Soviet deportations of Chinese people

Origin of Sinophobia Through the Aigun Treaty of 1858 and the Peking Treaty of 1860, Russia acquired the lands north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri from China, since which Russia began to colonise the lands. As a result, the Russian government began to restrict the Chinese economic influence, In the meantime, Chinese diasporas in Russia formed their own communities that circumvented Russian authorities and practised Chinese customs, where crimes also emerged. During the First World War, as the Russian Army High Command claimed that Germany recruited Chinese spies from Manchuria, several thousand Chinese traders were deported from all areas under military rule in 1914. Meanwhile, the Chinese were also banned from entering the empire, despite the Chinese government's neutral stance over the war. However, they suffered from the subsequent civil war in Russia, as they became discriminated against and repressed by multiple parties of the war. For example, the Japanese-backed Semyonov and Kalmykov regimes specifically targeted Chinese businesspeople, rather than their Korean counterparts, for robbery. According to Chinese diplomatic documents, the White Army executed the Chinese they captured and displayed their bodies in public as an act of intimidation. Chinese males were often rounded up and summarily executed. The Red Army was arguably even worse. Undisciplined Red Army soldiers looted and burned ethnic Chinese villages, raped women, killed random Chinese, imprisoned and tortured males of military age and interned women and children. Many junior officers of the Red Army regarded anyone who could not speak Russian as potential spies or foreign agents. Besides, the Allied army randomly searched the belongings of the Chinese workers. They would regard the workers as communists if they thought anything was suspicious and kill them without interrogation. Eventually, among the Chinese workers in Russia, around 50,000 joined the Soviet Red Army, whilst most of the rest returned to China with the help of the Chinese government, the Chinese Red Cross Society and the Chinese trade union in Russia. These groups were co-registered with the Russian and Chinese governments, with their annual reports sent to Beijing and their leaders mandated by Beijing. The Russian government only had limited knowledge regarding the groups' close ties with China. At the same time, the Chinese societies settled disputes within the Chinese community, despite Russian jurisdiction, due to the weak Russian administration in the Far East. Thus, in April 1918, the Chinese government sent the cruiser Hai Yung from Shanghai to Vladivostok. In the following months, the Chinese government rented several passenger ships from China to evacuate its citizens in the region. Evolving Soviet policies After the Russian Civil War, the ruling Communist Party introduced the New Economics Policy, which soon attracted Chinese immigrants back to the Russian Far East where manpower was lacking. Although the Soviet government also migrated 66,202 from Europe to the region, However, this figure could underestimate the local Chinese population, as it did not include the information regarding the seasonal workers from China. At the beginning of Communist rule, the Soviet government tried to flourish the Chinese community by allowing the publication of Chinese newspapers, encouraging the establishment of Chinese trade unions and promoting literacy education among Chinese. However, in 1926, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs resolved to use any means to stop Chinese and Koreans from migrating into Soviet territory, as they were regarded to cause danger to the Soviet Union. Koreans began to be relocated from the Far East, while measures were taken to "squeeze out" the Chinese from the border area. He further proposed that a Korean could take the place of each deported Chinese worker, Thus, after 1926, the Chinese population began to decrease as a result of the Soviet policy to reject foreign labourers, end private business and eliminate crimes in the region. Despite the decreased Chinese population, the Soviet government still considered the East Asians, including Chinese, Japanese and Koreans, as a major threat to the country, especially after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 deepened Japanese threat to the Soviet Union. == Deportation in the 1920s ==

