Battle of Savo Island

Operations at Guadalcanal On 7 August 1942 Allied forces (primarily U.S. Marines) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Island in the eastern Solomon Islands. The landings were meant to deny the use of these islands to the Japanese as bases, especially the nearly completed airfield that was being constructed on Guadalcanal. If Japanese air and sea forces were allowed to establish forward operating bases in the eastern Solomons, they would be in a position to threaten the critical supply routes between the U.S. and Australia. The Allies also wanted to use the islands as launching points for a campaign to recapture the Solomons, isolate or capture the major Japanese base at Rabaul, and support the Allied New Guinea campaign, which was then building momentum under General Douglas MacArthur. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign. The overall commander of Allied naval forces in the waters around Guadalcanal and Tulagi was U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. He also commanded the carrier task groups providing air cover to Allied forces in the region. U.S. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner commanded the amphibious fleet that delivered 16,000 Allied troops to Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Also under Turner was Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley's screening force of eight cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and five minesweepers. This screening force was tasked with protecting Turner's ships and providing gunfire support for the landings. Crutchley commanded his force of mostly American ships from his flagship, the Australian heavy cruiser . In these air attacks, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, including 14 carrier-based fighter aircraft. Some historians contend that Fletcher's fuel situation was not at all critical but that Fletcher used it to justify a premature withdrawal from the combat zone. Even though the unloading was proceeding more slowly than planned, Turner decided that without carrier air cover, he would have to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal. He planned to unload as much as possible during the night and depart the next day. The Japanese Navy had trained extensively in night-fighting tactics before the war, a fact of which the Allies were unaware. Mikawa hoped to engage the Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the night of 8–9 August when he could employ his night-battle expertise while avoiding attacks from Allied aircraft, which could not operate effectively at night. Mikawa's warships rendezvoused at sea near Cape St. George on the evening of 7 August and then headed east-southeast. ==Battle==

Prelude Mikawa decided to take his fleet north of Buka Island and then down the east coast of Bougainville. The fleet paused east of Kieta for six hours on the morning of 8 August to avoid daytime air attacks during its final approach to Guadalcanal. Mikawa's floatplanes returned around 12:00 and reported two groups of Allied ships, one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi. By 13:00, he reassembled his warships and headed south through Bougainville Strait at . Mikawa entered The Slot by 16:00 and began his run towards Guadalcanal. To protect the unloading transports during the night, Crutchley divided the Allied warships into three groups. A "southern" group, consisting of the Australian cruisers HMAS Australia and , cruiser , and destroyers and , patrolled between Lunga Point and Savo Island to block the entrance between Savo Island and Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal. A "northern" group, consisting of the cruisers , and , and destroyers and , conducted a box-shaped patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo Island to defend the passage between Savo and Florida Islands. An "eastern" group consisting of the cruisers and with destroyers and guarded the eastern entrances to the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal Islands. Wary of the potential threat from Japanese submarines to the transport ships, Crutchley placed his remaining seven destroyers as close-in protection around the two transport anchorages. The crews of the Allied ships were fatigued after two days of constant alert and action in support of the landings. Additionally, the weather was extremely hot and humid, inducing further fatigue and, in Morison's words, "inviting weary sailors to slackness." In response, most of Crutchley's warships went to "Condition II" the night of 8 August, which meant that half the crews were on duty while the other half rested, either in their bunks or near their battle stations. In the evening, Turner called a conference on his