Market1996 Mount Everest disaster
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1996 Mount Everest disaster

The 1996 Mount Everest disaster occurred on 10–11 May 1996 when eight climbers were caught in a blizzard and died on Mount Everest while attempting to descend from the summit. Over the season, 12 people died trying to reach the summit, making it then the deadliest season on Mount Everest and now the third deadliest to date after the 23 fatalities from avalanches caused by the April 2015 Nepal earthquake and the 16 fatalities of the 2014 Mount Everest avalanche. The 1996 disaster received widespread publicity, raised questions about the commercialization of Everest, and prompted a never-ending controversy about who and what was at fault for the disaster.

Climbers
The following is a list of climbers en route to the summit on 10 May 1996 via the South Col and Southeast Ridge, organized by expedition and role. All ages are as of 1996. Adventure Consultants The Adventure Consultants' 1996 Everest expedition, led by Rob Hall, consisted of 19 people, including eight clients. GuidesRob Hall (35) (New Zealand) – expedition leader; died near the South SummitMichael Groom (37) (Australia) - professional mountaineer • Andy Harris (31) (New Zealand) – disappeared near the South Summit while assisting Hall Clients • Frank Fischbeck (53) (Hong Kong) – had attempted Everest three times and reached the South Summit in 1994 • Doug Hansen (46) (USA) – had previously attempted Everest with Hall's team in 1995; disappeared near the South Summit while descending with Hall • Stuart Hutchison (34) (Canada) – youngest client on Hall's team; previous 8,000 m experiences included K2 winter expedition in 1988, Broad Peak west ridge in 1992, and Everest north side in 1994 • Lou Kasischke (53) (USA) – had climbed six of the Seven SummitsJon Krakauer (42) (USA) – journalist on assignment from Outside magazine; an accomplished technical climber, but had no experience in climbing peaks over 8,000 m • Yasuko Namba (47) (Japan) – had climbed six of the Seven Summits; became the oldest woman to summit Everest at the time; died on the South Col • John Taske (56) (Australia) - oldest climber on the Adventure Consultants team; no 8,000 m experience • Beck Weathers (49) (USA) – had been climbing for 10 years and was also making a bid for the Seven Summits, but had no 8,000 m experience SherpasSardar Ang Dorje (26) • Arita • Chuldum • Kami • Lhakpa Chhiri • Ngawang Norbu • Tenzing The Sherpas listed above were the climbing Sherpas hired by Rob Hall's Adventure Consultants. Many other Sherpas working at lower elevations performed duties vital to the Adventure Consultants and Mountain Madness expeditions. Most climbing Sherpas' duties required them to ascend at least to Camp III or IV, but not all of them to summit. The expedition leaders intended for only a select few of their climbing Sherpas to accompany clients to the summit. Legendary Sardar Apa Sherpa was scheduled to accompany the Adventure Consultants group but withdrew due to family commitments. With the exception of Namba, no client on Hall's team had reached the summit of an 8,000-meter peak, and only Fischbeck, Hansen, and Hutchison had previous high-altitude Himalayan experience. Hall had also brokered a deal with Outside magazine for advertising space in exchange for a story about the growing popularity of commercial expeditions to Everest. Krakauer was originally slated to climb with Scott Fischer's Mountain Madness team, but Hall landed him, at least in part by agreeing to reduce Outsides fee for Krakauer's spot on the expedition to less than cost. Mountain Madness The Mountain Madness 1996 Everest expedition, led by Scott Fischer, consisted of 19 people, including 8 clients. GuidesScott Fischer (40) (USA) – expedition leader; died on the Southeast ridge balcony below the South SummitAnatoli Boukreev (38) (Kazakhstan/Russia)– professional mountaineer • Neal Beidleman (36) (USA)– professional mountaineer Clients • Martin Adams (47) (USA) – had climbed Aconcagua, Denali, and KilimanjaroCharlotte Fox (38) (USA) – had climbed all 53 of the 14,000 ft (4,267 m) peaks in Colorado and two 8,000 m peaks, Gasherbrum II and Cho OyuLene Gammelgaard (35) (Denmark) - an experienced mounaineer • Dale Kruse (45) (USA) – long-term personal friend of Fischer's and the first to sign up for the 1996 expedition • Tim Madsen (33) (USA)– had climbed extensively in the Colorado and Canadian Rockies, but had no 8,000 m experience • Sandy Hill Pittman (41) (USA)– had climbed six