Stalinist collectivisation From 1928 to 1932, as the collectivisation led to significantly increased racial tension; the severe anti-Chinese and anti-Korean sentiments led to a major outflow of the Chinese and Korean population in the region. In the Russian Far East, 7,978 Chinese accounted for 37% of those who owned a property in urban areas. Among the Chinese property owners, there were 2,372 who employed at least one workers. Although most of them only ran small businesses, their properties were all confiscated by the Soviet government amid the socialist transformation. Unlike Koreans in the Soviet Union, the Chinese farmers mostly had their families in China, thus unwilling to work in the Soviet Union permanently. Thus, Soviet inclusion of them in the collectivisation led to their dissatisfaction. Meanwhile, there was a growing concern within the government, as they were unable to control local Chinese. The authority admitted that they had little information about temporary Chinese workers who came to Russia without a legal permit and returned in a similar way. They complained that the Chinese took their profits in Russia out of the country. 1929 Sino-Soviet conflict In May 1929, backed by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government, the army of the Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang raided the and detained Soviet citizens at the consulate, which led to Soviet retaliation by arresting Chinese citizens in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union broke off its diplomatic relations with China on 19 July 1929, with all diplomats recalled or expelled to their home countries. The Soviet Union suspended railway communication and demanded that all Chinese diplomats leave Soviet territory. The Soviet government forced the Chinese to move to Manchuria. Thousands of Chinese in Irkutsk, Chita and Ulan-Ude were arrested due to reasons including breach of local orders and tax evasion. When they were to leave Russia, any Chinese to cross the border with more than 30 rubles in cash will need to pay the surplus to the authority. 1,000 rubles in cash to cross the border would make them arrested, with all the money confiscated. The Chinese were detained in massive numbers according to the Shanghai-based newspaper Shen Bao. on 24 July 1929, the newspaper said, "around a thousand Chinese who lived in Vladivostok were detained by the Soviet authority. They were all said to be bourgeoisie." On 12 August, the newspaper stated that there were still 1,600-1,700 Chinese in jail in Vladivostok, and that each of them was provided with a piece of rye bread daily and underwent various tortures. On 26 August, the newspaper continued that the detained Chinese in Khabarovsk only had a bread soup for meal daily, among which a lot of people had hanged them due to unbearable starvation. On 14 September, the newspaper stated that another thousand Chinese in Vladivostok were arrested, with almost no Chinese left in the city. On 15 September, the newspaper continued that Vladivostok had arrested more than 1,000 Chinese during 8–9 September and that there were estimated to be more than 7,000 Chinese in jail in the city. On 21 September, the newspaper said, "the Government in the Russian Far East cheated the arrested Chinese, and forced them to construct the railway between Heihe and Khabarovsk. The forced workers only had two pieces of rye bread to eat daily. If they worked with any delay, they would be whipped, making them at the edge of living and dead." Although after signing the 1929 Khabarovsk Protocol which settled the issues regarding the 1929 Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet Government released most arrested Chinese, considering that the Chinese had been severely tortured by the Soviet Government, that the confiscated possessions the Chinese were not returned, and difficult situations among the workers and businessmen, the high prices of goods, and the unaffordable living costs, the released Chinese all returned to China afterwards.The conflict was a turning point in people's lives across the border, which united the Soviet borderland community and turned it against the Chinese. The Soviet Government also began to stop the Chinese from crossing the border after Japan established the client state of Manchukuo in Northeast China. Many Chinese in Russia were from Manchuria; thus, Japan could possibly claim the Chinese in the Russian Far East to be subjects of its client state. == Deportation during 1936–39 ==