flagship off Guadalcanal with Crutchley and Marine commander Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift to discuss the departure of Fletcher's carriers and the resulting withdrawal schedule for the transport ships. At 20:55, Crutchley left the southern group in Australia to attend the conference, leaving Bode in charge of the southern group. Crutchley did not inform the commanders of the other cruiser groups of his absence, contributing further to the dissolution of command arrangements. Bode, awakened from sleep in his cabin, decided not to place his ship in the lead of the southern group of ships, the customary place for the senior ship, and went back to sleep. At the conference, Turner, Crutchley, and Vandegrift discussed the reports of the "seaplane tender" force reported by the Australian Hudson crew earlier that day. They decided that it would not be a threat that night, because seaplane tenders did not normally engage in a surface action. Vandegrift said that he would need to inspect the transport unloading situation at Tulagi before recommending a withdrawal time for the transport ships, and he departed at midnight to conduct the inspection. Crutchley elected not to return with Australia to the southern force but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage, without informing the other Allied ship commanders of his intentions or location. As Mikawa's force neared the Guadalcanal area, the Japanese ships launched three floatplanes for one final reconnaissance of the Allied ships, and to provide illumination by dropping flares during the upcoming battle. Although several of the Allied ships heard and/or observed one or more of these floatplanes, starting at 23:45, none of them interpreted the presence of unknown aircraft in the area as an actionable threat, and no one reported the sightings to Crutchley or Turner. Mikawa's force approached in a single column led by Chōkai, with Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Tenryū, Yūbari, and Yūnagi following. Sometime between 00:44 and 00:54 on 9 August, lookouts in Mikawa's ships spotted Blue about ahead of the Japanese column. Action south of Savo To avoid Blue, Mikawa changed course to pass north of Savo Island. He also ordered his ships to slow to to reduce wakes that might make his ships more visible. Mikawa's lookouts spied either Ralph Talbot about away or a small schooner of unknown nationality. The Japanese ships held their course while pointing more than 50 guns at Blue, ready to open fire at the first indication that Blue had sighted them. When Blue was less than away from Mikawa's force, she reversed course, having reached the end of her patrol track, and steamed away, apparently oblivious to the long column of large Japanese ships sailing past her. Seeing that his ships were still undetected, Mikawa turned back to a course south of Savo Island and increased speed, first to , and then to . At 01:25, Mikawa released his ships to operate independently of his flagship, and at 01:31 he ordered "Every ship attack." At about this time, Yūnagi detached from the Japanese column and reversed direction, perhaps because she lost sight of the other Japanese ships ahead of her, or perhaps because she was ordered to provide a rearguard for Mikawa's force. One minute later, Japanese lookouts sighted a warship to port. This ship was the destroyer , heavily damaged the day before and departing Guadalcanal independently for repairs in Australia. Whether Jarvis sighted the Japanese ships is unknown, since her radios had been destroyed. Furutaka launched torpedoes at Jarvis, which all missed. The Japanese ships passed as close to Jarvis as , close enough for officers on Tenryū to look down onto the destroyer's decks without seeing any of her crew moving about. If Jarvis was aware of the Japanese ships passing by, she did not respond in any noticeable way and was torpedoed and sunk the following day by Japanese aircraft. There were no survivors. After sighting Jarvis, the Japanese lookouts sighted the Allied destroyers and cruisers of the southern force about away, silhouetted by the glow from the still-burning transport George F. Elliott. At about 01:38, the Japanese cruisers began launching salvos of torpedoes at the Allied southern force ships. At this same time, lookouts on Chōkai spotted the ships of the Allied northern force at a range of . Chōkai turned to face this new threat, and the rest of the Japanese column followed, while still preparing to engage the Allied southern force ships with gunfire. Pattersons crew was alert because the destroyer's captain, Frank R. Walker, had heeded earlier daytime sightings of Japanese warships and evening sightings of unknown aircraft. At 01:43, Patterson spotted a ship, probably Kinugasa, dead