Situation (seated), 1941 During the time the division had spent in East Africa, the Desert War had progressed and by the time of their arrival in Egypt: • The initial advance by the Italians to the Egypt border had been checked (August 1940), with constant raids being launched across the border fence. The Italians were demoralised and had lost approximately three thousand men against British losses of little more than one hundred. • By September the Italians had attacked and taken
Sollum,
Halfaya Pass, and
Sidi Barrani and dug in around
Sidi Barrani and established several fortified campsin the area, stopping eighty miles west of the British defences at
Mersa Matruh. Severe administrative problems, as well as organizational issues related to integration of the division into the Western Desert Force, caused discontent and eventually lead
Gen. Brink to raise the issues with
Field-Marshal Smuts and the Chief of SA General Staff when they visited
Cairo in early July. Discussions indicated that
Lt-Gen. Sir Alan Cunningham and Wavell were of the opinion that South Africa could not field two divisions for lack of resources. Smuts claimed that the manpower shortages were due to troops being retained for protection duties in East Africa and that a lack of shipping precluded the arrival of a further 3,000 men and he rejected the idea of reducing the South African forces into divisions of two brigade strength, as was recommended by Wavell. In addition, Brink continued to express his displeasure at the fact that the 1st Division was being utilised to construct defensive positions, instead of training in order to prepare for operations. Differences between British and South African administration were becoming more pronounced (and so too were differences between the South Africans and other Commonwealth troops.) The insistence by the Australian government to retain the Australians in the theatre (at
Tobruk at that stage) as a unified corps, caused manpower shortages in other areas in the Western Desert.
Brink feared that the division would be split up and deployed piece-meal to fill these gaps, as had happened in East Africa. His insistence in this regard to
Auchinleck further widened the gap between the South Africans and the Army commander. At the end of October, Brink advised
XXX Corps that 1st Division would not be ready to participate in the preparatory exercise as a prelude to
Crusader and that he required an additional 21 days for training. After consideration by
Cunningham and
Auchinleck, the division was permitted three days for training and was required to be available for the commencement of
Crusader on 18 November, subject to Brink confirming that the division was ready for operations. Brink was faced with the dilemma of either committing untrained troops to battle, or holding back the division and having them replaced by the Indian Division which would invariably relegate the division to defensive duties and a significant loss of prestige to the South Africans. He declared the division "ready" and 1 SA Division was deployed for
Operation Crusader.
Sidi Rezeg: November 1941 This account only reflects the role of the 1st SA Infantry Division.
Operational plan Following the costly failure of
Operation Battleaxe, General
Archibald Wavell was relieved as Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command and replaced by General
Claude Auchinleck. The Western Desert Force was reorganised and renamed the Eighth Army under the command of Lieutenant-General
Alan Cunningham and at this stage, the division comprised only two brigades. The plan for Operation Crusader (See Map 2) was to engage the
Afrika Korps with the
7th Armoured Division while the 1st SA Division and the
22 Guards Brigade covered their left flank. Meanwhile, on their right,
XIII Corps, supported by
4th Armoured Brigade (detached from
7th Armoured Division), would make a clockwise flanking advance west of Sidi Omar and hold position threatening the rear of the line of Axis defensive strongpoints which ran east from Sidi Omar to the coast at
Halfaya. Central to the plan was the destruction of the Axis armour by 7th Armoured Division to allow the relatively lightly armoured XIII Corps to advance north to
Bardia along the coast while
XXX Corps continued northwest to
Tobruk and link up with a planned break-out by the
70th Division.