Liquidation of Millionka On 17 April 1936, the Soviet Politburo resolved to liquidate Millionka, the Chinatown of Vladivostok. The operation began in May 1936, as the Primorsky Krai NKVD searched and arrested undocumented tenants, criminals and brothel keepers in Millionka, expelling all other Chinese residents from the neighbourhood and confiscating all properties that belonged to Chinese citizens. The actual deportation process did not begin until the middle of September 1937. On 23 October, Kharbintsy, or Harbin Russians, were further listed as a target of the purge after the Polish, the German and the Koreans, as announced by Order 693 of the NKVD. On 10 November, the Republic of China Consulate in Chita reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Soviet was migrating 30,000 Europeans to Siberia and the Far East monthly to strengthen defence and economic construction in the region. The consulate further reported that to save space for the European migrants and to avoid Chinese or Korean collusion with Japan and Manchukuo, the Soviet government enforced the policy to remove Koreans and Chinese. However, the Chinese government did not pay much attention to this information due to the war with Japan. The first ciphered telegram was sent from Ezhov (head of the NKVD) to Liushkov on 22 December, but the actual Soviet Chinese deportation began on 26 December 1937, when the state issued a formal NKVD deportation order, number 62833. NKVD Operation 62833 began in Millionka, Vladivostok, Russia. Also, the Soviet accusations of the Chinese often did not hold true. For example, there was a deaf, blind Chinese miner accused by the Soviet authority of being a spy. A Chinese business named Huang Nanbo was arrested for speaking Russian. On 31 January 1938, the Soviet Politburo decided to continue its suppression of ethnic minorities and added a separate Chinese line. As a result, massive arrests of Chinese became nationwide and began to occur where massive arrests had not taken place. On 22 February 1938, the Chinese Consulate in Khabarovsk reported another hundred innocent Chinese arrested during the previous night by NKVD and that it was heard that previously arrested Chinese were forced to work in those remote, cold areas. On 2 March, the Chinese Consulate in Vladivostok reported, "the Soviet authority searched for the Chinese day and night, arresting the Chinese even when they were at work. The Soviet was so aggressive that there was no space for any concession. The deeds were as brutal as the exclusion of China in 1900, during which many were drowned in the Heilongjiang River. Recalling the miserable history makes people tremble with fear." After times of massive arrests, there were only more than a thousand Chinese in Vladivostok. The Soviet authority stopped the search and detention for a month. After the Chinese who were sheltered by the Chinese Consulate all left the consulate, the Soviet authority restarted to search and seize the Chinese. As the Soviets had established tremendous checkpoints around the Chinese Consulate, the Chinese were unable to return to the consulate for help, which made almost all the Chinese in Vladivostok arrested. The second and third massive search-and-seizure operation arrested 2,005 and 3,082 Chinese respectively. On 7 May 1938, the Chinese Consulate in Vladivostok reported 7,000—8,000 Chinese in total under detention. The Chinese filled local prisons; the overcrowded prison, plus tortures during interrogation, often caused deaths. Most of the deported Chinese arrived in Xinjiang via Kazakh. According to Liushkov, it was estimated that 200,000 to 250,000 were repressed in the Russian Far East from August 1937 to June 1938, which accounted for at least 8% of the local population, a proportion much higher than for the Soviet Union as a whole. The removal of Chinese and Korean communities in the region also caused an irreparable loss in agriculture, as they were the most productive cultivators of the region. These contributed to the region's inability to fulfil its goal in the five-year plan. ==New Findings in 2025==

An Ethnographic Study: "Battling for Equality" The historian Jon K. Chang has recently published a deep history and thorough account of the Stalinist deportation of the Soviet Chinese based on Western and Russian/Soviet documents, academic literature(s) and oral history work conducted in the former USSR. This study is entitled, "Battling for Equality: East Asians in Imperial and Soviet Russia and the Soviet Chinese Deportation of 1937-39." Chang is also the author of Burnt by the Sun: The Koreans of the Russian Far East. His article demonstrated that some 19,000 Chinese in Russia were deported from 1937 to 1939 from the Russian Far East and Zabaikal regions to Almaty, Kazakhstan and Tashkent, Uzbekistan. After a brief stay in Central Asia, most of the Chinese were deported to Urumchi, China. Three to four thousand Chinese (and their descendants) remained in Almaty, Kazakhstan and in the Central Asia to 1991 according to Maria Kubasova, one of the Chinese survivors of the deportation. Chang spent four to eight months