Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are complex actors within the field of deep-sea mining. SIDS are small island communities that hold the status of developing countries due to their economic, political, and social limitations and challenges. Despite their small size and relatively limited political and economic capital, their geographic position means that they are often perceived as so-called ‘Large Ocean States’. This self-perception is rooted in the fact that This geographic advantage elevates these islands as increasingly important political and economic actors in the emerging deep-sea mining industry. Their positions, however, are also shaped by historical legacies, most notably the enduring impacts of slavery and colonialism, which in many cases resulted in the severe depletion of local resources and long-term constraints on wealth and development. As a result, many of these states feel a strong imperative to avoid once again being exploited for their natural resources, and they therefore seek to maximize their influence through participation in supranational organizations. Several of these states are geographically located near potentially lucrative deep-sea mining zones. One of the most promising of these areas is the
Clarion-Clipperton Zone, whose resource potential has prompted a number of SIDS to initiate or explore early-stage deep-sea mining projects. According to economic assessments published by The Metals Company in 2025, mining polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone could potentially generate substantial economic returns. However, this projection should be interpreted with considerable caution. The Metals Company makes it clear that these assessments rely on a series of assumptions regarding technological feasibility, regulatory permissions, and future market prices. Moreover, researchers question whether deep sea minerals can be lifted to the surface in a commercially profitable way at all, and there is no scientific consensus on the economic viability of large scale extraction. According to the most recent assessment from 2025, the following 5 SIDS have entered into agreements or sponsorship arrangements related to early-stage deep-sea mining companies in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone: A total of five Small Island Developing States (SIDS) currently sponsor exploration activities in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ): the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Jamaica. Although all five states play a role in enabling access to seabed minerals in this region, they do so through very different institutional arrangements and with varying degrees of legal and financial exposure
. In contrast, Nauru and Tonga rely on sponsorship agreements with subsidiaries of The Metals Company that include strong investor-protection mechanisms, potentially limiting their policy flexibility and increasing the risk of investor-tate disputes. Kiribati’s participation is organized through a state-owned enterprise whose contractual arrangements with DeepGreen were terminated in 2024, leaving the country formally present in the CCZ but without an active commercial partner However, there is also a significant importance in the fact that technological development now promises to make it possible to extract these materials and resources. Therefore, it is predictable that in recent years we are seeing an increasing number of countries, including SIDS, claiming and protecting maritime areas and their resources. Since many of these SIDS possess potentially valuable Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), there is significant interest from both major countries and corporations in developing the production and extraction of these minerals and resources from the seabed. This interest means that many members of the Global South and developing states, such as SIDS, find themselves in a favorable negotiating position with the potential to boost their economies. In this context, they are brought into contact with multinational corporations and powerful states that show interest in their resources. Despite their relatively small landmasses, these countries have a strong interest in ensuring that the surrounding areas are not exploited or extracted without their involvement. These nations are deeply dependent on the potential of the seabed, as in many cases it constitutes the vast majority of their economic potential. Therefore, international cooperation is not just an option but a necessity for these states. A stronger ISA will make it easier for them to stand up to foreign powers and corporations that seek to profit at their expense. Together these regimes shape the formal authority, political leverage, and environmental responsibilities of SIDS within global ocean governance. Article 145 requires the protection of the marine environment from harmful effects of mineral exploitation. However, the legal position of SIDS does not depend solely on The Area. The second foundational regime is the EEZ, defined primarily through Articles 55 to 57, and especially Article 56. For SIDS, whose economies and food security often depend heavily on marine ecosystems, these spillovers heighten the importance of the environmental protections outlined in Article 145. Meanwhile, their participation in The Area’s governance enables them to influence decisions about deep sea mining beyond their national borders and to articulate broader Global South concerns regarding justice, environmental protection, and postcolonial vulnerability. In this dual framework, SIDS emerge not merely as small or vulnerable states, but as states whose legal entitlements under UNCLOS grant them both territorial authority and normative leverage. Their EEZs anchor their identity as stewards of large ocean territories, while the principles governing The Area enable them to challenge inequitable distributions of power and benefit in the governance of the global commons. The industry is already highly concentrated, dominated by a small number of corporate operators due to extremely high technological and financial barriers to entry. As a result, when SIDS enter this sector, they often confront asymmetrical negotiations with a few highly powerful corporate actors. Their limited experience with large scale contract management or natural resource governance further weakens their bargaining position. Their vulnerability is not only economic but also institutional. Postcolonial legacies, constrained administrative capacity, and fragile regulatory structures leave SIDS highly exposed to the influence of powerful corporate and state backed actors in this emerging industry. In this context, the legal requirement to sponsor deep-sea mining companies places a disproportionate burden on SIDS, who must assume the liabilities of sponsorship while lacking the leverage to shape outcomes on equal terms. The ongoing negotiations over the Mining Code, which is still incomplete after more than a decade, create a regulatory gap in which key issues such as environmental thresholds, liability, benefit sharing, and enforcement mechanisms remain uncertain. This legal uncertainty disproportionately affects SIDS, who often lack the diplomatic capacity, in-house legal expertise, and scientific infrastructure needed to navigate such emerging governance regimes. In the absence of finalized ISA rules, SIDS are frequently left to negotiate bilateral contracts and joint ventures directly with multinational corporations, most of which have far greater financial resources, legal teams, and technical knowledge. This structural asymmetry increases the risk that SIDS may accept contractual terms that expose them to long-term liabilities or grant excessive influence to companies over national decision-making. == Remittances ==