention in
Afghanistan would strain the USSR's foreign relations with the First World according to Kosygin, most notably West Germany. However, in a closed meeting, without Kosygin, who strongly opposed any kind of military intervention, the Politburo unanimously supported a Soviet intervention.
Economic policy Five-Year Plans The
Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966–1970) is considered to be one of the most successful periods for the Soviet economy and the most successful when it comes to consumer production (see
The "Kosygin" reform). It became known as the "golden era". The
23rd Party Congress and the
Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971–1975) had been postponed by Brezhnev due to a power struggle within the Soviet leadership. At the 23rd Party Congress, Kosygin promised that the Ninth Five-Year Plan would increase the supply of food, clothing and other household appliances up to 50 percent. The plan envisaged a massive increase in the Soviet
standard of living, with Kosygin proclaiming a growth of 40 percent for the population's cash income in his speech to the congress. The
Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976–1981) was referred to by Kosygin as the "plan of quality". Brezhnev rejected Kosygin's bid for producing more
consumer goods during the Tenth Five-Year Plan. As a result, the total volume of consumer goods in industrial production only stood at 26 percent. Kosygin's son-in-law notes that Kosygin was furious with the decision, and proclaimed increased defence expenditure would become the Soviet Union's "complete ruin". The plan was less ambitious than its predecessors, with targets of national industrial growth no higher than what the rest of the world had already achieved.
Soviet agriculture would receive a share investment of 34 percent, a share much larger than its proportional contribution to the Soviet economy, as it accounted for only 3 percent of the Soviet GDP.
The "Kosygin" reform Like Khrushchev, Kosygin tried to reform the
command economy within a socialist framework. In 1965 Kosygin initiated an
economic reform widely referred to as the "Kosygin reform". Kosygin sought to make Soviet industry more efficient by including some market measures common in the First World, such as
profit making, for instance; he also tried to increase quantity of production, increase
incentives for managers and workers, and freeing managers from
centralized state
bureaucracy. The reform had been proposed to Khrushchev in 1964, who evidently liked it and took some preliminary steps to implement it. Brezhnev allowed the reform to proceed because the Soviet economy was entering a period of low growth. In its testing phase, the reform was applied to 336 enterprises in
light industry. The reform was influenced by the works of Soviet economist
Evsei Liberman. Kosygin overestimated the ability of the Soviet administrative machine to develop the economy, which led to "corrections" to some of Liberman's more controversial beliefs about
decentralization. According to critics, Kosygin's changes to Liberman's original vision caused the reform to fail. Kosygin believed that decentralization,
semi-public companies, and cooperatives were keys to catching up to the First World's contemporary level of economic growth. His reform sought a gradual change from a "state-administered economy" to an economy in which "the state restricts itself to guiding enterprises". The reform was implemented, but showed several malfunctions and inconsistencies early on.
Results The salary for Soviet citizens increased abruptly by almost 2.5 times during the plan. Real wages in 1980 amounted to 232.7 rubles, compared to 166.3 rubles before the
1965 Soviet economic reform and the Eighth Five-Year Plan. The first period, 1960–1964, was characterized by low growth, while the second period, 1965–1981, had a stronger growth rate. The second period vividly demonstrated the success of the Kosygin reform, with the average annual growth in retail turnover being 11.2 billion rubles, 1.8 times higher than in the first period and 1.2 times higher than the third period (1981–1985). Consumption of goods and daily demand also increased. The consumption of home appliances greatly increased. Refrigerators increased from a low of 109,000 in 1964 to 440,000 units by 1973; consumption declined during the reversal of the reform. Car production increased, and would continue to do so until the late 1980s. The Soviet leadership, under pressure, sought to provide more attractive goods for Soviet consumers. The removal of Khrushchev in 1964 signalled the end of his "
housing revolution". Housing construction declined between 1960 and 1964 to an average of 1.63 million square metres. Following this sudden decrease, housing construction increased sharply between 1965 and 1966, but dropped again, and then steadily grew (the average annual growth rate was 4.26 million square metres). This came largely at the expense of businesses. While the housing shortage was never fully resolved, and still remains a problem in present-day Russia, the reform overcame the negative trend and renewed the growth of housing construction. There is no proof to back up the claim that the reform itself contributed to the high growth seen in the late-1960s, or that its cancellation had anything to do with the stagnating growth of the economy which began in the 1970s.
1973 and 1979 reforms Kosygin initiated another
economic reform in 1973 with the intention of weakening the
central Ministries and giving more powers to the regional authorities at republican and local levels. The reform's failure to meet Kosygin's goal led to its cancellation. However, the reform succeeded in creating
associations, an organization representing various enterprises. The last significant reform undertaken by the pre-
perestroika leadership was initiated by
Kosygin's fifth government in a joint decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. The "Improving planning and reinforcing the effects of the economic mechanism on raising the effectiveness in production and improving the quality of work", more commonly known as the
1979 reform. The reform, in contrast to the 1965 reform, was intended to increase the central government's economic involvement by enhancing the duties and responsibilities of the ministries. Due to Kosygin's resignation in 1980, and because of
Nikolai Tikhonov's conservative approach to economics, very little of the reform was actually implemented. ==Later life and resignation==