between 2006 and 2020 (approximately twelve years or so) conducting fieldwork and interviews (ethnography) in Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. First, to describe "why" the Soviet Chinese deportation took place is to be set adrift in a sea of "what ifs" and possibilities. The Chinese typically were one of the most difficult groups to assimilate to either Russian or Soviet culture. Soviet society despite its pretensions of "internationalism," socialism, and a dictatorship of the proletariat (all class-based) was very Russian (meaning all three Eastern Slav groups). One should keep in mind, that the ideals and culture of the Decembrists from St. Petersburg were transplanted to Siberia and the Russian Far East. For many Soviet citizens, the Chinese represented one of the most "alien" yet intelligent "nations" ever in the USSR. This term is used in regards to culture (of the ethnic group), cultural gap, differences in worldviews, individual relations, and lastly, this question, "Were the Chinese given enough time, opportunities and resources to assimilate?" All of these are question marks, and undoubtedly, some Soviet Chinese had their difficulties with all of the aforementioned. Many (if not most) Chinese impressed others with their intellect, work ethic and especially, their ability improvisational talents at work (that is, to see the "thing" in a new light and make a few wonderful, minor adjustments). But one thing is certain, the Soviet Chinese deportation was undertaken based on security fears as well as criminality. E.N. Chernolutskaia wrote, "However with the Chinese in the Far East appeared some problems with banditry, opium smoking and the sale of narcotics, the running of drug dens, contraband, espionage and secret societies... but it remained acute even after the revolution, which was the reason Stalin deported the Chinese from the Primor'e during the period of growing Japanese aggression in the [Russian] Far East." If one reads "Battling for Equality," they would understand that the element of criminality was unjustly applied to any and all Chinese, whether full or mixed-race, their children and their wives. This is part of the "[ethnic] chauvinism" argument. Millionka and the other vice-ridden areas and redlight districts in reality made up only five to eight percent of the Chinese population. Most of the Chinese women and men were simply too busy to waste time gambling or consorting with a prostitute in tandem with gambling and or drug use [shooting up opium and heroin]. This is where the Soviets overplayed their hand regarding Chinese criminality and licentiousness. However, these is no doubt that the Chinese were considered quite "alien" to Soviet socialism. Theirs was the first and the last Soviet deportation where the majority of deportees were exiled outside the USSR and for criminality. Let us now examine the primary factors which influenced the USSR to deport the Soviet Koreans and Chinese in 1937-39 were those of ethnic chauvinism (шовинизм in Russian which translates to racism), Russian nationalism(s) and nativist/populist sentiments. This was demonstrated in Tsarist Russian and Soviet policy statements issued by P.F. Unterberger, Aleksei Kuropatkin, Comrade Geitsman of the NKID (the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs), and Vladimir K. Arsenev. Arsen’ev gave a speech from his paper to Dalbureau (the CP leadership committee) in both 1928 and 1934. After Arsen’ev's 1934, Dalbureau elected to deport the Korean beginning with a partial deportation in 1935. There should be further explanation to why this is important. Pravda is claiming that Japanese spies have infiltrated the RFE to resemble RFE Koreans and Chinese in every single one of their most common occupations. This was written and or edited by Stalin. Yet at the same time, the Soviet state leader, General Secretary Stalin and his NKVD chief (there were two during the Great Terror. Iagoda and then Ezhov) are utilizing large numbers (over 400) during the late 1930s in intelligence missions abroad to defend the USSR and its borders. While overseas, the Soviet state would have very little control over its agents. How can this be possible? This is because the deportations were based on prejudice and the Soviet state under Stalin wanted to "center" or focus its policies, politics and society around Russians and Russian culture. Stalin wanted to terminate the USSR's Leninist policies of korenizatsiia, internationalism (that is equality for all Soviet peoples and nationalities) and the bugaboo of "Great Russian chauvinism" because he felt that these politics were divisive and made the USSR weak. To the right is a Soviet photo of Van In