ahead and immediately sent a warning by radio and signal lamp: "Warning! Warning! Strange ships entering the harbor!" Patterson increased speed to full and fired star shells towards the Japanese column. Her captain ordered a torpedo attack, but his order was not heard over the noise from the destroyer's guns. At about the same moment that Patterson sighted the Japanese ships and went into action, Japanese floatplanes dropped aerial flares directly over Canberra and Chicago. Canberra responded with Captain Frank Getting ordering an increase in speed and a reversal of an initial turn to port, which kept Canberra between the Japanese and the Allied transports, and for her guns to train out and fire at any targets that could be sighted. As Canberras guns took aim at the Japanese, Chōkai and Furutaka opened fire on her, scoring numerous hits. Aoba and Kako joined in with gunfire, and Canberra took up to 24 large-caliber hits. Early hits killed her gunnery officer, mortally wounded Getting, and destroyed both boiler rooms, knocking out power to the entire ship before Canberra could fire any of her guns or communicate a warning to other Allied ships. The cruiser glided to a stop, on fire, with a 5- to 10-degree list to starboard, and unable to fight the fires or pump out flooded compartments due to of lack of power. Since all of the Japanese ships were on the port side of Canberra, the damage to the ship's starboard side occurred either from shells entering low on the port side and exiting below the waterline on the starboard side, or from one or two torpedo hits on the starboard side. The crew of Chicago, observing the illumination of their ship by air-dropped flares and the sudden turn by Canberra in front of them, came alert and awakened Captain Bode. Bode ordered his guns to fire star shells towards the Japanese column, but the shells did not function. At 01:47, a torpedo, probably from Kako, hit Chicagos bow, sending a shock wave throughout the ship that damaged the main battery director. A second torpedo struck Chicago but failed to explode, and a shell hit the cruiser's mainmast, killing two crewmen. Chicago steamed west for 40 minutes,leaving behind the transports she was assigned to protect. The cruiser fired her secondary batteries at the trailing ships in the Japanese column and may have hit Tenryū, causing slight damage. Bode did not try to assert control over any of the other Allied ships in the southern force, of which he was still technically in command. More significantly, Bode made no attempt to warn any of the other Allied ships or personnel in the Guadalcanal area as his ship sailed away from the battle area. Meanwhile, Patterson engaged in a gunnery duel with the Japanese column, receiving a shell hit aft that caused moderate damage and killed 10 crew members. Patterson continued to pursue and fire at the Japanese ships and may have hit Kinugasa, causing moderate damage. Patterson then lost sight of the Japanese column as it headed northeast along the eastern shore of Savo Island. Bagley, whose crew sighted the Japanese shortly after Patterson and Canberra, circled completely around to port before firing torpedoes in the general direction of the rapidly disappearing Japanese column; one or two of which may have hit Canberra. Bagley played no further role in the battle. Yūnagi exchanged non-damaging gunfire with Jarvis before exiting the battle area to the west with the intention of eventually rejoining the Japanese column north and west of Savo Island. At 01:44, as Mikawa's ships headed towards the Allied northern force, Tenryū and Yūbari split from the rest of the Japanese column and took a more westward course. Furutaka, either because of a steering problem, or to avoid a possible collision with Canberra, followed Yūbari and Tenryū. Thus, the Allied northern force was about to be enveloped and attacked from two sides. Action north of Savo When Mikawa's ships attacked the Allied southern force, the captains of all three U.S. northern force cruisers were asleep, with their ships steaming quietly at . Although crewmen on all three ships observed flares or gunfire from the battle south of Savo or else received Pattersons warning of threatening ships entering the area, it took some time for the crews to go from Condition II to full alert. At 01:44, the Japanese cruisers began firing torpedoes at the northern force. At 01:50, they aimed powerful searchlights at the three northern cruisers and opened fire with their guns. Astorias bridge crew called general quarters upon sighting the flares south of Savo, around 01:49. At 01:52, shortly after the Japanese searchlights came on and shells began falling around the ship, Astorias main gun director crews spotted the Japanese cruisers and opened