Advance The division advance commenced at 0600 on 18 November with uneventful progress through the empty desert, save for two air attacks by Italian aircraft (
Point 1 on Map 3). Having steadily advanced northwards, 1 SA Division was advised on 20 November to "mask" Bir el Gubi and to prevent interference from the
Ariete Div into the flank of
7 Armoured Div (
Point 2 on Map 3). El Gubi had now become a lesser objective after the capture of
Sidi Rezeg and early morning on 21 November, the
21st and
15th Panzer had withdrawn to the north-west, not aware of the Allied advance to their south – creating the impression within the division, that the Axis forces had already been defeated. By noon, 22 November, the Sidi Rezeg area was clear of Axis formations but by mid afternoon, German armour launched a violent attack on the area of the airfield. In this attack, 4th Armoured Brigade HQ had been destroyed (captured) and by nightfall, the SA 5th Brigade as well as the
6th New Zealand Brigade had been tasked to hurry in support of
7 Armoured Div at Sidi Rezeg (
Advance 3 on Map 3), with the 5th SA Bde tasked to occupy Point 178, three miles south of Sidi Rezeg. 1st SA Bde was to disengage from the Ariete at Bir el Gubi and to advance in a night march, north in support of the 5th Brigade at Sidi Regez, being relieved by the 22nd Guards Brigade.
Totensonntag By the 23rd, 5th Brigade had joined up with 7 Armoured Div, deploying straight from its advance into the centre of the armoured division area of deployment to the south of the airfield. The 1st SA Brigade was expected later the morning, from its night march from El Gubi. Unbeknownst to the division Rommel's plan was to attack 7 Armoured Division in a frontal assault with the
Afrikakorps and to launch an attack into the rear of 7th Armoured Division with the armoured Ariette Division. The 5th SA Brigade was caught in the middle of this armoured attack. By late morning, the 15th Panzer had launched their attack with 150 tanks aimed to link up with the Ariette Division and panzers were cutting through the rear of 7th Armoured Division into the support B Echelons. 5th SA Brigade had most of their transport and supplies destroyed in this action, but did destroy a number of German tanks. After destroying significant logistical elements the 15th Panzer withdrew so as to by-pass the 7 Armoured Division / 5th SA Brigade positions and to engineer a link-up with the Ariette Division. They achieved this by 1235 and
Gen Crüwell prepared for a decisive attack on the Allied armour. Advance elements of the 1st SA Brigade had now met elements of 5 Brigade, but the brigades never physically linked up. By 1315 a major tank battle was underway between Axis forces and 7 Armoured Division. At 1555 1st SA Division were passing a signal to 5 SA Brigade when the brigade interjected "wait....." Those were the last words received from the 5th SA Infantry Brigade. Some units retained some form of unity and managed to escape east through the New Zealand and Indian fronts. Against the German tanks, the South African infantry had no real means of defence with limited Anti-Tank capabilities, they were compelled to use 25-pounders in a direct fire role. By the time the panzers had broken into the rear of the brigade, the artillery had been subdued and all anti-tank capabilities had been destroyed. By nightfall, all that remained of 5 SA Brigade was "...little groups of disconsolate prisoners.....between frequent flares and the light of burning ammunition." "The 5th SA Brigade had been caught by an overwhelming force in the open desert, quite unprepared and without inflicting any negligible damage on its opponents." The battle had resulted in a victory for the
Afrikakorps, but the 7th Armoured and 1st South African Divisions had not been annihilated and the loss of the 5th SA Brigade was not enough to set off the loss of almost 50% of the
Afrikakorps tanks which went into battle. At 0100 on 24 November, Brink reported to XXX Corps that 5th SA Brigade had "ceased to exist as a fighting formation".