of the Seven SummitsPete Schoening (68) (USA)– one of the first to climb Gasherbrum I and Mount Vinson; known for singlehandedly saving the lives of six team members during a mass fall in the American expedition on K2 in 1953 • Klev Schoening (38) (USA) – Pete's nephew and a former US national downhill ski racer; no 8,000 m experience SherpasSardar Lopsang Jangbu Sherpa (23) • "Big" Pemba • Nawang Dorje • Ngawang Sya Kya • Ngawang Tendi • Ngawang Topche (died a few months later from HAPE he contracted during hauling duties to Camp II) • Tashi Tshering • Tendi The Sherpas listed above were the climbing Sherpas hired by Scott Fischer's Mountain Madness expedition. On 9 June 1996, three days after Sherpa Ngawang Topche died in hospital from high-altitude pulmonary edema, a private memorial service was held for Scott Fischer attended by the climbers and Sherpas from Mountain Madness at Kiana Lodge, near Seattle, Washington. The Sherpa chanted a Buddhist prayer, Beidleman gifted his late friend's engraved expedition knife to Fischer's two children, and Jeannie Price, Fischer's wife, released a cloud of butterflies. Taiwanese expedition "Makalu" Gau Ming-ho led a five-member team to Everest on 10 May 1996. The previous day (9 May), Taiwanese team member Chen Yu-Nan had died following a fall on the Lhotse Face. Indo-Tibetan Border Police Half of the climbing team from the Indo-Tibetan Border Police North Col expedition from India (Subedar Tsewang Samanla, Lance Naik Dorje Morup, and Head Constable Tsewang Paljor) died on the Northeast Ridge. ==The plan==
The plan
Hall and Fischer's plan for their clients to summit Everest on 10 May was to leave Camp IV on the South Col at midnight, to reach the summit of Everest about 12:00 p.m. and to descend, reaching Camp IV at about 6 p.m. The time required for the round trip would be eighteen hours. Hall established a turn-around time of 2:00 p.m. (some sources say 1 p.m) at which time all climbers, wherever they were on the mountain, were required to begin their return to Camp IV. Hall said that his decision to descend was "absolute law, beyond appeal." Fischer does not seem to have established a firm turn-around time. Thirty-three climbers departed Camp IV on 10 May to climb upward toward the Everest summit. Twenty of them consisted of Hall's and Fisher's guides and clients and the rest were Sherpas and the Taiwanese climber Makalu. All clients and guides, except Boukreev and a few Sherpas, were required to use supplemental oxygen during the climb. Each client would depart Camp IV, elevation , with two oxygen tanks (weighing each) which at a moderate rate of flow each would each last six hours. At the South Summit, , they would discard their first oxygen bottle and use their second oxygen bottle to summit Everest and return to the South Summit where additional oxygen bottles had been pre-positioned by Sherpas for them. They would use a third bottle for the descent to Camp IV. If they ran out of oxygen before reaching Camp IV, they would begin to suffer the impact of oxygen deprivation. Oxygen was waiting for them at Camp IV after they completed their descent. A rest day or two later, they would leave Camp IV and descend to lower altitudes. Camp IV, at elevation, was at the lower edge of the "death zone" where the body and mind quickly deteriorate due to lack of oxygen in the atmosphere. Hall and Fisher did not have enough bottled oxygen to make a second attempt on Everest from Camp IV if the 10 May attempt failed. They would have to descend to lower elevations from Camp IV and either give up the attempt on Everest or resupply. ==Timeline==
Timeline
Delays reaching the summit Shortly after midnight on 10 May 1996, the Adventure Consultants expedition of three guides and eight clients plus Sherpas began a summit attempt from Camp IV, atop the South Col (). They were joined by six client climbers, three guides, and Sherpas from Scott Fischer's Mountain Madness company, as well as one climber and two Sherpas in an expedition sponsored by the government of Taiwan. The expeditions quickly encountered delays. The climbing Sherpas and guides had not set the fixed ropes by the time the team reached the Balcony (), and this cost the climbers almost an hour. The cause of this delay is unclear, in part due to the death of the expedition leaders. Upon reaching the Hillary Step (), the climbers again discovered that no fixed line had been placed, and they were forced to wait an hour while the guides installed the ropes. Because some 33 climbers were attempting the summit on