fire. Astorias captain, awakened to find his ship in action, rushed to the bridge and ordered a ceasefire, fearful that his ship might be firing on friendly forces. As shells continued to cascade around his ship, the captain ordered firing resumed less than a minute later. Chōkai had found ''Astoria's range, and the ship was quickly hit by numerous shells and set afire. Between 02:00 and 02:15, Aoba, Kinugasa, and Kako joined Chōkai in pounding Astoria'', destroying the cruiser's engine room and bringing the flaming ship to a halt. At 02:16, one of Astorias remaining operational main gun turrets fired at Kinugasas searchlight but missed and hit one of Chōkais forward turrets, putting the turret out of action and causing moderate damage to the Japanese vessel. Astoria sank later that day at 12:15 after all attempts to save her failed. Quincy had also seen the aircraft flares over the southern ships, received Pattersons warning, had just sounded general quarters and was coming alert when the searchlights from the Japanese column came on. Quincys captain gave the order to commence firing, but the gun crews were not ready. Within a few minutes, Quincy was caught in a crossfire between Aoba, Furutaka, and Tenryū, and was hit heavily and set afire. Quincys captain ordered his cruiser to charge towards the eastern Japanese column, but as she turned to do so Quincy was hit by two torpedoes from Tenryū, causing severe damage. Quincy managed to fire a few main gun salvos, one of which hit Chōkais chart room from Admiral Mikawa and killed or wounded 36 men, although Mikawa was not injured. At 02:10, incoming shells killed or wounded almost all of Quincys bridge crew, including the captain. At 02:16, the cruiser was hit by a torpedo from Aoba, and the ship's remaining guns were silenced. Quincys assistant gunnery officer, sent to the bridge to ask for instructions, reported on what he found: Quincy sank, bow first, at 02:38. Like Quincy and Astoria, Vincennes also sighted the aerial flares to the south, and furthermore, actually sighted gunfire from the southern engagement. At 01:50, when the U.S. cruisers were illuminated by the Japanese searchlights, Vincennes hesitated to open fire, believing that the searchlight's source might be friendly ships. Kako opened fire on Vincennes which responded with her own gunfire at 01:53. As Vincennes began to receive damaging shell hits, her commander, Captain Frederick L. Riefkohl, ordered an increase of speed to , but at 01:55 two torpedoes from Chōkai hit, causing heavy damage. Kinugasa joined Kako in pounding Vincennes. Vincennes scored one hit on Kinugasa causing moderate damage to her steering engines. The rest of the Japanese ships also fired and hit Vincennes up to 74 times, and at 02:03 was struck by another torpedo, this time from Yūbari. With all boiler rooms destroyed, Vincennes came to a halt, burning "everywhere" and listing to port. At 02:16, Riefkohl ordered the crew to abandon ship, and Vincennes sank at 02:50. During the engagement, the U.S. destroyers Helm and Wilson struggled to see the Japanese ships. Both destroyers briefly fired at Mikawa's cruisers but caused no damage and received no damage to themselves. At 02:16, the Japanese columns ceased fire on the northern Allied force as they moved out of range around the north side of Savo Island. Ralph Talbot encountered Furutaka, Tenryū, and Yūbari as they cleared Savo Island. The Japanese ships fixed Ralph Talbot with searchlights and hit her several times with gunfire, causing heavy damage, but Ralph Talbot escaped into a nearby rain squall, and the Japanese ships left her behind. Mikawa's decision At 02:16 Mikawa conferred with his staff about whether they should turn to continue the battle with the surviving Allied warships and try to sink the Allied transports in the two anchorages. Several factors influenced his ultimate decision to withdraw. His ships were scattered and would take some time to regroup. Additionally, his ships would need to reload their torpedo tubes, a labor-intensive task that would consume valuable time. Mikawa also did not know the number and locations of any remaining Allied warships, and his ships had expended much of their ammunition. More importantly, Mikawa had no air cover and believed that U.S. aircraft carriers were in the area. Mikawa was probably aware that the Japanese Navy had no more heavy cruisers in production and thus would be unable to replace any he might lose to air attack the next day if he remained near Guadalcanal. He was unaware that the U.S. carriers had withdrawn from the combat zone and would not be a threat the next day. Although several of Mikawa's staff urged an attack on the Allied transports, the ultimate consensus was to withdraw from the battle area. Therefore, at 02:20, Mikawa ordered his ships to retire. ==Aftermath==