Aftermath s after the Sidi Rezeg battle. Having failed to link up with 5 SA Brigade, 1st Brigade withdrew south to Bir Taieb el Esem and commenced to establish a strong-point to effect its own defence. Between 24 and 26 November, elements of the 1st SA Brigade were deployed north east in attempts to support the
New Zealand Division in their assault on Tobruk. Attempts to join up with the New Zealanders were repeatedly blocked (at one stage
Gen Norrie himself lead a combat group from the SA Brigade) by Axis actions. On the 24th, 1st SA Brigade was attacked by the
Ariete Armoured Division at Taib el Esem and were able to extricate themselves only after assistance from Gatehouse and the 4th Armoured Brigade. The same day, Rommel committed himself to a "dash for the wire" with the intention of exploiting the disorganisation and confusion in the enemy's bases and cutting their supply lines. The Germans attacked towards Egypt to relieve his garrisons at
Bardia and Sollum. The advance came on a route that took the Afrikakorps in succession through the headquarters of
XXX Corps,
7th Armoured Division, 1st SA Division,
7th Support Group and
7th Armoured Brigade. By 1145 General Norrie stated that the "Matruh Stakes" had officially started as 8th Army A and B Echelons hurriedly withdrew east (
Point 5 Map 3). of Sidi Regez on 29 and 30 November. But the pressure was too great and an eastward withdrawal was inevitable. Finally, the Afrikakorps stalled as it outran its supplies and met stiffening resistance. By early December, Rommel had withdrawn to a line of defences west of Tobruk at Gazala, and the division occupied defensive positions at
Mersa Matruh. After the Sidi Regez battles, the division brigades were deployed in various offensive and defensive roles from
Mersa Matruh, of which the following are noteworthy: • The
Imperial Light Horse found an unprotected Axis tank repair depot on 9 December and their attack resulted in the destruction of 38 tanks (Five Mk IVs, 26 Mk IIIs and five Mk Is); • On 18 December 2 company of the 3rd Recce Bn of the armoured car regiment in cooperation with the
4/11 Sikhs destroyed 12
Ju 52 transports on the ground and took 300 prisoners and captured five 88 mm AA guns when they attacked an airfield at
Derna. Following the disaster there was a dire need to determine the cause of the 5 SA Brigade's defeat and to prevent it from happening again. Brink argued of the futility of sending infantry against armour but suggested that the task of the infantryman was to follow in the wake of armoured spearheads. The tactics he suggested in the wake of the 1 Division's defeat were taught in South Africa for the following twenty years.
Preparing defences at Gazala and change of command . Assumed command of the division on 10 March 1942 By New Year, the 5th Brigade was re-forming at Mersa Matruh and the 2nd Brigade was earmarked for deployment to Tobruk and the 1st Brigade was to be deployed on operations outside of the division structure. The question re-arose, as to whether South Africa was capable of maintaining the division in the field. By 8 January 1942, the division was 5,570 men under-strength of the approved establishment of 23,187. On 25 January the 1st Brigade was deployed to Tobruk, tasked to fight a delaying action with the
38th Indian Infantry Brigade against the Axis who had by now started a new advance from Msus.
Auchinleck recommended to
Ritchie that the forthcoming battle was to be fought west of Tobruk, and not on the frontier. For this reason, 2nd Brigade was also moved forward to support the 1st. On 10 March, Brink injured his back and was evacuated back to South Africa he was replaced by
Dan Pienaar from the 1st Brigade, who had now been promoted to Maj-General. On 26 May 1942, in his Order of the Day,
Gen Pienaar warned the division (now, for the first time deployed with all three brigades under Division command) of an impending attack – directly aimed at their front.
Gazala: May 1942 This account only reflects the role of the 1st SA Infantry Division.
"The Cauldron" Rommel's advance, containing at least 10,000 vehicles was headed south, to make a long sweeping right-hook around the southern end of the Allied line. The
Afrika Korps diary speaks of a bright moonlit night where they advanced without having any contact with the enemy. However the 4th SA Armoured Car Regiment had been tracking their advance and reporting the progress three to four times per hour. Three days armoured fighting ensued in the area of the Cauldron. To better secure his positions, Rommel then drove two Italian formations directly west, through the Allied minefields to re-establish his supply channels. All this time, opposite the 1st SA Division positions to the north of the Gazala Line, the German 15th Rifle Brigade (
Brigade Stab zbv (mot) 15), and the Italian
Sabratha and
Trento Divisions remained quiet. By 12 June, the remaining Free French had been forced to withdraw from
Bir Hakeim. At Bir el Hatmat, Rommel had dispersed the tactical HQs of the two British Divisions as well as the HQs of the
9th and
10th Indian Infantry Brigades and other smaller units and the
22nd Armoured Brigade had been forced from the battlefield by renewed attacks from 15th Panzer. In "The Cauldron", three Indian infantry battalions, a reconnaissance regiment and four artillery regiments had been virtually destroyed. On the day before, Axis forces had pushed towards El Adem and had forced the
201st Guards Brigade to withdraw from the Knightsbridge Box on the Gazala Line back to the
Tobruk perimeter. On the 14th, Auchinlek authorised Ritchie to withdraw from the Gazala line and the 1st SA and the
50th Northumbrian Divisions were ordered to withdraw along the coastal road back towards Tobruk.