the same day, and Hall and Fischer had asked their climbers to stay within of each other, there was a bottleneck at the single fixed line at the Hillary Step. Hutchison, Kasischke, and Taske returned towards Camp IV as they feared they would run out of supplementary oxygen due to the delays. Many of the climbers had not yet reached the summit by 14:00, the last safe time to turn around to reach Camp IV before nightfall. Boukreev began his descent to Camp IV at 14:30, having spent nearly 1.5 hours at or near the summit helping others complete the climb. By that time, Hall, Krakauer, Harris, Beidleman, Namba, and Mountain Madness clients Martin Adams and Klev Schoening had reached the summit, When Hall arrived at the scene, the Sherpas offered to take Hansen to the summit, but Hall sent the Sherpas down to assist the other clients, and instructed them to stash oxygen canisters on the route. Hall said he would remain to help Hansen, who had run out of supplementary oxygen. Initially, Boukreev said he was going down with client Martin Adams, According to Boukreev, this plan was discussed with and approved by expedition leader Fischer. Krakauer sharply criticized Boukreev's decision not to use bottled oxygen while employed as a guide. Boukreev's supporters, who include G. Weston DeWalt, co-author of The Climb (1997), state that using bottled oxygen gives a false sense of security. Krakauer and his supporters point out that, without bottled oxygen, Boukreev was unable to directly help his clients descend. The worsening weather began causing difficulties for the descending team members. The blizzard on the southwest face of Everest was reducing visibility, burying the fixed ropes, and obliterating the trail back to Camp IV that the teams had broken on the ascent. Fischer, helped by Lopsang Jangbu Sherpa, was unable to descend below the Balcony () in the storm. Sherpas left Makalu Gau (at by Gau's account) with Fischer and Lopsang when Gau, too, became unable to proceed. Eventually, Lopsang was persuaded by Fischer to descend and leave him and Gau. Boukreev gives 18:00 as "the onset of a blizzard". In 1997 Anatoli Boukreev was awarded the David A. Sowles Memorial Award by the American Alpine Club. The award is the American Alpine Club's highest award for valor in recognition of his rescue of climbers in the 1996 Everest disaster. 11 May In the early morning of 11 May, at 04:43, Hall radioed Base Camp that he was on the South Summit (), confirming that he survived the night. He reported that Harris reached the two men, but Hansen, who was with him since the previous afternoon, was now "gone", and Harris was missing. Hall was not breathing bottled oxygen because his regulator was too choked with ice. Shortly thereafter, he froze to death in his sleep. His body was found on 23 May by Ed Viesturs and fellow mountaineers from the IMAX expedition, but was left there as requested by his wife, who said she thought he was "where he'd liked to have stayed". The bodies of Doug Hansen and Andy Harris have never been found. Viesturs stated in the IMAX film that upon finding Hall's body, he sat down and cried beside his friend. Later in the day, however, Weathers regained consciousness and walked alone under his own power to the camp, surprising everyone there, though he was suffering severe hypothermia and frostbite. Despite receiving oxygen and attempts to rewarm him, Weathers was practically abandoned again the next morning, 12 May, after a storm collapsed his tent overnight and the other survivors again thought he died. Krakauer discovered he was still conscious when the survivors in Camp IV prepared to evacuate. Despite his worsening condition, Weathers could still move mostly under his own power. A rescue team mobilized, hopeful of getting Weathers down the mountain alive. Over the next two days, Weathers was ushered down to Camp II with the assistance of eight healthy climbers from various expeditions and evacuated by a daring high-altitude helicopter rescue, one of the highest ever attempted. He survived and eventually recovered, but lost his nose, right hand, half his right forearm, and the fingers on his left hand to frostbite. The climbing Sherpas located Fischer and Gau on 11 May, but Fischer's condition had deteriorated so much that they were only able to give him palliative care before rescuing Gau. Boukreev made a subsequent rescue attempt but found Fischer's frozen body at around 19:00. Like Weathers, Gau was evacuated by helicopter. ==Causes of the disaster==
Causes of the disaster