Allied At 04:00 on 9 August, Patterson came alongside Canberra to assist the cruiser in fighting her fires. By 05:00, it appeared that the fires were almost under control, but Turner, who at this time intended to withdraw all Allied ships by 06:30, ordered the ship to be scuttled if she was not able to accompany the fleet. After the survivors were removed, the destroyers and sank Canberra, which took some 300 shells and five torpedoes. returning to Guadalcanal only to be sunk in the engagement off Battle of Rennell Island on January 30, 1943. Japanese In the late evening of 9 August, Mikawa on Chōkai released the four cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 to return to their home base at Kavieng. At 08:10 on 10 August, Kako was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine from her destination. The other three Japanese cruisers picked up all but 71 of her crew and continued on to Kavieng. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto signaled a congratulatory note to Mikawa on his victory, stating, "Appreciate the courageous and hard fighting of every man of your organization. I expect you to expand your exploits and you will make every effort to support the land forces of the Imperial army which are now engaged in a desperate struggle." Later on, though, when it became apparent that Mikawa had missed an opportunity to destroy the Allied transports, he was intensely criticised by his comrades. ==Tactical result==

From the time of the battle until several months later, almost all Allied supplies and reinforcements sent to Guadalcanal came by transports in small convoys, mainly during daylight hours, while Allied aircraft from the New Hebrides and Henderson Field and any available aircraft carriers flew covering missions. During this time, Allied forces on Guadalcanal received barely enough ammunition and provisions to withstand several intense drives by Japanese ground forces to retake the islands. For several weeks after the naval defeat off Savo Island, Japanese warships maintained command of the sea around Guadalcanal, particularly at night. Japanese naval commanders took advantage of this by carrying out multiple intense shore bombardments of Allied ground forces at Henderson Field well into late fall 1942. Although these bombardments destroyed several Allied aircraft and damaged valuable supply stocks, they ultimately were not enough to facilitate a collapse of the Allied perimeter on the island. Despite their defeat in this battle, the Allies eventually won the larger battle for Guadalcanal, an important step in the defeat of Japan. In hindsight, according to Richard B. Frank, if Mikawa had elected to risk his ships and go after the Allied transports on the morning of 9 August, he could have improved the chances of Japanese victory in the Guadalcanal campaign at its inception, potentially altering the course of the war in the Pacific. Although the Allied warships at Guadalcanal that night were completely routed, the transport fleet remained unaffected. Many of these same transports were later used many times to bring crucial supplies and reinforcements to Allied forces on Guadalcanal over succeeding months. Mikawa's decision not to destroy the Allied transport ships when he had the opportunity proved to be a crucial strategic mistake for the Japanese. ==U.S. Navy board of inquiry==

A formal United States Navy board of inquiry, known as the Hepburn Investigation, prepared a report of the battle. The board interviewed most of the major Allied officers involved over several months, beginning in December 1942. Crutchley was later gazetted with the Legion of Merit (Chief Commander). Admiral Turner assessed why his forces were so soundly defeated in the battle: Historian Frank adds that "This lethargy of mind would not be completely shaken off without some more hard blows to (U.S.) Navy pride around Guadalcanal, but after Savo, the United States picked itself up off the deck and prepared for the most savage combat in its history." During the battle, many ship fires were attributed to aviation facilities filled with gas, oil, and planes. Motorboats were filled with gasoline and also caught fire. In some cases, these facilities were dead amidships, presenting a perfect target for enemy ships at night. Ready-service lockers (lockers containing ammunition that is armed and ready for use) added to the destruction, and it was noted that the lockers were never close to being depleted, i.e., they contained much more dangerous ammunition than they needed to. A focus was put on removing or minimizing flammable amidship materials. ==See also==

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ==Further reading==