Retreat While the 1st SA and 50th Divisions were preparing for their withdrawal on the
Via Balbia, Axis forces were wreaking havoc on the escarpment amongst Allied forces and Rommel directed his
170mm guns to open fire from the escarpment down onto the Via Balbia as the South Africans and British were destroying their ammunition dumps in the Gazala Line Rommel tasked 15th and 21st Panzer with breaking north and severing the
Via Balbia close to Elwet et Tamar, cutting off the two Divisions to the west. The 21st and 15th Panzer attacks forced the 1st SA Division to fight a rearguard action and to withdraw through each of the respective boxes well into the night. Chased by Axis tanks, driving east on the Via Balbia, the first elements reached
Tobruk during the night of 13/14 June. The division was now spread out between the original Gazala defences and Tobruk, as each element tried to make their way east.
Gazala Gallop By 1400 on 15 June, 1st SA Division and elements of the
50th Northumbian Division were close to Gambut, headed towards the Egypt frontier. At the same time, Ritchie had ordered the balance of Eighth Army to withdraw to the defensive positions at Mersa Matruh, some 100 miles east of the frontier, leaving Tobruk to hold out and threaten the Axis lines of communication in much the same way as in 1941 This became known as the
Gazala Gallop. At dawn on 21 June, the Tobruk Garrison surrendered to the Axis forces. On the same day, 1st SA Division were ordered to withdraw a further 220 miles east, to El Alamein.
First Battle of El Alamein: July 1942 Having arrived back from the Gazala Line, the division spent two weeks improving defences on the El Alamein defences in the "Alamein Box". Auchenlik had issued an order instructing all surplus personnel to be sent back to the Delta, which greatly displeased Pienaar. The division had been deploying two brigades of infantry, each accompanied by a battery of artillery to protect the areas west and south of the defensive box. Auchinlecks order effectively meant that Pienaar could only hold the box with one under-strength brigade At 0605 Axis transports were seen advancing to within 2,000 yards of the 3rd Brigade positions and they were engaged with machine and anti-tank gun fire from the
Imperial Light Horse. During the early morning hours, the 90th Light had lost direction and veered too far north, resulting in the clash with ILH. The 90th Light only managing to extricate themselves under cover of a dust storm later in the day.
Cracks Widen Cracks and fissures had again become visible between the 1st SA Div and the Army command. 1st SA Brigade had been deployed on the flank, on Ruweisat Ridge and by this time they had become somewhat isolated during the previous days fighting and the Allied bombing missions of the previous night. Auchinleck deployed the 9th Australian Division to re-enforce the northern sector of the line held by the South Africans three days later. Pienaar had also been falsely accused of supporting the retreat to the Delta and engaging the Axis from behind the Suez Canal – he remained resolved to fight, stating to an American war correspondent at Alam Halfa in July 1942 "....Here I stop, I've retreated far enough, whether we hold the damn thing or not!"
Alam Halfa: August 1942 Rommel launched one more assault on 31 August, aimed at Alam el Halfa ridge. The division responded by launching a number of successful raids at the enemy forces after last light, once they had stopped their advance for the night on 31 August. By noon on 1 September, 15th Panzer were immobilised by lack of fuel south of Alam Halfa. Pienaar re-organised the division to occupy the positions with one brigade and released two brigades as part of "battle groups" to act against the immobilised Axis division. The report that these forces were available was not welcomed at Corps and Army headquarters, and these mobile formations were not used. After the counter-attack was eventually organised, the Axis had already started to withdraw and fighting was broken off on 7 September.
Second Battle of El Alamein: October 1942 Battle plan For what was to become the final South African assault on the Axis forces (
Operation Lightfoot), the division was tasked attack on a two-brigade front to secure the southern end of Mieiriya Ridge. The Indian 4th and Northumbrian 50th Divisions were deployed to their south and to the north, was the 2nd New Zealand Division. The South Africans were to attack towards the south west with 2nd SA Infantry Brigade (Brig. W.H.E. Poole) on the right and 3rd SA Infantry Brigade (Brig. R. Palmer) on the left. 1st SA Infantry Brigade was deployed further south and was responsible for creating an anti-tank screen to protect the left flank of the South African attack (See Map 4). The Australians and Highlanders were to force a northern corridor through the Axis minefields while the New Zealanders and South Africans were to do the same in the southern sector.