for Rob Hall, Andy Harris, Doug Hansen, and Yasuko Namba The disaster was caused by a combination of events, including: • Weather was the primary cause of the disaster. Evidence suggests that the storm starting in the afternoon of 10 May produced temperatures near the summit of Everest of about and wind speeds exceeding 20 meters per second or 45 miles per hour. That converts into a wind chill factor of at least which can cause frostbite to bare skin in two to five minutes. Some climbers and authors have claimed an even colder wind chill factor. Blowing snow reduced visibility to a few feet and the ability to hear and communicate. • Ineffective leadership. • The team leaders and guides did not enforce a turnaround time of 2:00 p.m. Many climbers summitted after 2:00 which, even if the weather had been good, did not give them sufficient time to descend to the relative safety of the South Col and Camp IV before darkness which occurred about 6:45 p.m. • The expedition leaders did not believe that the blizzard, which hit in full force on 11 May, would be preceded by falling temperatures, increasing snowfall, and heavy winds through the late afternoon and evening of 10 May. • A rivalry between Hall and Fischer, who were incentivized for business reasons to get their clients to the summit, leading them to ignore the aforementioned weather forecasts and turnaround times. Moreover, two journalists were on their teams, Jon Krakauer with Hall and Sandy Hill Pittman with Fischer. Their presence put additional pressure on Hall and Fischer to try to assure a successful climb. • Hall and Fischer anticipated a round trip time of not more than eighteen hours from the South Col to the summit of Everest and back to the South Col and allocated three bottles of oxygen to each climber. Only one climber (guide Anatoli Boukreev) made the round trip in less than eighteen hours and all others ran out of oxygen which had the immediate consequences of altitude sickness, confusion, loss of energy, and frostbite. • Bottlenecks at the Balcony and Hillary Step which caused a two hour delay in summiting. The delays were caused mostly by the failure of Hall's and Fischer's teams to secure fixed ropes beforehand, plus the slowness of some clients traversing these difficult spots and the number of people arriving at the bottlenecks at the same time. Thirty-three climbers were attempting to summit Everest on 10 May, the greatest one day total up until that time. Krakauer suggested that the commercialization of climbing Everest allowed otherwise unqualifed climbers to attempt to summit leading to dangeous situations. • Anatoli Boukreev, Scott Fischer's Kazakh/Russian guide, is universally proclaimed a hero and admired for his near-superhuman abilities as a mountaineer. He rescued three climbers during the height of the storm on Everest, but Jon Krakauer and others criticized him. Krakauer said, "There is a world of difference between being a brilliant climber and an able guide." A 1998 article in Salon magazine said: "A guide should, in general, remain with his clients; and Boukreev's failure to carry oxygen made it extremely difficult for him to do that. If Boukreev had carried oxygen, he would likely not have been forced to descend early, and might have been able to save more climbers." Boukreev's defense of himself, detailed below, was that with his experience it was safer not to use oxygen because running out of oxygen would cause a sudden shock to the body. Supplementary oxygen Following the disaster, the use and non-use of supplementary oxygen was the focus of much discussion and analysis, with Boukreev and Sherpa leader Lopsang criticized by Krakauer for not using supplementary oxygen while performing guide duties. Both men gave detailed written explanations as to why they preferred not to use oxygen; both men did in fact carry a bottle on the summit day that could be used if needed in an emergency or extraordinary situation. In his book The Climb, Boukreev shared this explanation with Mark Bryant, the editor of Outside magazine: Beidleman said that Boukreev had brought oxygen to the Balcony but declined to use it, handing the bottle to Beidleman and stating he had “no need.” This contradicted the original plan and Fischer’s directive that guides use oxygen while supporting clients according to Beidleman. While acknowledging Boukreev’s strength and speed as a climber, Beidleman argued that going without oxygen impaired Boukreev’s ability to assist others down from the summit. He suggested that Boukreev didn’t fully recognize his responsibility as a commercial guide, noting the consequences of prioritizing personal style over team safety. Radios There were several issues and problems with radios and their use on summit day. Scott Fischer's Sardar did not have a company-issued radio, but did have a "small yellow" radio that was owned by Sandy Pittman. Rob Hall's team also had an issue with a radio during a discussion over oxygen bottles that caused confusion. Ian Woodall, the leader of a South African team at the South Col, refused to let other groups use his radio after their batteries were depleted during the storm. ==The 1996 season after this disaster==