Zun. By 1937, Van was the highest ranking Soviet Chinese in the NKVD. He generally is credited as the (Chinese) leader of the Chinese NKVD regiments who helped carry out the Chinese deportation. "Russian" NKVD also participated in the Chinese deportation. Anastasiia Kivalova (a relative of Van) wrote a short biography of Van In Zun in 2021 (Van is the Russian transliteration of the surname Wang). There are many touching photographs of Van and his daughter, Maia in the book. Chang included a short biography of Van. Another photo on this page is of four Soviet Koreans who participated in the 1929 Sino-Soviet War. Note that in the photo, two of the Korean wear OGPU uniforms (Soviet secret police) while the remaining two are wearing Soviet Red Army uniforms. The four Koreans had come back to Nikolsk-Ussuriisk in late 1929 (at the end of the war) to take the photo together. Sergei M. Lenintsev, who was a Chinese OGPU officer also served in the 1929 War serving under Vasilii Bliukher interrogating Chinese prisoners of war. From April 23 to July 10, 1937, the Soviet newspaper Pravda ran four articles insinuating that in every single occupation where there were Chinese and Koreans in the Russian Far East, one would find a Japanese espionage point or vector. Arsen’ev in his speech of 1928 and 1934 argued that the Soviet East Asians (Soviet Koreans and Chinese only) were distinctly non-communist by their race as judged by him using the sciences of anthropology, ethnography and psychology. He stated in the speech to Dalbureau: They are anthropologically, ethnographically, psychologically and by their own world views, they remain closer to the Japanese than to us. Believing that the Koreans will soon turn into Soviet citizens will never occur. We should never wait for them to change their convictions, character, and world view. With our close relations with the residents of Manchuria and Korea, the fulfillment of danger comes closer and closer to being realized with Koreans and Chinese in our borders. This was a Soviet continuation of the “yellow peril” trope because the Soviet Chinese and Koreans were distinctly part of the Soviet proletariat and peasantry if judged by social class. Chang's article represents one of the most complete research studies ever on the Soviet Chinese and their deportation. ==Erasing East Asians from the RFE==

This is a section related to the Chinese deportation of 1937-39. We begin with Russian and Soviet historiography intentionally erasing the histories and contributions of the Chinese and Koreans to the Russian Far East (abbreviated as RFE). The Russian historian, Semyon D. Anosov wrote, “In the 17th century, the Manchu-Tungus tribes living in the region were conquered by China and deported. Since then, the region has been deserted.” Kim Syn Khva, a Soviet Korean historian and author of Essays on the History of the Soviet Koreans [очерки по историй Советских корейтсев], wrote, "The first Korean migrants appeared in the southern Ussuri region when secretly 13 families came here fleeing Korea from unbearable poverty and famine." This migration occurred in 1863. However, Chang found Western sources, most notably Ernst G. Ravenstein's The Russians on the Amur and J.M. Tronson's Personal Narrative of a Voyage to Japan, Kamtschatka, Siberia, Tartary, and Various Parts of Coast of China: In H.M.S. Barracouta, which detailed Chinese, Korean and Manchu settlements from Ternei to Vladivostok and Poset before 1863 (see small map below). Some of these Chinese and Korean settlements and settlers were remnants from the Bohai/Parhae kingdom (which ended in 926 AD). Parhae was a Korean and Manchu polity. Both Ravenstein (1856-60) and Tronson (1854-56) explored the Russian Far East before 1860. Ravenstein's account is much more accurate and full of ethnographic details. At the very least, he noticed the differences between Koreans and Chinese versus the Manchus. The former prepared and sold trepangs according to Ravenstein. They (Chinese and Koreans) also raised crops and cattle and lived in small villages and settlements among their co-ethnics. Ravenstein was a German geographer, cartographer and ethnographer of some note. Tronson's account called all of the East Asians whether Chinese, Korean, Manchu or Tungusic peoples "Mantchu-Tartars." Chang also interviewed an elderly Soviet Korean grandmother in 2008, named Soon-Ok Li. Ms. Li stated that, "No one came from Korea. We have always lived in Vondo [the Korean name for the Russian Far East]. Even my grandparents [Ms. Li was born in 1928] were born here." Returning to the geographer, Ravenstein, he found Chinese and Korean settlements, settlers and criminals in the RFE from Ternei Bay to