Break-In: Operation Lightfoot Operation Lightfoot started at 2140 on 23 October with a five-hour fire plan, the start of which signified H-Hour for the infantry assault. Pienaar had deployed each of the lead brigades, with on battalion leading for the first phase to the "red line" after a pause of an hour and a quarter, the two trailing battalions would pass through to the final objective on Miteiriya Ridge. 1st Brigade who was not part of the main advance was provided with a special force of armoured cars, machine guns and anti-tank guns to guard their and the division's left flank (Refer Map 4). They were also allocated a mobile element of the 8th Royal Tanks. The divisional artillery, reinforced by three troops from X Corps was to fire a fire-plan of timed concentrations – using smoke on the intermediate and final objectives to cover re-organisation and to help with direction finding. The two South African brigades advanced with
40mm Bofors guns marking the lines of advance between the respective battalions The
Cape Town Highlanders were the last battalion to reach their individual unit objectives on Oxalic – and were established on Miteiriya Ridge by 0800 the following morning. The fact that the 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions had not broken through into the open areas west of the line as originally planned, meant that
Montgomery had to change his orders – moving to an attritional World War I type of battle, which Montgomery in a semblance of a novelty – dubbed "Crumbling Actions." By the evening of 26 October (as from the H-Hour on the 23rd), the South Africans had suffered 600 casualties, as compared to 2,000 in the 51st Division, 1,000 Australians and a similar number of New Zealanders.
"Crumbling Operations" During the night of 25/26 October, some South African and other elements which had not yet established themselves on their exact Oxalic objectives, made corrective moves and by dawn the entire XXX Corps was finally in their initial phase objectives. The Australians and the 1st Armoured Division had launched attacks in the north, being the start of the "crumbling" process, while at the same time, there was much re-organisation and re-deployment to the south. On 26 October
Leese issued orders for the 1st SA Division to "side-step" north in conjunction with a similar move by the 4th Indian Division and to extend their lines to occupy the area held by the
New Zealand Division and the
9th Armoured Brigade. Once this move was completed, these relieved units were to be withdrawn into reserve. During the order group to issue these instructions, Pienaar again voiced an objection to orders – on the grounds that he had insufficient transport to make the move in the required time.
Freyberg, in a move to "spike his guns" asked Pienaar again, if the only limiting factor was transport? Pienaar confirmed – and when Freyberg offered him transport from the New Zealand Division, no more was heard of the matter and the re-deployment was executed. The South Africans were now stretched on a wider front, between the Australians and 51st Division in the north and the
Indian 4th Division on Ruweisat Ridge, with 5th SA Brigade on the right, 3rd SA Brigade on its left and 1st SA Brigade being pulled back as the divisional reserve.
Break-Out: Operation Supercharge On the night of 2/3 November, the Australians noticed signs of withdrawal by Axis units in the coastal salient and by 1000 Montgomery had received similar reports from the south. Contrary to Hitler's instructions – Rommel had started to withdraw. The final plan to destroy the Axis forces, code named "Supercharge" was put into action. The 1st SA Division played no role in this phase of the operation – but the South African armoured cars attached to XXX Corps were actively involved in the attempted destruction and subsequent pursuit. At 0540 on 4 November, after repeated attempts at breaking through the Axis lines – Lt-Col Reeves-Moore lead the South African armoured cars into the rear of the Axis positions, "....the eager children of any mechanized pursuit... scampered at dawn into the open desert beyond the mines and trenches and guns, to make their exuberant mischief amid the disintegrating enemy". They soon started causing the havoc for which they had been intended – A Sqn capturing two
88mm guns, two
105 mm guns, two
110mm guns, a
Breda portee, six trucks and 130 prisoners; while B Sqn captured five trucks, a staff car, one
105 mm and one
150 mm gun and 100 prisoners within a matter of hours. ==Disbandment==