Svechin wrote clearly. Despite the clarity of his text, Svechin's approach and positions, were, at the time of the book's publication up until our time often and widely misunderstood. For Svechin, war is only a part of a political conflict. Strategists should not complain about political interference in the leadership of military operations because strategy itself is a projection of politics. The claim that politics is superior to strategy is universal in nature, so it follows that unsound politics are inevitably followed by unsound strategy. since war is not an end in itself but is waged for the purpose of concluding a peace on certain terms. provided the sides are stable enough and possess adequate defensive abilities. The author gives the
Treaty of Versailles as a prime instigator of serious instability across Europe, precisely because the struggle to maintain the status quo proved to be by far the most costly choice: The whole of
Central Europe, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and so forth, was placed in a situation that ruled out completely any possibility of defense and positional warfare. Svechin, writing in the 1920s, goes on to predict the operational
outbreak of the next world war. The central importance of politics in the realm of military strategy promoted by Svechin is reflected in Marxist theoretician
Antonio Gramsci's emphasis on politics
per se as a vital, though largely neglected, aspect of the ideological struggle. Strategy "should be the projection of the general political line of conduct on a military front," argued Svechin. For Gramsci, the concept of the "operation" allows us the bridge the "insurmountable gap" between strategy and tactics at the higher levels of the political struggle, and should inform the actions of the left organizations that pursue the radical transformation of the prevalent social formation.
Preparing the Armed Front Svechin examines in depth the "initial principles" of preparation and militarizion, of the use of
intelligence, and, most extensively, the preparation of the armed front: The building of armed forces, the military & general mobilization, the preparation of operating theatres, and the formulation of operation plans. Stone points out the example of
Condoleezza Rice, who, in her capacity as
Stanford University professor of
political science, was writing, as late as near the end of the 20th century, that Svechin, in his book, was convinced of "the fallacy of operations in depth to achieve decisive victory" and was claiming "the next war would be [one] of attrition." Stone remarks that, in support of this assertion, Rice only cited
Strategy in toto, without specific references to the book's text.
Command On strategic leadership, Svechin emphasizes the need to both give shape to a general staff composed of specialists who are capable of coordinating and harmonizing extensive, diverse, and multi-directional preparations and eliminate the gap between the general staff and line officers. The orienting and goal-setting work of headquarters should naturally proceed at a calm pace. This work would be based also on intelligence, as aspect so important that the most talented member of the leadership must be placed in its charge. He dismisses the notions prevalent in 18th century military education, yet still alive until almost WWI, whereby hesitation was practically not permitted among military men. The notion of initiative itself has led to errors grave and small. Having the initiative does not necessarily mean being on the offensive, yet the perspective of many leaders is distorted by the "mirage of destroying the enemy." True initiative may involve compelling the enemy to attack in conditions that are unfavorable to him. In fact, not every movement forward can be automatically assessed as a strategic offensive. The author deals extensively with the discharge of the high command's strategic duties during the war. While the high command cannot remain "slavishly subordinate to the tactical reality unfolding on the battlefield," there are times when its intervention in operational and tactical details is "absolutely necessary," citing examples from the Prussian army's conduit in 1870 where friction and misunderstanding amongst neighboring armies within a very narrow front had to be avoided through very specific instructions. ==Reception==