Poset, Russia (from 1854 to 1860). Ravenstein noted that it was the Koreans and Chinese who fished for trepangs (sea cucumbers) and then dried and salted them as an expensive delicacy to be sold in Korea, Japan and China. He did not find the Tungus nor Manchus harvesting the trepang. Ravenstein and Tronson's accounts refute the Soviet historians who maintain that the Russian Far East (previously was known as Outer Manchuria prior to 1858) was devoid of Chinese and Koreans before 1863. Chang estimates that there were ten thousand Chinese and four to five thousand Koreans in the region during the 19th century. There might have been more than this number as well. The Qing had sent many of its political prisoners and criminals to exile in Manchuria beginning in 1644. This included all of the ethnic groups in China including Koreans. Perhaps, the Han dynasties prior to the Qing did so as well. Chinese reactions to deportation On 10 January 1938, Yu Ming, Charge-D of the Chinese embassy in Moscow lodged representations to the Soviet Union, urging the authority to release the Chinese. The Chinese request to meet the chief officer of the Department of the Far East of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on the following day was declined by the officer who claimed to be sick. On 13 January, some Chinese reported to Chinese consulates in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk that the detained Chinese were starving and even tortured to death, yet the NKDA reject any meeting or food donation by the Chinese consulates. On 28 January, the Chinese Consulate in Vladivostok reported to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "how could we believe that (the Soviet authority) said the Chinese all committed espionage!" On 14 February, the Chinese Consulate in Vladivostok reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "the Soviets robbed everything, especially money and possessions; if they were hidden somewhere, the Chinese would be extorted by torture, and numerous people were killed by such detention, which was miserable and harsh to an extreme." On 17 February, the Chinese Consulate in Khabarovsk protested against the tortures during interrogation, calling on the Soviet Union to release arrested Chinese. On 21 February, Hong Kong-based Kung Sheung Daily News re-posted a Japanese coverage of the Soviet brutality against the Chinese, expressing its outrage against the deeds of the Soviet Union.Since 18 April 1938, Wang Chonghui, Minister of Foreign Affairs of China's Nationalist Government, and Ivan Trofimovich, the Soviet Ambassador to China, held a four-day talk over the detention of the Chinese nationals in the Russian Far East. Seven conclusions were made as follows: The details of the policy for implementation were sent from Nikolai Yezhov to Genrikh Lyushkov on the following day. From mid-June to the end of 1938, the deportation continued. Thus, there were few Chinese left in the region in 1939. According to Chinese diplomatic documents, Xinjiang government reports and the Soviet decision to release Chinese who had committed minor offences, there were at least 12,000 Chinese who were deported from the Russian Far East to Xinjiang. On 1 January 1942, the number of ethnic Chinese detained in forced labour camps reached 5,192. == Legacy ==

After the deportation, Millionka became a ghost town. Shop signs were pulled down. Bordellos and all the other businesses had gone. There was no sign that the Chinese had lived in the neighbourhood. For half a century, only Soviet citizens lived in Vladivostok, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As the Chinese labourers and merchants came back to the city since 1992, they were again faced with the old Stalinist suspicions of outsiders and racial tension. On 8 June 2010, corpses of Chinese people, suspected to be victims of the Great Purge, were re-discovered in Millionka. In recent years, the neighbourhood was branded as Vladivostok's "Arbat" by the local tourist authorities, where there are upscale restaurants and boutique hotels, although there is no mention of the history of the old Chinatown. Today, some villages in Komi are called "Chinatown" because of the Chinese prisoners held during the 1940s and 1950s. == Memorials ==

The human rights group Memorial International kept the records of over 2,000 Chinese victims of Soviet political repression, yet it has been almost impossible to recognise their original Chinese names from Russian scripts. On 30 April 2017, the Last Address set up an inscribed board in memorial of Wang Xi Xiang, a Chinese victim of the Great Purge in the Moscow Office of the International Committee of the Red Cross. ==See also==