The 1996 season after this disaster
1996 is statistically curious as the fatality rates on Everest in the 1996 season were statistically lower than normal. The record number of 12 fatalities in the 1996 spring climbing season was 3% of the 398 climbers who had ascended above Base Camp—slightly below the historical average of 3.3% at that time. Additionally, a total of 84 climbers reached the summit that season, giving a fatality-to-summit ratio of 1 to 7—significantly less than the historical average of 1 to 4 prior to 1996. Accounting for the increased volume of climbers in 1996 compared with previous years, the fatality rates on Everest dropped considerably, meaning that 1996 was statistically a safer-than-average year. ==List of fatalities==
List of fatalities
Other fatalities in 1996 The following is a list of the other fatalities during the spring 1996 climbing season on Everest. These deaths were not directly related to the storm or the events of 10–11 May 1996 Everest disaster. • 9 May – Chen Yu-Nan (陳玉男) – from the Taiwanese National Expedition, died after a fall down the Lhotse Face • 19 May – Reinhard Wlasich – Austrian climber, died from a combination of HAPE and HACE at on the Northeast Ridge • 25 May – Bruce Herrod – photojournalist with a South African team, was on the South Col during the 10–11 May storm and reached the summit two weeks later, but died descending the Southeast Ridge • 6 June – Ngawang Topche Sherpa – Nepali Sherpa for Mountain Madness, developed a severe case of HAPE on 22 April while working above Base Camp; died in June in a Kathmandu hospital The following fatalities occurred on Everest during the fall 1996 climbing season. • 25 September – Yves Bouchon – French climber, died in an avalanche at on the southeast route below Camp IV, along with the two Sherpas listed below • 25 September – Lopsang Jangbu Sherpa – Nepalese Sherpa, the same climbing Sardar on the Mountain Madness expedition involved in the May 1996 Everest disaster; died in avalanche • 25 September – Dawa Sherpa – Nepalese Sherpa; died in avalanche In the epilogue to High Exposure, David Breashears describes encountering some of the bodies upon climbing Everest again in May 1997. ==In the media==
In the media
Into Thin Air: Death on Everest (released 9 November 1997) is a made-for-TV movie based on Jon Krakauer's book Into Thin Air: A Personal Account of the Mt. Everest Disaster (1997). The film, directed by Robert Markowitz and written by Robert J. Avrech, tells the story of the 1996 Mount Everest disaster. • The Climb is Anatoli Boukreev's account of the events that unfolded on the mountain. It is also in part a response to Krakauer's book. • The IMAX film Everest (1998) documents the disaster, and the involvement of that film's crew and climbing team in the rescue effort. • The Dark Side of Everest (2003), National Geographic Channel, discusses climbers' motivations, the ethics and challenges involved when climbers encounter trouble at high altitudes, and specific disasters, e.g. the 10–11 May 1996 Mount Everest disaster and Bruce Herrod's death on 25 May 1996. • Remnants of Everest: The 1996 Tragedy (2007; released in the US as Storm over Everest and broadcast on the US PBS-TV series Frontline), is a documentary by director David Breashears), with music composed by Jocelyn Pook. • Seconds from Disaster - Into the Death Zone, 2012 TV documentary. • The events inspired the feature film Everest (2015). • Joby Talbot's opera Everest, based on the events of the disaster, was produced by the Dallas Opera and premiered in 2015. • Beck Weathers' book Left for Dead: My Journey Home from Everest (2000). • Lene Gammelgaard's book ''Climbing High: A Woman's Account of Surviving the Everest Tragedy'' (first published June 9, 1999). • Lou Kasischke's book ''After the Wind: 1996 Everest Tragedy, One Survivor's Story'' (2014). ==See also==
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